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Introduction
Everyday Coexistence in the Post-Ottoman Space
REBECCA BRYANT
In 1974 they started tormenting us, for instance we’d pick our 
apples and they’d come and take them right out of our hands. 
Because we had property we held on as long as we could, we 
didn’t want to leave, but ﬁ nally we were afraid of being killed 
and had to ﬂ ee. … We weren’t able to live there, all night we 
would stand by the windows waiting to see if they were going 
to kill us. … When we went to visit [in 2003, after the check-
points dividing the island opened], they met us with drums as 
though nothing had happened. In any case the older elderly 
people were good, we used to get along with them. We would 
eat and drink together.
—Turkish Cypriot, aged 89, twice displaced from 
a mixed village in Limassol district, Cyprus 
In a sophisticated portrayal of the conﬂ ict in Cyprus in the 1960s, 
Turkish Cypriot director Derviş Zaim’s feature ﬁ lm Shadows and Faces 
(Zaim 2010) shows the degeneration of relations in one mixed village 
into intercommunal violence. Zaim is himself a displaced person, and 
he based his ﬁ lm on his extended family’s experiences of the conﬂ ict and 
on information gathered from oral sources. Like anthropologist Tone 
Bringa’s documentary We Are All Neighbours (Bringa 1993), ﬁ lmed at 
the beginning of the Yugoslav War and showing in real time the division 
of a village into warring factions, Zaim’s ﬁ lm emphasizes the anticipa-
tion of violence and attempts to show that many people, under the right 
circumstances, could become killers. Th e ﬁ lm also shows, however, an 
 aspect of that cycle of violence that I often recorded in interviews with 
Turkish Cypriots displaced during the period: namely, an emphasis on 
fear but also very often the mention of “old people” who tried to hold 
things together.
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Th e epigraph above highlights this, as the speaker, displaced twice 
over the period of a decade, emphasizes that “the older elderly people 
were good, we used to get along with them.” He uses the phrase eski yaşlı 
insanlar, the “older elderly people,” to indicate not relative age today, but 
rather that these were people who were already mature, perhaps in late 
middle age, by the time of the occurrences he describes. In Zaim’s ﬁ lm 
as well, the degeneration into violence is provoked by the actions of a 
few hotheaded youths, even as the older men and women of the village 
try to maintain calm and where possible to use relations or connections 
with police and paramilitaries to prevent the violence from spreading to 
their own streets. Zaim shows how the more mature members of each 
community engaged in everyday forms of diplomacy that wove the fra-
gile quotidian fabric of village life. Similarly, in Bringa’s documentary 
Croatian and Muslim women continue to visit and drink coﬀ ee together 
even as their region is on the brink of war. While Bringa’s documentary 
shows how encroaching violence forces neighbors to take sides, Zaim’s 
historical feature ﬁ lm demonstrates how the devolution into violence 
may be triggered by a few rash actions that create mistrust and hostility 
and rend the fabric of village life.
Moreover, both the epigraph above and the two ﬁ lms make reference 
to commensality, a theme often invoked by those who lived in mixed 
villages. In my own interviews with both Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots who lived in mixed villages, I often heard that “we would eat 
and drink together” or “we attended each other’s weddings” (see Bryant 
2010, 2012; also Argyrou 1996). Since commensality is not mentioned 
in reference to intra-group contact, its invocation already marks this 
as inter-group contact, implying the unexpected or exceptional. In 
this circumstance, the invocation of commensality implies a diﬀ erence 
overcome through the ritual practice of breaking bread. Women visited 
each other for coﬀ ee, though such rituals were circumscribed by prox-
imity and therefore tended to be limited by the composition of neigh-
borhoods. Meals were shared at weddings, and men drank together in 
the coﬀ eehouses, although very few accounts speak of sharing food at 
home, and even more rarely eating together during religious holidays or 
funerals. Indeed, these instances of commensality appear in many cases 
to bear resemblance to the “gastronomic diplomacy” discussed by Cos-
tas Constantinou (1996) as an important method and ritual for keeping 
the peace that has been employed throughout the world and throughout 
human history.
Th e “shared spaces” of the volume’s title are those places where per-
sons of diﬀ erent faiths and ethnic groups lived and worked side by side, 
where they felt under some moral obligation to attend each other’s wed-
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dings and festivals. “Shared spaces” may be religious sites with meaning 
for more than one confessional group; the market, mine, or other site of 
economic activity; or the common space of the mixed village or urban 
neighborhood.
Shared spaces may be characterized by political, economic, or social 
cooperation or antagonism. Th e everyday cooperative practices that 
enable the sharing of space may entail friendship or simple pragmatic 
accommodation. While these were obviously “places” endowed with 
speciﬁ c historical and social meanings to the persons who lived in them, 
we refer to them here as “spaces” to indicate simple geographical close-
ness, where it was precisely the meanings of those spaces as places that 
so often became a source of antagonism and conﬂ ict (see Hayden and 
Bowman this volume). Beginning in the nineteenth century, the spread 
of nationalisms throughout the Ottoman Empire led to everyday ways of 
(re)claiming spaces, through renaming sites and streets, destroying and 
building monuments, and other territorial practices. Th roughout South-
east Europe and the Middle East, many former spaces of interaction are 
now sites of past violence and are marked by the absence of groups who 
had once lived there. Post-Ottoman spaces are today palimpsests of the 
social memory of violence, where persons attempt to live together under 
the shadow of past coexistence and the conﬂ ict that rended it.
We know that coexistence in pre-nationalist Southeast Europe in-
volved more than simply living side by side, and that there were rituals 
of accommodation that simultaneously deﬁ ned and crossed boundaries. 
But we piece together this past from fragments of information, and ones 
that today are heavily laden with the ideological baggage of ongoing 
conﬂ icts—as in cases such as Cyprus—or unresolved histories, such as 
in Bosnia, Turkey, and other case examples included in this volume. In 
such instances, “living together” has signiﬁ cant historical and political 
implications. Ideology, in turn, gives shape to memory, either nostalgi-
cally tinting the past with a rosy glow or painting it as an era of constant 
conﬂ ict.
“Coexistence” is a term that acquires special relevance and meaning 
when it is no longer possible. Th e search for an “Ottoman model” for co-
existence, for instance, begins retrospectively, after the disintegration of 
the empire in the wake of Balkan and Arab nationalisms and the ethnic 
cleansing of Anatolia.1 Similarly for South Asia, where a literature has 
emerged in recent decades that explores the events leading to Partition 
and Hindu-Muslim tensions today that have resulted in periodic riots. 
While these and other similar literatures are in some ways case-speciﬁ c—
for instance, “the riot” as a concept does not exist for the Ottoman and 
post-Ottoman literature2—what they share is an attempt to understand 
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the forces that drive us apart by looking at those forces that in the past 
have held us together. Much as nostalgia emerges from irretrievable loss, 
so “peaceful coexistence” emerges from violence that appears irrepa-
rable. Th is is, no doubt, why discussions of coexistence often struggle 
against the rosy tinge that often envelops nostalgic images of the past.3
If many people in Southeast Europe and the Middle East today mourn 
past pluralism, it is in the wake and under the inﬂ uence of that plural-
ism’s destruction. Th e post-Ottoman space is one where the Ottoman 
millet system that deﬁ ned diﬀ erence along religious lines became the 
basis for the peculiar binding of nationalism and religion in the post-
Ottoman period (see, e.g., Grigoriadis 2012; Leustean 2014; Yosmaoğlu 
2014). It is also a space that experienced the twentieth century’s ﬁ rst 
massive displacement, movement, and exchanges of peoples, as nation-
states attempted to homogenize populations within newly drawn bor-
ders. Th at homogenization was never complete, leaving minority “re-
mainders”—Muslims in Greek Th race, Orthodox and Armenians in 
Turkey—who also served as reminders of the violence that had destroyed 
previous ways of living together and reduced substantial populations 
to non-threatening numbers. Th e post-Ottoman space, then, is deﬁ ned 
both by the legacy of pluralism and by the enduring puzzle of its violent 
dissolution.
As I discuss in more detail below, the multi-religious, multi-ethnic 
Ottoman Empire was a state organized around the management and 
appreciation of diﬀ erence. As a result of these arrangements and their 
violent splintering into nation-states, coexistence has acquired a special 
meaning in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman context to refer to every-
day, horizontal relations among persons belonging to diﬀ erent ethnic or 
confessional groups. One common assumption in the historical litera-
ture is that something that might be called coexistence existed and was 
operative before the divisions produced by nationalist ideologies and na-
tion-state projects. As a result, “coexistence” has become the conceptual 
and historical background against which violence unfolds.
Indeed, much of the literature to date conceptually exploring coexis-
tence within the anthropology of the region has primarily addressed the 
extent to which some form of conﬂ ict was or was not latent in the in-
tercommunal quiet of the pre-nationalist everyday.4 Th e spectrum from 
antagonism to amity has been especially well represented by two con-
tributors to this volume, Robert Hayden and Glenn Bowman. Hayden 
refers to the “robustness of boundaries” between religious groups, seen 
in “diﬀ erences such as in naming, kinship terminology, marital endog-
amy, places and methods of burial, diet, dress, education, and perhaps 
preferred methods of gaining a livelihood” (Hayden and Walker 2013: 
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401). Moreover, in the model of “antagonistic tolerance” that Hayden 
has developed with numerous co-authors, he argues that “there is ‘tol-
erance’ in the Lockean sense, of enduring the presence of the other but 
not embracing it, so long as one group is clearly dominant over others” 
(Ibid.: 402). Hayden claims that such tolerance perdures as long as one 
group has clear dominance over another, and he argues for a longue 
durée perspective that will allow us to situate moments of peaceful in-
teraction within the long-term relations of dominance between groups 
(especially Hayden and Walker 2013; Tanyeri-Erdemir, Hayden, and Er-
demir 2014; Hayden this volume).
Bowman, on the other hand, taking issue with “Hayden’s concept 
of the incommensurability of cultures,” instead stresses “moments of 
apparent amity” (Bowman 2013: 2) and the variety of ways in which 
“boundaries are variously reinforced, opened, and transgressed” (Ibid.: 
13). Bowman emphasizes the porosity of popular religious practice that 
allows it to be suﬀ used with non-orthodox elements, including those 
of other faiths, when they appear to be eﬃ  cacious. While Hayden ar-
gues that Bowman’s work is commensurate with his own thesis in that 
it shows a recognition of religious diﬀ erence and is synchronic but may 
change over time (see Hayden this volume), Bowman views their posi-
tions as fundamentally incompatible. Indeed, in this debate, those who 
take the stronger “diﬀ erence” position and see quotidian antagonism 
have been equated with identitarian, nationalist ideologues, or the “clash 
of civilizations” perspective,5 while those who make arguments for the 
importance of commonalities are often accused of wishful thinking, of 
projecting their own desires onto the pasts of others.6 Th is debate is rep-
resentative of a continuing conceptual deadlock within the literature re-
garding what diﬀ erence has meant in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman 
contexts.
Moreover, at least three methodological problems await the researcher 
attempting to examine coexistence, especially past coexistence aﬀ ected 
by conﬂ ict. Th e ﬁ rst is the simple dearth of sources, since coexistence 
represents the practices of everyday life that rarely ﬁ nd their way into 
the records, as opposed to the “events” that construct archives and de-
ﬁ ne historical study.7 As Nicholas Doumanis in his own examination 
of pre-nationalist intercommunality remarks, “Intercommunality was 
designed to produce the kind of history that Hegel likened to a blank 
page. It militated against the possibility of ‘events,’ which are the grist of 
conventional history writing” (Doumanis 2012: 2). Th is does not mean 
that we are without records: for instance, the literature on the Ottoman 
neighborhood uses court documents of formal and informal conﬂ ict 
resolution to assess living together as a way of maintaining communal 
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peace (sulh). While such history has only minimal means for under-
standing perceptions of diﬀ erence or the texture of relationships, it does 
help us to understand the mechanisms by which sulh was maintained. 
Th rough its “uneventfulness,” then, coexistence is by nature self-eﬀ acing, 
though I argue below that there is much to learn from the practices that 
accomplish its historical disappearance.
Th e second is the danger of projecting present categories and con-
cerns onto the past, or attempting to deﬁ ne coexistence through the 
lens of concepts used today such as multiculturalism. Doumanis, for 
instance, claims that the problem of diﬀ erent groups living together, or 
the problem of diﬀ erence per se, is one created in Western Europe and 
spread to other parts of the world during the era of Western colonial-
ism.8 Aron Rodrigue has argued that the problem of diﬀ erence emerged 
with post-Enlightenment ideas of majority/minority, and their inﬂ ection 
in a public sphere, where otherness must be “accommodated” (Rodrigue 
1996). Indeed, our own contemporary inability to conceptualize diﬀ er-
ence beyond “identity” and its presumed boundaries continually returns 
us to the problem of “reconciling” such cultural identities—a problem 
represented most clearly in the “clash of civilizations” literature, which 
presumes the irreconcilability of cultural identities.9 Indeed, “identity” 
has perhaps been the most troublesome concept for understanding co-
existence, as it demands reiﬁ cation where there may be none,10 and in 
popular literature “peace” is often equated with having the same “iden-
tity”—even where the presumption of such an identity is clearly a result 
of power relations that occlude minority claims.11
In a similar vein, current popular nostalgia for a multicultural past may 
mask denial of the ways in which that multiculturalism was destroyed. 
Focusing on one neighborhood in Istanbul, Amy Mills shows that the 
“disguising power of nostalgia,” viewed in a landscape dotted with the 
remnants of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, occludes how those com-
munities ceased to exist in the present (Mills 2011: 190). In his contri-
bution to this volume, Aris Anagnostopoulos shows how it was actually 
the disappearance of Muslims from Iraklio in Crete that made it possible 
to become nostalgic about a multicultural past (see also Kasbarian this 
volume). In this sense, as Mills comments, the moral values of tolerance 
and cosmopolitanism work to disguise power, presenting “elite … visions 
of history that paradoxically refer to minorities even while they obscure 
minority perspectives of history” (Ibid.). In her study of plurality in con-
temporary Poland, Agnieszka Pasieka (2014) refers to this highly ideal-
ized and nostalgic view of a “lost paradise” and past “harmony” as the 
“multiculturalization” of the past, which she believes disguises the ten-
sions of actual living together. Concomitantly, such nostalgia may draw 
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attention away from current discriminatory practices against minorities, 
many of whom are immigrants. As Nora Laﬁ  observes,
Mediterranean cities do not seem to be sponsoring the invention of a 
new cosmopolitan ideal. Th e present situation, in which uses of cos-
mopolitanism are more often ideological decoys than genuine innova-
tions in terms of governance of diversity, draws on a limited vision of 
the cosmopolitan past of some cities of the region. (Laﬁ  2013: 331–32)
Rather than engaging fully with a cosmopolitan ideal, in which many 
residents of especially port cities in the past saw themselves as “citizens 
of the world” (Driessen 2005), this popular nostalgia instead is used to 
valorize one’s own tolerance and in Turkey has been part and parcel of a 
neo-Ottoman revival (see Onar 2009).
A third problem, which follows from the ﬁ rst two, is recognizing “co-
existence” when one sees it. For instance, is coexistence simply noninter-
ference, or is it a way of actively managing diﬀ erence? Does coexistence 
require common goods or aims? Does it include or exclude violence? 
What we can say with some certainty is that coexistence is a form of so-
ciality, a way of living together and deﬁ ning belonging and the meaning 
of its boundaries. Clearly, for the process of living together, and for any-
one wishing to study this process, what is important is both the porosity 
or impassibility of those boundaries, as well as how we understand the 
implications of what they contain.
Various authors in this collection tackle this latter problem through 
terms that speak to other aﬀ ective or experiential facets of living with 
diﬀ erence and negotiating boundaries. Deniz Duru uses “conviviality” 
to describe the ways in which place may be created for those who live 
in it through the norms and patterns of a shared lifestyle that actively 
values pluralism and that they consider to be diﬀ erent from the norms 
of the larger society. Th is analysis emphasizes the self-conscious making 
of pluralism, using the Spanish convivència, or “a shared life,” which has 
been recently taken up as policy by local governments in Spain (see Heil 
2014) and has been described as “an exercise of negotiation that assumes 
diﬀ erence as a basic fact of life and the need to make room for dialog 
among all members of society, respect for one another, and sharing the 
public social sphere” (Suárez-Navaz 2004: 191f ).
Contrary to the term “coexistence,” which appears to imply passively 
“existing” together, terms such as conviviality emphasize the performative 
nature of boundary-crossing and the conscious or self-conscious value at-
tached to living with diﬀ erence. While Duru describes the role of conviv-
iality in making Burgaz Island in Istanbul a place deﬁ ned by its plurality, 
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Deborah Starr shows how what she calls a “Levantine idiom” deﬁ ned by 
identity ﬂ uidity may be performatively produced. Both these chapters call 
attention to the relationship between plurality and place-making, “an ur-
ban localism characterized by diversity” (Starr this volume). Being a Bur-
gazlı or a Levantine was also a matter of self-consciously making one’s own 
neighborhood or local identity through the performance of pluralism.
Other authors think with ideas of cohabitation or co-presence, con-
cepts that describe sharing space especially in urban environments, as 
something that may require not the sort of active social interaction de-
scribed by Duru and Starr but rather inattention or giving way. Sylvaine 
Bulle describes this as “a mode of living together based on an indiﬀ er-
ence toward communitarianism and respect for private life” (Bulle this 
volume). Th is is the form of coexistence in which we “live and let live,” or 
when in urban spaces we share trains and sidewalks with persons who 
may be identiﬁ ably Other. As Bowman points out, this form of sharing 
puts emphasis on space rather than place: while the former may be de-
ﬁ ned by simple “civil inattention” (Goﬀ man 1971), the latter is deﬁ ned 
by “giving ground” (Bowman this volume). As Bulle suggests, however, 
such encounters may also create a foundation for mutual engagement 
and civic action. Describing these as “communities of conﬁ dence,” Bulle 
employs Simmel’s idea of “the stranger,” someone who has general but 
not speciﬁ c similarities to us, as a way to understand this ability to 
share space. Anita Bakshi’s chapter similarly gives us insight into such 
“communities of conﬁ dence” in the marketplace of central Nicosia, a 
place deﬁ ned by intercommunal interaction distinct from the primar-
ily monocommunal interaction of the neighborhood. However, Bakshi 
employs Simmel’s stranger also to warn that such everyday interactions 
usually are not capable on their own of surviving incidents of intercom-
munal violence.
“Coexistence,” then, implies recognition of boundaries but also ac-
knowledges that such boundaries are negotiable and that they allow us 
in some sense still to live together. While recognizing the limitations 
of coexistence as a term, we use it here as an umbrella for understand-
ing ways of living with acknowledged diﬀ erence. We qualify this here, 
however, as “everyday coexistence,” the form of coexistence produced 
through proximity, to distinguish it from the legal, political, and discur-
sive forms of coexistence that imply the “living together” of millets or 
ethnic groups within the empire or nation. As I discuss below, geogra-
phy plays an important role in the ways that modes of living together 
are negotiated and enacted, especially in the form of what I refer to as 
multi-scalar sovereignty, experienced as territoriality or territorializa-
tion in the enactment of local relations.
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In what follows, then, I draw upon chapters in this volume and the 
literature on Ottoman and post-Ottoman coexistence to think about 
the negotiations of everyday life in the post-Ottoman space. Building 
on this discussion, I then argue that the anthropology and history of the 
region would beneﬁ t from greater conceptual engagement with theories 
of sovereignty and everyday diplomacy in its studies of everyday interac-
tions involving the proximity of persons understood to be diﬀ erent. As 
I discuss below, the norms of hospitality and neighborliness that guide 
interactions in the settings under discussion in this volume are both for-
malized and embedded within multiple scales of sovereign domain. And 
while anthropology has long examined the rituals and exchanges of war 
and peace, there has been little attempt to incorporate recent literature 
on what Costas Constantinou calls “homo-diplomacy” into the study 
of quotidian relations (Constantinou 2006). Below I discuss studies of 
coexistence in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman space in order to make 
a case for more attention to the role of territoriality, sovereignty, and 
everyday diplomacy in local socialities.
I then turn to a discussion of the volume’s chapters in order to argue 
for a particular way of understanding everyday coexistence that I believe 
helps clear some of the conceptual muddle that currently befuddles the 
ﬁ eld. Bracketing discussions of antagonism or amity, I instead describe 
everyday coexistence as the labor of peace, including the sorts of conﬂ ict 
resolution mechanisms that maintained sulh, as well as the constant, 
everyday practices of accommodating each other that maintained huzur. 
While sulh tends to be used to refer to peace as that which contrasts with 
conﬂ ict, huzur refers to peace as tranquility and calm, the sort of peace 
that is broken not by violence but by the daily disruptions and tensions 
of the neighborhood—making too much noise, or disrespecting one’s 
neighbors. “Sulh might occur in any mahalle or village,” notes historian 
Ronald Jennings, “and the negotiation of sulh was a neighborly process, 
not a formal legal procedure” (Jennings 1978: 148). While sulh might be 
seen as a type of informal conﬂ ict resolution, the maintenance of huzur 
in the neighborhood is achieved both through the rituals of sociality 
and through the management of tension in everyday interaction and ex-
change (see also Ring 2006).
Th e Historiography of Ottoman Coexistence
In the wake of war and social upheaval, certain symbols have acquired 
the cache of representing “peaceful coexistence.” One of the most fa-
mous of these is the Mostar Bridge. During the Yugoslav war it became 
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symbolic of the savageness that rends peoples, and after the war was 
reconstructed with the express purpose of demonstrating “that the con-
nections between Bosnia’s people were being rebuilt, too” (Hayden 2007: 
108; see also Hromadžić this volume). As Hayden emphasizes, the bridge 
was celebrated as a symbol of reuniﬁ cation even as Muslims and Croats 
in the city were keeping to their own sides of the river. Similarly in Cy-
prus, images of minaret and church bell tower side-by-side were used by 
the government of the Republic of Cyprus after 1974 to represent a new 
discourse of peaceful coexistence that had supposedly been shattered by 
Turkey’s invasion and division of the island.
However, Mete Hatay (2011) has shown that minarets and bell towers 
in the island proliferated in the age of nationalisms, as a competitive way 
of imprinting one’s ethnic presence on the landscape. Moreover, this dis-
course of peaceful coexistence intentionally occludes the conﬂ ict period 
between 1963–74 (Constantinou and Papadakis 2001) when Turkish 
Cypriots were disproportionately the victims. In a similar way, nostalgia 
for multiculturalism in Turkey occludes the way that multiculturalism 
was destroyed, although Doumanis (2012: 2) urges us not entirely to dis-
miss the content of nostalgia for this reason.
What is clear, however, is that in the post-Ottoman context, discourses 
of peaceful coexistence imply a selective archeology of cultural ruins. 
Th is region, stamped by pogroms, large-scale population movements, 
erasures, and reinscriptions, is one in which past coexistence is hidden 
under conceptual accretions and in which present coexistence is trou-
bled by conﬂ ict histories. Moreover, “coexistence” as discourse has often 
become a tool for denial. In Cyprus and Bosnia, for instance, past coexis-
tence is often invoked as a way to avoid apportioning blame for violence in 
the (recent) conﬂ icts. Th is may involve denying the suﬀ ering of particular 
victims, or it may be a way of deﬂ ecting blame from oneself—for instance, 
by scapegoating nationalist “agitators” or “extremists” and deﬂ ecting 
blame from the general population who have, it is claimed, “always gotten 
along together.” In order to avoid these conceptual problems, I ﬁ nd it 
useful to return to the origins of the concept of peaceful coexistence and 
its entry into the study of Ottoman and post-Ottoman societies.
Th e term “peaceful coexistence” ﬁ rst emerged in the context of the 
Cold War to refer to Soviet policy toward non-communist states and was 
a central part of Soviet propaganda that set up a contrast with the con-
ﬂ ictual foreign policy of the capitalist West. Indeed, it is in the post-1920 
period that coexistence acquires academic relevance as a term to explain 
how nations or groups may live side by side without conﬂ ict. “Peaceful 
coexistence,” then, originally emerges as a diplomatic term that assumes 
hard boundaries around collective entities and calls for noninterference 
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between those entities. It was eﬀ ectively an international term, not one 
applied to domestic issues, and in that sense is about horizontal, rather 
than vertical, relations between diﬀ erent social orders. However, as one 
early discussion notes, what distinguishes “peaceful coexistence” from 
“peace” per se is not only that it is the coexistence of diﬀ erent social or-
ders but also that an active and strong implementation of peaceful coex-
istence would imply “the strengthening of contacts in the interest of aims 
which can be mutually formulated and settled” (Kende 1968: 362–63).
In the twentieth-century literature on the Ottoman Empire and its 
successor states, a state-based literature that focuses on an Ottoman 
“model of tolerance” that allowed religious practice relatively unim-
peded has opened up to encompass social histories of how groups in the 
empire “coexisted,” or lived together in relatively non-conﬂ ictual ways 
for centuries.12 Th e main focus of this literature is the operation of the 
millet system, which divided Ottoman society by faith and gave con-
siderable, although hierarchical, freedoms to Christians and Jews that 
allowed them to practice their religions, be judged in civil cases under 
their own laws, and be represented by their own religious leaders. A sig-
niﬁ cant part of the literature on tolerance examines the ways and the 
extent the Ottomans tolerated other religious groups under their rule.
While in the nationalist literatures of many former Ottoman sub-
jects—especially in Southeast Europe—the Ottoman period was one of 
oppression, it is clear that during the Ottomans’ long reign there were 
various periods when non-Muslims enjoyed greater freedoms than re-
ligious minorities in Europe. Indeed, one Ottoman historian makes the 
claim that the generosity of freedoms granted to non-Muslims under the 
millet system eventually led to that system’s downfall:
If the Ottomans had done what other occupiers elsewhere did and 
forced those living under their occupation to change their religion, 
they would never have experienced the minority problem that weak-
ened them in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Instead the Ot-
tomans protected the rights of Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews 
to live their own lives with little interaction with the Ottoman ruling 
class, under the guidance of their own religious leaders, with their own 
languages and customs, their own schools, courts, orphanages, hos-
pitals, etc., as long as they paid the required taxes and maintained the 
security and order of the empire. (Shaw 1985: 1003)13
Th e vast literature in English, Turkish, and various languages of the for-
mer empire that addresses the question of non-Muslims under Otto-
man rule has been concerned with understanding what freedoms were 
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realized in practice (e.g., Greene 2002; Jennings 1993); how the Otto-
mans perceived non-Muslims (e.g., Barkey 2005; Masters 2004); what 
tolerance meant for the operation and longevity of the empire (e.g., Bar-
key 2007); and how those freedoms may have expanded or contracted 
in diﬀ erent periods (e.g., Greene 2002; Baer 2011). Because of its focus 
on state practice, “coexistence” as a question emerges when one begins 
to ask how Ottoman doctrines and practices of tolerance aﬀ ected the 
ways that individuals interacted in daily life, perhaps especially in re-
mote parts of the empire and at times when the state was not palpably 
present. Moreover, in discussions of the dissolution of that coexistence, 
a not insigniﬁ cant part of the literature has focused on the ways that the 
millet system laid the ground for the strong merging of ethnic and reli-
gious identity that we ﬁ nd in many of the Ottoman successor states (e.g., 
Grigoriadis 2012; Hirschon 2010; Masters 2004).
For the Ottoman context, then, studies of toleration have primarily 
focused on the structure of the empire and the operation of the mil-
let system. Studies of coexistence, on the other hand, examine the 
person-to-person interactions enabled, shaped, and impeded by such 
understandings of diﬀ erence and their legal and political implementa-
tion. Moreover, while “toleration” implies living with or tolerating beliefs 
or practices that one ﬁ nds wrong or disagreeable for social, economic, or 
political reasons, historiographically “coexistence” implies a nonhierar-
chical form of everyday interaction that is adopted as a manner of living. 
Historiographically, the primary distinction between these emphases 
appears to be that while “toleration” assumes that diﬀ erence is perceived 
negatively, “coexistence” attempts to interrogate understandings of dif-
ference and boundaries, including indiﬀ erence to diﬀ erence.
It is perhaps to be expected that while studies by anthropologists have 
focused primarily on coexistence and shared spaces, especially shared 
religious sites,14 historians until recently have turned much of their at-
tention to the question of toleration. While tolerance, in this literature, is 
primarily a strategy of empire, coexistence, as Ussama Makdisi recently 
commented, is “more diﬃ  cult to gage, to describe, and to get at through 
the available sources than is the practice and politics of toleration, es-
pecially when the sources present history from the imperial center and 
from those at the pinnacle of power in this center” (Baer, Makdisi, and 
Shryock 2009: 929). While Marc Baer takes issue with “coexistence” as 
an appropriate term to describe what was, during the Ottoman period, 
a set of relationships determined by hierarchy, we may turn to Karen 
Barkey’s important work on the longue durée of Ottoman toleration for 
observations on the connection between the vertical relationship of tol-
eration and the horizontal relationship of coexistence:
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In the Ottoman Empire, because religious identity determined a per-
son’s legal and political status, boundaries and belonging were essen-
tial; ethnic and religious peace could be maintained by both respecting 
boundaries and allowing movement across them. (Barkey 2008: 118)
Although her focus is the contribution of toleration to the durability of 
the empire, and therefore concentrates on state-society relations, she 
notes that Ottoman understandings of diﬀ erence had a systemic quality:
Th e Ottoman understanding—similar to the Roman conception—was 
that diﬀ erence was tolerated because it had something to contribute. 
Th at is, diﬀ erence added to the empire; it did not detract from it, and 
therefore, it was commended. Toleration had a systemic quality; main-
taining peace and order was good for imperial life, and diversity con-
tributed to imperial welfare. (Barkey 2008: 110–11)
Such an imperial understanding of diﬀ erence, she argues, trickled down 
into the relationships of everyday life.
Similarly, Aron Rodrigue argues that “the static ‘mosaic’ view, which 
posits building blocks for Middle Eastern society, in which each group is 
deﬁ ned and ﬁ xed permanently by its religion or ethnicity, is not particu-
larly useful analytically.” Rather,
one can reinterpret the mosaic notion more dynamically, not stressing 
“minority/majority” or “ruler/ruled,” but instead emphasizing the rec-
ognition of “diﬀ erence” and, in fact, the near lack of any political will 
to transform the “diﬀ erence” into “sameness.” Th is is not the same as 
pluralism. Th e “diﬀ erence” each group was ascribed, or ascribed to it-
self in its self-representation, was not articulated on the basis of rights. 
Rather, nothing in the political system of the Ottoman Empire called 
for diﬀ erent groups to merge into one. Th e diﬀ erence was a given and 
accepted as such. (Rodrigue 1996)
By most historical accounts, then, the Ottoman Empire was a politi-
cal space in which diﬀ erence was recognized and salient in daily life. Th e 
hardness of boundaries and the extent to which they mattered clearly 
diﬀ ered between village and town, between center and periphery, and 
between diﬀ erent periods of Ottoman rule. Periods when the rules 
governing the dress and comportment of religious minorities were lax 
were often followed by periods when they were more strictly enforced 
(Barkey 2008: 110–11). Historians have shown that during certain pe-
riods zealous sultans instituted campaigns of conversion (Baer 2011), 
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while in other periods some of their subjects may have infringed the 
boundaries of their religious community in order to provoke their own 
martyrdom (Mazower 2005: 159–70). While we can understand prac-
tices and infringements of the rules governing religious diﬀ erence from 
court records, eyewitness reports, and the records of travelers, we still 
lack suﬃ  cient means to understand how those who lived at the time 
perceived these diﬀ erences. Th is presents a challenge for those wishing 
to comprehend coexistence as an everyday practice, as well as for those 
who wish to think about the necessary social conditions for long-term 
coexistence.
Th e “Neighbor’s Right”
One of the few lenses we have for understanding the texture of intercom-
munal relations is provided by an indigenous term for sociality-in-prox-
imity. Th roughout much of the former Ottoman space, coexistence is 
encapsulated under the name of “neighborliness,” what in Turkey and 
the Balkans is known as komşuluk, a conventional form of everyday in-
teraction that acknowledges the need to accommodate and negotiate 
diﬀ erence in the interests of local solidarity (Bringa 1995; Baskar 2012; 
Valtchinova 2012).15 In reference to the concept as it is understood in 
Bulgaria, Galia Valtchinova comments that komşuluk
has become a cultural category embracing the complex of rules and 
implicit knowledge about how to live together, side by side, without 
losing one’s religious identity. … If this ensemble of conventional atti-
tudes and forms of sociability was supposed to ensure peaceful cohab-
itation in everyday life, it also allowed a safe distance between them. 
Often regarded as a “traditional” guarantee of religious peace, the kom-
şuluk works through informal codes that are not well adapted to the 
modern categories of identity, belonging, or citizenship. (2012: 77)
Certain chapters in this volume (especially Dietzel on Cypriot rural land 
ownership) demonstrate the circumstances under which such concep-
tions of neighborhood may be shaken or destroyed, although “neigh-
borliness” remains a reference point for ideas of the moral community.
Komşuluk describes a form of everyday life that implies interaction 
and interdependency while bracketing the aﬀ ective. One may not love 
one’s neighbors, but one normally needs to get along with them. Even 
more than this, however, in the Ottoman period the mahalle or neigh-
borhood was an administrative unit in which persons were made legally 
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responsible for each other and for maintaining the peace. As Barkey 
notes above, maintaining peace and order, what the Ottomans called 
sulh (Tamdoğan 2008), was an imperial priority. Moreover, the extensive 
literature on the Ottoman mahalle shows us the legal means by which 
persons were made responsible for each other. Neighborhoods were 
jointly assessed for taxes, but they were also made jointly responsible for 
crimes. Harboring a criminal often resulted in collective punishment. 
But similarly, one relied on one’s neighbors for statements of one’s char-
acter, as in cases found in local courts where persons wrongly accused of 
crimes such as theft and prostitution were found innocent on the basis 
of statements of their good character made by their neighbors.
Indeed, from the early Ottoman period until its end, we ﬁ nd accounts 
of how neighbors acted as “guarantors” (keﬁ l ) of each other’s character.16 
Th is was only possible, however, through close attention to the behavior 
of others and care in one’s own actions and comportment. Some histo-
rians have called this an “auto-control mechanism” (Özcan 2001; Özsoy 
1998; Yılmaz 2013), and all conclude that records show the neighbor-
hood as an important social and legal unit. “It would not be wrong,” says 
one historian, “to deﬁ ne the neighborhood community as one that has 
become a unity sharing a common fate, and with common rights and 
responsibilities” (Özcan 2001). Fikret Yılmaz, for instance, uses court 
records from Edremit to argue that the neighborhood was one in which
apart from the civil neighbor relationship it was in fact a control mech-
anism and a chain of persons who were guarantors for each other and 
therefore responsible to a degree for each other’s behavior, in other 
words even more than a civil neighborhood, it had become a relation-
ship of oﬃ  cial duty, or at least we see that this is how the state had set 
it up. (Yılmaz, Gürkan, and Gratien 2013; also Yılmaz 1999/2000)
In other words, there seems to be agreement that “peace [huzur] in the 
neighborhood was the principle thing. Th ere was no discrimination be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims in that regard” (Özsoy 1998).
Moreover, persons tended to be identiﬁ ed based on their neighbor-
hoods, as in “Fatma from Baştepe Mahallesi,” or “Ali from Beşpınar Ma-
hallesi.” In the period before surnames and identity documents, identity 
was determined through oral information and witness statements given 
by those who knew the person best, i.e., neighbors. When necessary, 
“People who know the person would be asked questions such as, ‘Who 
knows Rabia, and how do they know her? Does she have her wits about 
her?’ in other words, ‘Is she someone honorable who won’t bring harm to 
anyone, or isn’t she?’” (Tamdoğan-Abel 2002: 68). Such statements had 
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the eﬀ ect not only of making neighbors morally accountable but also 
morally responsible for each other. Th e neighborhood, in other words, 
appears to have been understood as a moral community from which one 
also derived one’s identity.
In this sense, then, neighborliness becomes a moral imperative, and 
one that continued to be written about in the ethics manuals (ahlak ki-
tapları) of the nineteenth century that were part of late Ottoman public 
culture and education.17 Indeed, these manuals often discuss what was 
known as the “neighbor’s right” (komşu hakkı), a right to aid and respect. 
In the various hadiths concerning the neighbor, neighbors are usually 
seen as having a combination of basic “rights”: the “neighbor’s right,” 
which includes non-Muslims; the “Muslim’s right”; and the “kinship 
right.” Some neighbors may have only the ﬁ rst of these, while others may 
have two or more. “What is interesting in the ethics manuals of the Ot-
toman period,” notes one historian, “is their advice to tolerate the faults 
of neighbors” (Tamdoğan Abel 2002: 68). Advice includes cultivating 
the virtues of patience and speaking in public about the virtues of one’s 
neighbors, not about their shortcomings. Moreover, “another facet of 
the discourse of neighborly relations in Ottoman ethics manuals is that 
they do not establish a religious separation: the neighbor ‘even if he is an 
inﬁ del is still a neighbor and has the neighbor’s right’” (Ibid.).
While the language of the “neighbor’s right” may have disappeared 
today, there are many indications that the moral imperative of neigh-
borhood remains important in the post-Ottoman space. As one young 
Turkish Cypriot who had a dispute with his English neighbor over access 
to his property commented to me, “He made me go to court, and now 
he won’t speak to me. But we’re neighbors! If something happens, your 
neighbor’s there for you. Neighbors may be more important than fam-
ily.” Anthropologist Cornelia Sorabji noted a similar sense of duty among 
Muslims in Sarajevo in the 1980s and remarks, “Th e call of komsĭluk is 
not heard through a cost/beneﬁ t ﬁ lter but as a duty with religious over-
tones, a duty that is sometimes pleasurable and proﬁ table, sometimes 
painful and testing, but never a neutrally moral choice” (Sorabji 2008: 
104). Th e sense of duty rather than aﬀ ection comes to the fore in these 
interactions: “In komsĭluk painful feelings are put aside in the interests 
of the religiously sanctioned residential community” (Ibid.: 106; see also 
Henig 2012).
What emerges clearly from these descriptions is a mutual constitution 
of person and place, where the social person emerges through the milieu 
of the neighborhood, while the character of the neighborhood appears 
through the constitution of its community. Th e capacity of neighbor-
hoods collectively to ban individuals who would sully their reputation 
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(Çetin 2014) or the care to counsel one’s neighbors are instances of the 
ways in which neighborhood and personhood are mutually constituting.
At the same time, this mutual constitution of person and place occurs 
within the context of mahalles that often were monoreligious. While this 
was not uniformly the case, and in large cities there were many mixed 
neighborhoods, it was the tendency for a mahalle to emerge around a 
central religious structure—a mosque, church, or synagogue—and for 
the neighborhood to take its name from that structure (Açık 2014; Tam-
doğan 2008). Moreover, religious leaders often played important roles 
in these neighborhoods apart from conducting religious services, such 
as representing their neighborhood communities before the state. Th is 
might include making complaints about insuﬃ  cient water supply and 
roads on behalf of their parishioners or acting as agents for registering 
births, deaths, marriages, and divorces (Açık 2014; Hızlı N.D.; Kazıcı 
1982). Imams also acted as tax collectors, assessing the ability of their 
constituents to pay (Behar 2003: 6). On the other hand, neighborhoods 
tended not to be divided by occupation or social class, and “in intramu-
ral Istanbul, large mansions of pashas and beys neighboring the shanty 
lodgings of beggars (se’ele) or of street-porters … were quite a common 
occurrence” (Ibid.: 5). Th e mahalle, then, may be taken as a social unit 
that for the most part was not divided by class; was often, though not 
always, divided by religion; and where protection of the mahalle, its 
honor, and its reputation were of central importance.
Given the political importance ascribed to the sociality of komşuluk, 
it should not be surprising that it occupies a signiﬁ cant role in post-
Ottoman nostalgia for lost pluralism. In that nostalgia, there is a ten-
dency to blur scale, equating the existence of certain neighborhoods 
where persons of diﬀ erent religions lived side by side, sharing the re-
sponsibilities of the mahalle, with the “peaceful” existence of religious 
and ethnic minorities within the Empire. In other words, the “fact” that 
religious minorities existed in the Empire for the most part without per-
secution—in other words, under a regime of tolerance—seems to blend 
with narratives of mixed neighborhoods, making the claim that “we are 
all neighbors” applicable even to larger political entities.
In contrast to this blurring of scale, the relatively self-contained nature 
of the mahalle and the intertwining of personhood and place point us 
to another feature of living together that I wish to emphasize here: what 
I have earlier called “the labor of peace.” To speak of labor is to empha-
size agonism rather than antagonism, and accommodation rather than 
amity. It is to recognize that neighborliness is not only about living with 
the Other but is equally importantly about the ways that one becomes 
a person in the other’s eyes. It is also to recognize that the intertwining 
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of Other and Self entails a ritualized sociality and forms of exchange 
that simultaneously bind persons and families together and create their 
diﬀ erence. In coming to that point, I will ﬁ rst discuss two other features 
of Ottoman social structure that are important for our considerations: 
what I will call here “multi-scalar sovereignty,” and the performativity of 
neighborliness. While the former concerns the type of territoriality pro-
duced through the neighborhood, the latter concerns the production of 
self within the context of the neighborhood. As we will see, both facets 
are important for thinking about the dissolution of neighborhood rela-
tions and the possibilities for living together after violence.
“To Be Master of One’s Own Home”
Th e common Turkish saying, kendi evinin efendisi olmak (to be master 
of one’s own home) has resonances with the English saying, “a man’s 
home is his castle.” Both phrases imply the sovereignty of the home, 
because while komşuluk requires interdependence, it also requires re-
specting the “sovereignty” of the other by not making too much noise, 
not blocking their passage, not picking the fruit from their trees. In the 
English saying, the image of a castle invokes sovereignty in the form of a 
king, but the phrase is more commonly used to signal the separation of 
public and private, or the noninterference of the state in private life. Th is 
noninterference is invoked by the walls of the castle, within which each 
man is his own king.
Rather than stressing the castle with its implications of walls and 
boundaries, the Turkish saying emphasizes the sovereign as “master” or 
“lord.” In Turkish, to be an efendi or master is not only to be in control but 
equally to be someone deserving of respect, a realized person. Indeed, 
the word efendi comes originally from the ancient Greek authentes, 
which has connotations of self-realization or agency. Th is is a self-
realization, though, that happens within the context of place-making, 
the context in which one is known and acquires the respect that makes 
one “master.”
Moreover, in both cases the idea of “home” may be used metaphor-
ically, to refer not only to a house, but also to a larger unit, especially 
the nation-state. Indeed, we often ﬁ nd that international relations com-
pares relationships between countries to those of neighbors. States have 
“neighborhood policies,” while the doctrine of noninterference resem-
bles the advice above that neighbors avoid too much curiosity about the 
other’s home. In writings on plural societies, “the neighbor” often comes 
to stand for the Other, the non-ruling ethnic or religious group sharing a 
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political space (Zizek, Santner and Reinhard 2013). Th e tendency to use 
the neighbor as a scale-free abstraction (compare Candea 2012) reﬂ ects 
similar tendencies in the study of hospitality, where Candea argues that 
the analogization of hospitality in the home to that in the nation is “tying 
together into causal chains entities of radically diﬀ erent sizes (individu-
als, nations, doors, villages, etc.)” (Candea 2012: S35; see also Herzfeld 
1987).18 By using “the neighbor” to stand for a country, an ethnic group, 
and at the same time the person next door, the focus is on ethics (espe-
cially Levinas and Derrida’s response) while sidelining the problems of 
scalar sovereignty.
Indeed, hospitality is the practice in which the scales of sovereignty 
embedded in discourses of neighborliness both emerge and are blurred. 
Put simply, although one owes hospitality to one’s neighbors, in actual 
practice the neighbor emerges as the one who does not need hospitality. 
Th is becomes clear in ethnographic examples where various scales of 
“neighborliness” are employed. For instance, when I conducted research 
in Cyprus between 2003 and 2005 on the opening of the border that di-
vides the island, I spent about nine months living in a town in northern 
Cyprus that had a mixed Turkish-Greek population before 1963. After 
the division of the island in 1974 and the ﬂ ight of Greek Cypriots to 
the island’s south, Turkish Cypriots originally from the town who had 
ﬂ ed in 1963 returned, later to be joined by displaced Turkish Cypriots 
from the island’s southern region and a small number of persons reset-
tled from rural Turkey. A decade or so after the division, foreigners of 
various stripes, though mostly from the U.K. and Germany, also began 
to settle in the town. I rented a small apartment in a larger house in 
a neighborhood of Turkish Cypriots who had been displaced from the 
island’s south. Many of my neighbors were also relatives or came from 
neighboring villages in the south.
Th e neighbor who lived opposite our house was a woman around ﬁ fty 
years of age whose husband ran the neighborhood coﬀ ee shop. While 
Şengül sometimes helped him, she mostly baked at home and sold her 
pastries to local shops. As a result, she was one of two or three female 
neighbors who were always home. Moreover, during the times that they 
were at home, their doors were always open, as is common in villages 
throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Europe, where 
the open door implies both that neighbors are welcome and also that 
one has nothing to hide (see Henig 2012). Neighbors would step in and 
out, call to each other, occasionally stop by for coﬀ ee. While technically 
the rules of hospitality remained in place, as for instance the practice 
of always oﬀ ering something to drink or eat, in practice hospitality be-
came a referential discourse, something to which one could gesture and 
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at the same time ﬂ out. In other words, neighbors do not occupy the 
category of “guests,” and they may joke together about the formalities of 
hospitality. Similarly, Catherine Allerton (2012) notes how in Mangarrai 
relatives and neighbors may jokingly “become guests” at formal events, 
taking their places as guests because the formalities of the occasion de-
mand it but at the same time recognizing that their intimacy with the 
hosts makes “becoming guests” a performance. Conversely, in the Turk-
ish context, the moment when one ceases to be a guest and becomes 
an intimate treated with a more relaxed hospitality may be marked by 
the comment, yabancı değilsin artık (you are not a stranger/foreigner 
anymore).
Guests, then, come in many shapes and sizes, some more intimate than 
others. Neighbors, however, are hardly ever seen as guests, and certainly 
not as “strangers.” Moreover, the open door puts the norms and rules of 
hospitality in abeyance. Th e neighbor’s home is porous, although it is not 
“one’s own.” Th is indiscernability of the open door is both a form of com-
munity and a way of shaping oneself in the neighbor’s eyes: one has noth-
ing to hide, and one displays this honorable openness. To close the door 
is to hide, to retreat into private life. Given the traditional signiﬁ cance of 
the neighbor’s testimony in the Ottoman neighborhood, it should not be 
surprising that neighbors are the primary persons in whose eyes reputa-
tion is formed. We will return to this consideration in a moment.
In contrast to the intimate hospitality of the neighborhood stands the 
formal hospitality of the host-guest relationship.19 It is the host-guest 
relationship that appears to be what A.M. Hocart had in mind when 
he observed that the original form of sovereignty is a hospitality event 
(Hocart 1957; also Candea and Da Col 2012: S7). While all hospitality 
depends upon the home and its sovereignty, the host-guest relationship 
also harbors another element: the guest is expected eventually to leave. 
In the town where I conducted research after the border opening in Cy-
prus this element of sovereignty became especially contested in that dis-
placed Turkish Cypriots were living in formerly Greek Cypriot houses. 
With the opening, the owners of those houses returned to visit them, al-
though in the absence of a political solution to the island’s division were 
not able to reclaim them. As a result, those persons with original title 
deeds to the houses were put in the role of guests being served coﬀ ee 
and lemonade in houses that they claimed as their own. Th e ambiguity 
of ownership and the pain of past conﬂ ict, then, were mediated through 
the rituals of hospitality: as good hosts, my neighbors said, “Of course 
we served them coﬀ ee! I wouldn’t behave badly to someone who’s a guest 
in my home.” And as good guests, the Greek Cypriot visitors eventually 
would leave.
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In these encounters, the threshold materializes sovereignty, the point 
at which a stranger knocks or calls out even when the door is open. Th e 
open door is for the neighborhood, allowing the sovereignty of home 
to blend with the sovereignty of the community and signaling the mu-
tual interpenetration of person and place. Th e open door symbolically 
blurs the space between inside and outside, between the house and the 
street, enabling everyday forms of negotiated interaction. Not only does 
one have nothing to hide from one’s neighbors, but those neighbors also 
cannot pass without greeting. Unlike hospitality, then, it is a practice of 
moral exchange and interdependency that entails the everyday diplo-
macy of pleasantries, greetings, and often the exchange of important 
information in the form of gossip. I saw this in the ways that displaced 
Greek Cypriots mourned for their lost homes, not as structures but as 
parts of networks and neighborhoods.20 In their descriptions of home, 
what stands out are the paths between houses, the closeness of relatives, 
and the openness to ﬁ elds and to others.
Both neighborliness and hospitality, then, are deﬁ ned by closeness 
and distance, by boundary-making that depends upon the threshold of 
the home. But whereas hospitality depends upon the strict deﬁ nition of 
the threshold as boundary between “ours” and “theirs,” neighborliness in 
practice has depended on a blurring of that boundary and on forms of 
everyday diplomacy. When I refer to “everyday diplomacy” I mean not 
simply the negotiation of common terms or interests. Rather, I refer to 
the diplomat as emissary, someone who enters the space of the Other 
and addresses that Other in a common language. Th inking of diplomacy 
in this way opens up the possibility also to understand what Constan-
tinou calls the “transformative potential of diplomacy,” in other words, 
“the experience of new or expanding space, opening up possibilities and 
promising alternative ways of relating to others” (Constantinou 2006: 
352; see also Constantinou 1996). Diplomacy, then, involves according 
respect to the Other but also the potential for self-transformation.
Taking a term from the language of diplomacy, I propose to think of 
everyday coexistence in post-Ottoman spaces as a labor of peace that 
relies upon a constructive ambiguity of the boundaries of belonging. By 
“labor of peace” I have in mind the everyday management of both so-
ciality and tension that is most clearly seen in the neighborhood as a 
social unit. Sociality is managed through forms of symbolic and material 
exchange, from exchanging labor in ﬁ elds to attendance at weddings and 
funerals. In remembering their lives together, both Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots from the same time independently recalled the neighborhood 
system in which families would take turns making halloumi, a local 
cheese and staple of the Cypriot diet.
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Th e labor of peace, however, also depends on both managing con-
ﬂ ict and maintaining tensions. Th e local management of conﬂ ict is well 
known as a subject from the anthropological literature on dispute res-
olution (e.g., Nader 1991; Roberts 1979/2013; Starr 1978) and should 
be understood as what the Ottomans referred to as maintaining sulh. 
In places such as Cyprus, traditions of local dispute management cre-
ated conﬂ icts with British colonial rulers, who wished to replace them 
with formal judiciary practices.21 As one such administrator observed, 
under the Ottoman system “it was enough that a man was known as an 
evil-doer to the people generally, and that there was reasonable cause to 
believe him guilty of certain oﬀ ences.”22 At the time of the British arrival, 
then, the sociolegal practices of the mahalle appear to have been in full 
force, and the multitude of complaints by British police regarding infor-
mal dispute resolution practices indicates that they continued until well 
into the twentieth century.
Apart from the resolution of disputes, however, the labor of peace 
also entailed what I have referred to as maintaining tensions. In her 
discussion of everyday coexistence in Karachi, Laura Ring observes that 
it is in women’s bearing of tension, rather than men’s discharging of it, 
that peace is maintained. In Ring’s rendering, this “ethic of suspense” 
linked
generalized reciprocity with the ability to bear in tension, or hold in 
suspense, contradictory principles of social organization (nation and 
ethnic group, hierarchy and equality). … [T]reating stranger-neighbors 
as kin depended not on sentiments of love and attachment but on the 
willingness and ability to bear the tension of contradictory categories 
of belonging. … Social, cultural, and intergroup tension is thus man-
aged via the bodies and subjectivities of women. (Ring 2006: 179)
Ring’s sensitive study focuses speciﬁ cally on the ways that women’s bod-
ies bear tension because men’s bodies are presumed to be violent, inca-
pable of tension and subject to exploding under it.
I cannot engage here with Ring’s analysis of the gendered nature of 
this practice, which is certainly not speciﬁ c to her ﬁ eld location but may 
nevertheless not be universally applicable. My own research indicates 
that while women may disproportionately “bear tension” in this way, the 
management of contradiction and ambiguity is an intrinsic part of living 
together. I choose to refer to this process as “constructive ambiguity,” a 
term taken from diplomacy, where it means the use of ambiguous lan-
guage to deal with sensitive issues about which parties would otherwise 
remain irreconcilable.
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In diplomacy, constructive ambiguity is the practice of setting aside 
those issues that cause conﬂ ict and moving to those issues about which 
agreement can be reached. In doing so, the hope is that eventually a new 
state of aﬀ airs will allow the parties to overcome previously irreconcil-
able diﬀ erences. Th is in eﬀ ect allows each side to claim that it has not 
conceded the point while allowing negotiations to proceed beyond it. 
One summary of the strategy notes, “Ambiguities make sure that, on the 
one hand, the parties retain their own individual perceptions as to ‘how 
things should proceed’ and that, on the other, one common language is 
adopted, which both parties may later equally use” (Pehar 2001: 170). 
Language, in this case, acts as a type of boundary deﬁ ning the possibility 
or impossibility of negotiation.
I use the term for what it brings to understanding the everyday ne-
gotiation of what Ring calls “tension.” “Constructive ambiguity” is a pro-
cess by which we agree to see diﬀ erently on a particular issue while not 
letting that disagreement stand in the way of peace. It is a process of 
allowing certain boundaries to remain in place while ﬁ nding common 
ground where it is possible. It does not deny diﬀ erence; in fact, it recog-
nizes diﬀ erence in its refusal to confront it. It does not eﬀ ace diﬀ erence 
but rather denies that diﬀ erence must be an insurmountable obstacle to 
sociality and peace. Constructive ambiguity brackets diﬀ erence, allow-
ing us to retain it while continuing with the everyday process of living.
Just as neighborliness makes the threshold porous, so in everyday life 
we may recognize, but at the same time bracket, the everyday diﬀ erences 
that deﬁ ne boundaries in order to make those boundaries permeable. 
Th is is usually done in the interest of some larger cause perceived to 
be more important—what Kende, in his deﬁ nition of strong peaceful 
coexistence, described as “the strengthening of contacts in the interest 
of aims which can be mutually formulated and settled.” Th at cause may 
be the need to work together in the ﬁ elds or marketplace, or simply the 
belief that the Other, despite Otherness, still subscribes to the moral 
code of neighborliness that protects the peace of a village. My Turkish 
Cypriot neighbor commented that “neighbors may be more important 
than family.” And while in a struggle over land access the young Turk-
ish Cypriot was willing to suspend diﬀ erence in the interest of a higher 
moral code, his English neighbor saw the fence between them as a legal 
boundary deﬁ ning his rights rather than a moral threshold deﬁ ning his 
responsibilities.
I have suggested that we may usefully see the coexistence expressed 
in komşuluk as a constructive ambiguity of the boundaries of belonging, 
and I have also suggested that seeing it in this way may allow us insight 
into the everyday diplomacy of coexistence without necessitating insight 
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into the aﬀ ective realm, which is diﬃ  cult to document in retrospect. 
Where that coexistence begins to break down, or where it may be diﬃ  -
cult to repair, is where such ambiguity is no longer encouraged or feasi-
ble. Moreover, it should not be surprising that this occurs with the rise 
of demands for nation-state sovereignty, as we see that it was precisely 
in the demands for freedom of ethnic and religious minorities within the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as the Ottoman attempts to claw back against 
the empire’s disintegration, that the scale of nation-state sovereignty 
penetrates the sovereignty of the neighborhood. Village and street-names 
are “nationalized,” while national and religious symbols come to domi-
nate local landscapes. In his contribution to this volume, Robert Hayden 
describes the changes in what he calls “religioscapes” with the advent of 
nationalist demands. Such changes included the building or destruction 
of minarets, as well as the size of mosques and churches.
I suggest that the tendency to blend scale in discussions of home 
or neighborhood is also an indication of multi-scalar sovereignty—the 
sovereignty of the home, of the mahalle, of the church, all of which 
have their own sovereign thresholds. In the past, crossing into another 
neighborhood was not very diﬀ erent from crossing the threshold of a 
home and entailed scrutiny, as well as rituals of hospitality (see Çetin 
2014; Tamdoğan-Abel 2002). Crossing the threshold of a church or 
mosque was to step into the sovereign realm of faith, something one 
usually would not do if one did not “belong.” Th ese embedded sover-
eignties were made possible when the state and realm were perceived to 
belong to a dynasty but not to a “people.” Although the Ottoman Empire 
was a Muslim Sunni state, the state was not equivalent to territory but 
rather imposed upon it and thereby encompassing all that lived within 
it. As a result, multi-scalar sovereignties present us with ambiguities 
and incompleteness in a way that is materialized in the threshold but 
that disappears with the homogenization of space in the nation-state 
era. Commenting on the ambiguities inherent in what I have called here 
multi-scalar sovereignties, Shryock remarks,
the underlying problem is one of sovereignty over a space whose in-
completeness, both as a physical and a sovereign space, must be per-
petually managed in ways that encourage interaction with outsiders. 
Bad guests and hosts come in many dramatic forms, but even before 
they drop the millstone or sever the hand that greets them, they are 
ﬁ rst of all people who refuse to accept the proper role of host or guest. 
Th is refusal is most likely to occur when guest and host cannot agree 
on who controls the space of interaction, who is sovereign, who be-
Introduction 25
longs, and who owes or should oﬀ er respect. … Shifts in scale com-
pound these disagreements and create new ones. (Shryock 2012: S30)
One such scalar shift is when the space of the neighborhood, with its 
own intimate sovereignty, is overlaid by the exclusive territorial claims 
of the nation-state—claims that are often also in conﬂ ict with others.
Using the contributions to this volume, I would like to think about 
what the labor of peace and the constructive ambiguity that it entails 
would mean in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman context. What is helpful 
about the term “constructive ambiguity” is that it makes reference to a 
form of everyday diplomacy, to a way of acknowledging both diﬀ erence 
and a common set of moral concerns that have priority over that diﬀ er-
ence. It also allows us to think with more speciﬁ city about the conditions 
under which such ambiguity is no longer possible, and about what hap-
pens when it is lost. In addition, it may enable us to identify why it is so 
diﬃ  cult to recover such forms of everyday diplomacy in post-conﬂ ict 
interaction.
Everyday Diplomacy in the Post-Ottoman Space
My attempt to clear away some conceptual brush by referring to coex-
istence as a labor of peace, and more speciﬁ cally one supported by the 
constructive ambiguity of the boundaries of belonging, is also in conso-
nance with other works that have similarly struggled with how to con-
ceptualize the meaning and perception of boundaries in the Ottoman 
and post-Ottoman space. Exploring the porosity of boundaries at the 
local level, Doumanis argues that intercommunality, as he calls it, was 
produced in the quotidian negotiations of daily life:
Ottoman mixed communities did not meld into one organic unit. 
However … where such distinct units lived cheek by jowl it was also 
essential that boundaries shifted whenever dictated by necessity and 
social norms, and in order to promote an atmosphere of civility and 
cordiality. (Doumanis 2012: 65)
Th e everyday creation of community in this way is conﬁ rmed for other 
cases, such as Anja Peleikis’s study of Lebanon, where she argues,
shared local identity was not a given simply because of the fact that 
Christians and Muslims used to live in the same place. On the con-
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trary, social relations across confessional borders had to be conﬁ rmed, 
created and reproduced again and again through the diverse everyday 
practice of neighborhood relations, mutual assistance in agriculture, 
and attendance at religious rituals of the confessional “Other.” (Peleikis 
2006: 134)
Community, then, may not be assumed but must be constantly reaﬃ  rmed 
and reproduced, emphasizing the conscious eﬀ ort or labor involved. 
Laura Ring, in her discussion of everyday coexistence in contemporary 
Karachi, described a similar process of insisting on diﬀ erence while at 
the same time complicating it: “[t]he repeated insertion of the particu-
lar—the insistent invocation of the complexity and ambiguity of social 
identity—was critical to the very possibility of ‘sharing the shade’ or ham 
sayagi, the Urdu term for ‘neighborhood’” (2006: 4).
Th e performance of coexistence also often entailed ritualized and 
even exaggerated expressions of community solidarity, expressed retro-
spectively in nostalgia for having attended each other’s weddings. Dou-
manis notes,
[b]ehaving ‘as if ’ they were one community was fundamental to in-
tercommunality. Being like a community without being a community 
promoted solidarity for the purposes of social order and security, while 
at the same time ensuring that the distinctions remained intact. Th e 
purpose of loving one’s neighbour was to keep that neighbour ﬁ rmly 
at bay. (2012: 78)
Here Doumanis appears to fall into the identitarian trap he has tried 
to avoid, by eﬀ ectively saying that such everyday constructions of com-
munity are simulacra rather than essence. In Deniz Duru’s chapter in 
this volume, we see how such self-conscious valuing of plurality may 
construct the sense of community as community and of place as place.
Moreover, if we return to my earlier invocations of neighborliness and 
thresholds, we can see how “social order and security” may constitute a 
higher moral order that calls for constructive ambiguity of boundaries. 
Leaving one’s door open signals both that the home is one’s own and also 
that its threshold is porous. It is also, as certain authors in this volume 
make clear, a site of performativity. Opening one’s door is also a way of 
constructing oneself in the neighbor’s eyes, of displaying that one has 
nothing to hide. Moreover, one of the most important aspects of hospi-
tality is the rehashing of it afterwards—what one served, how the guest 
behaved, what this indicates. Hospitality, then, is not only an event but 
is simultaneously a discourse on an event. In this sense, the moral dis-
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course of hospitality also shapes the moral practice of its performance: 
to be a good host is to be one not primarily in the eyes of one’s guest but 
in the eyes of one’s own community. Similarly with neighborliness: while 
people such as my own Turkish Cypriot neighbor often perceive the in-
terdependence of neighborliness as something born of necessity, not to 
help one’s neighbor is also to risk the talk of other neighbors.
Th e argument that everyday coexistence may be as much about the 
rules of social life as it is about individual relationships—as much about 
morality as aﬀ ection and as much about performance as essence—is also 
in consonance with Ashutosh Varshney’s empirical study (2003) of cities 
in India where ethnic conﬂ ict has occurred, and his well-argued claim 
that intercommunal civil associations are more eﬀ ective in controlling 
violence than are individual relationships. “If vibrant organizations serv-
ing the economic, cultural and social needs of the two communities ex-
ist,” Varshney claims, “the support for communal peace not only tends 
to be strong but it can also be more solidly expressed” (Ibid.: 10). In cit-
ies, his study shows, formal networks are important for facilitating what 
informal networks and relationships may be able to achieve in villages: 
namely, spaces for negotiating common goods that in turn make what 
might otherwise be exclusive demands into inclusive ones.
Th e chapters in this volume suggest that living together is a labor 
of peace that entails an everyday diplomacy, requires the blurring but 
not the dissolution of boundaries, and includes the potential for self-
transformation. Chapters discuss the simultaneous exclusiveness and 
inclusiveness of boundaries symbolized by the threshold; the performa-
tive aspect of everyday coexistence; and the forms of common civility 
necessary to enable diversity within the same space. Together, the chap-
ters help us to understand the “constructive ambiguity” that pervades 
everyday interactions, as well as the moments when such ambiguity or 
“civil inattention” (Goﬀ man 1971) may no longer be possible.
In her discussion of the Ermou marketplace of Nicosia in this volume, 
Anita Bakshi, referring to Georg Simmel’s now classic observations re-
garding the stranger, remarks that persons from the other group were 
both near and remote, deﬁ ned by diﬀ erence. However, within the space 
of the marketplace it was possible also to complicate and blur such bor-
ders through the recognition of individuals in face-to-face interactions:
Th e shared realm provided by the Ermou streets allowed for the rec-
ognition of speciﬁ c diﬀ erences—the elements that begin to form the 
outlines of individuals, distinguishing them from the group as a whole. 
Th ese outlines may remain hazy. Th ey need not be deep friendships, 
and indeed they probably often were not, but they do help to create 
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a public life in which the individual can operate comfortably. … Th is 
allowed for a particular habitus to emerge, one constituted by the re-
petitive nature of interactions and facilitated by the stable pattern of 
streets and intersections. (this volume, p. 120)
Th e city, with its separate Greek and Turkish neighborhoods, included 
sites of exclusion as well as nodes of integration. Indeed, it was the draw-
ing of boundaries that made neighborliness across those boundaries 
possible.
Similarly, Irene Dietzel shows how the complex land use and land 
ownership patterns of Ottoman Cyprus encouraged the interdependence 
and solidarity of village life. As may be seen elsewhere in the Mediterra-
nean, multiple ownership in land, including rights to water and trees, as 
well as the complexities of farming in a parched climate, lent themselves 
to forms of cooperation and solidarity that began to disappear with the 
“rationalization” of land rights under the British administration and the 
“modernization” of land use in the mid-twentieth century. However, Aris 
Anagnostopoulos also reminds us in his own chapter that our concep-
tualization of such coexistence is also predetermined by its end, empha-
sizing ethno-religious cooperation before later conﬂ ict while covering 
over other forms of exclusion (class, gender, age, etc.) that were present 
during such periods of “peaceful coexistence.” Bakshi gives the example 
of women excluded from certain marketplace spaces, while Deniz Du-
ru’s chapter describing interreligious interaction in Burgazadası, Istan-
bul, reminds us that such cross-ethnic or cross-faith interactions may be 
based on their own class, ideological, or gendered exclusions.
Sossie Kasbarian’s discussion of the Armenian community in Turkey 
today is one where individuals think “in terms of clearly deﬁ ned spheres 
and the need to transgress and move from one to the other.” (this vol-
ume, p. 223). However, Kasbarian emphasizes that these spheres are 
deﬁ ned not only by religious, ethnic or other identities but also by 
diﬀ erent historical narratives that must be accommodated. “When 
contemplating coexistence,” Kasbarian remarks, “the coexistence of dif-
ferent narratives is at least as essential as physical coexistence” (this 
volume, p. 222).
Robert Hayden argues in this volume and elsewhere that examples 
such as Kasbarian’s show that “‘peaceful coexistence’ is not so much a 
condition that can be disrupted, as a manifestation of relations at times 
when the dominance of one group over another is so ﬁ rmly established 
that it need not be imposed, and cannot be much countered” (this vol-
ume, p. 62). In other words, any “peaceful coexistence” with a dominated 
minority is only temporary and is bound to change when power rela-
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tions do. He shows this through the physical domination of the land-
scape during the Ottoman period and attempts to erase signs of that 
domination in Ottoman successor states.
Other chapters, however, suggest that what may be important is not 
the “reality” of coexistence but rather its performance, in other words, 
the ways in which a constructive ambiguity of the boundaries of be-
longing is (self-)consciously constructed. While Duru’s chapter shows 
the way that residents of the Istanbul island of Burgaz self-consciously 
value and construct plurality as part of the island’s identity, Deborah 
Starr highlights the performativity of coexistence through discussion 
of what she calls the “Levantine idiom” in Togo Mizrahi’s Alexandria 
ﬁ lms. Produced at a moment when Egypt was experiencing a rise of a 
new Arab/Islamic nationalism that excluded, for instance, the large Jew-
ish community of which Mizrahi was a member, Mizrahi’s farces use 
cross-dressing, class-hopping, and hints of homosexuality to emphasize 
the performative and ﬂ uid nature of (Levantine) identity. Th e “Levan-
tine aesthetics” of the ﬁ lms is one in which “the performance of iden-
tity is ﬂ uid and mutable, embracing vagueness and porousness of the 
boundaries of identity” (this volume, p. 136). However, Starr emphasizes 
that the inclusiveness of this Levantine aesthetic is not “natural” but is 
explicitly depicted as something performed, an inclusivity that is both 
self-consciously and repetitively created.
Azra Hromadžić, in her study of a mixed Mostar gymnasium, returns 
to performativity when she shows how language “purism” in a mixed 
space is performed by youth often confused by what counts as “their” 
national language. “Youth,” notes Hromadžić,
are … called to accept, appreciate, welcome and act out this “authen-
tic” diﬀ erence—the essence of cultural hermaneutics—in exchange for 
acceptance into the larger transborder nation and domovina’s (home-
land’s) recognition. As a result, language performance acts as a social 
ethics and cultural technology for successes and failures of national 
and individual dreams. (this volume, p. 193)
As she demonstrates, however, this ideology of cultural purity is also 
mapped onto territory, thus creating the presumption of “incommen-
surability of mutually hostile, spatially segregated ethnicities which are 
treated as rooted, bounded, homogeneous, and mutually hostile” (this 
volume, p. 193).
Both Sylvaine Bulle and Glenn Bowman’s chapters use Erving Goﬀ -
man to think about contiguity—what Bulle calls “co-presence”—in con-
texts that are potentially conﬂ ictual. In the context of a divided Jerusa-
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lem, Bulle describes the ephemeral “temporary communities of conﬁ -
dence” that emerge even in and around a security wall. Pizza deliveries, 
marketplaces, and tramways all provide spaces for interactions that are 
characterized by what Goﬀ man called “civil inattention,” a form of public 
civility that allows heterogeneous public spaces to function. Temporary 
communities of conﬁ dence “are created within situations where people 
simply come together, and are not aﬃ  rmations of belonging,” Bulle notes 
(this volume, pp. 248–9).
Bowman discusses this as “giving ground,” what Bulle refers to as a 
basic civility in urban space:
Viewed not from the perspective of an ideal model of coexistence but 
rather from its actual practice, we see that small acts of respect for the 
Other—the exercise or not of domination, of courtesy, of civility—
may be able to construct a livable space, creating a place for people, 
while at the same time helping to build a shared life. (Bulle this vol-
ume, p. 252)
However, as Bowman notes, such forms of ordinary civility are enabled 
by “spaces” but impeded by “places.” In other words, civility is possible 
only when one community does not make an exclusive claim to a site.
Taken together, the papers in this volume provide new insight into 
the everyday practices of living together in contexts fraught with con-
ﬂ ict histories that include discrimination, displacement, and division. 
Authors here stress the importance of boundaries that deﬁ ne forms of 
neighborliness and cooperation, and the everyday diplomacy that allows 
those boundaries to remain constructively ambiguous. Th ey describe, 
as well, the quotidian performances of coexistence, which comply with 
standardized notions of the civil and the cosmopolitan. And they ex-
plore the political potential of contiguity and civility for creating spaces 
deﬁ ned by robust forms of living together.
Notes
 1. On the way that a discourse of coexistence occludes the manner that coex-
istence was destroyed in Turkey, see Mills (2011) and Onar (2009).
 2. On “the riot” and the post-conﬂ ict everyday, see Das (2007); Jeganathan 
(1997); Mehta (2002); and Mehta and Chatterji (2001).
 3. See, for instance, the discussion of such nostalgic visions in Doumanis 
2012: 2–19.
 4. For a debate that outlines many of the stakes, see Robert Hayden’s 2002 
Current Anthropology article, including responses (Hayden 2002), as well 
as articles in Bowman (2012) that respond to Hayden’s thesis.
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 5. See Glenn Bowman and Dionigi Albera on Robert Hayden’s antagonistic 
tolerance thesis (Bowman 2012; Albera 2012).
 6. See Robert Hayden on Stef Jansen and others, as well as replies (Hayden 
2007).
 7. On the “eventful-ness” of history, see Pandey (2006) and Lubkemann 
(2008).
 8. Doumanis remarks, for instance, “Whereas Ottomans presupposed that 
cultural diﬀ erence within society was a given, Westerners tended to pro-
ceed from a diametrically opposite position, seeing societal homogeneity as 
normative and the Babel-like conditions in the Near East as symptomatic of 
societal degeneration” (Doumanis 2012: 18).
 9. On the problem of the “clash of civilization” literature as it relates to the 
study of multiculturalism, see Mills (2011); Barkey (2005); and Baer, Mak-
disi, and Shryock (2009).
10. On the problems of identity as a concept in the social sciences, see the im-
portant article by Brubaker and Cooper (2000). 
11. In Cyprus, for instance, Greek Cypriot nationalists beginning in the 1950s 
advanced the thesis that Turkish Cypriots were really converted Orthodox 
and therefore Greek “by blood.” Since 1974, the Republic of Cyprus has of-
ﬁ cially claimed that Cypriots lived “like brothers” before the 1974 Turkish 
invasion and division of the island. Th e Left, in turn, has supported “Cypri-
otism,” the claim that Cypriots are “really all the same” and that they were 
divided by nationalist elements. While this thesis has gained support from 
left-wing Turkish Cypriots when it is future-oriented and refers to an inclu-
sive, civic patriotism, Turkish Cypriots have tended to give it considerably 
less support when it is used to refer to “identity.”
12. Classic texts that discuss Ottoman tolerance include those by Inalcik 
(1973), Lewis (1961), and Shaw (1976), as well as one more recently by Or-
taylı (2003). For a collection that draws together works on both tolerance 
and coexistence in the Ottoman domains, see Karpat (2010).
13. Th is and all other translations from Turkish in the text are my own.
14. Th ere is, indeed, a signiﬁ cant body of anthropological work on shared 
shrines that constitutes a large part of the ethnographic work on the shar-
ing of space in Southeast Europe and the Middle East. For more on the sub-
ject, see recent works by Albera and Couroucli (2012); Barkan and Barkey 
(2015); Bigelow (2010); Bowman (2012a); and Hayden and Walker (2013).
15. In the Balkan context, the discussion of komšilik has centered primarily on 
the question of whether or not those relations were antagonistic in the con-
text of the Balkan wars. Th e term, which comes from the Turkish komşuluk, 
not only means “neighborhood” rather than “neighborliness,” but it also 
appears speciﬁ cally to have acquired the meaning of living with plurality. 
Nevertheless, as I discuss below, the term appears to have retained in the 
Balkans some of the normative and aﬀ ective dimensions of the more gen-
eral “neighborliness,” which applies to all forms of living in proximity.
16. For a discussion of the contested way in which this system was destroyed by 
British colonial rule in Cyprus, see chapter two in Bryant (2004).
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17. On ethics manuals in the late Ottoman period, particularly their use in ed-
ucation, see Fortna (2002).
18. Also, Andrew Shryock remarks, “Hospitality, as Bedouin describe it, is a 
quality of persons and households, of tribal and ethnic groups, and even 
of nation-states. At any of these levels of signiﬁ cance, failure to provide 
karam [hospitality] suggests low character and weakness, qualities that at-
tract moral criticism” (Shryock 2012: S20).
19. Herzfeld has referred to the often aggressive hospitality of the region, as 
well as the suspension of hostility that contains the ever-present possibil-
ity of its degeneration, as “courtesy-as-menace.” He remarks that these en-
counters have a “fragile, nervous force” that he suggests derives from their 
formality. “It is formality, not the simple act of giving, that creates the am-
bivalence and tension that is so prominent in the literature about Southern 
Europe, my own contributions included” (Herzfeld 2012: S214).
20. For more detail, see Bryant (2010).
21. I document this in a previous work (Bryant 2004), in which I devote a chap-
ter to the transition from the Ottoman to the British legal systems. Com-
plaints of the loss of authority by village elders are multitude, and British 
administrators received numerous letters vociferating against the central-
ized nature of the new system and the refusal to accept the word of village 
elders as binding to convict. In 1895, the Bishop of Kition, for instance, 
reported that “the people wish restrictions to be put on persons of bad 
character, on persons whom the Mukhtar [headman] and Ayas [Turkish 
ağa = elder] of a village may say are of bad character. Such persons might 
be restricted by being conﬁ ned to certain localities” (Parliamentary Papers, 
1887–1895, quoted in Bryant 2004).
22. Parliamentary Papers, 1887–1895: 51.
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Part I
[ • ]
Landscapes of Coexistence 
and Conﬂ ict

[• Chapter 1 •]
Sharing Traditions of 
Land Use and Ownership
Considering the “Ground” for Coexistence and Conﬂ ict 
in Pre-modern Cyprus
IRENE DIETZEL 
Cyprus is a paradigmatic post-conﬂ ict society in which “coexistence 
studies” abound, especially since the island’s division in 1974 into a 
Turkish North and a Greek South, an event that formed a tragic clo-
sure to two decades of unrest and quarrels between the communities. 
Peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians in Cyprus has been 
largely attributed to the dynamics of “neighborhood” (Jennings 1993, 
1999; Asmussen 2001; Bryant 2004). Mixed neighborhoods, urban as 
well as rural, emerged during the Ottoman period (1571–1878) as a re-
sult of heterogeneous residence patterns, which at ﬁ rst did not follow 
any systematic pattern of spatial segregation.1 By the end of the Ottoman 
period the majority of villages (346 according to the ﬁ rst oﬃ  cial census) 
were ethnically mixed. Although the number of mixed villages dropped 
drastically during the course of the twentieth century, the experience 
of life in mixed settlements has come to form a central part of the col-
lective consciousness of Cypriots. Th e research on these shared spaces 
describes the texture and quality of coexistence as determined by the 
face-to-face-society and the rhythm of agricultural seasons. Despite a 
low rate of intermarriage, Cypriots forged a variety of inter-communal 
relations: they entertained neighborhood relations, formed friendships 
and cooperated in agricultural production.
Th is chapter contributes to this panoptic of neighborhood through 
an examination of the particular relationships that emerged from local 
forms of land use and shared concepts of property. Property relations—
whether forged through inheritance practices among kin or maintained 
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through agricultural cooperation among neighbors—were deeply wo-
ven into the fabric of neighborhood. Yet, unlike the clear-cut model of 
individual ownership common to contemporary Western societies, lo-
cal property concepts in Ottoman Cyprus involved various degrees of 
ownership, rights of use, as well as an obligation for maintenance—an 
Ottoman distinction that in itself generated particular and highly so-
phisticated forms of neighborhood.
Coexistence was certainly not free of conﬂ ict. Consider the following 
example from the mid-twentieth century, describing a state of aﬀ airs 
that seemed to alienate the Cypriot modernizers of the time. Th e geog-
rapher and later state-appointed consolidation oﬃ  cer Demetrios Christ-
odoulou writes in 1959:
Land in Cyprus is unenclosed and unfenced. Th is permits not only 
easy subdivision, but also leads to endless friction between farmer 
and shepherd since the latter can roam with his ﬂ ocks over anybody’s 
property; friction, constant and costly, often exists between owners of 
neighboring land. (Christodoulou 1959: 84)
It is thus important to keep conﬂ ict and societal unrest between groups 
well within the scope of analysis. Indeed, practices of land use gave ample 
reason for dispute: Th e “constant and costly friction” described above may 
well be an example of what Bryant describes as “everyday diplomacy,” a 
constant negotiation of boundaries that distinguishes neighborliness from 
plain hospitality (this volume, p. 21). Yet it is worth asking why conﬂ icts 
over land and resources did not tend to coincide with ethnic distinc-
tions, mobilize on the grounds of religious identities, or reiterate reli-
gious diﬀ erences. What were the underlying structures that allowed for 
the management of communally accessed resources as well as the distri-
bution of property in the absence of clear-cut boundaries? Did ethno-
religious diﬀ erences play a part in the distribution process?
Th is chapter casts neighborhood in socio-ecological terms and focuses 
on particular strategies of Cypriot ruralists pertaining to the island’s key 
resources of land, forests, and water. Whether a cause for conﬂ ict or 
cooperation, the particular strategies are “sociogenic” (compare Lansing 
1991: 128). Th ey generate speciﬁ c forms of sociality that in turn maintain 
the social relations necessary for the strategy to succeed. Th ese social 
relations can extend far beyond the bounds of the immediate neighbor-
hood, yet property remains a key factor. Th e Ottoman system of land 
tenure provided the island’s peasantry, both Christian and Muslim alike, 
with a context in which they could acquire, share, and maintain their 
access to land and resources. Furthermore, property was also deﬁ ned 
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by the particulars of the Mediterranean landscape. Th e socio-ecological 
perspective on Cypriot neighborhoods therefore also reﬂ ects the wider 
picture of the Mediterranean equation of landscape and people.
Local forms of daily coexistence did not cease with the end of Ot-
toman rule but survived well into the twentieth century. Nonetheless, 
the ﬁ rst half of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual dissolution of 
rural communities and traditional agricultural networks.2 Th ese devel-
opments unfold prior to and along with the rise and consolidation of op-
posing Greek and Turkish national ideologies, the anti-colonial struggles 
of Greek nationalists (1955–59), as well as the violent clashes between 
the communities during the early years of the Republic (1963–64). Th e 
time of British colonial rule (1878–1960) therefore represents a tran-
sitional period during which the foundations for Ottoman coexistence 
gradually eroded. Th e study of coexistence in Cyprus thus inadvertently 
formulates a critique of colonial hegemonic practices. While the British 
“divide and rule” strategy has been the focus of numerous valuable stud-
ies (Constantinou 2007; Dietzel and Makrides 2009), this chapter also 
addresses less overt, and possibly less intentional disruptions of Otto-
man coexistence, namely the British involvement in the modernization 
of the agricultural sector and the consequences this bore for societal 
dynamics between the island’s communities.
Reﬂ ections on the Ottoman System of Land Tenure
Despite the oﬃ  cial status of most arable land as property of the state, 
the Ottoman Mediterranean has been described as a “sea of land pro-
prietors,” where state land had de jure, rather than de facto character 
(Hadjikyriacou 2011: 49). However, the Ottoman ways of administering 
land and property were inherently diﬀ erent from those of Europe. An 
obvious diﬀ erence lies in the absence of feudal structures in the Otto-
man realm and the concomitant lack of a propertied hereditary noble 
class that could impose servile obligations on the peasantry. Rather, it 
was the “signature” of the Ottoman Empire that state control drew its 
legitimacy of rule from its paternalist protection of the autonomy of the 
peasant population. It was the priority and ideal of the central state to 
act as guarantor for the independence of the peasantry and the peasants’ 
means of subsistence, to ensure the provision of the regional markets 
with agricultural goods, and to prohibit the excessive accumulation of 
land and resources by private individuals (İslamoğlu-İnan 1991: 58).
Th e empire administered land and resources in a “distributive-ac-
commodative state environment” that was inclusive of local forms of 
44 Irene Dietzel
land management and that ensured the loyalty of local authorities in 
the provinces through the distribution of state land and tax revenues 
(İslamoğlu 2004: 292). Th e Ottoman timar state economy depended on 
a particular system of land distribution, whereby the state leased land 
to tenants for cultivation, who in turn were expected to pay a portion of 
their revenue as taxes. Th e beneﬁ ciaries of these taxes were various local 
rulers or pre-Ottoman ruling groups, such as the Orthodox Church, yet 
they exercised no jurisdiction over the peasant producers. Jurisdiction 
over the peasantry lay with the kadı,3 who represented Sultanic law (örf ) 
and Shari’a. Th e central state thus remained the sole source of legitima-
tion for revenue collection (İslamoğlu-İnan 1991: 59).
Th e Ottoman agrarian landscape was thus fashioned by the cultiva-
tion patterns of small producers. Even under increased pressures of com-
mercial expansion following the integration of the Ottoman realm into 
the world market during the seventeenth century, this pattern did not 
change in any signiﬁ cant way. While market pressures would encour-
age the formation of large-scale commercial agriculture and single-crop 
plantations elsewhere in Europe, small-scale production patterns re-
mained predominant throughout the Ottoman realm (Keyder 1990).
In Cyprus, the Ottoman conquest of 1571 brought a change to the liv-
ing conditions of the local peasantry that was akin to a socio-economic 
revolution. By granting the peasants—hitherto serfs on the plantations 
of Latin feudal lords—the right to resettle and bequeath their leases on 
state land to their children, Ottoman rulers encouraged the emergence 
of subsistence agriculture as the predominant form of land use. Another 
important shift aﬀ ected the social stratiﬁ cation on the island. Th e com-
plex social stratiﬁ cation that had characterized the Latin period was re-
placed by a basic division of society into two major classes: a ruling class 
(askeri) consisting of imperial administrators, nobility, military oﬃ  cials, 
and religious clergy, and a large, tax-paying peasant class (reayah).
Th e emergence of a large and religiously heterogeneous peasant class, 
as well as the autonomy of small-scale cultivators were important factors 
in the development of local forms of coexistence. Until the mid-nineteenth 
century, taxes and tithes were exacted from the villages as a whole—this, 
one might argue, necessitated a certain degree of internal village solidar-
ity and thereby discouraged social or interethnic strife that could com-
promise the ability to meet tax requirements.4
Th e legal context of Ottoman land administration oﬀ ered another 
ﬂ exible system that could accommodate a multitude of claims. Questions 
pertaining to the way in which the formal category of state property 
(miri) blended with existing patterns of land ownership have been lit-
tle explored. Th e legal context that emerged, however, represents the 
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ability of the empire to respond to the cultural diversity throughout its 
provinces. Th e Ottoman Land Code reﬂ ects the complexity of the sys-
tem: promulgated by Sultan Abdul Mecid in 1858 during the Ottoman 
reform period, the Land Code aimed at modernizing the system of land 
tenure, but accommodated much of the old system within it. It set down 
no less than ﬁ ve types of categorization of land:5 the large part of arable 
land was state property (miri) that could be rented to individuals for 
cultivation. Th e tenant would have to hold a title deed to prove his, or 
her,6 rights to cultivate a particular plot. Th e tenant could also bequeath 
the lease to his, or her, children. Th e land could revert back into exclu-
sive state ownership if the tenant left it uncultivated over a period longer 
than three years. In the case of reversion, the tenant could still buy the 
rights back by payment of an equivalent sum. Th is provision, however, 
was rarely enforced.
A second category comprised all immovables that were full property, 
or freehold (mülk). Next to land and houses, also planted trees, such as 
orchards and vineyards, as well as water holdings would fall under this 
category. In the latter cases, the law envisioned a system of “multiple 
ownership.” A piece of land, for example, could be owned by the state 
and leased to a peasant, while the trees growing on this land, or the wa-
ter that irrigated it could be owned by another.
Th e full property of religious organizations, however, was not sub-
ject to the Ottoman Land Code, but rather to Shari’a law. While reli-
gious institutions were exempt from taxes, the revenue of these lands 
and properties, subsumed under the term evkaf, would be dedicated to 
religious and charitable purposes. Th e category of evkaf also included 
state-owned land, on which the tenant paid taxes and tithes to a reli-
gious organization and not to the state.
Th is communal purpose further deﬁ ned all land that was dedicated 
to the public (metruk), such as those tracts in the vicinity of settlements, 
which were assigned to the inhabitants of villages or towns as a whole. 
Th ese lands could not be individually possessed, bought, sold, inherited, 
or used for any other purpose other than that for which they were dis-
tinctly assigned ab antiquo. Th e category comprised communal forests, 
village pasture lands, public roads, and places of worship.
Finally, the remaining waste or rough-land (hali) could function as 
state land, while permission had to be granted for its use. All rights to 
utilization were revoked after three years of non-cultivation.
All of the above categories were important factors in the administra-
tion of Ottoman provinces. For the fabric of neighborhood, however, the 
particular stipulation for forms of multiple ownership may have been 
especially signiﬁ cant, since it legally bound together several individu-
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als as shareholders of one agricultural unit (such as irrigated orchards 
and multi-use ﬁ elds). Th is kind of shareholding not only necessitated a 
certain level of cooperation, it also fused together the interests of share-
holders in the functionality of the agricultural unit, thereby furthering a 
“sense of the commons”7 within the villages. To the quality of Ottoman 
neighborhoods, the system of land tenure added another realm of nego-
tiation and diplomacy—perhaps analogously to the “constructive ambi-
guity of belonging” in Ottoman neighborhoods (this volume, p. 21ﬀ ), 
the Ottoman Land Code and its multiple forms of property reﬂ ect an 
equally constructive ambiguity of ownership.
Reﬂ ections on the Mediterranean Landscape of Production
While anthropologists have questioned the idea that an area with as 
much linguistic and religious diversity as the Mediterranean may repre-
sent a cultural unit (especially Herzfeld 1984; Pina-Cabral 1989), there 
seems to be more agreement on the Braudelian view of the Mediter-
ranean as an ecological unit. Central works have identiﬁ ed the Med-
iterranean landscape as the fundament for a cultural distinction that 
nonetheless characterizes local traditions across the region (Braudel 
1972; Horden and Purcell 2000; Tabak 2008). While all of these works 
acknowledge the landscape as a Mediterranean characteristic of longue 
durée, they vary in their estimation of the geo-deterministic element 
in Mediterranean history. Still, the history of Mediterranean localities, 
and with it Cypriot neighborhood, proceeds from the environmental 
strategies of local agriculturalists and pastoralists who have altered the 
Mediterranean landscape in a lasting fashion, rendering it essentially 
anthropogenic. Such reciprocity of environmental and human history is 
reﬂ ected in Horden and Purcell’s concept of “micro-region.” It includes 
“obvious microtopographical identiﬁ ers,” such as the location of valleys, 
plains, or the sides of islands, characterized by their particular hydrol-
ogy, soil conditions, vegetation cover, and annual weather cycle. But it 
also encompasses the various human eﬀ ects on the landscape, such as 
the intensity of labor, the number of animals, and the speciﬁ c choices 
of productive strategies. Micro-regions are further determined by the 
locations they are functionally connected to, such as harbors or de-
tached pastures (Horden and Purcell 2000: 302). Traditional agriculture 
in Cyprus revolved around these micro-regions and the multitude of 
micro-economic opportunities they aﬀ orded. It is therefore important 
to imagine Cypriot rural neighborhoods and the “labor of peace” they 
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entailed as taking place within these micro-regions, rather than as con-
ﬁ ned to the residential settlements of the village.
Th e landscapes of production in Ottoman Cyprus resembled the 
“agro-sylvo-pastoral system” typical for the Mediterranean region 
(Blondel 2010; Schnabel 2004; Delipetrou et al. 2008; Tabak 2008). Th e 
combination of cereals, tree-crops, and small livestock that made up the 
core of Cypriot small-scale production bore signiﬁ cant socio-ecological 
advantages, as it helped to optimize the use of microclimatic and edaphic 
variations on the island. Interestingly, this polycultural strategy was shared 
by all peasants, irrespective of their ethno-communal aﬃ  liations. In con-
trast to other cases of similar mosaic co-residence of ethnic communi-
ties, the Cypriot peasantry did not develop “niche-speciﬁ c” agricultural 
practices (compare Barth 1956). Rather, both Muslim and Christian 
peasants used the environment in a similar fashion, while there was very 
little agricultural specialization in terms of ethno-typical preferences for 
either pastoralism or sedentary cultivation. Most households tended to 
exploit the full array of possibilities that polyculture could oﬀ er. In the 
semi-arid environment of the island these polycultural strategies as well 
as the agricultural mobility of Cypriots oﬀ ered eﬃ  cient ways to maxi-
mize the material basis for life even during periods of scarcity (Given 
2000; Harris 2004). In terms of land use and ownership, polycultural 
strategies, and with it the experience of neighborhood, were fashioned 
by the basic features of land fragmentation, shifting cultivation, and a 
complex system of irrigation.
Th e phenomenon of land fragmentation has been a characteristic pat-
tern of land use throughout Europe, especially in the Mediterranean. It 
is a result of local patterns of property distribution through inheritance 
systems, which in turn are subject to change according to demographic 
developments. While in many parts of Europe land fragmentation has 
been minimized through consolidation measures, it continues to be the 
central feature of the rural landscape in Cyprus. Typically, land fragmen-
tation is seen as a problematic historic relic that is incompatible with 
modern means of agriculture and eﬃ  cient production. While agrarian 
reformers of the mid-twentieth century lament the slow and insuﬃ  cient 
implementation of consolidation measures (Shaw 1963; Lanitis 1992 
[1944]; Christodoulou 1959), they misread or disregard the social and 
ecological dimensions of land fragmentation. More recent work sug-
gests that under Mediterranean island conditions, land fragmentation 
holds signiﬁ cant advantages for the local population, by managing the 
risk of harvest loss, water shortages or pests (Bentley 1987). In socio-
genic terms, the dispersal of land holdings is conducive to a very partic-
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ular form of agricultural cooperation that establishes a property relation 
beyond the level of the village neighborhood. Land fragmentation also 
engenders what Horden and Purcell call “structural absenteeism,” a sys-
tem that allows the cultivation of scattered ﬁ elds with the help of other 
labor-providers who live closer to the particular piece of land (2000: 280). 
Sharecropping thus alleviates the problems arising from the geographical 
separation of holdings, forges micro-economic relations across remote 
villages and maintains the connection between dispersed micro-regions.
Fragmented holdings are thus more suited to a system of “shifting 
cultivation,” which is also known as “swidden” or “slash-and-burn-agri-
culture” (Horden and Purcell 2000: 264; Dove and Carpenter 2008: 26).8 
Until the nineteenth century, the method of clearing vegetation within 
a cycle of cultivation was an integral part of local practices in Cyprus, 
especially for vine plantations. It also incorporated the grazing of goats 
as part of the land-use cycle and thus occasioned the cooperation of 
shepherds and farmers of one region. Th e strategy requires a profound 
knowledge of soil types and the ability to predict soil quality from veg-
etation cover. As Christodoulou notes for the Cypriot peasant, it was a 
highly empirical knowledge that was “inherited together with the land” 
(1959: 41); one might add that developing such expertise must have been 
a central subject of daily communication among neighbors.
Finally, strategies of irrigation require the highest amount of coor-
dination and negotiation. In Ottoman Cyprus, the use of surface water 
for irrigation was predominant and depended on a complex system of 
regulation. In mountainous regions, especially on the southern slopes of 
the Troodos Mountains, water had to be used eﬀ ectively to avoid water 
run-oﬀ  to the sea. Th is was envisaged through an intricate distribution 
of rights to irrigation, i.e., shares or holdings, which could be subdivided 
according to the needs of the local population.9 Land and water sources 
were held separately and were subject to the stipulations of multiple 
ownership. Interestingly, rather than providing top-down regulations 
through a central irrigation scheme, the Ottoman government accom-
modated traditional systems of distribution that had proved successful 
over time, and formalized them as part of the legal system. Th is was set 
down in Article 6 of Ottoman Civil Law: “Ab antiquo is left in its ab an-
tiquo state” (Christodoulou 1959: 90). Consequently, local ways of water 
management depended on constant negotiations among the many par-
ticipants of local agricultural networks. Th e provision of the Ottoman 
government to give priority to long-established arrangements required 
the participants to give testimony based on memory, which resulted 
in frequent disputes (Ibid.). However, the use of water resources also 
formed a very practical focus of alliances across ethno-religious borders. 
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Frequently, the inhabitants of villages or entire regions took joint ac-
tion to ensure the water routing in their favor. One example comes from 
the mixed village of Kolossi, whose inhabitants in 1900 took joint action 
against a Greek Cypriot outsider who attempted to own all water rights 
in the region, in order to lease them back to the peasants. Local farmers 
forged such ad hoc alliances not only within villages, but also regionally. 
Such was the case in the villages of Styllos, Limnia, and Gaidhouras, all 
of which competed over water with the village of Prastio, leading the 
Muslim and Christian villagers to sign a joint petition against the water 
routing (Asmussen 2001: 138). Th ese are just two out of numerous ex-
amples of water negotiations in which the ethno-religious identities of 
the quarrelling parties were rarely of any signiﬁ cance.
Colonial Land Reforms and the Commodiﬁ cation of Property 
(1946–1974)
So far, the modernization of land use has received only cursory attention 
in the study of the Cyprus conﬂ ict (Scott 1998; Heinritz 1975). Rarely is 
the abandonment of traditional land use patterns understood as a loss. 
On the contrary, the modernization of the agricultural sector is over-
whelmingly seen as an advantage for society, as it guarantees the food 
security of a growing population and ensures the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector through rationalization and an increase in proﬁ tabil-
ity. However, the social and cultural consequences that accompany these 
transformations are often underestimated in their complexity.
Th e Ottoman Land Code continued to be in eﬀ ect until it was ﬁ nally 
abolished during the Land Reform of 1946. Depending on national per-
spective, the persistence of the Ottoman system under British rule has 
received diﬀ erent evaluation. Th e Turkish Cypriot perspective empha-
sizes the idea of its eﬃ  cacy and sophistication as reasons for its contin-
uation. To the modernizing minds of urban Greek Cypriots, however, 
both the Ottoman Land Code and the prevalent system of inheritance 
were considered backward, inappropriate, and in dire need of reform. 
As Christodoulou puts it: “Ownership in Cyprus is diﬀ use, fragmented 
and complicated. It militates against smooth transactions and rational 
economic land use” (1959: 85).
It was this “rational economic land use” that formed the main pur-
pose of the land reforms of 1946. Th e Immovable Property Law of 1946 
reformed tenure, registration, and valuation of land. It simpliﬁ ed the 
complex Ottoman Land Code by subsuming the diverse types of land 
under the two categories of “state land” and “private property.” It also 
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made provisions that targeted the abolition of the system of multiple 
ownership. Buildings and trees on a piece of land, as well as the land itself 
represented one agricultural unit, and as such were now to be the prop-
erty of one and the same owner. Th e bill also aimed at limiting further 
fragmentation of land holdings, prescribing one dönüm10 for arable land 
and one dönüm for vineyard, orchard, or irrigated land as the smallest 
acceptable size (Lanitis 1992: 4). In addition, the land reform foresaw the 
consolidation of land holdings, in part as a necessary measure for the 
construction of water dams.
Th e consolidation law, which went into planning in 1956, met with 
repeated and ﬁ erce opposition from landowners, and only passed in 
1969 (Heinritz 1975: 33). From the reformers’ perspective, the peasants’ 
opposition to agricultural reforms was nothing more than tedious paro-
chialism. “Government has failed to realize that the peasant-farmer is 
by nature, as suspicious, obstinate and unprogressive as any human be-
ing can be. Th e whole world to him is his land, his home and the village 
coﬀ ee-shop. He would never go to the nearest town or even write to ob-
tain advice. In fact, he would often treat any friendly suggestion as to the 
crops he grows or the way he cultivates his land as one made against his 
proper interests” (Lanitis 1992 [1944]: 70). Yet, acts of opposition against 
land reforms also contained an ethno-political dimension. According to 
the Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defense, the land consolidation mea-
sures of the early 1960s constituted a kind of Greek “land-grabbing exer-
cise” that violated the constitution (Örek 1971).
Th e agricultural reforms mark an important shift from traditional 
land use patterns to modern ones. Certainly, local patterns of land use 
were slow to change. Th e reforms not only met with repeated opposi-
tion of farmers but were also compromised by the inevitable inertia of 
a well-established system. However, legal foundations were laid down 
with the new law, while former practices of land use were marginal-
ized as backward impediments to progress and prosperity. In ecological 
terms, the land reform entailed the discontinuation and eventual loss of 
environmental practices that were well-adapted to the Mediterranean 
environment of the island. Th e commodiﬁ cation of land and the institu-
tionalization of individual property as the sole form of ownership, which 
was to change property relations and social dynamics within Cypriot so-
ciety, permitted the rise of a dynamic real estate market. Clothed in the 
guise of modernization, the land reform of 1946 thus literally removed 
the “ground” for trans-societal environmental cooperation, and should 
be included as a key date in the chronology of the Cyprus conﬂ ict.
Th e ﬁ rst part of the twentieth century sees a gradual transforma-
tion of the traditional rural economy of Cyprus, furthered along by the 
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processes of urbanization and emigration. By the mid-century, most 
landowners no longer depended on agriculture as their sole source of 
income. According to the census of 1960, only about 50 percent of the 
privately owned arable land was being cultivated by the owner, while 
about 40 percent of agricultural land belonged to “non-farmers” (Hein-
ritz 1975: 34). As a result, the system of management farming estab-
lished itself as the dominant form of agricultural work, replacing other 
models of communal work, such as shareholding or cooperative farming 
(Heinritz 1975: 63).
In addition to this decoupling of land ownership from agricultural la-
bor, the value of land was now determined within the context of a thriv-
ing real estate market. Th e prices for the diﬀ erent types of land were 
subject to high regional variability and reﬂ ected the priorities of urban-
ization and of newly emergent industries, above all the tourism sector.11 
Most lucrative were those pieces of land that were suitable for construc-
tion, such as the dry land in the plains of the urban outskirts of Nicosia, 
but also the coastal areas, which due to their sandy soil and salty ground 
water had not been useful for cultivation.
Despite the decline of the actively farming population, agricultural 
productivity increased steadily. Th is was mainly achieved on perennially 
irrigated ﬁ elds (such as citrus plantations), which yielded more produce 
in comparison to dry farming in areas that depended on seasonal rain-
fall. Th e proliferation of this form of intensive agriculture was furthered 
by government-subsidized construction of the water infrastructure nec-
essary for the transformation of dry land into irrigated land. Th e increas-
ingly invasive ways of tapping ground water created an unsustainable 
industry that further contributed to the severe water shortages on the 
island (Heinritz 1975: 200). Th is problem was also exacerbated through 
market speculations. In many cases, the owner who had installed the 
infrastructure for irrigation on a piece of land did not intend to use it for 
agricultural purposes, but rather planned to resell it for a higher price. 
Th is form of “upgrading” dry land was conducted without regard for 
groundwater limitations, putting the entire form of irrigated farming at 
risk (Ibid.: 78).
Th e advances in agriculture and the proﬁ ts of the real estate market 
did not beneﬁ t the farming population, but rather those who did not de-
pend on agricultural income. “Non-farmers”—urban Cypriots (doctors, 
lawyers or government oﬃ  cials), British customers, or Cypriots living in 
Britain—were thus at ease to buy land solely to use it as asset for market 
speculation (Heinritz 1975: 92).12
Th e real estate market not only catalyzed the emergence of a new 
land-holding class; it also provided another setting in which the Cyprus 
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conﬂ ict unfolded, not least because it provided the possibility to accumu-
late the ﬁ nancial resources necessary for political campaigns. Between 
1950 and 1970, the Orthodox Church sold large portions of its real estate, 
in part to further the activities of EOKA, the Greek national paramilitary 
organization that fought against British colonial rule and for the union of 
Cyprus with Greece (Enosis). Th e Orthodox Church also retained sub-
stantial assets, especially those in the non-agrarian sector (Heinritz 1975: 
86). Moreover, it was within the context of the land market in which the 
inequalities between the ethnic groups were ﬁ rst manifest and where dis-
crimination against the Turkish Cypriot minority took material form.
Th is is exempliﬁ ed in the land transactions following the ﬁ rst violent 
clashes between the communities. In the course of the intercommunal 
ﬁ ghting of 1963–64, a large part of the Turkish Cypriot population emi-
grated to enclaves under Turkish Cypriot administration. Th e relocation 
mainly aﬀ ected Turkish Cypriots from mixed villages, as well as from 
smaller Turkish villages that were surrounded by predominantly Greek 
settlements. According to Turkish Cypriot sources, approximately 20,000 
people (about 20 percent of the entire community) left their homes in 
order to move to the enclaves.13 Only a quarter of the total number of 
refugees returned to their homes in the following years. By 1970 about 
15,000 members of the Turkish Cypriot community remained displaced 
(Heinritz 1975: 89).14
Maintaining a normal life and economy within the various enclaves 
that lay scattered over the island constituted a very complicated logis-
tical act (Brey and Heinritz 1988). Given the mixed settlement patterns 
and the extension of traditional agricultural networks, Turkish Cypriots’ 
land holdings, too, were dispersed and fragmented. Enclave conditions 
now made it diﬃ  cult to cultivate or even access those Turkish Cypriot 
properties that were located too far from the enclave. Some of these 
holdings remained deserted, while others were used by Greek Cypriots 
who could be persuaded to pay a lease on them. Th e threat of planned 
and systematic acquisitions of Turkish Cypriot land by Greek Cypriots 
prompted the Turkish Cypriot leadership to issue a ruling that restricted 
all sales to intra-communal deeds or, if inter-communal, to exchanges 
with Greek Cypriot property of equal value. However, this ruling was 
often circumvented by exchanging the land in question with Greek Cy-
priot property of lesser value, while the diﬀ erence was paid out covertly 
(Heinritz 1975: 90).
In retrospect, the shared spaces of Ottoman Cyprus appear a far-re-
moved reality. Certainly, ethnic boundaries did not dissolve within the 
peasant context, yet they often remained secondary in the face of a com-
mon peasant lifestyle that was based on shared agricultural practices 
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and environmental strategies. Th e relative lack of social stratiﬁ cation in 
Ottoman society, the mosaic co-residence of Christians and Muslims 
as well the predominance of cooperative strategies of polyculture facil-
itated the dissemination of what might be called a “common concept of 
nature” across ethnic divides. In other words, neighbors shared similar 
sets of botanical, zoological, and edaphic knowledge of their region, ex-
changed in day-to-day communication and encoded in many local reli-
gious customs and folklore practices.15
From Land Dispute to Property Issue: 
Reconsidering the “Ground” of Coexistence and Conﬂ ict
Under Ottoman conditions of coexistence, land disputes appear as com-
mon forms of conﬂ ict between the particular interests of local resource 
user groups. Th ese conﬂ icts rarely produced ethnic discord; rather they 
provided reasons for inter-ethnic solidarity. In that way, property dis-
putes of the Ottoman and early British period diﬀ er substantially from 
those conﬂ icts that make up the current “property issue,” or the dispute 
over properties that has emerged since the island’s division in 1974. Th e 
latter arises from the discrepancies between Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
estimations of the actual land holdings of their communities, the treat-
ment of the property left behind by the displaced population, as well 
as the conﬂ icting claims for restitution versus remission of property. 
Its history is a recent one. To the Turkish Cypriot community, it also 
echoes the losses of land through colonial intervention, such as the dis-
tribution of Evkaf (plural of vakıf, or religious foundation) properties to 
Orthodox peasants during the early part of British rule; Turkish Cypriot 
accusations of “land grabbing” during the agricultural reform period; or 
the sales of Turkish Cypriot properties to Greek Cypriots following the 
ﬁ rst wave of displacement after 1963. While these modern land disputes 
seem to have lost the particularity of local neighborhood interests, they 
convey the impression of uniform ethnic communities with essentially 
opposing interests in the matter. Since the 1990s, the issue has gained 
an international dimension through several legal cases against Turkey 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights by Greek Cypriot in-
dividuals, who decided to take measures against their expropriation 
following their displacement in 1974 (for a discussion of the “property 
issue,” see Scott 1998; Gürel and Özersay 2006; Kyriacou 2009; Trim-
ikliniotis and Sojka 2012).
Still, it is helpful to conceive of the current “property issue” as just 
a recent facet of the long history of inter-ethnic property relations in 
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Cyprus. Th e issue has lost nothing of its historical complexity and rep-
resents the one aspect of the conﬂ ict that proves the hardest to solve. 
Th ere is one feature common to all attempts at restitution, remission, 
and compensation of property: in order to allow for a smooth transac-
tion, the value of land has to be redeﬁ ned in terms of its monetary, or 
market, value. While the commodiﬁ cation of land and houses may seem 
a practical step toward a solution of individual disputes, the historical, 
biographical, and deeply emotional baggage associated with these con-
tested properties is not easily eradicated. On both sides of the border, 
Cypriots continue to “assert a model of property as embodying partic-
ular places, social relationships and personal histories in which … the 
‘other side’ and the idea of the island ‘as a whole’ play a part” (Scott 1998: 
158). Th e current “property issue” thus reverberates a long history of 
deep involvement of people with their physical environment, a history 
that is enmeshed in the fabric of mixed settlements and agricultural net-
works. Its Mediterranean characteristics as well as the complexity of the 
Ottoman system of land tenure were central parameters for local conﬁ g-
urations of coexistence. Th e history of Cypriot property relations should 
therefore be explored for its potential for future solutions rather than 
seen as an old-fashioned relic of the past.
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Notes
 1. Th is applied primarily to the properties that were subject to agricultural 
use, like ﬁ elds, gardens, or grazing grounds. Residential patterns, however, 
displayed a number of ethnic diﬀ erences in terms of spatial organization. 
Muslim villages, as well as Muslim family homesteads in mixed villages, 
were characterized by a larger inner domestic sphere, given the religious 
reasons for the spatial segregation of women. In contrast, neighborhood 
relations in Greek villages tended to be maintained in the open (Charalam-
bous 1998). Th e rural context also diﬀ ered from the urban settings of the 
island’s towns and villages. Here, spatial segregation of ethnic communities 
was more prevalent, probably due to the occupational specialization of eth-
nic communities in distinct crafts and trades (Rizopoulou-Egoumenidou 
2009: 234).
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 2. In 1960, the proportion of urban to rural population was 38.1 percent to 
61.9 percent (of a total population of 573,500). In 1973, 42.2 percent of Cy-
priots lived in urban areas, while the rural population amounted to 57.8 
percent (of a population of 631,800) (Brey and Heinritz 1988: 12).
 3. A state-appointed judge who rules according to Islamic Law.
 4. Th e fact that internal solidarity of local communities and the tax-paying 
ability of their villages were closely linked is also emphasized by Hadjikyr-
iacou. Th e levy of a “lump sum” (maktu) from entire villages thus necessi-
tated a certain level of cooperation, which was in peril when the economic 
situation was dire (2011: 277).
 5. Th e summary of the Ottoman Land Code is adapted from the works of 
Harris (2007: 176ﬀ ) and Christodoulou (1959: 72ﬀ ).
 6. See Jennings (1999) on the established property rights of women in the 
Ottoman legal system.
 7. Th e “commons” are deﬁ ned here as those natural resources that are accessi-
ble to all members of a local community. It has been the subject of a lengthy 
debate whether all human societies are bound to deplete the commons 
through actions of unconstrained individual self-interest (Hardin 1968), or 
whether traditional or indigenous societies have developed mechanisms to 
protect and maintain them. 
 8. Colonialists have usually portrayed the phenomenon of shifting cultivation 
with negative connotations—a fact that reﬂ ects a limited understanding of 
this form of agriculture. French colonialists termed this method “nomad-
isme agricole,” Dutch colonialists called it “roofbouw” (robber agriculture) 
(Dove and Carpenter 2008: 26). In Cyprus, the British colonialists called 
this method “ﬁ tful cultivation” (Harris 2007: 138).
 9. Christodoulou gives the following example: “A holding [of water] here re-
fers to each owner’s aggregate holding that is made up of a number of reg-
istered rights to irrigation on various occasions in a number of localities 
within the village area with water from the various divisions of the Kythrea 
Spring. Such rights are more often held in undivided shares, the co-owners 
being at times numerous. Th e largest aggregate holding, amounting to 183 
hours every fortnight, is that of a parish church; the least does not exceed 
12 seconds in the fortnight. About one-quarter of the owners of water pos-
sess neither land nor trees” (Christodoulou 1959: 90).
10. Th e dönüm is an aerial measurement used widely throughout the Ottoman 
Empire. In Cyprus it came to denote an area of approximately one thousand 
square meters. Th e dönüm was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century 
in an eﬀ ort to standardize, replacing the çift as measuring unit for arable 
land, which deﬁ ned an area that could be ploughed by a pair of oxen in a 
day. Th e çift varied throughout the empire according to the climatic and 
topographical conditions of the locality (İslamoğlu 2004: 297).
11. Th e tourism industry grew substantially in the years 1966–67, once the 
upheavals of the conﬂ ict of 1963–64 had ebbed. At that time the number 
of foreign arrivals to Cyprus increased yearly by 25 percent. Th e northern 
coast of the island experienced the fastest growth rates of touristic devel-
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opment. By 1974, the district of Kyrenia had recorded the most land sales 
(Heinritz 1975: 80).
12. In most cases, the construction of hotels followed after the plot of land had 
changed its proprietor. Th e ﬁ rst sales of dry land aﬀ ected the group of “full-
time farmers”—Cypriot peasants who depended entirely on agricultural 
work for income. While the land was purchased for its agricultural value, it 
was resold following a re-estimation of its value for the building and tourist 
sectors, often at several times the original price (Heinritz 1975: 81–85).
13. Th e number of Turkish villages left deserted was 112, while Turkish Cypri-
ots left 59 of the 146 mixed villages (Heinritz 1975: 89).
14. Alternative sources cite an even higher number of displaced Turkish Cypri-
ots, estimating a total of 25,000 displaced persons, while only about 2,000 
were able to return by 1970 (www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net).
15. In Ottoman Cyprus, local religious practices tended to blur, rather than 
accentuate diﬀ erences of ethno-religious belonging. As in other Mediter-
ranean settings, the peasant context of Cyprus holds numerous examples 
of shared practices of devotion, common places of worship and even entire 
syncretic communities. For an involved discussion, see Dietzel (2014). 
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[• Chapter 2 •]
Intersecting Religioscapes 
in Post-Ottoman Spaces
Trajectories of Change, Competition, 
and Sharing of Religious Spaces
ROBERT M. HAYDEN
Introduction
The term “post-Ottoman space” seems to be unproblematic: places 
that had been part of the Ottoman Empire, but then ceased to be so. Yet 
the matter is hardly simple. Th e Ottoman Empire, like many other pol-
ities, expanded and then contracted. Th us Pecs, Hungary, and for that 
matter, Budapest, which were within the Ottoman Empire at its farthest 
reaches in central Europe in the late seventeenth century, should be 
considered as much post-Ottoman space as the Balkan territories that 
were the last to be “liberated,” in 1912, even though Ottoman rule in 
Hungary and Croatia ended more than two centuries earlier than it did 
in Macedonia and Albania. At the other extreme, we cannot speak of 
“Ottoman space” before there was at least an Ottoman state, if not yet 
empire. Th is means that we must look at the varieties of transformations 
of the ﬁ rst Ottoman capital, Bursa, over a very long period—from 1326 
until the end of Ottoman rule there, ﬁ rst by the Greek occupation in 
1920–22, then by the achievement of control there by the forces of the 
new Turkish state, as well as the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 and 
the founding of the Republic in 1923. Th ere was not simply an Ottoman 
Empire and then post-Ottoman period, even in that one city. Th e varia-
tions in historical periods, national groups, and other elements of Otto-
man history are at least as complex as those of any other major empire, 
so looking for commonalities in the making and unmaking of space as 
“Ottoman” from Budapest to Basra, and from Sarajevo to Kars, would 
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seem an impossible task, even were we not to consider the historical 
trajectory of a single place, like Bursa from 1326 through 1923. 
Yet there was a common way of marking a territory as Ottoman, from 
the very start of the Empire. From the founder of the dynasty, Osman, 
through the last Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed VI, the Ottoman ruler was a 
Muslim and the Ottoman state was grounded on Islam. Th is was noth-
ing unusual, of course. From the very beginning of Islam, Muslims con-
fronted Byzantium, and Muslim leaders who became rulers did so by 
conquering territories ruled until then by Christians (Evans and Ratliﬀ  
2012). Th e Christian populations did not disappear, but they were sub-
ordinated to Muslims, and this subordination took the form of, among 
other things, imposing physical signs of the superiority of Islam on land-
scapes that had until then been marked by signs of the superiority of 
Christianity. With the weakening or collapse of Ottoman authority in 
various regions of the Balkans, as shown below, these markers of Muslim 
dominance were supplanted by markers of Christian dominance. Th is 
means that there were common ways of marking territory that became 
Ottoman, on the one hand, and post-Ottoman, on the other, reﬂ ect-
ing the fact that the Christian and Muslim populations were engaged 
in what a Bulgarian historian, analyzing four hundred years of interac-
tion between Muslims and Christians at key religious sites in the former 
Bulgarian capital of Veliko Tarnovo, calls “mutual provocation” (Parveva 
2002: 52), a pattern of interaction that my colleagues and I have deﬁ ned 
more generally as “antagonistic tolerance” (Hayden 2002), explained 
below.
Other chapters in this volume examine forms of diﬀ erence such as 
gender and class, rather than religion, and Rebecca Bryant in her in-
troduction reminds us of Karen Barkey’s argument that the Ottoman 
Empire valued diﬀ erences. Bryant also notes that the extent to which 
religious distinctions mattered in daily life “diﬀ ered between village and 
town, between center and periphery, and between diﬀ erent periods of 
Ottoman rule” (this volume, p. 13). Yet it is necessary to recall that there 
was a hierarchy of statuses, using the model of hierarchy proposed by 
Louis Dumont and recently reinvigorated by Joel Robbins, in which the 
superior value encompasses the inferior one (Dumont 1980; Robbins 
and Siikala 2014). In the Ottoman Empire and in post-Ottoman spaces, 
the religious identity was superior to the others, in that each of these 
others was encompassed within it. For example, a woman would rarely 
be seen as only that, but would of necessity be regarded by others, and 
regard herself, as a Muslim woman, or a Christian one, or a Jewish one, 
to give major classiﬁ cations; there are other possibilities within these 
larger categories (Baumgarten 2008; Green 2008). Similarly, peasants 
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were not just a single category of tax-paying common people; they were 
also grouped as Muslims or alternatively, as various speciﬁ ed others, 
who were subject to taxes not imposed on Muslims. While patterns of 
interaction varied between city and countryside, this seems also to have 
involved individuals dealing with each other as members of religious 
communities. Minority communities sometimes had greater autonomy 
in the countryside than in cities, but their autonomy was tenuous since 
there could still be overriding involvement from the metropolitan center 
(Catlos 2014).
Diﬀ erences between members of diﬀ erent religious communities in 
formerly Ottoman spaces were and are marked by names, some food 
prohibitions, following diﬀ erent ritual calendars, and overwhelmingly, 
endogamous marriages. In this last category, while Muslim men could 
take non-Muslim women as wives, the reverse was not true. Further-
more, conversion could only be into Islam, conversion from Islam being 
strongly negatively sanctioned. Focusing on the changing formations 
of religious dominance is thus not only a way to identify Ottoman and 
post-Ottoman spaces, but also to identify a primary social category that 
encompassed other elements of identity, which were subordinated to re-
ligious identity.
Of course, recognizing the importance of the categories of religious 
identities reinforced in multiple ways is not to assert that there is some 
essential quality to any of them, but rather only to recognize the impor-
tance of social phenomena: people themselves used these categories, ap-
parently believing in their validity even as they may often have adopted 
cultural practices from each other. In this regard, I must question the 
position asserted in some other chapters in this volume, that the bor-
ders between the religious communities were “blurred” when members 
identifying themselves as belonging to diﬀ erent religions interacted. A 
leading researcher in the ﬁ eld summed up the ﬁ ndings of a volume on 
sharing religious sites in the Mediterranean by saying that “while the hy-
brid practices are striking, mixing with individuals of a diﬀ erent religion 
does not result, so to speak, in any evident damage to existing religious 
identities. Indeed, these ‘transgressions’ usually appear to be associated 
with the original religious polarization” (Albera 2012: 243). Such contin-
ued “polarizations” are a common ﬁ nding of researchers on sites shared 
by members of diﬀ erent religious communities.
Sharing of sites does not mean sharing of identity. I am reminded 
of the Ottoman-era tombstones exhibited inside a Bulgarian museum 
that in situ had shown Muslim names in the Arabic script above ground, 
but also carried crosses with Christian names, in Cyrillic, below ground, 
both names referring to the same person. Even obvious syncretism does 
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not lead to shared identities. Observational studies of Christians and 
Muslims at shrines frequently attended by members of both groups have 
been very clear: from Hasluck in 1913 through very recent studies in 
Bulgaria nearly a century later, members of these communities main-
tain their separate religious identities, and avoid engaging in some of the 
characteristic forms of worship of the other religion. As one recent study 
put it, at sites in which members of two or more religious communities 
interact, “[c]ooperation between believers from diﬀ erent religious tradi-
tions should not be mistaken for religious syncretism. Deep down, this 
… is a cultural strategy developed by members of both groups for an-
ti-syncretic purposes, that is to preserve the religious autonomy of each 
group” (Lubanska 2013: 107). We have no reason to believe that such 
strategies were diﬀ erent in the Ottoman period.
If we pay attention to the processes of marking and unmarking Otto-
man space through manifestations of dominance of Islam or Christian-
ity, we are forced to consider the circumstances under which they take 
place, and thus also the trajectories of relations between the religious 
communities. Seen in this light, “peaceful coexistence” is not so much a 
condition that can be disrupted, as a manifestation of relations at times 
when the dominance of one group over another is so ﬁ rmly established 
that it need not be imposed, and cannot be much countered. By focusing 
on the physical forms used to mark dominance, we can also trace the tra-
jectories of domination and its decline, and thus of periods of peaceful 
interaction with those of contestation.
Marking and Unmarking Space as Ottoman
Let us begin with the very start of Ottoman rule in Bursa. Osman died 
two years before Bursa was captured, but his son and successor Orhan 
had him buried in the most prominent building of the formerly Chris-
tian town, the “silver dome” of a monastery complex (Çağaptay 2011: 
52–53). Upon his own death, Orhan was buried in the main church 
of the same complex (Ibid.). Çağaptay argues that the early Ottomans 
thereby “transferred the confessional loci” in the city by adapting these 
Byzantine religious structures into their developing Ottoman design. In 
so doing, she argues, the Ottomans were demonstrating conquest and 
power, but also incorporation of Christian elements into their empire 
(Çağaptay 2011: 64–65). Th us we have apparent syncretism, but in an 
eﬀ ort to persuade Christians to accept the legitimacy of Muslim rule 
and even, possibly, emphasize the continuity of Islam with Christianity. 
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Such appropriation of the most prominent Christian structures was 
a common feature of Ottoman conquest, as seen at Constantinople in 
1453, Belgrade in 1521, and Pecs in 1545. In all of these cases, literally 
the ﬁ rst action of the conquering Ottoman (Mehmet II in Constantino-
ple, Suleyman in Belgrade and Pecs) was to convert the largest church 
into a mosque. Th ereafter, in all of these cases, the city soon came to be 
dominated by mosques and other structures associated with Islam, and 
in ways that quite literally imposed Muslim dominance on the cities.
Th e early Ottoman development of Bursa has recently been studied 
using advanced geo-spatial technologies. Employing GIS data and vari-
ous mapping techniques, a Turkish–Japanese research team found that 
the ﬁ rst Ottoman mosques were placed so as to maximize their visibility 
throughout the city. Th ese researchers suggest that the Ottoman emper-
ors controlled the city through the strategic placement of mosques in 
what had been a Christian city (Dostoğlu et al. 2004). A later publication 
by members of the same team argued that not only was one of the largest 
mosques built on a site of high visibility, but that after the mosque was 
built the road network was altered to increase the mosque’s visibility 
even further (Kensuke et al. 2004).
Çağaptay sees the transformation of Bursa as a model for later Ot-
toman adaptations of conquered Christian towns, in the region and 
beyond. Another tendency was to build outward from the old town in 
ways that were more clearly Muslim in origin and did not connect to the 
Byzantine past. In fact, Bursa’s contested history continued: the Greek 
army conquered it in the invasion of 1920 and held it as their headquar-
ters until their defeat and withdrawal in 1922. We know that they re-
converted Byzantine churches that had been converted into mosques in 
nearby towns such as Trilye/Triglia and Iznik/Nicea, but we do not have 
details of those conversions, which were in any event reversed after not 
only the Greek army but the Christian civilian population was driven 
out in 1922–23 (Hayden et al. 2011). Remarkably, however, in October 
2012, renovations in the Muradiye Mosque (1426) in Bursa revealed 
blue stencils of Greek ﬂ ags under the whitewash, obviously from the 
time of Greek rule in 1920–22, but unknown until now (personal com-
munication from Dr. Tuğba Tanyeri-Erdemir, 13 October 2012). Th ese 
Greek national icons indicate that the Greeks converted the mosque to 
their own use at that time.
Since marking a space as Ottoman involved imposing a Muslim iden-
tity on major Christian structures within it, and then expanding the vis-
ibility of Islamic structures in a town, the reverse process also held true: 
de-Ottomanization (at least outside the territory of today’s Turkey) was 
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marked by replacing the dominance of Muslim structures by dominant 
Christian ones.
Th e case of Pecs is interesting. Th e Mosque of Kasim Pasha was built 
between 1543 and 1545 on the site of what had been St. Bartholomew’s 
Church and using the stones of that church, but was (re)converted into 
a Catholic church when the Ottomans were forced from Pecs, and re-
mains such today (Bachmann and Bachman 2010). Th is was hardly an 
unusual case. In Belgrade, following the 1521 Ottoman conquest, ev-
ery church was destroyed or converted until the Hungarians took the 
place in 1688 and then all mosques were converted or destroyed. After 
the Ottomans took it again in 1690 they repaired the damaged mosques 
and built a new one; but when the Austrians took the city in 1717 they 
promptly destroyed the mosques or converted them. Th e Ottomans re-
turned in 1739 and again tore down churches while setting up mosques; 
the third Austrian occupation from 1789 to 1791, again saw the destruc-
tion or conversion of mosques, until the ﬁ nal Ottoman conquest of Bel-
grade in 1791 led, again, to the repair of mosques and the destruction of 
churches. Among the very ﬁ rst actions taken by Karađorđe, the leader 
of the First Serbian Uprising, when his troops took control of Belgrade 
in 1806, was to convert the largest mosque into an Orthodox church. 
Figure 2.1. Minaret on the fourteenth century St. Nicholas Church in 
Famagusta, Cyprus, converted into a mosque after the Ottoman conquest 
in the sixteenth century. Aya Sofya mosque until 1954, then renamed Lala 
Mustafa Paşa Mosque (photo by Robert M. Hayden, October 2011).
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While that uprising was suppressed in 1813, with Belgrade retaken and 
the church reconverted into a mosque, with the establishment of the 
Serbian principality in 1830 the power of the Ottomans was in decline, 
so that when they were ﬁ nally forced to abandon Belgrade in 1867, only 
Figure 2.2. St. Nicholas Church, Chania, Crete. Venetian fourteenth cen-
tury Catholic church, converted into a mosque by Ottomans in 1645, then 
into a Greek Orthodox church in 1918. Note truncated minaret (photo by 
Robert M. Hayden, May 2015).
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one small mosque remained in operation, and remains so today (on all 
of this history, see Hayden 2005).
Soﬁ a, Bulgaria, saw a history similar to that of Belgrade, with the Ot-
tomans destroying churches or converting them into mosques, and the 
newly liberated Bulgarian state destroying mosques or converting them 
into Bulgarian Orthodox churches (Hayden et al. 2011). Such cycles of 
destruction/conversion/reconversion were not limited to capitals. One 
of my favorite examples is the present-day Church of the Resurrected 
Christ in Čačak, Serbia. Th e church still has visible signs of its last in-
carnation as a mosque between 1738 and 1805; but between 1560, when 
the ﬁ rst mosque was built on the site by destroying a church there, until 
1738, the town changed hands numerous times and the building went 
through several cycles of transformation from mosque to church and 
back again (Rajić and Timotijević 2011).
What marked a space as Ottoman, then, was the imposition of Mus-
lim religious structures in primary locations in the town or city con-
cerned, while marking it as no longer Ottoman involved displacing these 
Muslim structures with Christian ones. Th is does not mean that, in ei-
ther case, all of the religious structures of the group that was suddenly 
subordinated would be transformed or destroyed. On the contrary, we 
know that very soon after taking Constantinople, Mehmet II issued or-
ders giving rights to the remaining Greek population and protecting 
many of their churches (Inalcik 1969/70), and even though the Hagia 
Sophia was immediately converted into a mosque, some of the Christian 
iconography on the walls remained for decades afterwards (Necipoğlu 
1992). One small Byzantine church in Istanbul, St. Mary of the Mon-
gols, was never converted and remains functioning as a Greek Ortho-
dox church. Similarly, in Belgrade and Soﬁ a, there are still functioning 
Ottoman-era mosques, albeit small ones. In Triglea/Trilye, already men-
tioned, the Ottomans did indeed convert the largest of the Byzantine 
churches there into a mosque in the sixteenth century, but ﬁ ve other 
large churches remained functioning in a town that was overwhelmingly 
majority Christian until the “population exchange” of 1923 forced the 
Christian population to leave for Greece (Hayden et al. 2011).
Being marked by the Ottoman conquest in all of these places was 
Muslim dominance over Christianity; this was the primary indicator 
that a space was indeed Ottoman. And when a territory was brought out 
of Ottoman rule, the physical markers of Muslim dominance—mosques, 
minarets, türbes, and other structures—were destroyed or displaced by 
more prominent Christian structures: churches, bell towers, and the 
like (see, e.g., Mišković 2011 on the transformations of urban space in 
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Belgrade during the transition from Ottoman to Serbian national rule). 
Th is form of marking was constant, from the beginning of the empire 
until past its end, and this consistency through time provides a means to 
analyze the coexistence of the religious communities in the Ottoman pe-
riod, by considering the physical structures associated with each: their 
distribution through time, and their features as indicators of dominance. 
Th ese are brought together in the concept of religioscape, the distribu-
tion in spaces through time of the physical manifestations of speciﬁ c 
religious traditions and of the populations that build them, as explained 
below. First, however, it is necessary to consider what we mean by saying 
that space is “shared,” peacefully and less so.
Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing, 
Dominance and Intertemporal Violence
My analysis diﬀ ers from that of others in this volume because it draws 
on concepts developed in the course of a ﬁ ve-year, multi-disciplinary, 
and comparative research project on competitive sharing of religious 
sites, which my colleagues and I have carried out via ﬁ eld research in 
Bulgaria, India, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, and Turkey, with substantial ref-
erence to library resources on other places (see Hayden 2002; Hayden et 
al. 2011; Hayden and Walker 2013; Hayden et al. 2016; and the website of 
the project, http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/antagonistictolerance/AT_Main_
Page.html). We have developed a model of “antagonistic tolerance” 
(hereafter, AT) to explain long-term patterns of relationship between 
members of groups who identify themselves and each other as Self and 
Other communities, diﬀ erentiated primarily on the basis of religion, liv-
ing intermingled but rarely intermarrying (Hayden 2002). Th e religious 
distinction is often accompanied by other diﬀ erences, such as in nam-
ing, kinship, diet, and perhaps preferred methods of gaining a livelihood. 
In this model, which was inspired by the work of F.W. Hasluck (1973 
[1929]), contestation develops in a region in which one religious tradi-
tion is dominant when a community identiﬁ ed with a diﬀ ering religion 
arrives via trade or indigenous development.
Th e AT model holds that in such situations, there is “tolerance” in the 
sense of enduring the presence of the other but not embracing it, so long 
as one group is clearly dominant over others. Such dominance is indi-
cated in part by control of the primary identity of major religious sites. 
However, when existing dominance is threatened, violence results, and 
violence often accompanies the transformation of sites, which may hap-
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pen when one group replaces the dominant position previously held by 
another. Th e processes involved are long-term, though transformations 
may take place in short periods.
A key feature of this model is consideration of the dominance of one 
religious community over another, or over others, and of contestations 
for dominance; we do not regard religion as likely to be irrelevant polit-
ically in any situation in which large groups self- and Other-identify as 
diﬀ erent communities. Religious dominance is marked by control over 
key religious sites, and the attainment of dominance leads to the trans-
formation of such places. Th e transformation of Hagia Sophia in Istan-
bul from a church into a mosque, or the conversion of the great mosque 
of Cordoba into a church, are obvious examples; but the mosque in Cor-
doba stood in the place of the Gothic Christian church, which had re-
placed the Roman Christian one, which had replaced the Roman temple. 
It is important to note that, often, members of a subordinated commu-
nity may visit religious sites claimed by the dominant one, and even per-
form some observances there. Syncretism may arise from such sharing, 
even though dominance of one group over the other is clear.
Th e AT pattern is also one of intertemporal violence, either at times 
when an existing structure of dominance of one group over others is 
threatened or when existing dominance has been overturned. We adapt 
the term intertemporal in part from economics, where it refers to dy-
namic decision making in regard to investment and consumption over 
the course of a period of time, so that the present state of, for exam-
ple, an investment account is the result of a series of forward-looking 
decisions made at earlier times. In international and comparative law, 
intertemporality refers to the diﬀ erences between the legal rules applied 
to a factual situation at an earlier time and those applied at the time of 
analysis, so that, for example, a decision granting ownership of property 
to a party at an earlier time is not ordinarily challengeable later on the 
grounds that the law changed ex post facto.
In the AT model, we envision relatively stable manifestations of dom-
inance that are both adjusted and reinforced by changes attempted by 
the parties with greater or lesser success (drawing on the economic 
meaning of intertemporal) but also liable to sudden transformations 
when a change in dominance is eﬀ ected (drawing on the legal meaning 
of intertemporal). Th us the model is akin to what biologists describe 
as punctuated equilibrium, as that term has been adopted for religious 
studies by Mark C. Taylor (2007: 27): “periods of relative stability and 
gradual change are interrupted by phase shifts that lead to structural 
and morphological transformations.” Even then, in many cases, violence 
is likely to be only that which is necessary either to re-establish the ear-
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lier dominance or to put in place the dominance of another group. After 
that, relations between the communities involved may continue rela-
tively peaceably for centuries (see, e.g., Hayden et al. 2011).
Critics of the AT model generally disregard the intertemporality of 
social relations between members of religious communities, preferring 
instead to isolate speciﬁ c brief periods in historical trajectories for anal-
ysis and largely ignoring what has occurred before and after. Th ey also 
analyze individual shrines as if they were isolated from other such sites, 
focusing on what they see as primarily local actors. Such analyses reﬂ ect 
the traditional anthropological framing of imagining an ethnographic 
present and a locally delimited community. Yet they also manifest the 
conceptual weaknesses of structural-functionalism, presuming stasis 
in social relations among local communities and unable to deal with 
change except as disruption of this static condition by the intervention 
of outsiders.
Glenn Bowman’s critique of the AT model through analysis of rela-
tions between members of diﬀ erent Christian churches at the Church of 
the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (Bowman 2011b) exempliﬁ es this tacit 
revival of structural functionalism. He posits an “existential consanguin-
ity … when people live in relatively close proximity, engaging with each 
other in quotidian activities” except when this is disrupted by external 
religious leaders. He also says that “[e]ven manifestations of apparent 
hostility between local Christians of diﬀ erent denominations, such as 
the ritualised ‘ﬁ ghts’ which take place between Armenians and Greeks 
… are traditional charades played out between men who, on the street, 
are friends.” Since Radcliﬀ e-Brown (1965: 179) deﬁ ned the function of 
any recurring practice (here, the “ritual ﬁ ghts”) as the role it plays in 
maintaining the social structure (the “set of relations amongst unit en-
tities,” here the “existential consanguinity” of local Christians), Bowman 
seems to have re-invented structural-functionalism. I understand the 
normative appeal of seeing interaction within shrines as being deter-
mined primarily by the traditions of sanctity that mark them as sacred 
to a local community that supposedly operates in harmony unless it is 
disrupted from the outside. However, to do so is to make the same mis-
take as the structural-functionalists did when they analyzed the inher-
ently stabilizing eﬀ ects in local communities of “tribal” institutions (e.g., 
kinship, law) without making reference to the institutions of the larger 
colonial states that set the parameters on what the natives could do.
At the same time, ignoring the intertemporality of social relations be-
tween members of diﬀ erent religious communities also permits critics 
of the AT model to ignore the reality of these communities as corporate 
groups. Rogers Brubaker’s dismissal of putative “groupism” has been 
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used to criticize the AT model (Henig 2014), but it is diﬃ  cult to deny 
that religious communities existed as corporate groups in the Ottoman 
and post-Ottoman period. Th at individuals act in the name of corpo-
rate groups hardly negates the importance of considering the group as 
a social actor, without assuming that the corporate group is internally 
homogenous or is composed of “unitary collective actors with com-
mon purposes” (Brubaker 2004), though further discussion of Brubak-
er’s model lies outside the scope of this chapter. Corporate groups, of 
course, are in principle immortal, so an intertemporal frame of refer-
ence is needed to accommodate their relevance before, and after, any 
particular ethnographic present, period of conﬂ ict, or post-conﬂ ict con-
ﬁ guration. By the same token, saying that the AT model sees periods of 
peaceful interaction as “only temporary” misses the point that we always 
anticipate change—neither peaceful interaction nor conﬂ ict are perma-
nent conditions, and in fact, we see the longer periods as being those of 
peaceful interaction.
I should also make clear our view of the connection between religion 
and violence. It has become popular in policy and political science cir-
cles to emphasize the diﬀ ering worldviews of various religions, which 
by deﬁ nition are at variance, to say that violence is inevitable between 
members of diﬀ erent religions, and that conﬂ ict at “contested” religious 
sites is inevitable, intractable, and impervious to a rational solution (At-
ran et al. 2007; Ginges et al. 2007; Hassner 2009; Atran and Ginges 2012). 
In part this position rests on a confusion between the necessarily totaliz-
ing worldviews of religions, which tend to explain the world in toto, (i.e., 
without remainder), with the political reality of a modern totalitarian 
state (Bakić-Hayden 2002: 65–67). In fact, among the latter, only a few 
attempts have been made to completely eradicate religion (in the name 
of socialism, with the possible exceptions of the early years of the USSR 
and of Albania among European socialist states) or even particular mi-
nority religions. Even the Islamic Republic of Iran tolerates Judaism and 
Christianity, albeit antagonistically, since demographically and other-
wise the members of these communities do not pose any threat to it.
We see violence as likely only when dominance is under contention 
and must be either acquired or (re)inforced. We also do not see religion 
per se as inherently linked to violence, despite the fact that violence is 
present in many a holy book. Rather, religion may be the key identifying 
factor associated with a community and thus accepted as deﬁ ning that 
group as opposed to others. Th e importance of such distinctions, while 
potentially strategic, are not static but may be subject to change with 
new circumstances, reﬂ ecting their intertemporality. For example, Bow-
man (1993) has shown how Christian and Muslim Palestinians unite at 
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a shrine shared by members of both groups in the face of oppression of 
both communities by the Israeli state, but that when Israeli occupation 
was brieﬂ y lifted following the Oslo accords, the Muslims and Chris-
tians became much more opposed under the Muslim-dominated, and 
Muslim-favoring, governance of the PLO (Bowman 2001).
Shared Space: Overlapping Religioscapes 
and Indicators of Dominance
Th is brings us back to the nature of the “space” that we can call Ottoman 
or post-Ottoman, and how it was shared. In the AT model, we refer to 
groups that live intermingled, and our own initial conceptualization was 
of individual sites in localities (neighborhoods, towns) where members 
of diﬀ erent groups may live in the same neighborhoods, or in adjacent 
neighborhoods. As our research progressed, however, we saw that it is 
better to view shared religious sites as nodes in structures of social inte-
ractions between populations that distinguish themselves and each ot-
her as diﬀ erent, on religious grounds, through time. As a node, a single 
site is not isolable from the social networks that interact at it. Th us a 
Muslim site should be seen as linked to other Muslim sites, a Christian 
site to other Christian sites, and all at varying scales. Scale here may 
range from local communities to regional networks to those on a state 
or imperial scale, and even between states/empires.
In our usage, “religioscape” refers to the distribution in spaces through 
time of the physical manifestations of speciﬁ c religious traditions and of 
the populations that build them (Hayden and Walker 2013). Both the 
population and the physical manifestations of the religion are compo-
nents of a religioscape; a physical artifact associated with a religion that 
is no longer practiced may be evidence of a previous religioscape but 
does not itself constitute a religioscape. Religioscapes as we deﬁ ne them 
are inherently ﬂ uid: people move, taking their religious practices with 
them, and potentially change the built environment, too, in ways that 
reﬂ ect their beliefs. Yet the religioscape also reﬂ ects the connections 
between people who regard themselves as holding the same beliefs, or 
are regarded by others as doing so. Th e religioscape, then, is a social 
space marked by physical icons, from small shrines to large complexes 
of them, or even sacred cities. Indeed, complexes of places, or even ter-
ritories, may be imbued with religious meaning.
Th e situations we are interested in are those in which two populations 
distinguished by diﬀ ering religions inhabit the same territory. In such 
cases, their religioscapes intersect, and the power relations of the two 
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groups will be displayed by features of the sites relative to each other. In 
our work, we have identiﬁ ed two indexes of empirical indicators of dom-
inance, centrality and perceptibility. Centrality refers to location within 
a settlement, or perhaps proximity to locations of important economic 
or political activities.1 Perceptibility refers to features of a structure that 
make it more perceptible: height, mass, color, projection of sound are 
examples. In all cases, the greater the indicator, the higher the assertion 
of dominance. Th us a building that is more centrally located is likely 
to belong to the dominant community, as is a building that is taller, or 
broadcasts sound better, or is more colorful than a nearby building of 
another religious community. Centrality and perceptibility are co-rele-
vant factors, meaning that a shrine may exhibit a combination of these 
attributes. A massive building with a high tower and ampliﬁ ed sound 
in the center of a settlement would be dominant, but as these factors 
vary, dominance may be challenged. A primary ﬁ nding of our compar-
ative research, however, is that centrality is the key factor in indicating 
dominance. Th at is, a religious structure that is at a central location is 
presumed to reﬂ ect dominance over shrines at less central positions.
We can give some concrete examples from spaces that were soon 
to be, or had just become, post-Ottoman. Let us start with one of the 
most important indicators of perceptibility, height. Building churches 
was generally prohibited in the Ottoman Empire, but it was possible to 
“repair” older ones. Even so, churches could not be as tall as mosques 
and were generally on the periphery of settlements that also contained 
mosques (Gradeva 1994), and could not have bell towers; indeed, even 
clock towers were resisted by many Muslims in the late Ottoman period 
because they were said to resemble church bell towers (Uluengin 2010). 
When the Ottoman Empire was losing its ability to govern in Bosnia and 
tried to appease the Serbian population in Sarajevo by permitting the 
construction of a large Orthodox church, the dedication of the church 
(1872) was protected by 1,200 Ottoman troops, with cannon positioned 
to bombard the city should trouble break out from among the local 
Muslims, who were protesting not only against the construction of the 
church, but especially against its having a bell tower (Donia 2006: 33–35). 
Among the ﬁ rst actions taken after the end of Ottoman rule in 1878 in 
both Bosnia and Bulgaria was that bell towers were added to churches, as 
can be seen in the old Serbian church in Sarajevo (sv. Arhanđela Mihaila 
i Gavrila) and the 1859 cathedral in Plovdiv (sv. Bogoroditsa), both of 
which received bell towers in 1880. Another example from northeastern 
Bulgaria: near the center of the town of Suvorovo in northern Bulgaria, 
a mid-nineteenth century church faces a sixteenth-century mosque. Th e 
town now has a Christian majority, though it had a Muslim majority 
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under Ottoman rule. Th e minaret of the mosque is taller than the bell 
tower of the church—but the minaret is topped by a cross, an unusual 
feature (to say the least!) that both Christians and Muslims will point 
out to visitors. Close-up pictures reveal that what looks like a cross from 
the ground is actually a ﬂ eur de lis, quite an ambiguous symbol, and 
while doubtless most townspeople know this, the general acceptance of 
the icon as a cross acknowledges the local supremacy of the Christian 
population of the town.
Th e interplay between centrality and perceptibility can be seen in Plo-
vdiv (Turkish: Filibe), Bulgaria, a former capital city and one of the ﬁ rst 
parts of Bulgaria conquered by the Ottomans. Th e main Friday mosque, 
the Muradiye, built apparently in the 1420s (Boykov 2009),2 is in the cen-
ter of the Ottoman town and actually the center of the place since the 
Roman period: the mosque perches literally on the edge of a Roman am-
phitheater. Almost due east, up a hill via ulitsa Saborna (Cathedral St.), 
is the Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God (sv. Bogoroditsa), an 1850s 
church with a bell tower added in 1880, two years after Ottoman rule 
ended. Th e church is large, and taller than the mosque, but it is removed 
from the center of the town. Even then, looking back at the mosque, 
one sees that the minaret is at the same level as the church, and until 
an earthquake in 1928, the minaret was actually higher than the roof of 
the church—which makes the erection of the bell tower, even taller than 
that, very understandable.
Other evidence on the importance of centrality can be seen in 
Razgrad, also in northeastern Bulgaria, and still the center of one of the 
few remaining concentrations of Turks in Bulgaria (Sözer 2012). Th e six-
teenth-century Ibrahim Pasha Mosque, one of the largest mosques in 
the Balkans, is in the center of town. As of 2008, the mosque had been 
closed for decades, which means that even though it is in the center of 
the town, that center is denied to the Muslims, as sacred space; they are 
limited to using a much smaller mosque outside the city center (Hande 
Sözer, personal communication, 14 November 2012; see also Keil 1991). 
Meanwhile, the 1860 St. Nicholas Church, on the outskirts of the town 
when it was built (presumably without a bell tower), was massively re-
constructed (and a bell tower added) after the oﬃ  cial independence of 
Bulgaria, and again immediately after the fall of communism. Since the 
town center is denied to the dominant Christian community (the Ibra-
him Pasha Mosque being too large and well-known to permit its de-
struction), the Muslims are denied use of it as well.
Dominance, though, is local, as can be seen in the one region of Bul-
garia in which ethnic Turks form a majority, around Kardjali/Karcali 
(see Sözer 2012). Th e town itself is under the political control of the 
74 Robert M. Hayden
main Turkish political party in Bulgaria, the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms [Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi], and is one of the very few 
towns in Bulgaria in which an Orthodox church is not located in the 
center, but there is a mosque there. In the nearby town of Benkovski, 
which has an almost exclusively Muslim population, is not only one of 
the oldest mosques in the region (recently renovated as of 2008) but 
also one of very few, if not the only, churches from the Tanzimat period 
that is abandoned. When we saw it in July 2008, not only was the church 
empty (though it did bear a sign saying it would be renovated), but the 
church yard was being used to dry tobacco, the local cash crop. Th is 
empty church would not be so surprising were it not for the fact that 
so much eﬀ ort and money has been put into renovating other churches 
from the period, which are often referred to as “liberation churches” and 
are seen as having been central to the Bulgarian national movement in 
the nineteenth century. Indeed, a mural from the 1950s in the Plovdiv 
Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God depicts a Turk whipping a crying 
woman, a city dweller, and a priest, all in chains and at the head of a 
column of other Bulgarians, with the title of “the church and the nation 
in the struggle for liberation.” Th us the local dominance of the Turks in 
Kardjali lets them maintain mosques in the center of towns there, but 
they are on the south-eastern periphery (the Greek border) of a post-
socialist Bulgaria deﬁ ned very much in terms of its Orthodox Christian 
heritage—with St. Ivan Rilski, carrying a cross, appearing on the one-lev 
coin in use in the post-communist period.
By evaluating the nodes of religioscapes in accordance with the indi-
cators of centrality and perceptibility, we can get a very good picture of 
which group is dominant at any given moment in time for which we can 
obtain the relevant data; and by looking at the changing nodes of reli-
gioscapes through time, we can assess the development of dominance 
by religiously-deﬁ ned groups as well. To give the simplest of examples, a 
map of religious sites in Soﬁ a shortly before 1878 would have indicated 
two small Orthodox churches near the Market Mosque and the Banya 
Başı Mosque, much smaller and lower than either of them; an 1867 stone 
church without a bell tower (St. Nedelya) nearby; slightly farther way 
and on a hill was the sixth-century St. Sophia Church for which the city 
was named but had been converted into a mosque; and there was also 
a large mosque on another nearby hill, the Kara Camii (Black Mosque). 
In terms of our indicators, the Muslim religioscape shows dominance: 
the mosques were all larger than the churches, and on higher ground. 
However, a map today would show the reverse: the two small Christian 
churches remain, but the former Market Mosque is now the Museum 
of the Archeological Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 
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the former Black Mosque has been transformed into the Church of the 
Forty Martyrs, the St. Sophia church is once again a church, and there 
is a larger St. Nedelya, erected in 1933 to replace the earlier one (which 
had gotten a bell tower in 1879), plus the second-largest cathedral in the 
Balkans, the Aleksander Nevsky Cathedral, planned in 1888 and built in 
the ﬁ rst decade of the twentieth century, on a point even higher than St. 
Sophia and the Forty Martyrs Church. Th e Muslim religoscape still ex-
ists, but is much reduced in size, and the remaining nodes on it are dom-
inated by the nodes of the Orthodox Christian religioscape, in terms of 
height, elevation, size and ampliﬁ cation of sound. On this last point, the 
churches have bell towers, but the mosque is not permitted to amplify 
the call to prayer.
Intersecting Religioscapes
Most intriguing, perhaps, are those situations in which two religioscapes 
intersect, in that a single site is claimed as a node on each of them. Saints’ 
shrines are common places of such overlap, from India (where a saint 
may have both a Hindu identity and a Muslim one, and be venerated as 
such by members of each group [Hayden 2002]) through the Balkans 
and indeed, the wider Mediterranean world (see Albera and Courou-
cli 2012; Bowman 2012). Th e AT model anticipates such intersections, 
drawing on Hasluck’s analysis that “ambiguous shrines,” those shared by 
members of more than one religion, represented a “period of equipoise” 
in the relations of power between them. To us, what is most interesting 
is to analyze the trajectories of the development of the diﬀ ering reli-
gioscapes that can turn a site from belonging to one group, through the 
period of equipoise when it is also claimed by another, to perhaps a stage 
in which the ﬁ rst group has been largely displaced.
Such a site can be seen in Obrochishte, in northeastern Bulgaria, in 
what was clearly built as the türbe of a Muslim saint and has long been 
identiﬁ ed as the tomb of the saint Ak-yazul Baba. Th e site has been a 
museum since at least the communist period, and a booklet from the 
time (Маrgos n.d.) presents a straightforward archaeological and his-
torical analysis of the site, as having been built in the sixteenth century 
and being similar in design to other türbes in the region. Th ere was also 
a dervish connection: the site has not only the tomb (türbe) but also 
an additional building which Margos (n.d.) identiﬁ es as an imaret (soup 
kitchen) or a tekke. Th e latter seems more likely, since Margos reports 
that in 1884 (thus six years after Bulgarian independence) a Czech histo-
rian visited the site and found one remaining dervish. It is also possible 
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that the site was Alevi or Bektashi, and the second building a cem hall, 
though, as Hande Sözer (2012) has shown, the Alevi presence among 
Bulgarian Turks often passes unnoticed.
In any event, there seems little reason to doubt that the site was built 
for the use of Muslims, during the Ottoman period. By the time of our 
visit in 2008, however, while the site was still oﬃ  cially a museum, the 
usual internal trappings of the türbe of a suﬁ  saint were accompanied by 
Christian icons, as well as by crosses,3 and the site was identiﬁ ed by the 
museum employee on duty as actually being that of a Christian saint, 
Atanas, the “good friend” of Ak-yazul Baba, rather than of the Baba 
himself. In fact, the identities of the saint(s) were merged in the telling, 
with the ultimate climax of the story being that Atanas had been so un-
fortunate as to fall in love with a Muslim woman, something that was 
prohibited and thus led to his execution. Ak-yazul Baba, heartbroken, 
knew that to build a tomb for his friend would not be permitted by the 
Ottoman rulers, so in one night he built the türbe, saying it was a tomb 
for himself, but actually burying Atanas there and then leaving the place.
Th e website of the museum, now called the “Monastery of Akyazala 
Baba—St. Atanas,”4 does not tell this story but refers to the place as “Th e 
bi-ritual prayer house of the Muslim saint Akyazala Baba and of his 
Christian counterpart St. Athanasius,” in contrast to the booklet from 
the communist period, which referred only to the Baba. Th e website 
identiﬁ es the site as having been built as a Bektashi tomb in the six-
teenth century but that in the late nineteenth century it became a “bi-
ritual sanctuary” visited by Muslims and Christians, presumably follow-
ing Bulgarian liberation from Ottoman rule in 1878. Th e website notes 
that Christians believe that there had been a monastery at the site before 
the Muslims came and turned the monastery into a Dervish lodge/tekke, 
a claim made of many other tekkes in the Balkans and Anatolia. Th e web-
site, which is in English as well as Bulgarian, is thus more reserved than 
the Bulgarian-speaking museum employee whom we met in 2008, who 
presented the site as the tomb of the Christian, St. Atanas, telling the 
story related above.
In terms of the balance between the religious communities, in this 
part of Bulgaria Muslims have almost vanished, and the site is increas-
ingly visited by Orthodox Christians, not only Bulgarian but also Russian 
and Romanian (whose border is only about forty kilometers distant). In 
May 2009, a “folklore fair—St. Anasthasius” was held at the site for the 
ﬁ rst time.5 Th e site thus seems to be at a stage of transformation that 
is likely to turn it into a predominantly Christian shrine, just as Has-
luck’s model, and ours, would predict. We note that this transformation 
is taking place in the context of a democratic Bulgaria, a member of the 
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European Union and, thus, presumably dedicated to minority rights, 
comprehensive religious freedoms, and cultural preservation. Th e mu-
seum is facilitating this change.
Other cases of intersecting religoscapes have been presented by per-
haps the most persistent critic of the AT model, Glenn Bowman. He and 
other scholars have done an excellent job of providing detailed ethnog-
raphy, including a short book with a separate analysis of certain shrines 
along with professional photographs (Koneska and Jankuloski 2009) 
and accompanying ﬁ lm (Koneska 2009). Th ose correspond to and doc-
ument further sites in Macedonia that Bowman has presented in several 
publications (Bowman 2010, 2012b) and as the cover photograph of an 
edited book (Bowman 2012). We focus on the Sveti Nikola church in 
Makedonski Brod, Macedonia, which “contains the turbe (tomb) of a 
Bektashi saint, Hadir Bābā,” and which is visited by members of other 
Suﬁ  orders as well as by Sunni Muslims. Th e Christians also hold rituals 
there. Th e place shows very interesting forms of syncretism: various pic-
tures show Muslims praying and, in the background, there are icons of 
Orthodox Christian saints, and another icon of an Orthodox saint is on 
the very grave of the Bektashi saint to which they are praying. Th e ﬂ at 
stone marking the grave, covered by a green cloth, is used by the Chris-
tians as a table for their icon and oﬀ erings during their rituals. Several 
striking photographs in the Koneska and Jankuloski volume show Bek-
tashi and Helveti Muslims praying (separately) toward the grave, which 
has on top of it an Orthodox icon of St. George. Bowman also notes that 
a Suﬁ  prayed towards the iconostasis that the Orthodox added to the 
building, thus towards the Christian altar, rather than toward the grave 
of the saint.
Bowman interprets all of this as a form of “mixing” that is actually 
a symbiotic “sharing” (Bowman’s quotes) of the shrine (Bowman 2010: 
202), and reﬂ ects “an institutional and personal openness on the part 
of Orthodox caretakers towards the presence of Muslim ‘others’” (Bow-
man 2010: 203). However, this ignores the main factor of the AT model: 
dominance. We have argued that when one group is clearly dominant 
over another, the subordinated group may be permitted to attend the 
shrines of the dominant group. Th is ﬁ ts perfectly the site of the St. Nich-
olas church in Makedonski Brod: the population of the town is now al-
most completely Orthodox Christian, so dominance of that group is not 
threatened, and the building is clearly controlled by the Christians. Th ey 
determine when the Muslims can utilize the place, and the appropria-
tion of the stone covering the grave of the Bektashi saint to serve as a 
table for Christian services, even when the Muslims are conducting their 
own rituals, is a striking manifestation of dominance. Furthermore, de-
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spite the presence of elements of each others’ iconography in the build-
ing, there is no evidence that the Muslims regard themselves as anything 
other than, severally, Bektashi, Halveti, and Sunni Muslims, nor are the 
Christians in doubt as to their identity as Macedonian Orthodox Chris-
tians; none of these identities is in question, and neither are they in any 
way mixed, shared, or mingled. Koneska’s essay (2009) and ﬁ lm make 
these separations literally visible, especially in the original, Macedonian, 
version of the bilingual text, and in the spoken Macedonian heard in the 
ﬁ lm.
Th e importance of both the trajectory of events and the scale of rel-
evant religioscapes can be seen by revisiting Bowman’s citation of Has-
luck for the proposition that Orthodox Christians rarely if indeed ever 
convert mosques into churches unless the site had previously been a 
church (Bowman 2010: 217n13). Hasluck did his ﬁ eldwork before World 
War I, while the Ottoman Empire was still in existence. After ﬁ nal Bul-
garian independence in 1908, and the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire 
from Macedonia in 1912, Orthodox Christians did indeed convert some 
mosques into churches, including those in Soﬁ a and Uzundzhovo Bul-
garia (Hayden et al. 2011). Heath Lowry (2009: 61–93) describes sev-
eral more such transformations in northern Greece, and notes that this 
process is understudied. Th e trajectory of events following the demise 
of the Ottoman Empire changed the possibilities for contesting domi-
nance between Christians and Muslims, and this change in possibility 
had local eﬀ ects but on a large scale. Hasluck’s early twentieth-century 
ethnography thus reﬂ ected the structure of dominance of Muslims over 
Christians in the late Ottoman period but not those in post-Ottoman 
space, and cannot be taken as evidence of an Orthodox Christian aver-
sion to converting Muslim shrines.
What we ﬁ nd most lacking in ethnographic accounts of interaction 
that seems non-conﬂ ictual is serious consideration of the trajectories 
of events that set up the systems of dominance that, in our model, allow 
for such peaceful situations. We believe that the more fully developed 
approach to competitive sharing put forth in this article should serve 
to clarify that both long periods of peaceful interaction as well as brief 
ones of violence can be explained by the AT model, which identiﬁ es the 
conditions that promote both.
Contiguous Religioscapes as Demarcating Borders
Historical processes may lead to the physical separation of religious com-
munities that had been living intermingled, peacefully through voluntary 
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processes of migration, or violently and suddenly through the processes 
formerly called “population exchanges” and now called “ethnic cleans-
ing.” In such cases, what had been nodes in religioscapes may be aban-
doned, destroyed, or transformed into nodes in the religioscape of the 
other group. Th is last form of transformation may be exempliﬁ ed by the 
sixteenth-century mosque in Uzhundzhovo, Bulgaria, that since 1908 
has been an Orthodox Church (Hayden et al. 2011), or the mid-nine-
teenth-century Orthodox church in Derinkuyu, Turkey, that since 1949 
has been the Republican Mosque (Tanyeri-Erdemir et al. 2014). As for 
sites abandoned or destroyed, we may recall many Orthodox churches 
in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or many Islamic ones in 
the Republic of Cyprus; or mosques in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia 
after 1992, and Serbian Orthodox churches in Kosovo after 1999. In 
such cases, the religioscapes no longer overlap, and they are unlikely to 
intersect. Th ey are instead contiguous, marking the frontiers of territo-
ries that have been partitioned. Th e territorial spaces marked by such 
borders need not be coterminous with state or political borders, though 
they may become so through time.
We would argue that careful examination of the sites that actually 
remain in use by members of a minority religious community may re-
veal aspects of inter-communal interactions that may otherwise go un-
noticed. For example, while most people in Belgrade know that there 
are two türbes in the oldest part of the city, I have observed that these 
are used as saint shrines by local Muslims, who seek blessings and fa-
vor at them. Th is use is unknown to my colleagues at Belgrade Univer-
sity, even though one türbe is directly across the park from the building 
that houses the Departments of Anthropology and Archaeology, but it 
means that the Muslim archaeoscape of Belgrade still has more nodes 
than might be expected.
Sometimes such a more or less covert use of part of a site that has 
otherwise been lost to a religious group may indicate that there are more 
intergroup activities going on than may be recognized at the level of 
public politics. Two such sites may be seen in northern Cyprus, in places 
that were major Orthodox Christian sites but from which the Christians 
were driven away in 1974: the Monastery of St. Barnabus (Famagusta) 
and the Church of St. Mamas (Morphou). In both cases, the churches 
were turned into museums. Yet visits to them in October 2011 revealed 
the renewed presence of Orthodox Christians.6 At St. Barnabus, the 
monastery remains a museum, but the tomb of the saint is lit by vo-
tive candles, and has icons and symbolic oﬀ erings (dolls representing 
hoped-for babies, eye symbols for the return of sight) that indicate that 
the Orthodox faithful, and probably others, are coming there. As for St. 
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Mamas, the church looks as though it is ready for a liturgy at any time: 
the iconostasis is in place, as is the altar behind it, and the altar has all of 
the necessary equipment. And it turns out that the Bishop of Morphou 
has been able to hold occasional services in the church, beginning in 
2004, thirty years after he and his ﬂ ock were driven out of the town. It 
seems that these sites, though oﬃ  cially secularized and thus no longer 
part of any religioscape, may be serving to make the Orthodox Christian 
religioscape in Cyprus overlap again with that Muslim one, and possibly 
even to make them intersect, since Muslims also leave oﬀ erings at the 
shrines to the saints. Mete Hatay has also noted cases of what we would 
regard as re-overlapping of the Christian and Muslim religioscapes in 
northern Cyprus, in places where Greek Christian visitors to places from 
which they or their families had been driven in 1974 are reclaiming parts 
of abandoned churches by lighting candles in them (Constantinou et al. 
2012: 180–82). If we pay careful attention to such low-proﬁ le manifes-
tations of religious behavior in places where a group has oﬃ  cially been 
excluded, we may well be able to see indicators of the low-key sharing of 
space, even after such sharing has been dissolved at oﬃ  cial levels.
Conclusion
I have utilized the concept of religioscape and the indicators of domi-
nance to analyze the ways that spaces and places were marked as Ot-
toman and post-Ottoman as manifestations of interaction between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Th is analysis demonstrates the im-
portance of linkages between local sites and wider networks of religious 
structures, at speciﬁ c moments in time and through time as well. We 
can thus see the commonalities of the political and social processes that 
led to the transformation of spaces from Byzantine, thus Christian, to 
Ottoman, thus Muslim, and in southeastern Europe, from Ottoman to 
the several Christian nationalist spaces (Bulgarian, Greek, Hungarian, 
Serbian), on varying scales, and from the seventeenth century in Hun-
gary to the present in Bulgaria. Th ese commonalities indicate that the 
term “peaceful coexistence” is misleading, as even during periods when 
there is little or no violence, relations of dominance are manifested in 
the physical structures associated with religious communities, measured 
against each other rather than analyzed as isolates, with the divisions re-
produced through these structures as well other markers of diﬀ erence.
From this perspective, looking at local patterns of interaction to ex-
plain coexistence is to reverse causality, because it is the placement of 
a local site on a religioscape, and that site’s relationship to the nodes of 
Intersecting Religioscapes in Post-Ottoman Spaces 81
the religioscape of a competing religious community (i.e., contiguous, 
overlapping, or intersecting), that determines whether local relations are 
likely to be peaceful or conﬂ ictual. Space may be shared as the nodes 
of competing religioscapes overlap; local shrines may be shared if they 
form nodes on two or more competing religioscapes; and both larger 
spaces and local shrines may no longer be shared when the religioscapes 
no longer intersect. In all cases, however, coexistence must be analyzed 
through the patterns of competition of the larger religious communi-
ties whose religioscapes are represented locally, if we are to understand 
when it is likely to be peaceful, when conﬂ icted, and when disrupted 
completely.
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Notes
Research reported here was supported in part by the National Science Founda-
tion, which is not responsible for the views expressed in this paper. I am grateful 
to Professors Simeon Evstatiev and Galina Stefanova-Evstatieva for their orga-
nization of ﬁ eldwork in Bulgaria in 2008 and help during it, to Dr. Hande Sözer 
for her assistance as well during part of that ﬁ eldwork and for her comments on 
this paper, and to Dr. Rabia Harmanşah for her assistance in site visits in Cy-
prus in 2011. As with all other work stemming from the Antagonistic Tolerance 
project, this paper has beneﬁ tted from the discussions of my team members: 
Tuğba Tanyeri-Erdemir, Aykan Erdemir, Tim Walker, Devika Rangacahri, Man-
uel Aguilar, Enrique Lopez-Hurado, and Milica Bakić-Hayden.
. 1. Our use of centrality is diﬀ erent from that of Ron Hassner (2009), who in-
stead deﬁ nes centrality of a site in terms of its “space in the spiritual land-
scape” of the religious community concerned. He sees conﬂ ict as increasing 
insofar as a site central to a religious community becomes vulnerable to 
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being controlled by another community. However, he then confounds the 
importance of this supposedly primary consideration by noting the impor-
tance of vulnerability, saying that conﬂ ict should be “expected to arise” at 
the places a religious group are “most central and most vulnerable,” without 
distinguishing which condition is more important, except to say that he is 
oﬀ ering a “rough heuristic at best,” and furthermore, that even a minor site 
can be the focus of conﬂ ict “if a local community places high value on it for 
political reasons” (Hassner 2009: 33). Th at last admission actually vitiates 
Hassner’s attempt to deﬁ ne centrality in terms of the wider symbolic geog-
raphy of a religious community and brings it precisely to those local levels 
where conﬂ ict does, in fact, take place. We are conﬁ dent that our deﬁ nition 
of centrality, in terms of the local importance of a site, is thus superior to 
Hassner’s, even in his own terms.
 2. By far the best scholarly source on this mosque that I have found is the web 
blog of Grigor Boykov (2009), which draws on Turkish, Bulgarian, and En-
glish-language sources.
 3. See the Museum’s “gallery” website, http://www.museumbalchik.com/eg/
t_gallery.php?id=&page=1.
 4. http://www.museumbalchik.com/eg/mteketo.php.
 5. http://www.museumbalchik.com/eg/t_fsabor.php.
 6. I am grateful to Rabia Harmanşah for taking me to both sites, discussing 
their meaning with me and sharing some of her own ﬁ eldwork data on 
them; her dissertation (Harmanşah 2014) contains other details.
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[• Chapter 3 •]
Cosmopolitanism or 
Constitutive Violence?
Th e Creation of “Turkish” Iraklio
ARIS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
When thinking and speaking of past coexistence, we necessarily 
speak from the historically speciﬁ c ideological conditions of contem-
porary discourses, since those discourses have been shaped by events of 
ﬁ ssure and strife. Th is has become by now almost a truism in the social 
sciences, but it is far less accepted in public discourses on historical di-
vision. When studying peaceful coexistence before a period of intereth-
nic strife, we need to wonder, for example, whether the subjects of this 
coexistence are social entities created after the fact of violent rupture. 
Th is is a point amply made by Rebecca Bryant in the introduction to this 
volume and need not be reiterated here. What I want to consider, how-
ever, is that this condition of reﬂ exivity is not an epistemological adept-
ness—or lack thereof—on our part, but a historical “real”: the very same 
processes and events that were recorded as transformative in the time-
line of communities are often those that create the analytical categories 
we assume as natural. Historians and social scientists, as evidenced in 
this volume, speak and intervene as political subjects ﬁ rmly embedded 
in an ex post facto arrangement of concepts, people, and things. In this 
respect, it may be more pertinent to instill a radical strangeness in these 
taken-for-granted agglomerates, rather than establish a ﬁ nal truth about 
communities and individuals in the past, which, as Bryant points out, 
may oftentimes be impossible. By studying these liminal positions of 
strangeness, we may hope to understand more clearly the construction 
of either/or binaries through which historical reason functions in in-
tercommunal conﬂ ict (see Bakshi this volume), but also establish our 
position as engaged subjects, without recourse to essential identities and 
states (Bryant this volume).
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Th e particular examples I discuss below show how historical cate-
gories such as “Turkocretans,” widely accepted today as an accurate 
sociological denomination for Cretan Muslims and a political tool for 
reframing interreligious coexistence, when examined more closely pre-
sent testimonies for a violence of deﬁ nition that is the corollary of a so-
cial rupture they leave unexplained. Th e profound antagonism between 
Christian and Muslim Cretans produced a descriptive term for the latter, 
which bore the marks of the predominance of the former in all aspects of 
social life during the last half of the nineteenth century (Andriotis 2004). 
Th e creation of sociological entities such as “communities” is often in-
tertwined with larger projects of power, which reshape the material en-
vironment and therefore alter the memoryscape in which groupings of 
people are imaginatively created and remembered. Th e way scholars and 
laypeople approach and recreate images of peaceful coexistence in the 
Ottoman Empire is oftentimes markedly aestheticized by the heritage 
industry of today, especially in the context of cosmopolitan Mediterra-
nean ports, and often prevents them from understanding the context of 
coexistence in the past (e.g., Ilbert and Yannakakis, 1997; see also Dries-
sen 2005; Waley 2009). Furthermore, a picture of coexistence painted 
after conﬂ ict has occurred may avoid the portrayal of power relations 
of exploitation or oppression on a multiplicity of levels—gender, class 
or otherwise—in favor of a major, usually ethnic, antagonism (see Starr
this volume; compare Humphrey 2012: 45; Th eodossopoulos 2006).
Th e turn of the twentieth century constituted a threshold in the his-
tory of Crete. Following a Christian insurrection that began in 1896, in 
1898 the nearly two hundred-year-long Ottoman rule was succeeded by 
an autonomous regime that lasted for ﬁ fteen years, up to 1913, when 
Crete was oﬃ  cially annexed to Greece. Th e year 1898 marked, for the 
inhabitants of the city of Iraklio, the beginning of the destruction of 
the material traces of Ottoman presence. Th is was part of a class ini-
tiative to reshape the city into a western metropolis (Anagnostopoulos 
2007)—a process that began after Iraklio was annexed; gathered pace 
in the decades following the 1923 exchange of populations, when the 
last Muslims left the island; was deepened by wartime destruction; and 
eventually reached its apex in the construction boom of the early 1970s. 
Th roughout the destruction of the Ottoman past of the city runs a unit-
ing thread that connects the annihilation of material artifacts with the 
eﬀ acement of the living memory of its Muslim inhabitants. Th e latter 
either abandoned the island in subsequent waves of immigration to Asia 
Minor and the Middle East, or they were forcibly relocated in the 1923 
exchange of populations. Th e very process that guaranteed the destruc-
tion of the marks of their presence was the same process that created the 
88 Aris Anagnostopoulos
grounds for the nostalgia for the “others” that cohabited the cosmopol-
itan city. In a very apposite irony, this process began eﬀ acing the marks 
of those others by ﬁ rst naming them.
One City, One History, Two Cities, Two Histories, 
or Perhaps More?
In 2004, in view of the portion of the Olympic Games being held in the 
city, the municipality of Iraklio issued a DVD guide to the city in collabo-
ration with the University of Crete. Th e guide, a celebration of the mate-
rial and cultural heritage of the city, is called “Heraklion, A City Th rough 
the Ages.”1 Th e Greek subtitle of the guide is much more revealing of its 
scope: “One City, One History” (mia poli, mia istoria). Th e uniﬁ cation 
of the history of the city into one continuous narration, held together 
by the material fabric of the city and the traditions, real or invented, 
of the people inhabiting it today, is further pursued in the spoken text, 
especially in the section “Monuments” (or “Space” in the Greek version):
Th rough [sic] a dynamic city, modern Iraklion is steeped in the history 
of its awe-inspiring defenses. A stronghold built by the sea, its walls 
stand in silent witness to the moments of glory and terror. Many races 
have found a home in its streets, and many gods have been invoked 
in its houses of prayer. Along its winding streets, humble dwellings 
are cramped cheek-by-jowl with neoclassical mansions and modern, 
multi-story apartment blocks. (Municipality of Heraklion 2004)
To identify Iraklio with its Venetian ramparts is here a convenient way of 
conceiving the city as a single, compact body, transformed though his-
tory. Many of the “races” implied in the voiceover lived in the city long 
before the “awe-inspiring defenses” were constructed in the ﬁ fteenth 
century CE. Th e idea of the enclosed city-organism is the converging 
point for the rationales of modern heritage industry and nationalist his-
tory: past antagonisms and historical transformations are subsumed into 
a major antagonism, which in this case is understood as the liberation 
of Cretans—Greeks—from subsequent waves of invasion and occupa-
tion, which is inscribed in the uniﬁ ed material infrastructure of the city 
and sold as a packaged commodity to the thousands of tourist visitors 
each year. In view of this subsumation, material markers of communal or 
other identity that were prominent in the past are naturalized as marks 
of the “pluralism” of the cultural heritage of the city. Th e diﬀ erent “races” 
that walked the streets of the city, the diﬀ erent religions that prayed 
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in its conﬁ nes, and the diﬀ erent classes and gendered individuals that 
lived in the city, are all transformed into positive forces that “secreted” 
the multifarious built record of the city, which proves a selling point in 
the context of the heritage industry today. Ironically, the eﬀ ort to show 
the city as a unique transhistorical organism is a distinctively modern 
concept. Th e Cretan Autonomy period (1898–1913) was marked by the 
eﬀ ort of the prevailing Christian Cretans to modernize the city accord-
ing to Western precepts (Anagnostopoulos 2007). City authorities and 
entrepreneurs cut into the fabric of the city, excising most signs of het-
erodox presence—especially Muslim.2 For example, there is not a single 
standing minaret in Iraklio, whereas the minarets of the other main cit-
ies of Crete (Chania and Rethimno) constitute iconic selling points for 
these cities. Much later, during the commercial and tourist boom of the 
1960s and 1970s, important Venetian landmarks—such as the church 
of St. Salvador—were demolished by the city authorities following deci-
sions to encourage progress aimed at creating a cityscape more akin to 
a western metropolis. Th e idea was to open up spaces and roads in the 
urban fabric that to many progress-minded commentators looked like a 
“tourkopolis” (Turkish city) (Dermitzakis 1963: 89). Now this dedication 
to progress has put Iraklio in the diﬃ  cult situation of having to shape a 
past by pulling together what remains of the destructive eﬀ ects of mod-
ernization (Anagnostopoulos 2007, 2011).
In the DVD, the Muslims of Crete are rarely encountered. In fact, 
they are only mentioned as the mob that perpetuated the uprising of 25 
August 1898 and the slaughter of some two hundred Christian Irakliots 
and eighteen British soldiers (Karelis 2001). However, many of the old 
houses that are presented as the built heritage of the city are Muslim Cre-
tan houses. In fact, throughout the nineteenth century at least, Cretan 
cities were predominately Muslim. Iraklio itself had a very pronounced 
Muslim element, which declined after the transition to the autonomous 
regime in 1898 and the massive immigration of Cretan Muslims.3 Irak-
liot Muslims were notorious for their propensity to mass violence; how-
ever, there is little known about the social reasons for the reactions of 
the most destitute of Iraklio Muslims (see Anagnostopoulos 2007: 88; 
Andriotis 2004: 71). Th is “barbarous mob” featuring in most histories 
of Crete and the city is responsible however for most of the remaining 
buildings that constitute the “old Iraklio” today.
Th e periodization of Cretan history presented in the DVD is based 
on the tacit understanding that the history of Crete is the history of its 
conquest by foreign armies, and that the time between the Byzantine era 
and 1898 was merely a break in the continuation of Greek history on the 
island. To give only one example, the nineteenth century, a century of 
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profound changes in the administration and character of the Ottoman 
Empire (Ortaylı 1999), which had equally deep and long-lasting eﬀ ects 
on the social formations in Crete, is described in the work of historians 
of Crete as “the era of Cretan revolutions” (e.g., Detorakis 2005: 26). In-
ternational events feature in this kind of history only as a backdrop, as 
echoes from distant shores, but Cretan history is conceived as a product 
of the voluntarism of its people and their desire for union with Greece. 
Th e dramatic and epic scale such events are described in this history 
contrasts starkly with the parochial character historians attribute to it, 
since they consistently refuse to examine Crete as part of a wider net-
work of economic exchanges and political power. Consequently, all in-
terpersonal, familial, or clan instances of violence recorded throughout 
the nineteenth century are inscribed into this narrative of the struggle of 
all (Christian) Cretans for uniﬁ cation with Greece.
While this picture is currently being rectiﬁ ed in economic history 
(e.g., Perakis 2008), social history remains trapped in a strange conun-
drum. Contemporary historians attempt to counter strictly nationalist 
narratives by emphasizing the cosmopolitan past of the city. Giannis Zai-
makis, for example, in a chapter titled “Th e Cosmopolitan City, 1900–
1923,” after stating that “historical events and political changes trans-
formed the social body of the ‘oriental’ city” (Zaimakis 1999: 69), gives 
the following description:
Cultural elements of the spatial organization, like religious monu-
ments (Orthodox, Sinai and Armenian temples, mosques, minarets 
and tekkes), Venetian buildings (the Koule,4 the Loggia, the tall ram-
parts etc), the Arabian wall, poor neighbourhoods with stone paved 
alleys and low-ceilinged houses, mondain [‘kosmikos’] squares with 
theatre halls and nightclubs and, ﬁ nally, scattered cafe aman and cafe 
chantants shaped a landscape that testiﬁ ed to the cosmopolitan char-
acter of the city and the mix, in its environment, of various cultural 
traditions. (Zaimakis 1999: 70)
Th e question here, of course, is how in the two years that followed the 
end of Ottoman rule the city was transformed from “oriental” to “cos-
mopolitan.” On further examination, the question remains: what exactly 
is the diﬀ erence between the two cities, since the picture Zaimakis gives 
us can apply to the city at the end of the nineteenth century as well as at 
the beginning of the twentieth (see Zei 2005: 82). Th e answer, according 
to the same author, is that the violent antagonism of the two main reli-
gious elements brought about profound demographic changes, with the 
emigration of some 40,000 to 50,000 “Turkocretans” to Asia Minor and 
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North Africa. It thus transformed a predominantly Muslim city into a 
city where the two elements were almost equally represented, with the 
Muslim element constantly declining until their ﬁ nal departure during 
the population exchange following the Asia Minor defeat of the Greek 
army in 1923. At the same time, the British occupation of the city, the 
development of trans-local communication networks and the mingling 
of diﬀ erent ethnicities within the city “created conditions of cosmopoli-
tanism” (Zaimakis 1999: 70).
One could counter that trans-local communication networks were al-
ready in place by at least the beginning of the eighteenth century (Trian-
taﬁ llidou-Balladié 1988), while contact with foreign ideas and mores was 
a mainstay for the wealthier classes of the city at least since the middle of 
the nineteenth century (Svolopoulos 2005: 147). Besides that, the main 
import of this description is to contrast cosmopolitanism to the “orien-
tal” city. In a few words, cosmopolitanism is secured only after the eth-
nic (religious) balance is shifted, when the Turkocretans leave the island, 
and only when the legitimate use of force (to use a Weberian category) 
changes hands and comes to employ distinctively Western techniques of 
liberal governance (Svolopoulos 2005: 122–23; compare Foucault 1997: 
73–74). Up to then the Ottoman Empire was the guarantor of the health 
and prosperity of the Muslim element. Now, the Great Powers were the 
guarantors of the growing economic and social power of the Christian 
element, and the legitimacy of the new autonomous state. Th e predom-
inance of the Muslim element was prohibitive of cosmopolitanism, but 
contributed greatly to it through its minority existence after its grad-
ual uprooting from Crete. Its non-presence, and the marks that it leaves 
behind, become cultural markers that secure the character of the new, 
cosmopolitan city. In fact, the cosmopolitan city becomes cosmopolitan 
only when contrasted to the older, “oriental” city, and incorporates the 
material fabric of this city as an indicator of this passage to modernity 
(compare Said 1978: 6–7).
Cosmopolitan versions of the city’s past are strikingly similar to what 
Renato Rosaldo has termed “imperialist nostalgia”: the agents of ruin-
ation feel nostalgic toward the state of things they have destroyed. Th e 
very force of destruction is the one that produces its memory, but oc-
cludes the process of destruction itself (Rosaldo 1989). Central to the 
“crypto colonialism” (Herzfeld 2002) of the West in this case is the ac-
tivity of merchant elites, especially Christian ones, in the forging of a 
cosmopolitan identity for the city. In fact, as recent work on “actually 
existing cosmopolitanism” (Robbins 1998: 2) shows, cosmopolitanism is 
an explicitly class-bound “ethos” that is intrinsic to the activity of mer-
cantile elites who integrated the eastern Mediterranean into the world 
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economy (Driessen 2005; Sifneos 2005). Th e ways in which this class 
ethos and its related ethnic politics translated into an aesthetic outlook of 
nostalgic cosmopolitanism is well documented for other port cities, as for 
example for Habsburg Trieste (e.g., Ballinger 2003a, 2003b; Waley 2009). 
Th e paradoxical nature of nostalgic claims to Irakliot cosmopolitanism is 
that it runs counter to wider political understandings of cosmopolitan-
ism. Recent revisions of the notion have stressed that cosmopolitanism—
as a political program envisioned in the early nineteenth century—is 
inimical to the territorial demands of the nation-state, although it can 
be a compliment to nationalism and irredentism (Cheah 1998: 25; see 
also Fine 2003, 2006). In the case of Crete, cosmopolitanism in its port 
cities was enhanced, rather than inhibited, by the protection of the mil-
let system (compare Driessen 2005: 138), and ﬂ ourished in tandem with 
the irredentism and nationalism of its Christian inhabitants. As Ballinger 
shows in the case of Trieste (Ballinger 2003b: 93), the apparent paradox 
of Cretan irredentism coinciding with cosmopolitanism is no paradox at 
all, in fact it is part of the political action that created a network of con-
tacts and power that caused political and social change. What is really 
paradoxical is that this cosmopolitanism is attributed to its eﬀ ect, rather 
than its cause: that it was really produced by the coming of the territorial 
state—which was the end result of its political mobilization—rather than 
the social relationships of empire that produced and nourished it.
Th e construction of the historical entity of the “old Iraklio” (to palio 
Iraklio), which represents the city at an indeterminate point in time 
amounts to a project of “aesthetic cosmopolitanism” (Kofman 2005; Cal-
houn 2008), stripped of its social or political corollaries and presented as a 
characteristic of the city-organism rather than a trait of a speciﬁ c class. It 
selectively connects a Eurocentric vision of modernity to a fetishization of 
ruins in the promotion of the European character of the city: the unifying 
characteristic is not the haphazard, maze-like urban fabric of “oriental” 
times, but the sturdy, imposing ramparts of Venetian, i.e., European, tradi-
tion. Th e erasure of poor, disenfranchised, oriental subjectivities from the 
shaping of history, through a variety of means, described below, is there-
fore the other central characteristic of this aesthetic. Th e remains of this 
underrepresented element constitute an addendum to aesthetic cosmo-
politanism: without these remains, a cosmopolitan image is impossible.
Marks of Coexistence and Invisible Minorities
Invisible and unrepresented, the Muslim element is usually identiﬁ ed 
with the anonymous mass that produced the indiscriminate maze of 
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low-rise houses in the poorest neighborhoods of the city. Th is maze in 
its nostalgic content becomes in other narratives a symbol of something 
else entirely: the peaceful coexistence of the “common people,” who in 
fact had nothing to divide them and were living in a continuous peace 
that was wracked by the forces of politics (compare Millas 2006). Inter-
estingly, accounts of this sort were descriptions of the Muslim element 
after the predominance of the Christian, in the two decades or so be-
tween the regime change of 1898 and the forced repatriation of Cretan 
Muslims in 1923.
Elli Alexiou, a female, left-wing writer, disciple and friend of Kazant-
zakis, wrote an autobiographical short story (published in 1938), in which 
this association of built monuments in space is precisely tallied with the 
forced excision of Muslim Cretans from the past of the city and the is-
land, leaving only their material traces behind. Th e short story begins 
with the communal spring donated by one “Brahim Baba,” which was 
the mainstay of the neighborhood and a common source for water. It 
was built by Ibrahim Baba, still alive at the time of Alexiou’s writing, as 
a donation for his son’s well-being. Alexiou describes it as a communal 
monument, a place for socialization, and also a marker for very personal 
coming-of-age rituals. Th e story then recounts the forced expatriation 
of Muslims and how their Christian friends reacted with sadness and a 
true sense of loss. Exhorted by her friend Hayriye Hanım, Ibrahim Baba’s 
wife, Alexiou’s mother sends the then teenage writer to tend the grave 
of Hayriye’s unfortunate son, to whose health the spring was donated. 
Th e story ends with Alexiou and her brother encountering two civil en-
gineers taking measurements of the Muslim cemetery for the refugee 
encampment subsequently built on the grounds: “Th e foundations of 
the houses were built on skulls and all sorts of human remains” (Alexiou 
1978: 73). To Hayriye Hanım’s constant questions in letters of whether 
the hyacinths on her son’s grave were in bloom, Alexiou’s mother falsely 
replies “yes, indeed they are again this year” (Alexiou 1978: 73).
While, in a sense, accounts such as these aim to subvert the nationalist 
narrative of predating Turks by showing the plight of Cretan Muslims, 
they nevertheless accept the major antagonism central in these accounts 
as valid. Th ey accept, in other words, that the cultural diﬀ erences be-
tween Christians and Muslims were the only real diﬀ erences worth con-
sidering. Other, less politically discerning writers, oﬀ er a much more 
nuanced picture. For example Marika Freri, born in 1907, describes the 
neighborhood where she grew up in the only Christian house, not as an 
“ethnic,” undiﬀ erentiated social space, marked by the idiosyncrasies of 
Cretan Muslims, but as a space where other diﬀ erences, and particularly 
class diﬀ erences, were also active. She explicitly contrasts the wealth of 
94 Aris Anagnostopoulos
Fatima, wife of the rich landowner Sami Bey, with the destitution of her 
fellow Muslims who lived in miserable abodes at the edge of the neigh-
borhood (Freri 1979: 36–40).
Th e extent, however, to which the prevailing narrative about Cretan 
Muslims blinded social commentators and memoirists to the diﬀ erence 
and variety crisscrossing Irakliot society at the time, is equally evident 
in discerning accounts of urban life. Manolis Dermitzakis, for example, 
a local barber, poet, and memoirist tends to lump all together as “Turks” 
Turkish oﬃ  cers; wealthy Muslims, educated in the ways of Islam; and 
the lower Muslim strata (Dermitzakis 1962). Furthermore, while women 
writers, such as Freri or Alexiou, stress cultural diﬀ erences as elements 
of diﬀ erence but not antagonism, their male counterparts reminisce 
somewhat diﬀ erently, by coupling stories of coexistence with more po-
lemic accounts; a good example of the latter is Kazantzakis’s account of 
the city in Kapetan Michalis (Bien 2001). Both men and women writ-
ers, however, represent women as guarantors of peaceful coexistence 
in the city, due to their mild character and female charms (see Anag-
nostopoulos 2014). Kondylakis, for example, in a series of articles that I 
will analyze below, notes with evident nostalgia: “Poor Hanıms! If it was 
up to most of them, there would be such concord between Turks and 
Christians! Th ey are especially conciliatory, and their beauty is often so 
great that it softens the cruelest heart” (Kondylakis 1896b). Th is is an 
oblique recognition of the communal ethos that emerged from practical 
considerations of everyday coexistence, of communal organization on 
the ground. Christians and Muslims shared common ground and habits, 
especially in the markets of the city, but also a deep-seated antagonism, 
which translated much larger stories of national strife into everyday 
terms (Dermitzakis 1962; Vardavas 1971a). It is therefore signiﬁ cant 
that stories of coexistence are woven into narratives that involve women 
as active agents and take place in essentially “eﬀ eminized” urban public 
spaces, such as communal springs (Anagnostopoulos 2011).
Th e Muslim element was doubly erased from the memory of the city. 
In nationalist versions, all Muslims are presented as the demonic “other,” 
the instrument of the oppressing “Turkish” regime, against whom Chris-
tians (Greeks) rose in revolt, rightly ousting them from the island. On 
the other hand, the contribution of this element to the built fabric of the 
city is cleansed of any reference to ethnic or religious denominations as 
active agents, and presented as the result of a regime of “coexistence.” 
Th ese twin versions present us with the same conundrum: either the 
Muslims of Crete were violent barbarians or they were peaceful nonen-
tities. Th eir violence is either vile or nonexistent, but in any case it has 
no social roots at all.
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Th e Muslims of Crete as a historical entity are a mute subject as well 
as a construction of historical thinking. Others speak about them; their 
speech is mediated by the reminiscences of their Christian compatriots 
or the appreciation of the authorities for their humble abodes. Th ere 
are rare occasions where a distinctively Muslim “voice” can be heard 
(e.g., Planakis 2011; Anagnostopoulos 2011). Appropriately, a recent in-
vestigation into the Muslims of Crete by a social historian was called 
“Turcocretes: In Search of Identity” (Tzedaki-Apostolaki 2001). Yet, the 
search for identity that is more evident right now is that conducted by 
the historians themselves. Th e existence of Cretan Muslims constitutes 
a major historiographic problem, that of writing about a group of people 
that has left sparse representations of itself as a community of any kind 
(see, e.g., Andriotis 2004; Peponakis 1997). However, in their attempt 
to resolve the question of political violence, social historians reverted 
to a notion that is totally created by the Christians of Crete, namely the 
Turkocretan.
Th e problem, then, is not whether the Muslims of Crete were violent 
or not. Th e problem is the question itself, which presupposes that the 
Muslims of Crete were one thing that must be examined in its totality 
as a political entity; that their violence, collective or individual, must be 
explained accordingly, based on social, cultural, or, even worse, “racial” 
traits. Th at violence, especially ethnic violence, is central in the politi-
cal constitution of this entity is evident. However, this violence is much 
diﬀ erent than the one supposed by the historians. Historians attempt 
a sum totaling of acts of violence under the common denominator of 
ethnicity-religion. For example, Margaritis states that the massacres 
perpetuated by the Muslims in Iraklio were of lesser impact and scale to 
the massacres perpetuated by Christians in Sitia (Margaritis 2001: 104). 
It is unclear whether the Muslims of Iraklio had anything in common 
with the Muslims in Sitia, and the same goes for the Christians of the 
same regions. In fact, fractionalism was much more pronounced in the 
two purported camps than is commonly accepted (e.g., Aggelakis 2004). 
Losses on two “sides” presuppose that there are two sides that under-
stand themselves as such. Not only as enemies of one another, but also 
as friends, as culturally common within their conﬁ nes. Th e notion of 
the millet may have been an oﬃ  cial way of thinking, but it is unclear to 
what extent it uniﬁ ed the religious element on the ground, beyond a 
merely strategic identiﬁ cation with a religious creed that regulated 
access to state services. As has been noted, the imagination of the an-
tagonistic other is paramount in the transgression of these fractional 
diﬀ erences within the community and sometimes the constitution of a 
nation-in-waiting from people who would not think of themselves as 
96 Aris Anagnostopoulos
members of a community (Bowman 2003, 2007). In this case, it also 
constitutes the Other as a distinct community, through a process that 
misrepresents this Other, eﬀ aces the social grounds of its existence and 
leaves traces that become ex post facto histories of this imagined Other.
Naming the Other
Th e category “Turkocretes” (Turkish Cretans) used by modern-day 
historians to denote and analyze Cretan Muslims as a community, as a 
consistent ethnicity, has a revealing genealogy. As a descriptive term, it 
collapses regional and class variations, and proposes a common iden-
tity, which probably only gained some signiﬁ cance after the last of the 
Muslims had left the island for the Asia Minor and North African coasts 
in 1923. Th en it came to signify Greek-speaking, Muslim refugees from 
Crete. Th e ﬁ rst public appearance of the term in writing that I have lo-
cated is in an article by the popular ﬁ ction writer and journalist Ioan-
nis Kondylakis in the Athens daily Estia, on 15 June 1896. While it is 
certain that Kondylakis did not himself invent the term, he is probably 
responsible for turning it into a sociological category of invented ethnic-
ity. Kondylakis aimed to show that Cretan Muslims were in their major-
ity Cretans who were converted to Islam after the Ottoman occupation 
of Crete in 1669 (see also Peponakis 1997). Th e new converts, albeit 
forced to change their religion, were so eager to show their allegiance 
that they were gradually transformed into “the ﬁ ercest and most repro-
bate of Turks” (Kondylakis 1896a). He recognizes that this accusation 
is not valid for the entire Muslim population of Crete, stating that the 
Muslims of the Iraklio rural provinces are more tame and industrious 
(Kondylakis 1896b), or that the diﬀ erences in customs and appearance 
between Christians and Muslims are minor and attributable to religion: 
“Th eir life in general diﬀ ers from the mores of Christians only where it 
is connected with their religion or soiled [sic] by Turkish wickedness” 
(Kondylakis 1896b). He nevertheless attempts to give an account of dif-
ferences that constitute the Muslims of Crete as a distinct ethnic group, 
and furthermore, one responsible for the perpetuation of the violence of 
the Ottoman state against its subjects.
But why did Kondylakis seek to introduce this new term at the time 
for the Athenian reading public? He could simply refer to Cretan Mus-
lims, as foreign diplomats, politicians, and the international press called 
them, and at least some of the Cretan Muslims called themselves this at 
the time (e.g., Députation des Musulmans de Crête 1896). Kondylakis 
was writing amid an uprising by the Christian element of Crete that was 
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meant to be the last under Ottoman rule. The nationalist atmosphere 
in Greece, which would lead to the unfortunate Greek-Turkish war of 
1897, brought the “Cretan Question” to center stage once more, as a 
pivot to the populist nationalism of diﬀ erent political factions in Athens 
(Gianoulopoulos 2001: 132). Simultaneously, the time seemed ripe for 
the annexation of Crete, either through diplomatic means or through 
direct intervention of the Greek army (see Holland and Markides 2006: 
87).
While the violent transition from Ottoman rule to autonomous state 
took place, other political questions emerged, regarding the status of 
Cretan Muslims in a new territorial state, whether autonomous or an-
nexed to Greece. Th is debate took place in view of massive Muslim out-
migration from Crete. Muslim smallholders sold oﬀ  their property, 
pressed by the Christian insurgents in the countryside, and left the is-
land permanently (Andriotis 2004: 88; Margaritis 2001). Th e emerg-
ing regime was forced to guarantee equal treatment to prevent further 
out-migration and depletion of the island’s productive workforce (Svol-
opoulos 2005: 111). Th e equality of the two creeds was guaranteed in the 
new constitution of the autonomous regime by the notion of ithagenia 
(autochthony), which employed the ideological notion of the Cretan soil 
as a basis for an ad hoc Cretan ethnicity, which transversed “older” re-
ligious diﬀ erences and securely tied ethnic identity to the territory of 
the new state (Anagnostopoulos 2007: 177). Simultaneously, however, 
an oﬃ  cial discourse was necessary that would account for interethnic 
violence, an analysis that would simultaneously advance the irredentist 
cause of Cretan Christians to its ﬁ nal consummation at enosis (union) 
with Greece, and pave the way to peaceful coexistence afterwards. Th e 
attention of social commentators turned to the “Turkocretans,” as a slip-
pery category denoting every Cretan Muslim by referring to the most 
fanatic among them. By naming this social group, it created it. At the 
same time, however, it concealed the social sources of events of religious 
fanaticism, and especially the ever-increasing numbers of Muslim Cre-
tans who were violently pushed into poverty in contrast to the rising 
fortunes of their Christian compatriots (Andriotis 2004: 87–90).
Kondylakis’s ﬁ rst use of the term is already loaded: the apparent con-
fusion that ensued from a term that aimed to denote ethnicity in the 
context of religious aﬃ  liation in the millet system shows how the polit-
ical position of Kondylakis determined its content, but also allowed for 
other meanings to slip in. Th is is evident for example in the brochure 
“Turkokrites” written by the translator and specialist in Ottoman law 
Konstantinos Fournarakis in 1929 (Fournarakis 1929). Fournarakis man-
ages to use the term Turkocretes only a handful of times, preferring the 
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more descriptive Cretan Muslim instead, pointing to the fact that ethnic 
identity and religious conviction were situation-bound and contingent, 
rather than ascriptive, especially in view of the devolution of the millet 
system and the empire as a political formation. He seems to reserve the 
characterization for those Cretan Muslims who were better oﬀ  and had 
closer ties with the Ottoman administration, the urban and rural aghas 
and beys, wealthy enough to aﬀ ord harems and konaks (Fournarakis 
1929: 9). Th e marked class diﬀ erences within the Muslim population, 
and its class relations with the Christian element, are already discernible 
in Kondylakis’s account several decades earlier, as well as other contem-
porary accounts as we have seen above.
Fournarakis was writing six years after the last of the Muslim Cretans 
were forcefully transferred to the Asia Minor coast, as a result of the 
“population exchange” agreed to in the Lausanne Treaty. Th erefore the 
author was referring to a social category that was already in the past, 
and its manipulation into nostalgia could be safely completed. To this 
day, the term has been so profoundly consolidated to signify Muslim 
Cretans in general, that scholarly debate can talk about “Turkocretans” 
as if they were a “really existing” ethnicity even before the events of 
their violent excision from the island (e.g., Tzedaki-Apostolaki 2001). 
As Slavoj Žižek argues, the identity of an object is “the retroactive eﬀ ect 
of naming itself: it is the name itself, the signiﬁ er, which supports the 
identity of an object” (1989: 95, emphasis in the original). Indeed, the 
creation of a name marked the precise moment of the beginning of the 
excision of this population from the life of the island, and in particular 
the economic and social life of the city. To look for the missing identity 
of “Turkocretans” without looking at the genealogy of the term itself, is 
an incomplete undertaking, and furthermore one that embodies a pro-
found symbolic violence. Th e very category that is aimed at bringing 
to light a supposedly forgotten “ethnicity” forgets the conditions of the 
creation of this category.
Spatial Politics: Th e “Oriental” City 
Versus the “Modern Western” Metropolis
As Th omas Hansen points out, “[t]he question of naming revolves,” 
among questions of history and language, “around the question of which 
space, and whose, should the name ﬁ x and territorialize as its object” 
(Hansen 2001: 3). A bundle of interconnected processes were at work in 
this erasure, all of which had to do with novel techniques and ideologies 
of managing space in the city. In Crete, and especially in the cities, the 
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creation of “Turkocretans” went hand in hand with the political project 
of restructuring urban space. Th e Christian bourgeoisie, who had con-
solidated their control over the political fortunes of the cities, developed 
a discourse of progress from the ﬁ lthy and disorganized Ottoman city to 
the controllable, clean and ordered Western, cosmopolitan metropolis, 
that put the blame for the destitute condition of the city in the after-
math of the 1896 uprising on the cultural shortcomings of the Muslim 
element.
Th e image of the city when a British garrison was stationed there in 
1897 was nearly apocalyptic. Almost 50,000 destitute, impoverished and 
hungry Muslim refugees were lumped within the city walls, when in 
times of peace the city had a mere 20,000 inhabitants (Detorakis 2001: 
112). Th e sanitation oﬃ  cials of the British occupying army described 
the situation with alarm in their reports to the Foreign Oﬃ  ce. In those 
papers, written by Lieutenant Clarke (sanitation oﬃ  cer for the British 
garrison in Iraklio, and later advisor for public health with the Cretan 
government), was a report copied verbatim from his correspondence 
with Amabile Ittar, a doctor of Italian descent, member of the “good so-
ciety” of Christian Irakliots. Ittar accounts for the sorry state of the city 
by giving a description of the island’s Muslims, saying that while for “Or-
thodox” Muslims in general bodily hygiene is of major importance, for 
the rural Muslims, because they are of the Bektashi order and therefore 
more secular, ablutions are not the norm, so they are “still less apt to feel 
horror of ﬁ lth and dirt” (Turkey No. 1 (1899): Further Correspondence: 
130). Th e medical gaze of the two correspondents was informed by the 
already established practices of the European urban sanitation move-
ment. But their ideological proximity was not based on a community 
of interest: Clarke’s concerns were practical, as he wanted to sanitize 
the eastern neighborhoods of the city, packed to capacity by impover-
ished Muslim refugees. Th ese neighborhoods were a potential source 
of contagion, and were close to the ramparts where the British garrison 
was stationed (Anagnostopoulos 2007: 114–16). For Ittar, cleaning these 
neighborhoods was part of a much larger scheme. On the one hand, his 
alarm was not only of a sanitary nature, but of a moral one as well. Th ese 
neighborhoods were locally known as berbat mahalle—and sanctioned 
most of the city’s unsolicited brothels and makeshift taverns.5 Th ese 
neighborhoods were thus seen as sources of pollution on two fronts.
Ittar was a vocal spokesman for the developing scheme of urban re-
form that was brought forward by the most enterprising of the city’s 
bourgeoisie. Sanitary ideologies eﬀ ectively justiﬁ ed the Christian bour-
geois class oﬀ ensive that reshaped the built form of the city and altered 
its conceptual geography. It prompted a view of the modern city that 
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contrasted its present with the abject past of disorganized, ad hoc Ot-
toman administration. It partly did so by creating an abject subject of 
Muslim Cretans, and organizing it in speciﬁ c geographic locations. It is 
only seemingly paradoxical that these very same abject spaces are today 
rendered in a nostalgic manner as the creation of the peaceful coexis-
tence of “common people” in their meandering alleys; seemingly, be-
cause from the moment of their inception in oﬃ  cial schemes of city 
building, they were already “older” spaces, representing the Ottoman 
past of the city, which ended with the triumph of Christian Cretans over 
their Muslim compatriots.
Interethnic Violence, Nationalism, Religion 
and Urban Space: From Stories to History
Th e wholesale reshuﬄ  ing of urban space in ethnic terms accompanied 
the process of solidifying local, contingent, person-speciﬁ c stories into 
grand narratives of nationalist history. Both these processes—shaping 
space and consolidating the history of this space—share the same logic 
of transforming smaller, seemingly unconnected events of local signiﬁ -
cance into an organized, interconnected whole. At the same time, how-
ever, they create meaning for these smaller parts that they may not have 
had in advance. For example, the street known locally as karteria was at 
the beginning of the century a badly lit alley that led from a gambling 
house for the wealthier urban professionals to the center of the city. Lo-
cal (Christian) lore exploited the similarity of the name karteria derived 
from the Italian quartiere, for the Venetian military quarters that stood 
in the street, with the Greek karteri, meaning ambush, urged possibly 
by the frequency of muggings in the area. Although Christian thieves 
were possibly equally involved in such exploits, the local lore has it that 
the name derived from the ambushes set up by Christian vigilantes that 
caught Muslim thieves in their getaway from robbing Christian gam-
blers, and then returned the money to the victims (Vardavas 1971b).
As unlikely and convoluted as this story sounds, the way it is narrated 
is meaningful. It seeks to connect stories of male prowess with struggles 
for the organization of space and the creation of ethnic subjects in the 
same process (compare Herzfeld 1988). Th e exploits of Christian and 
Muslim hoodlums in the city are a mainstay in accounts of the times 
(e.g., Vardavas 1971a, 1973; see also Zaimakis 1999). Th ese accounts 
make it clear that their behavior transgressed religious or ethnic bound-
aries and sought to establish “turfs” as networks of personal status and 
prestige. Th e example of one Ali Obashi, a ﬁ erce former lieutenant in 
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the Ottoman gendarmerie, who physically attacked a fellow Muslim for 
abusing a Christian passer-by in religious terms, is instructive. It is clear 
that Ali was at this particular time more interested in keeping order over 
his “turf” and preserving good relations with neighboring Christians, 
than playing on religious or ethnic diﬀ erence. Th is behavior becomes 
even more relevant to discussions about violence and coexistence when 
we learn that this same Ali Obashi was arrested for massacring Chris-
tians during the August 25 riots in 1898 (Dermitzakis 1962: 31). Rela-
tions with other male hoodlums, based on a violent male code of honor 
became more important than religious diﬀ erence in the context of ev-
eryday diplomacy even in peaceful times (see Bryant this volume). Th ese 
exploits were made iconic of the widespread occurrence of violence in 
interpersonal relations. Th e stories of manly feats that accompany the 
exploits of such men point to a narrative organization of customary, 
quotidian violence that transforms it into a commonsensical occurrence 
in the community (Ferrándiz and Feixa 2007: 57; Scheper-Hughes 1997). 
Violence in interpersonal relationships was constitutive in many aspects 
of social life in the city at the end of the nineteenth century. From estab-
lishing the boundaries of a social group such as a neighborhood to re-
solving interpersonal disputes, to opposing challenges to one’s integrity 
and honor (see Anagnostopoulos 2007 for extensive discussion). Histor-
ical circumstance, however, selectively transformed the stories about lo-
cal hoodlums of both religious faiths into a series of symbolic statements 
of Christian retributive violence.
Th e nineteenth-century irredentist “state of emergency” legitimized a 
number of common criminals as bulwarks of the struggle for liberation 
(e.g., Bien 2001: 373), while the military and political organization of 
Cretan insurgents was based on a network of status and manly violence 
developed in rural areas (Anagnostopoulos 2007: 90–94). As the “mod-
ern” Autonomous Cretan polity was instituted, it had to perform a dou-
ble feat: delegitimize personal violence by arresting and marginalizing 
its perpetrators as insults to the civilization and propriety of the “new” 
city, and at the same time make it heroic by ousting it into the past, in-
corporating it into the national narrative, and forgetting the mundane 
character of personal violence by referring to exceptional acts of collec-
tive violence. We have already seen how the “Turkocretan” subject was 
constituted as a violent subject symbolic of the institutional violence of 
the Ottoman regime. In spatial terms, the activity of hoodlums of both 
religions was morally colored by the abject urban spaces that it demar-
cated as its turf. Th at these spaces were the habitation of the majority of 
impoverished Muslims was, of course, no coincidence. Finally, the de-
ﬁ ning violence of Christian discourses had to be invested with historical 
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legitimacy, which would simultaneously justify the widespread social 
violence of the time, especially when coming from Christian subjects. 
Th us, the violence of “Turkocretans” was an inherent trait, caused by 
their religious aﬃ  liation and their corruption by the “Turkish” malad-
ministration (Kondylakis 1896a), whereas the violence of the Christians 
was a legitimate strategy, in view of their irredentist struggle.
What does this mean for the researcher who tries to establish the 
climate of peaceful coexistence between the two creeds? First, that co-
existence is not necessarily peaceful. Reconstructions of it, especially 
in ﬁ ction, had a speciﬁ c, progressive program that sought to present 
the city as a cosmopolitan haven, broken down by nationalist excesses. 
However, historical research makes it clear that violence was a common 
occurrence, moving both vertically (people oppressed by their more 
powerful compatriots) and horizontally (across religious groups). Espe-
cially in the case of Iraklio, to employ notions of cosmopolitanism is 
to ignore the plurality of antagonisms at the heart of this urban soci-
ety. Second, it means that the creeds themselves were social subjects 
that were created by violence not on the everyday level, but rather when 
this violence became transvaluated (Tambiah 1996: 191) by nationalist 
or religious retelling. Th e process of transvaluation takes everyday dis-
putes over “turf”—either personal or group territory—and invests them 
with imagined meaning that presupposes something “beyond” the di-
rect community of interest, a utopian space opened by the dream-nation 
(Gourgouris 1996). What changes in periods of widespread interethnic 
violence is that precisely this common occurrence of violence is orches-
trated around a common cause, which in turn justiﬁ es the proliferation 
of such violent incidents. Whereas the national dream proposes the ab-
olition of all violence, its political program is to justify the violence that 
engenders it, and in the course of this, it allows for personal strategies of 
identiﬁ cation that justify all instances of interpersonal violence through 
reference to a common cause.
Th is process of justiﬁ cation is inextricably linked with the recreation 
of the built fabric of the city. In fact, as I have proposed in this paper, 
it is the very same process that produces modern ruins and furnishes 
them with nostalgic histories. Th is is a process resulting in social fe-
tishism in the classic sense of the term, in that it creates material “testi-
monies” of the cosmopolitan city that occlude the social processes that 
have enabled them to exist at all; it seeks to present luxurious mansions, 
oﬃ  cial buildings, and humble abodes as one thing, created by the lin-
ear advancement of one people through history. However, the hidden 
genealogy of antagonism inherent in struggles over space comes out in 
the stories told about the space itself. Historical and anthropological re-
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search needs to read it, instead of opting for the romantically inﬂ ected 
nostalgia for ruins that is inherent in notions of past cosmopolitanism.
Aris Anagnostopoulos holds a PhD in social anthropology and an MA 
in urban history. His research focuses on the ways in which the material 
remains of the past are conceptualized and acted upon by contempo-
rary societies, and the ways in which the past inﬂ uences the shaping of 
social space. His recent work brings together the concerns and methods 
of archaeology and social anthropology, in the emergent sphere of ar-
chaeological ethnography. He is an honorary lecturer at the School of 
European Culture and Languages and a post-doctoral researcher with 
the Initiative for Heritage Conservancy in Greece; he currently serves 
as assistant director of the Irish Institute of Hellenic Studies at Athens. 
Notes
 1. Th e municipality uses the transliteration Heraklion, whereas in this article 
I use the much simpler and demotic Iraklio.
 2. While in other areas of the Greek state this process was a conscious ef-
fort of state authorities in order to “Hellenize” local populations, in Crete 
the Autonomous State at least acted as a buﬀ er to interethnic violence and 
attempted to safeguard the rights of Muslims, in an eﬀ ort to dampen emi-
gration and prevent economic stagnation. Local initiative was paramount 
in reshaping the urban environment and excising Muslim landmarks from 
the city, which accounts for the diﬀ erences in built heritage between Cretan 
cities, as well as their diﬀ erential management (see, e.g., Herzfeld 1991).
 3. In 1881, there were 6,421 Christians in total in the city and 14,597 Muslims 
(Stavrakis 1890: 68). In 1900, there were 10,753 Christians and 11,659 Mus-
lims (Kritiki Politeia 1904). In 1911, there were 15,877 Christians and 9,248 
Muslims (Eﬁ meris tis Kyberniseos 1911). 
 4. Th e local name for the Venetian castle at the Iraklio port.
 5. Th is is another phonetic allusion, as the one described in the following para-
graphs: the word berbantis in Greek means the dissolute philanderer. While 
the etymology of the word probably derives from the Italian birbante, which 
in turn derives from birba (crook, bum), it is phonetically close to the Turk-
ish berbat (terrible, disgusting). Later commentators, e.g., Vardavas (see ref-
erences), use the phrase berbat mahalle to refer to the neighborhood as a 
place of ill-repute that berbantis males would frequently visit, unaware of 
its original Turkish meaning (terrible neighborhood). I am indebted to the 
editor of this volume for alerting me to this particular detail. 
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[• Chapter 4 •]
Trade and Exchange 
in Nicosia’s Shared Realm
Ermou Street in the 1940s and 1950s
ANITA BAKSHI
A river once ran through the center of Nicosia’s walled city. It was 
diverted by the city’s Venetian rulers, and the “riverbed streets” later 
formed the backbone of the east-west route through the city—a ma-
jor commercial corridor that ran along Ermou Street.1 It is along these 
streets that Cypriots from all communities came together—streets that 
contained a mixture of Greek, Turkish, and Armenian businesses (Ma-
rangou 1995). Th is historic urban topography has endured, with most of 
these riverbed streets falling within the United Nations-controlled Buf-
fer Zone, radically transformed from spaces of cooperation into lines of 
division. Th is division, ﬁ rst termed the Mason-Dixon Line, a wire fence 
following Paphos and Ermou Streets in the late 1950s, gelled in 1963, 
and became permanent with the arrival of Turkish troops on the island 
in 1974 (Hocknell 2001). What is commonly known about this part of 
the city is that it was an important commercial area, well used by both 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as well as other ethnic minorities, 
prior to partition. Th e importance of this part of the city is recognized 
in that it was one of the few ethnically mixed areas of a city otherwise 
deﬁ ned by the Ottoman mahalle structure of generally segregated neigh-
borhoods. Th e signiﬁ cance of this area is often mentioned in other texts 
that outline the history of the city, and it is also referenced in idealized 
reconstructions of a past of brotherhood and unity when Greek and 
Turk ish Cypriots were sharing this area. Yet, the scholarship dealing 
with this site is thin, and little detailed information about it is available, 
thus enabling reductive depictions that serve these reconstructions.2 
Th is is a history that had remained unwritten, and had not found its way 
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into public discourse so that we might interrogate it as a more substan-
tive resource.
Th is chapter will attempt to rebuild the lost topographies of the Buf-
fer Zone—spatial, social, and commercial—using the few resources 
available and relying most heavily on the memories of those who knew 
this area in the 1950s, before intercommunal conﬂ ict changed the na-
ture of the city. It examines what these memories can reveal about the 
slow process of change from a city of coexistence to the spatial segrega-
tion of the two communities. I use Simmel’s discussion of “the stranger” 
to explore how the spatial framework of the marketplace street sup-
ported both the phenomena of “nearness” and “remoteness” as the 
street changed from a space of coexistence to a site of conﬂ ict. Th ese 
memories aid in the reconstruction of a clearer picture of the idealized 
description of the “mixed city” of Nicosia, using memories associated 
with the spatial framework of the Ermou marketplace to broaden un-
derstandings of social relations between the city’s diverse communities 
prior to division.
Th ese streets contained many shops, almost all of which were long 
and narrow, lit only by the entrance and an arsera, or small high window. 
Th erefore the tall wide doors were often left open, creating a rich and vi-
brant streetscape. Prior to division, residents from all over the city came 
to shop in these streets, where merchants and farmers from surrounding 
villages traded their goods. Today, however, this part of the city is nearly 
a reverse image of this past incarnation, its activity and density replaced 
by emptiness and silence. To use Dylan Trigg’s words regarding his ex-
perience of the temporality of ruins: “Th ere is a sense of being displaced 
here, of having come to a scene too late, as though the presence is de-
ﬁ ned by what fails to materialize in the present” (Trigg 2009: 98).
While the nature of the Cyprus problem has changed over the years, 
being further complicated by developments since 1974, such as the de-
mographic impact of large numbers of migrants from mainland Turkey 
and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, in many 
ways the area within this set of lines has remained the same since 1974. 
Th e layout of its streets and shops remains unchanged, and on some 
buildings signs still hang that advertise businesses once located there. A 
journalist allowed to tour the Buﬀ er Zone inside the walled city in 2010 
writes: “We come across signs bearing the names of famous entrepre-
neurs who range from brewers of beer to importers of cars and elec-
trical goods: Fotos Fotiades, Kozakis Galatariotis Bros, Philippou Bros, 
Hadzikyriakos and others” (Christoﬁ  2010). Because many buildings in 
this area were constructed from mud-brick, they have been slowly erod-
ing, and there have been many roof and facade collapses. Th e Nicosia 
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Master Plan (NMP) team has worked to reinforce several buildings, but 
they are only allowed to do as much as is necessary to prevent their col-
lapse, supporting crumbling facades with wooden scaﬀ olding.3 Th us a 
peculiar situation exists in this swath of land in the center of the city: 
buildings cannot be altered or demolished, and the eﬀ ects of time can 
clearly be witnessed on their scarred ﬁ gures.
Th e rationale for studying Nicosia through an investigation of place-
based memories is connected to the problematic nature of oﬃ  cial his-
torical narratives related to contested histories, where certain events, 
chronologies, and perspectives are remembered while others remain 
unregistered, oﬃ  cially relegated to the realm of the forgotten. In regions 
of conﬂ ict, histories are contested and competing, often resulting in na-
tional narratives that are heavily imposed through oﬃ  cial channels of 
history and memory. I will argue in this chapter that in Cyprus, where 
oﬃ  cial repositories of history like archives and textbooks can be heavily 
manipulated, an investigation of place can prove a valuable resource for 
understanding and challenging these competing histories.
Th e “Cyprus Problem” today remains unresolved, and the fate of the 
Buﬀ er Zone, which stretches for 180 kilometers through the island, re-
mains suspended; but perhaps the most contested terrain of all in Cyprus 
today is that of history. Oﬃ  cial Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot his-
torical narratives represent the contested past in starkly diﬀ erent ways 
(Papadakis 2008). Th ese divergent narratives present diﬀ erent chronol-
ogies, where diﬀ erent periods and events are remembered and forgotten 
by each side. Additionally, Nicosia in the past is represented in diﬀ erent 
ways: either as a city of brotherhood, where diﬀ erent communities lived 
together in complete harmony, or as a city segregated along communal 
lines (Bakshi 2012a). Th ese factors have made it diﬃ  cult to understand 
the nature of everyday coexistence and conﬂ ict between communities in 
Cyprus, necessitating the development of new theoretical and method-
ological tools arrived at through a close investigation of peoples’ indi-
vidual and collective engagements that can enrich our understandings of 
this space. Such tools can allow us to describe how diverse populations 
negotiate, through actual relations, the daily practices of sharing space 
and living together, and also to understand how enmity is created in the 
transition to conﬂ ict. In this chapter, I attempt to do this through a de-
tailed spatial investigation from my perspective as an architect, looking 
closely at the spatial conﬁ guration and materiality of the Ermou market-
place and how it functioned in structuring social relations.
Often the Buﬀ er Zone is rendered simply as a line on the map. But 
it does have thickness—a thickness that extends beyond its edges as 
the de facto Buﬀ er Zone, neglected and sparsely populated contiguous 
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areas, which radiate out from these edges deeper into the walled city. 
Th is chapter will argue that this part of the city has always “extended 
beyond” its apparent borders. Th e Ermou marketplace streets, while of a 
diﬀ erent nature than the rest of the city, introduced cohesion and struc-
tural integrity to the city as a whole. Market areas generally encourage 
the appearance of other urban activities and programs at their edges. 
Th ese are areas of the city that have their own associations and symbolic 
meanings: areas that operate on a diﬀ erent clock from the rest of the 
city, known for trade, exchange, and a multitude of possibilities (Calabi 
2004). Th is chapter, in rebuilding these topographies, aims to highlight 
the importance of these shared streets to the functioning of Nicosia as a 
mixed city of diverse populations.
A more comprehensive rendering of the Ermou marketplace will as-
sist in broadening understandings of the nature of coexistence of diverse 
populations in mixed cities.4 Th is is especially important in contested 
or divided cities where, as in Nicosia, much of the rhetoric about the 
past centers on the city as either intermixed or segregated. Scholars have 
challenged this reductive understanding of place, proposing instead a 
more dynamic and ﬂ exible understanding of cities. Doreen Massey de-
scribes space as a composition of multiple trajectories, reading it as a 
medium that involves time and allows for the simultaneity of multiple 
stories within its framework. Th is allows for an understanding of the 
city as an entity that is neither “diverse” nor “homogenous.” She views 
space as “the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity in 
the sense of contemporaneous plurality; as the sphere in which distinct 
trajectories coexist; as the sphere therefore of coexisting heterogeneity” 
(Massey 2005: 8). Th is research attempts to examine Nicosia along these 
lines, as a city where, prior to the 1950s, diﬀ erent communities were 
dependent upon each other, while at the same time maintaining varying 
degrees of separation. Th e picture of life that emerges from this research 
falls outside of the overly strict deﬁ nitions of the city as either inter-
mixed or segregated. Rather, the city’s mixed nature was in some ways 
facilitated by its segregation.
Th e Buﬀ er Zone is a gap in the city—a physical gap and a gap of the 
imagination, separating diﬀ ering interpretations of the past. Th ere also 
exists a gap in knowledge about this place and the way of life it at one 
time encapsulated. Th e limited existing scholarship on this site reveals 
that it was once the city’s main marketplace, well-used by all Cypriots, 
and that there are two divergent oﬃ  cial narratives about life in the city 
before 1974 (Papadakis 2005). I argue that this makes it important to 
now go back to the city as the base, and then rebuild a richer and more 
nuanced depiction of life in the most important and ethnically mixed 
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urban space of the city. Th is investigation of everyday life complements 
the histories, and it also narrates, using individuals’ stories, how people 
can become alienated and separated, even while sharing the same city 
center.
Th e reconstruction of the topographies of the Buﬀ er Zone was accom-
plished through a process of piecing together information from diﬀ erent 
sources—including archives, newspaper advertisements, commercial 
catalogues,5 land registers, and photographic surveys—and emplacing 
them on maps of the walled city.6 Th ese maps and visual prompts were 
then used in loosely structured interviews with Greek Cypriot, Turkish 
Cypriot, and Armenian Cypriot shopkeepers who once lived or worked 
in this part of the city, allowing themes to emerge.7 Th e spatial frame-
work of this site was used to trigger memories in the people who once 
worked there, enabling them to provide narratives describing a lost way 
of life and the relatively undocumented dynamics of intercommunal 
commercial and social relations. A study and discussion of place allows 
access to these types of memories because these places provided the set-
ting or background for the activities of daily life; and they serve now as 
a setting for memory. As this chapter will outline, the Buﬀ er Zone was 
and is so crucial to the functioning of this city and the relations between 
its populations that it certainly merits a closer, more detailed investiga-
tion—one that zooms in, to elucidate how the city functioned as a whole, 
and how it broke apart.8
Life of the Ermou Marketplace
By tapping into the resource of these maps and narratives a scenario can 
be composed of the rich street life along Ermou in the early 1950s—of 
narrow shops with workers sitting outside, and of recognizable street 
vendors with their distinct calls for advertising goods. Most of the shop-
keepers did not remember every detail about life in this area, nor were 
they able to remember time frames with much speciﬁ city. Rather, their 
remembrances were of certain images and sounds—memories of mo-
ments and places that have been strong enough to persist. It is these 
memories that begin to reveal the outlines of the narrow shops of the 
Ermou marketplace.9
Th ese streets would ﬁ ll with people early in the morning. Ali, whose 
father ran a grocery on Ermou, remembers opening the shop at 6:30 
AM and selling around three hundred loaves of bread most mornings 
within the ﬁ rst two hours of business. His shop was located around the 
corner from a Greek merchant who ran one of the city’s most recogniz-
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able businesses, Tsaiousis 1,000,000 Th ings. Th eir shops were near the 
intersection of Ermou and Goldsmiths’ Street, also known in Turkish as 
Köprü Başı, the “bridgehead,” as it historically was the location of one of 
the main bridges that spanned the river. In Greek it was known as Stavro 
Pazaro, the “cross-market.”10 Th is intersection could be considered the 
center of the marketplace streets, and many important merchants were 
located here. Monyatis, Klerides, Agrotis, and Kokinos were popular 
glassware shops. Nearby was a large KEO shop, selling the famous beer 
of Cyprus since 1951, as well as Platanis Wines and Spirits. Just to the 
east were smaller, but equally well-known shops, such as the Galip Gro-
cery, Camberis Clothing, Varnavas Nicolaou the timber merchant, Irfan 
Hussein’s large retail store, and the Çıraklı confectionary.
Th e shopkeepers’ memories describe the crowded nature of the street 
with people sitting outside of their shops, and at outdoor cafes during 
siesta time, which lasted from 1:00 PM to 4:00 PM during the summer. 
Th is was a mandated time of rest, enforced by the British, and people 
were required to close their workshops for these three hours. At 1:00 PM 
every working day a horn would sound from the nearby power station, 
marking the beginning of siesta. While some went home for lunch and 
a nap, others would sit at the cafes playing cards or backgammon. Th ey 
sat on traditional Cypriot chairs, wooden with woven seats, in the cafes 
or outside of their shops. A frequent sight on the streets would be a boy 
holding a metal tray, delivering short cups of strong coﬀ ee. Th e streets 
were often enlivened by coppersmiths and blacksmiths who would take 
their work outside. Tassos recalls that as a child he saw two men sit-
ting on Iphestos Street, where most of the coppersmiths were located, 
hitting a piece of metal and singing a song: “Ash gollarna, ash gollarna, 
sargolari”—a version of the Turkish song, “aç kollarını, aç kollarını, sarıl 
bana”—“open your arms and hug me.” Photographs from 1957 show 
what Tassos may have seen: Coppersmiths sit on the street, hammering 
away at large pans held up between their knees, next to stacked pots 
and pans of all sizes. Th ese were streets where daily rituals took place 
in accordance with a common clock, and where diﬀ erent traditions and 
languages came together.
Just as Iphestos was the street of the coppersmiths, other streets in 
the marketplace were also known for speciﬁ c trades. Goldsmiths’ was 
the street of jewelers. Arabacılar Street, “the coachmens’ street,” was one 
of the main stops for amaxa, horse-drawn carriages, and was lined with 
carpenters’ workshops. Arasta Street was largely known as a place to 
shop for shoes and leather goods, and there were many Armenian mer-
chants selling leather, shoes, and textiles.11 Among these streets were 
several outdoor gathering spots such as Platanos, located at the inter-
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section of Ermou and Militou, where a large tree provided shade from 
the strong Cyprus sun, and many people would gather here throughout 
the day. Towards the eastern end of Ermou Street, where it became con-
siderably wider, were several factories processing sesame seed oil. Th e 
leftover from this process, a delicious paste called kouzvos, was given 
away to the neighborhood children. Many factories were to be found at 
this end of Ermou including the Klitos soda factory, the Kulabis ﬂ our 
mill, and Kyriakos Anastassiades furniture factory, well known for the 
sign above the door that read “VISIT US FOR YOUR OWN BENEFIT.” 
And ﬁ nally, at the end of Ermou, was the Olympiakos Football Club. Just 
as individual shops were known for certain features, diﬀ erent parts of 
Ermou Street were deﬁ ned by distinct characteristics.
In the center of this activity was the main municipal market called 
Pantopolio in Greek, which means a place to buy everything, and pro-
nounced as Bandabulya in Turkish.12 Th is market, located at the in-
tersection of three of the most important commercial streets in the 
city—Ermou, Goldsmiths’, and Arasta—could be considered the hinge-
point of the city. Everybody shopped in this market, and it was the main 
outlet for produce and meat. Mustafa, a butcher who has been working 
at Bandabulya ever since he was a young child in the 1940s, remembers 
the many languages spoken there—Greek, Turkish, English, and even 
some Arabic. Th e market was very mixed, although the Greek butchers 
were in a separate section selling pork, and it was always crowded. In 
one of the rare memoirs written about this period, Taner Baybars de-
scribes his impression of this place as a child in the 1950s:
We went to the closed marketplace on foot, walking along the road 
called Arasta which was the hub of haberdashery, lingerie and buttons. 
Th at smell from each shop, cool, starchy. Th e market was always cool. 
… Th e whole place was a mixture of smells. Th ere were rows. Each row 
smelled diﬀ erently. One of spices, another one of vegetables and fruit, 
and another one of fresh blood dripping from newly slaughtered beasts 
hanging on sharp, shiny hooks. (Baybars 1970: 47)
Photos of Pantopolio taken in the 1950s show that the activity ex-
tended out from the large entrances of the market onto the surrounding 
streets. Just outside the northern entrance, located at the end of Arasta 
and in front of the Aya Sofya Mosque,13 a thick border of vendors deﬁ nes 
the edge of the street. Goods for sale are laid out, and vendors push carts 
with ready-to-eat food. It was not only the buildings and places that de-
ﬁ ned Ermou, but these vendors were part of the common vocabulary of 
the streets as well, and, more importantly, part of the common language 
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shared by all communities in Nicosia. Th is language was composed of 
the repetitive practices of the daily life of the city—practices that were 
known and recognized by all.
Many shopkeepers remembered the vendor who sold chickens from 
cages in a street just oﬀ  of Goldsmiths’ and the petrol-seller who trav-
elled the streets with a donkey-cart. But most popular of all were the 
sellers of sweets and refreshments. Th ey would push their carts of shi-
amali—made from semolina, yogurt, and syrup—and muhallebi, the 
characteristic starch pudding of Cyprus, making their rounds through 
the marketplace, especially in the evening hours. A variety of muhallebi 
was made from milk, and the most coveted ones were those that came 
out blackened, the sugar slightly burnt and caramelized. In the morn-
ings vendors would sell a variety of breakfast rolls, the warm and soft 
koullaria as well as bread rolls baked with halloumi or kaskavalli—a 
rich cheese with holes that the oil runs through when warm. Perhaps 
the most interesting vendor was the Turkish woman who sold Oxinindie 
Lemonade, which she carried in a tank on her back. She wore a belt 
stocked with glasses, bending over and pouring the lemonade from the 
tank into these glasses.
Th e vendors had their own unique calls for advertising their products. 
“Salebi vraaaaazi. …”—“hot salep”—the men would call out who sold this 
sweet winter drink made from crushed almonds. Some even had their 
own lyrical sayings; particularly well-remembered was a Maronite man 
who sold pastellaki, a mixture of nuts and honey pressed into ﬂ at bars. 
He would walk up and down the marketplace streets two or three times 
a day calling out:
To pastellaki to kalo,  Th e pastellaki is good,
Mono ego to poulo,  Th e only one who sells it is I,
Olo kouna kai athasi,  All nuts and almonds,
Opkios den fai tha hasi Whoever does not eat it loses.
Th ese vendors and their calls were recognized by all, and in this unas-
suming way diﬀ erent communities shared these aspects of everyday life 
in the city.
While this area contained hundreds of small shops, cafes, vendors, 
and gathering spots, there were several in particular that came up re-
peatedly in many of the shopkeepers’ mappings and remembrances. 
Many shopkeepers would gather in the taverns on Ermou in the eve-
nings: “a bachelor’s life was there, at the bar,” says Christos. While the 
rest of Ermou was quiet in these late hours, the bars and taverns, es-
pecially Antonakis, Kikas, and Iraklis, were always crowded. Antonakis 
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was a small, narrow bar where people would stop in for a quick drink 
and a light snack. Tassos remembers being intrigued by these places 
as a child, wondering about the clear, colorless beverage served there. 
Th rough the open doors he would watch the men sitting at small metal 
tables, eating from plates of olives and halloumi cheese; bottles of One 
Star Cognac sat on the tables.
Several popular restaurants sold pacha, a hearty soup made by slowly 
cooking together sheep head or stomach, vinegar, garlic, salt, and pep-
per. Th ese restaurants were very popular both for breakfast as well as 
for a late-night meal, opening around 3:00 AM to prepare the soup for 
breakfast for workers who would begin arriving at 5:00 AM. Th e most 
popular was Hadjigeorgios’ restaurant, located just north of Ermou. 
Some claim that Hadjigeorgios would carry cooked sheep eyes, con-
sidered a real delicacy, in his apron, popping them into the soup of his 
special customers. Another popular pacha shop was owned by an Arab 
from Beirut, who spoke excellent Turkish and also served hummus and 
pastries similar to börek. Vazken, an Armenian leather merchant who 
ran a shop on Arasta, remembers that his family would start work very 
early, leaving their neighborhood near Victoria Road around dawn, to 
return to their club only in the evening. Th ey would open up shop at 
7:00 AM, breaking for a 9:00 AM meal at Parsegh’s kebab shop, run by 
an Armenian who had migrated from Turkey. Some claimed that his 
was the most popular shop in all of Nicosia. Ermou also hosted dozens 
of small cafes, which were especially crowded during the siesta hours. 
Of these, everybody had his or her favorite. Many remember the smell 
of coﬀ ee from Özerlat, a coﬀ ee roasters operating since the early 1900s 
near the southern entrance to Pantopolio. Another roaster, Tahsin Bey, 
was known for his unique method of preparing coﬀ ee without a grinding 
machine, using a hammer instead. Many hans, or inns, were also located 
on Ermou, known for speciﬁ c characteristics and functions (Bakshi 
2012b).
Legendary characters were also housed in these streets. Many shop-
keepers told stories about Kutsofannis, who owned a small tobacco shop 
on Ermou. Many made of fun of him, recalling that he was a bit slow, a 
bit fat, and had a funny way of walking and talking. When Tassos was 
a child, his father, a soldier in World War I, collected his ration of ciga-
rettes, taking them to Kutsofannis’ shop to resell for cash. Tassos would 
stand outside the shop, and wonderingly stare up the steps at the “Cig-
arette Buddha.” Th e common knowledge about this character can best 
be illustrated by an anecdote. Andreas recalls a time when an actor, who 
of course knew about Kutsofannis, went to his shop to play a joke on 
him, speaking in the same manner, and walking with a limp. When the 
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actor left, Kutsofannis saw him straighten up and walk properly from 
the door. He became very angry, yelling curses down the street after the 
actor; and of course, all the shopkeepers on the street laughed. Places 
on Ermou were known not only for their physical characteristics or the 
goods they sold, but also for the personalities associated with them. Th e 
Ermou marketplace might almost be imagined as a framework in which 
these characters, sounds, and daily practices were located.
Th e nature of this area changed greatly beginning in 1958. At the end 
of two months of arson, destruction, and murder in Nicosia, ﬁ fty-six 
Greeks and ﬁ fty-three Turks had died (Panteli 1990: 180). Even after or-
der was restored and negotiations were underway for the eventual inde-
pendence of a united Cyprus, the city was left divided in crucial ways. 
I have described this in more detail elsewhere, but for the purposes of 
this discussion, Pantopolio can serve as example of this change. Th e tone 
of an article regarding the municipal market in the Turkish press on 1 
July 1958 is telling of the increasing territorial claims being staked in the 
once mixed commercial center:
Th e Lefkoşa Municipal Market, which had been closed for the last 
three weeks, opened yesterday. … Numerous British soldiers with ma-
chine guns and billy clubs can also be found occupying the market. … 
Th e market’s Greek Cypriot shop owners appear to be gone. … I met 
with the Turkish butchers and green grocers who had the chance to 
settle back into their old shops again. … Th e Turkish owners say that 
the market already belonged to the Evkaf, and therefore it has always 
been Turkish. Th ey also made the point that there are four municipal 
markets in the Greek Cypriot areas, and therefore the Greek Cypriots 
should not claim a right to this market.14
Th us after 1958 the Greek butchers and grocers never again sold their 
goods in Pantopolio. At the end of 1958 several major Ermou market-
place institutions including Bandabulya and the hans—both of which had 
once encapsulated a particular way of life and the overlapping of spatial, 
commercial, and social topographies familiar to both communities—
were irretrievably transformed. Th e intercommunal violence lasted for 
only two months, but the damage to the city was much more permanent. 
Th e topography of the Ermou streets was transformed by the begin-
nings of division—demarcated by fences, barriers, and patrolling military 
groups—giving visual expression to the separation of the two commu-
nities. Like a zipper pulling apart, the Ermou streets became divided as 
Turkish-Cypriot businesses relocated north and Turkish-Cypriot resi-
dents of these streets left their homes as refugees.
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Figure 4.1. “View Near St. Sophia 
- Late 1950s.” Th e main municipal 
market Pantapolio/Bandabulya 
appears in the background. Photo-
graph from Th e Press and Informa-
tion Oﬃ  ce Archive, 20C.151 (27), 
Ministry of the Interior, Republic 
of Cyprus.
Exclusion within Inclusiveness
It was important to here describe the Ermou marketplace in such great 
detail because the depiction of these streets is critical to understanding 
how the city functioned as a whole. It is clear that many aspects of daily 
life in Nicosia’s marketplace were shared and understood by Cypriots 
from all communities. But at the same time, the city was divided in other 
ways: structured into distinct mahalles, neighborhoods or quarters that 
were most often ethnically segregated.15
Figure 4.2. A portion of the map created through discussions and map-
ping sessions with the shopkeepers. Köprü Başı / Stavro Pazaro was a 
major landmark in the city and many shopkeepers were able to recall shops 
that once were located in this part of the city.
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While these quarters were generally divided along ethnic lines, other 
public, civic, and commercial areas in the city were quite mixed. Th e 
Ermou marketplace perhaps best exempliﬁ es this, but the commercial 
Ledra and Regena Streets were also used by all communities, as well 
as Sarayönü Square, considered the clerical center of the city. In this 
sense, the city was inclusive in that it provided spaces that were shared 
by all communities, allowing for the participation of all residents in a 
common urban life. At the same time, this was to some extent limited 
to certain areas, and the morphology of the city included spaces and 
urban practices that were formed around exclusion; there were diﬀ er-
ing degrees of inclusion and exclusion in the city. Th ere were “public” 
institutions within certain neighborhoods, but these were mainly for 
the use of deﬁ ned communities. For example, the Armenians, who were 
well represented as merchants throughout the city, had their own club, 
school, and church clustered around their main residential quarter near 
Victoria Road. Th e lives of the Armenians of Nicosia were “largely sepa-
rate” from those of the Greeks and Turks (Pattie 1997: 56), yet signiﬁ cant 
contact occurred through children’s play, business matters, and shops. 
Th eir community life was focused around their club:
By 1925 the Armenian club had been functioning in Nicosia for twenty 
years. … In the library … were numerous books and periodicals from 
around the diaspora. … Th ere was also a large room used for dances and 
meetings, and a small canteen from which coﬀ ee and food were served. 
Upstairs was a space for backgammon and card playing; above that were 
more rooms, where a few poor families lived. … [Th ere was] a cultural 
hour at midday on Sundays, after church. Th ese were attended by both 
men and women and included poetry, music, dramatic recitations, and 
lectures. People from the community played instruments or sang, and 
occasionally artists or speakers would come from outside. (Ibid.: 73)
Th is was a community space and a community life that others did 
not have, nor expected to have, access to. Th e Latin community, located 
near Paphos Gate, had their own space near the Maronite Church. Like-
wise, the Greek and Turkish communities had their own institutions and 
spaces for gathering. Th is social structure existed alongside the under-
standing of the city as areas and spaces with varying degrees of inclu-
siveness or exclusion, one that consisted of realms that were shared to 
diﬀ ering degrees. Even some aspects of the commercial life of the city 
were segregated: For instance, there was an order of Turkish tanners, 
marked by their special sashes and with their own initiation ceremonies 
in the Ömerye hamam (Bağışkan 2009: 469). Yet the Turkish and Greek 
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merchants and tradesmen came together in the Ermou bazaar. As Bry-
ant notes in her introductory discussion of “multi-scalar sovereignties,” 
there was an understanding of the city as a number of overlapping pub-
lic and private zones, not one monolithic understanding of the city as 
“shared space” to which every citizen had the “right” to access.
Additionally, Ermou Street was a very diﬀ erent space for women than 
it was for men. Vathoula, an 83-year-old Greek Cypriot woman inter-
viewed for this research, remembers the Ermou of the 1950s as being 
crowded with stores that sold jewelry, lace, fabrics, and shoes. Few 
women worked in the shops, but many shopped in these streets. While 
she remembers noticing restaurants and coﬀ ee shops from the street, 
she would never stop there. Th ese were places that were only for men, 
and if women even glanced inside they would be labeled with a “bad 
name.” Young girls never went to the market alone; they would always be 
accompanied by mothers, grandmothers, or brothers. Th e structuring 
of the Ermou marketplace, then, excluded women from certain parts of 
the city. As Vathoula’s testimony illustrates, it was not considered proper 
to even look into certain places.16 Th e diﬀ erential access allowed to men 
and women exempliﬁ es what was then an accepted structuring of the 
city into zones of inclusion and exclusion for diﬀ erent groups—much in 
the same way that it was accepted that the Turks had their own nargile 
cafes, the Greeks their own taverns, and the Armenians had their club.
Th ere is much in contemporary writing about cities that praises di-
versity and multiculturalism, and this narrative, as a nostalgic trope, is 
especially dominant in oﬃ  cial Greek Cypriot understandings of what 
the old city was like. But we can see through the example of the limited 
access that women had to certain places on Ermou, and the example 
of the Armenian Club, that this utopic narrative of urban inclusiveness 
does not stand up to close scrutiny. Rather, the city was inherently struc-
tured as diﬀ erent zones, and it was well understood which populations 
had access to which places. Nicosia worked as a mixed city because of 
a spatial structure and communal understanding of the city as one that 
was divided into areas with diﬀ ering levels of public access and private 
exclusivity. Th is overlapping could roughly, for the purposes of this dis-
cussion, be divided into three categorical realms, although greater sub-
tlety and nuance would assuredly allow for more. Each of these realms 
allowed the residents diﬀ ering levels of participation in the public life of 
the city, and thus enabled varying degrees of interaction with members 
of other communities.
Th e most mixed realm of the city consisted of shared commercial 
areas, most importantly the Ermou streets. Th is area structured daily life 
into a system that was repetitive: certain daily patterns and timings were 
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followed by all. Th is allowed for recognition of people that one would 
get to know over time, enabling relationships of secondary familiarity. 
A reference to Georg Simmel’s analysis of “the stranger” and human re-
lationships can shed some light on why this realm was so important. In 
his discussion of “nearness” and “remoteness” Simmel claims that the 
stranger is someone that we know, and in knowing them we understand 
that they are not part of “us”:
Th e unity of nearness and remoteness involved in every human rela-
tion is organized, in the phenomenon of the stranger, in a way which 
may be most brieﬂ y formulated by saying that in the relationship to 
him distance means that he, who is close by, is far, and strangeness 
means that he, who is also far, is actually near. (Simmel 1950: 402–8)
Th ese strangers are not really “conceived as individuals” in the sense that 
we do not think about their individual qualities, but rather generalize 
them into a group that is characterized by their being diﬀ erent to us. Th e 
shared realm provided by the Ermou streets allowed for the recognition 
of speciﬁ c diﬀ erences—the elements that begin to form the outlines of 
individuals, distinguishing them from the group as a whole. Th ese out-
lines may remain hazy. Th ey need not be deep friendships, and indeed 
they probably often were not, but they do help to create a public life in 
which the individual can operate comfortably—what Sylvaine Bulle in 
this volume describes as “co-presence.”
Unlike the Jerusalem described by Bulle, however, Nicosia of this pe-
riod was one that may have experienced the sorts of everyday tensions 
described by Bryant in her introduction, but where there was little overt 
hostility. Th is allowed for a particular habitus to emerge, one constituted 
by the repetitive nature of interactions and facilitated by the stable pat-
tern of streets and intersections. As Doreen Massey states:
One of the truly productive characteristics of material spatiality [is] its 
potential for the happenstance juxtaposition of previously unrelated 
trajectories, that business of walking around a corner and bumping 
into alterity, of having … to get on with neighbors … what is import-
ant is that contact is involved and some form of social negotiation. 
(Massey 2004: 94)
Th e spatial characteristics of the Ermou marketplace created the pos-
sibilities for such activities and mediation. Th is part of the city had func-
tioned as the main bazaar area for centuries, and its material and spatial 
characteristics developed because of this location and function. It was 
once a riverbed, and the narrow and twisting roads that were laid out 
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here were originally unpaved market lanes that followed the course of 
the river. It was the main east-west route through the city, linking two 
city gates, so hans were established along its course. Plots in this market 
area were divided to create narrow lots. Th e wide doors fronting on Er-
mou provided the main natural light for these narrow shops, and were 
often left open to the street making the shopkeepers visible to passersby. 
Th e few squares and wide streets became places where vendors would 
establish themselves into recognizable patterns. People could be seen 
sitting outside of their shops, walking in the streets selling their goods, 
or resting in cafes during siesta. Th us trade considerations created this 
particular spatial conﬁ guration, and then the material reality of the 
spaces served to create a well-functioning shared realm for the city—a 
space that allowed for visual recognition, contact and social negotiation. 
It was the praxis of the city that allowed for this. In her introduction to 
this volume, Bryant proposes using the term “constructive ambiguity” 
to think about a process that allows “certain boundaries to remain in 
place while ﬁ nding common ground where it is possible” (p. 23). In this 
way, diﬀ erences are bracketed, allowing it to be retained while everyday 
practices continue. Th e Ermou marketplace provided a spatial ﬁ eld that 
could accommodate this kind of negotiation.
Th e second realm was that of institutions within, or in close proxim-
ity to this mixed area: cafes, taverns, or clubs that were segregated and 
were for the exclusive use of one group or another. Th ese allowed for 
certain moments when one could withdraw from the shared realm. And 
ﬁ nally, the third realm is that of the mahalle, neighborhoods or quarters 
that were most often ethnically segregated. Th is allowed for a complete 
retreat from the mixed, public life of the city into the comfort and fa-
miliarity of the mahalle. It is important to state here that some of these 
neighborhoods, such as Tahtakale and Ömerye, were ethnically quite 
mixed, and here the familiarity with neighbors also became a deﬁ ning 
feature of the mahalle, outside of ethnicity.
Conclusion: Loss of a Structure of Meaning
While the walled city is mythologically depicted either as a space of 
comprehensive coexistence or total separation, a closer investigation 
reveals a more complex urban structure. Communities came together 
for trade and commerce, working together but generally living in sep-
arate quarters. Most of the Turkish neighborhoods were north of the 
old riverbed, with the exception of Tahtakale and Ömerye to the south. 
Most of the Greeks lived in the south, with the exception of Ayios Lucas 
in the north. Still, there were many places in the marketplace streets 
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frequented by both communities. Th ese were the tacitly agreed upon 
places for public intermingling, while intimate neighborhood spots, cer-
tain cafes, or ethnic institutions like the Armenian Club, were private, 
used exclusively by certain communities. An understanding was in place 
that the city was composed of a number of realms of varying degrees of 
exclusion or integration.
It is important to introduce this distinction and this gradation into 
the discussion, as this is lacking in most depictions of the city. For exam-
ple, a Greek-Cypriot text, Peaceful Co-existence in Cyprus under British 
Rule, shows a photograph taken in the 1950s at the Women’s Market, 
of Greeks and Turks shopping side by side. Th is text, using such photo-
graphs, seeks to render the old city as a site of unity, prior to 1974 (Kyrris 
1977). Yet, these kinds of narratives leave out the forces that changed 
the city from the 1950s to 1974. Rather than stopping with such photo-
graphic “evidence,” it is necessary to continue to examine the resource of 
place, to trace the devolution of the city toward complete division. From 
the shopkeepers’ memories outlined above, it certainly does seem as if 
these streets contained a common way of life that was recognized by 
many—a world of recognizable faces and images, a rhythm consisting of 
the regular ﬂ ow of known sounds and daily patterns of movement, gov-
erned by a common clock. Halbwachs has argued that “[h]abits related 
to a speciﬁ c physical setting resist the forces tending to change them” 
(Halbwachs 1992: 133). Th is understanding is limited by his assumption 
of the given dynamics of a stable society. Diﬀ erent dynamics present in 
sites of conﬂ ict, and it is obvious that it was not possible to resist the 
forces that changed Nicosia from a mixed city to a divided city.
Th e current material reality of the Buﬀ er Zone represents the loss of a 
collective way of life. Here an entire web of streets, buildings, occupants, 
and sounds has been destroyed. While these streets are still in place, the 
mud-brick buildings that deﬁ ne their edges are eroding away. Signs have 
rusted, walls have collapsed, and the life that sustained these market-
place streets is gone. What has been lost is what Peter Loizos, in his 
study of the 1974 refugees from the Cypriot village of Argaki, has called 
a “structure of meaning.” Th is refers not just to the loss of homes, but 
rather the loss of highly unique and particular homes, “in which most 
of their most important social experiences had taken place … identiﬁ ed 
with labour, life-history, taste and personality of their owners, and they 
are in each case a unique combination of subject (owner) and object 
(construction).” Loizos argues that a refugee can be given a new place 
to live, a new plot of land, or a new business, “but in the most profound 
sense, he cannot be given his home again” (Loizos 1977: 8–9). Th e same 
can be said of those who were forced to leave the Ermou streets—either 
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in 1958, 1963, or 1974—due to political developments and intercommu-
nal conﬂ ict. What they cannot ﬁ nd again, what has been lost, is the com-
mon experience of the mixed city. Th e closure of these streets meant the 
disruption of the everyday lives of all Cypriots. It meant the loss of the 
smell of warm koullaria breakfast rolls sold on the street, the rhythmic 
hammering of metal workers, the cries of the salep seller, the endless 
rounds of jokes about Kutsofannis, the crowds ﬂ owing into Pantopolio/
Bandabulya from two entrances in the north and the south, the end of 
quick drinks of cognac at Antonakis, and the end of long discussions 
under the shade of Platanos. What has been lost is not just this collective 
memory, but the collective city itself—the way of life that had existed in 
the shared realm of the Ermou marketplace.
Again, Simmel’s discussion of “the stranger” is useful in thinking about 
the change in the nature of social relations between Greeks and Turks 
in Cyprus:
With the stranger one has only certain more general qualities in com-
mon, whereas the relation to more organically connected persons is 
based on the commonness of speciﬁ c diﬀ erences from merely general 
features. (Simmel 1950: 407)17
Th is statement can be used to analyze the changing nature of relations 
between shopkeepers from diﬀ erent communities. In their remem-
brances of these streets, shopkeepers spoke about “organically connected 
persons” such as Kutsofannis or Hadjigeorgos, and other well-known 
personalities. Th ey spoke of the “commonness of speciﬁ c diﬀ erences” 
such as “he was fat,” “he walked funny,” “he had a quick temper,” “he was 
good about extending credit.” Th ese qualities later changed to “merely 
general features” about “the Greeks” or “the Turks” as the shopkeepers 
reminisced about later periods with statements such as “the Greeks were 
cunning” or “the Turks wanted too much.” Th ere was a shift in the dy-
namics of personal relations between Greeks and Turks, moving those 
from the other community into the position of “the stranger.”
Th is detailed study of Ermou has attempted to again bring out the 
“commonness of speciﬁ c diﬀ erences.” Place-based research has much 
to oﬀ er in bringing to light alternative narratives in contested environ-
ments where alternative histories may be unavailable or obscured by of-
ﬁ cial versions. Th e retrieval of memories from the resource provided by 
the Ermou marketplace does not serve simply to enable nostalgia for this 
lost past. Rather, if a shared future is to be possible in Cyprus, a recogni-
tion of a shared connection to place, by all Cypriots, can serve as a useful 
foundation for dialogue and exchange.
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Notes
 1. Th e name of this street in English is Hermes Street, and in Greek and Turk-
ish it is Ermou or Ermu, pronounced the same. In this chapter I will refer to 
it as Ermou, as this is the name by which it is recognized by all shopkeepers 
interviewed for this research.
 2. I have described elsewhere the signiﬁ cance of this area in the construc-
tion of the diﬀ ering Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot “myths” of the city 
(Bakshi 2014).
 3. Th e NMP is a bicommunal initiative involving the Greek-Cypriot and Turk-
ish-Cypriot communities. It was established in 1981, largely at the initiative 
of the mayors of the two sides of the city. Since that time they have worked 
to create an overall master plan for the city.
 4. Th ere is signiﬁ cant scholarship that addresses this issue in cities in the 
former Ottoman sphere. For instance, Gilson Miller and Bertagnin have 
looked beyond the dimensions of segregation in these communities, argu-
ing that apparent ﬁ xed boundaries were perhaps more ﬂ uid than previously 
thought (2010).
 5. Th e Cyprus Industrial, Commercial, and Professional Guide and Th e Cy-
prus General Directory contain listings and advertisements of businesses 
in the old city prior to division. For this research I consulted annual issues 
dating from 1946–1951. Th ese catalogues feature advertisements for many 
shops along formerly important commercial streets such as Ermou, Arasta, 
Yeşil Gazino, Kykko, Ledra, and Libertis Streets.
 6. As the existing maps gave no indication of street addresses, it was necessary 
to use partial Evkaf property registers and photographs of buildings taken 
during the Buﬀ er Zone Survey in order to connect the building plots with 
door numbers. Issues of the Cyprus Mail newspaper from the 1940s and 
1950s provided additional information about shop addresses through ad-
vertisements published by vendors in the back pages.
 7. I conducted a series of interviews with these shopkeepers in Nicosia, meet-
ing with them regularly in 2010–11. Eleven Greek Cypriots, twelve Turkish 
Cypriots, and two Armenian Cypriots were interviewed. Th e names of in-
dividuals appearing in the text have been anonymized.
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 8. As Dennis Cosgrove has stated, urban archeology works by “mapping the 
stratigraphy of material deposits stretched across former urban space.” Th ese 
mappings then can be used to “reconstruct not only a city’s physical appear-
ance but also its social, political, commercial and religious life” (1986: 169).
 9. Unless otherwise noted, most of the material in this section comes from 
interviews conducted with the shopkeepers.
10. Interviews with the shopkeepers revealed that diﬀ erent communities at 
times used common names to describe places in Nicosia, and in other cases 
described them using linguistically speciﬁ c referents.
11. At the foot of Arasta was Lokmacı Krikor, an Armenian maker of lokma, 
fried sweet dough, who unwittingly gave the name to the barricade that was 
to be built in front of his shop in 1964, the Lokmacı Barikat, which is the 
name by which the Ledra Street crossing is known today in Turkish.
12. While Pantopolio was the main market, there were smaller weekly markets 
as well such as the Gynaikobazaro, the Women’s Market, which was also 
mixed. Th is market was south of Ermou, and bordered on one side by the 
popular north-south commercial Ledra Street. An open structure, consist-
ing of two sets of slender columns supporting a wooden pediment roof with 
arched vault, deﬁ ned the crowded market.
13. Th is former Gothic cathedral, which had been commonly known as the 
Aya Sofya Mosque, was renamed the Selimiye Mosque in 1958. Tensions 
between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities was reﬂ ected 
in many such name changes, such as the names of street names, in 1958.
14. Türk Belediye Çarşısı açıldi [Th e Turkish Municipal Bazaar opened], 1958.
15. For example, the census of 1946 shows that Phaneromeni, a neighborhood 
in the south, had a population of 10 “Mahomedans” (Turks) and 1,065 “Non 
Mahomedans” (mainly Greeks). Tahtakaleh, also south of the riverbed 
streets, had 518 “Mahomedans” and 902 “Non Mahomedans.” Th e neigh-
borhood of Emerieh (Ömerye) had a population of 249 “Mahomedans” and 
917 “Non Mahomedans.” In the north, Ayios Lucas had a population of 536 
“Mahomedans” and 263 “Non Mahomedans.” Unlike Phaneromeni, these 
neighborhoods were the most mixed in the city.
16. According to Doreen Massey “not all the ‘others’ whose existence and dif-
ference were so vital to the establishment of the modern sensibility were 
located in distant regions of the planet. Th ere were also ‘others’ within …” 
including women (Massey 2005: 92–93).
17. See also Rebecca Bryant’s description of George Simmel’s analysis of “the 
stranger” in her 2004 study, Imagining the Modern: Th e Cultures of Nation-
alism in Cyprus (Bryant 2004: 186).
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Performing Coexistence 
and Diﬀ erence

[• Chapter 5 •]
In Bed Together
Coexistence in Togo Mizrahi’s Alexandria Films
DEBORAH A. STARR
The camera pans across the rooftops in a popular district of Alexan-
dria. Th e image cuts to chickens feeding on one of the rooftops, then 
fades to the interior of the adjacent one-room apartment. An alarm 
clock rings, waking Chalom, a Jewish seller of lottery tickets. He quiets 
the alarm, leans over, and wakens his bedmate, cAbdu, a Muslim butch-
er’s assistant (ﬁ gure 1). Th us opens al-cIzz Bahdala [Mistreated By Af-
ﬂ uence (1937)], a ﬁ lm written, directed, and produced by Togo Mizrahi 
(1901–1986), an Alexandrian Jew with Italian nationality.1
Th is image of a Jew and a Muslim in bed together functions as a point 
of departure for this essay’s analysis of the construction of coexistence 
in Togo Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms produced in his studio in Alexandria. I approach 
the phrase “in bed together” as not just a metaphor of coexistence, but as 
a key to unlocking Mizrahi’s projection of sameness and diﬀ erence, self 
and Other, in 1930s Alexandria.
From the outset I should note that the sight of these two impover-
ished characters sharing a bed need not—and indeed should not—be 
understood as signaling sexual desire or a romantic aﬃ  liation between 
them. Th ey share a bed because they are poor, not because they are gay. 
However, in this essay I argue that Togo Mizrahi’s Alexandria comedies 
queer gender identity in a variety of ways, and that we cannot dismiss 
out of hand the gender and sexuality implications of this opening scene.2 
In this essay I tease out the interrelationship in Togo Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms be-
tween an ethics of coexistence, “Chalom and cAbdu,” and the queering 
of gender identity, “in bed together,” as they play out against the back-
drop of the cosmopolitan city of Alexandria. I argue that Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms, 
through their narratives of mistaken identity, queer both ethno-religious 
identities and gender.
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I begin my analysis by situating Mizrahi’s Alexandria ﬁ lms within the 
development and critical reception of Egyptian cinema. Mizrahi’s com-
edies—and 1930s and 1940s Egyptian ﬁ lms in general—while popular at 
the time of release, have been disparaged by latter-day nationalist ﬁ lm 
critics and historians. In the ﬁ rst section below, I argue that the coex-
istence narrative in Mizrahi’s Alexandria ﬁ lms—as articulated through 
what I have termed a “Levantine cinematic idiom”—does not ﬁ t into the 
parochial nationalist paradigm of the critics, and goes at least part of the 
way toward explaining their discomfort with his ﬁ lms. In the second sec-
tion I unpack the twin critical frameworks through which I analyze Miz-
rahi’s ﬁ lms: queerness and the Levantine. In the ﬁ nal sections I ﬂ esh out 
this argument with readings of two of Mizrahi’s Alexandria comedies: 
al-Duktur Farhat [Doctor Farahat (1935)] and Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence.3
Levantine Farce Versus National Melodrama
Togo Mizrahi was one of the pioneers of the Egyptian ﬁ lm industry. 
Th rough the 1920s until the mid-1930s, ﬁ lmmaking was driven by the 
creative eﬀ orts (and ﬁ nancial investments) of individuals—there was no 
Figure 5.1. Chalom and cAbdu wake up together in bed. Screenshot, 
Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence (1937).
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Egyptian equivalent to the Hollywood studio system. In 1929 Mizrahi 
established his own ﬁ lm studio in Alexandria and his own production 
company Shirkat al-aﬂ am al-misriyya (Egyptian Films Company). Stu-
dio Mizrahi produced more ﬁ lms in the 1930s than any other studio 
in Egypt (El-Shammaa 2007). Mizrahi directed and produced his ﬁ lms, 
developed the scenarios, and for the most part, throughout his career 
wrote (or co-wrote) his scripts. Th e ﬁ rst three ﬁ lms that Togo Mizrahi 
made in his Alexandria studio addressed social issues: al-Hawiya / 
al-Kukayin [Th e Abyss or Cocaine (silent, 1930)];4 5001 (silent, 1932); 
and Awlad Misr [Children of Egypt (sound, 1933)].5 Between 1934 and 
1938 Mizrahi made nine Arabic comedies ﬁ lmed in Alexandria and its 
environs and in his Alexandria studio.6
In 1939 Mizrahi began ﬁ lming in Cairo, ﬁ rst shooting on the sound 
stage at Studio Wahbi, and then opening a second location for his own 
studio.7 His decision to begin ﬁ lming in Cairo was likely due to the cen-
tralization of talent and resources in the capital at that time. In 1934, 
Egyptian nationalist ﬁ nancier Muhammad Talcat Harb had founded Stu-
dio Misr, with the goal of establishing a robust national ﬁ lm industry. 
Harb also supported the development of local talent, investing in send-
ing Egyptians for technical training in Europe (al-Hadari 2007; Hasan 
1986). Studio Misr’s ﬁ rst ﬁ lm, Widad, a musical starring the already 
well-known singer, Umm Kulthum, was released in 1936.8
Th e comedies Mizrahi directed between 1934 and 1938 in Alexandria 
share a number of features that distinguish them from his ﬁ lms made af-
ter his 1939 move to Cairo. Th e Alexandria comedies are all set in Egypt 
of the 1930s and involve a plot of mistaken identity. Th ese ﬁ lms also 
all feature the same three comic stars who play consistent characters 
or types across the ﬁ lms: Chalom; cAli al-Kassar; and Fawzi al-Jazayirli. 
Leon Angel, the actor credited as Chalom, regularly appears as a charac-
ter named “Chalom.”9 Critics have noted that “Chalom,” a poor seller of 
lottery tickets in a popular district of Alexandria, is modeled on Charlie 
Chaplin’s tramp (Farid 1996).10 During the period under discussion Cha-
lom appeared in two ﬁ lms directed by Mizrahi. cAli al-Kassar regularly 
appeared on stage and screen as a character called cUsman cAbd al-Ba-
sit, a down-on-his-luck Nubian.11 Fawzi al-Jazayirli frequently played 
the shop owner “Bahbah,” as well as a variety of other simple characters 
of limited means.12 In Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms, al-Jazayirli’s characters get them-
selves into complicated situations beyond their comprehension.
Th ese ﬁ lms also all play out in the streets, cafes, shops, homes, clinics, 
and, of course, beaches of Alexandria. Alexandria has a long-standing 
reputation as a cosmopolis. Mizrahi’s representation of the city in these 
ﬁ lms reﬂ ects Alexandria’s diversity. Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms from this era repre-
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sent a culture of coexistence that cuts across class.13 Mizrahi’s choice of 
stars—Chalom plays a Jewish character; cAli al-Kassar portrays a Nu-
bian—reﬂ ects an inclusive vision of local subjectivity. Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms 
from this period regularly feature Greek and shami [Levantine Arab] 
characters as well as members of the Francophone Alexandrian elite.
While there is no abrupt rupture between Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms before and 
after the relocation of his studio in 1939, some diﬀ erences are notable. 
After 1939 Mizrahi continued to write and direct comedies of mistaken 
identity; however, he also began to explore other genres. Th e ﬁ rst ﬁ lm 
he made in Cairo, Fi Layla Mumtira [On a Rainy Night (1939)], is a mu-
sical melodrama.14 In the 1940s Mizrahi began to branch out into what 
could be called costume comedies, like the ﬁ lms starring cAli al-Kas-
sar based loosely on narratives from the Th ousand and One Nights: Alf 
Layla wa-Layla [1001 Nights (1940)]; and cAli Baba wa-l-Arbacin Ha-
rami [Ali Baba and the Forty Th ieves (1942)]. Also, in Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms 
after 1939 the self-conscious engagement with an ethics of inclusion be-
comes somewhat more muted, whether by virtue of generic conventions 
in the case of musicals, or the removal of comedies—which had already 
maintained a strained relationship to reality—from the Egypt of the time 
and into ﬁ ctional settings.
Contemporaneous Egyptian critics lauded Mizrahi’s eﬀ orts to bring 
locally produced entertainment to Egyptian viewers. One critic, Ra’uf 
Muhammad al-Shaf ci (1935), deemed Doctor Farahat “a brilliant success 
… in step with the Egyptian spirit.” During these early years, critics also 
lavished praise on the performance of Mizrahi’s stars. Muhammad Yunis 
al-Qadi (1935), a playwright who had written for Fawzi al-Jazayirli, ex-
pressed his appreciation for Mizrahi’s adaptation of the actor’s physical 
comedy for the screen. Another critic (Kutah 1935) lauded the screen 
presence of Tahiya Muhammad, later known by the screen name Tahiya 
Carioca, in her ﬁ lm debut under Mizrahi’s direction in Doctor Farahat.15
Later Egyptian critics do not generally share this enthusiasm about 
Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms. In an essay published in 1996, cAli Abu Shadi (1996: 91–
92), for example, concedes that, “Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms were very popular and 
successful at the box oﬃ  ce, and they made their stars famous.” However, 
he goes on to dismiss these ﬁ lms for their “contrived and exaggerated” 
plot lines and their low-brow humor. Abu Shadi (1996: 91–92) levied the 
following critique of Mizrahi’s comic fare: “Th ese ﬁ lms are light come-
dies, there is no character development, no motivation for action, and 
no subtlety to the words. Th ey seek only to amuse and entertain, and 
some are farces using mistaken identity and misunderstanding as their 
primary means of arousing laughs.”
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Abu Shadi is correct that farces were indeed Mizrahi’s stock in trade 
in the 1930s. Th e Concise Oxford Companion to the Th eater deﬁ nes farce 
as a “form of popular comedy in which laughter is raised by horseplay 
and bodily assault in contrived and highly improbable situations … It 
deals with the inherent stupidity of man at odds with his environment” 
(Hartnoll and Found 1996). In its modern usage, according to the en-
try, “the word farce is applied to a full-length play dealing with some 
absurd situation, generally based on extra-marital adventures—hence 
“bedroom farce” (Hartnoll and Found 1996). However, the entry draws 
a clear distinction between farce with “its hold on humanity” and bur-
lesque “depicting the grosser faults of mankind” (Hartnoll and Found 
1996). Abu Shadi and other Egyptian critics are not alone in disparaging 
the contrivances of farce.16 Eric Bentley (1964: 219–56), in his analysis 
of the genre, cites a host of oppositions to the underpinning violence of 
farce, and its subversion of the tenets of religion, marriage, and moral 
social codes.
Mizrahi’s farcical plots of mistaken identity are indeed “contrived” and 
“highly improbable.” In this article I aim to make a case for the value of 
revisiting these farces (which I, apparently unlike Abu Shadi, ﬁ nd quite 
entertaining). What interests me is the nature of the contrivances of 
Mizrahi’s farcical plots. Speciﬁ cally, I wish to unpack the particular acts 
of “mistaken identity and misunderstanding” that Abu Shadi dismisses.
Abu Shadi’s assessment also reﬂ ects a predominant trend in Egyp-
tian ﬁ lm criticism. Critics sympathetic to Nasserist ideology take a dim 
view of interwar and postwar genre ﬁ lms, dismissing them as decadent 
and derivative of (dangerous) foreign inﬂ uences (Flibbert 2005: 461n3).17 
Nationalist critics of Egyptian ﬁ lm have tended to view melodrama as 
the vehicle best suited to cinema of substance. Melodrama has the ca-
pacity to reveal social ills. It was also the genre of choice for depicting 
the anti-colonial struggle.18
To summarize this position, nationalist critics have posited a rela-
tionship between the genre of melodrama and the nation (with emphasis 
here on the post-Nasser Arabo-centric nation). In this chapter, I simi-
larly posit a relationship between the genre of farce and the Levantine. 
Th e Levantine idiom in Togo Mizrahi’s 1930s farcical ﬁ lms, I am argu-
ing, queers identity.19 It is this dynamic, more than the mere inclusion on 
screen of non-Arab minorities that challenges the hegemonic national 
narrative of Egyptian ﬁ lm criticism. As articulations of a queer, Levan-
tine urban localism, Mizrahi’s farces oﬀ er an alternative to the parochial, 
homosocial, and heteronormative national imaginary produced by and 
reproduced in melodrama.20
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Queerness and the Levantine
My construction of the performativity of identities—Levantine, on the 
one hand, and gender and sexuality on the other—is indebted to Judith 
Butler’s inﬂ uential work, Gender Trouble (Butler 1990). Since her de-
bunking of the myth of compulsory heterosexuality and stable categories 
of gender, the epistemological questions about identity that Butler raises 
burst open interrogation of other forms of identity formation. Richard 
Th ompson Ford (2011: 123), for example, models his own critique of 
racial identity politics on Butler’s critique of gender: “Queer theory’s an-
ti-identitarianism is the key to its portability … Th e queer critique of 
(nominally) gay identity politics would seem to apply to identity politics 
in general.” In labeling Mizrahi’s Levantine ﬁ lm idiom “queer” I am re-
ferring to both the particularities of the performativity of gender and 
sexuality, as well as its broader destabilizing potential, as explored by 
Ford, for “identity politics in general.”21
In the introduction to Out Takes, a volume of essays on queer theory 
and ﬁ lm, Ellis Hanson takes a similarly broad view of the term’s signiﬁ -
cance. Hanson (1999: 4) deﬁ nes “queer” as:
a rejection of the compulsory heterosexual code of masculine men de-
siring feminine women, and it declares that the vast range of stigma-
tized sexualities and gender identiﬁ cations, far from being marginal, 
are central to the construction of modern subjectivity; but it is also, 
as Michael Warner has pointed out, a resistance to normalization as 
conceived more generally as a sort of divide-and-conquer mentality 
by which cultural diﬀ erence—racial, ethnic, sexual, socioeconomic—is 
pathologized and atomized as disparate forms of deviance.
Hanson acknowledges the broad signiﬁ cance of the term queer, in de-
stabilizing received categories including but not limited to gender and 
sexuality. In the second half of the quote, he asserts the power of queer 
theory to expose the dynamics of other forms of social marginalization.
I argue that Mizrahi’s Alexandrian bedroom farces destabilize prevail-
ing gender categories in 1930s Egypt. Th e ﬁ lms, by extension, poke fun 
at emerging middle class assumptions about modernity and the nation. 
Historian Wilson Jacob (2011) has mapped what he terms “eﬀ endi mas-
culinity”—a subject position reﬂ ecting middle class aspirations toward 
and performance of modernity that began emerging in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. Th is “eﬀ endi masculinity” was commonly 
recognizable by the 1930s. Jacob reads as performance these new forms 
of gendered, national subjectivity that emerge in British colonial Egypt.
Coexistence in Mizrahi’s Alexandria Films 135
Mizrahi’s 1930s comedies feature lower class characters ill at ease 
with middle class expectations. Th e bumbling characters portrayed by 
Chalom, cAli al-Kassar, and Fawzi al-Jazayirli simultaneously confront 
modernity and emerging gender norms to which they do not conform. 
Class mobility is linked in these ﬁ lms with the performance of norma-
tivized gender expectations that look a lot like the “eﬀ endi masculin-
ity” Jacob identiﬁ es. Th e lens provided by Jacob permits us to see the 
ways, by extension, Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms reﬂ ect upon and subtly critique (in 
a non-ideological way) emerging normativizing discourse and Egyptian 
articulations of modernity.22
According to Gershoni and Jankowski (1995), the new eﬀ endiyya were 
also the driving force behind a shift in the conception of the nation Egypt 
underwent in the 1930s that ran counter to Mizrahi’s Levantine con-
struction of identity, and threatened the coexistence of Jews and Mus-
lims portrayed in his ﬁ lms. Th e territorial nationalism identiﬁ ed with 
the 1919 revolution, with its pluralist bent, had derived from Western 
thought and political philosophy. By the 1930s the economic and politi-
cal environment had shifted, and disillusionment with the failures of the 
1919 agenda fed the ascendance of what Gershoni and Jankowski (1995) 
call supra-Egyptian nationalism. Although these strains of nationalism 
shared an anti-colonial agenda, the supra-nationalists drew inspiration 
from Arab-Islamic sources and articulated their political agenda in terms 
shared by other Arabs and Muslims in contrast to the Western orien-
tation of territorial nationalism. In practice, the ascendant nationalist 
strains increasingly excluded resident non-Muslim minorities like Miz-
rahi. Th e 1929 Nationality Law, according to Shimon Shamir (1987: 48), 
“gave dominance to jus sanguina” in deﬁ ning those eligible for Egyptian 
nationality, and “accorded special position to Arab and/or Muslim aﬃ  li-
ation.” In the interwar period exclusionary nationalist discourses such as 
Greek irredentism, Italian fascism, and Zionism also circulated among 
some members of Egypt’s resident foreign minority communities, divid-
ing them from one another and from the majority culture.
Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms resist this deterministic trend by embracing what I 
call a Levantine cinematic idiom. I have chosen the term “Levantine” be-
cause it reﬂ ects the 1930s Alexandrian society that Mizrahi portrays on 
screen, and in which he produced his ﬁ lms. Th e term “Levantine” also 
highlights ambiguity and performativity of identity alongside the pre-
sumption of diversity. I identify three characteristics of Mizrahi’s Levan-
tine idiom. First, Levantine ﬁ lms depict an urban localism characterized 
by diversity, and feature, to echo Rebecca Bryant’s deﬁ nition of “coex-
istence” in the introduction to this volume, “the horizontal relations 
among persons belonging to diﬀ erent ethnic or confessional groups.”23 
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Th ese ﬁ lms engage with, although do not necessarily promote, a Le-
vantine ethics of coexistence. Second, these ﬁ lms also employ a visual 
language of inclusion, a Levantine aesthetic. Th ird, in these ﬁ lms the 
performance of identity is ﬂ uid and mutable, embracing the vagueness 
and porousness of the boundaries of identity. Th is idiom, which grows 
out of Egyptian comic theater, is evident in ﬁ lms by other ﬁ lmmakers in 
Egypt in the 1930s as well.24
In what follows, I analyze two Togo Mizrahi ﬁ lms produced and set 
in Alexandria in the 1930s that engage the nexus between queerness and 
the Levantine: Doctor Farahat and Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence. Doctor Fara-
hat overtly troubles assumptions about gender and sexuality. Mistreated 
by Aﬄ  uence, as I have already described above, foregrounds coexistence. 
By reading these ﬁ lms together, I aim to demonstrate how these two 
articulations of the performativity of identity in Mizrahi’s work inform 
one another.
Suitors in Swimsuits – Doctor Farahat (1935)
Like Mizrahi’s other ﬁ lms from this era, Doctor Farahat is fundamen-
tally a comedy of assumed identity. Hilmy, a successful surgeon who has 
been living in England for ﬁ fteen years, returns to his native Alexandria 
to get married. In addition to his wealth, he is considered a minor celeb-
rity for his medical discoveries. A match has been arranged to Nona, a 
woman he has not yet met. Concerned that she is a gold-digger, he seeks 
an opportunity to court her, without her knowing his identity. So, he 
arranges to meet her twice, once in disguise as the stuﬀ y, bearded, and 
bespectacled Dr. Hilmy (ﬁ gure 2), and once looking and acting naturally, 
but under the assumed identity of Mustafa, a clerk (ﬁ gure 3).
To add to the confusion, upon Hilmy’s arrival, he dodges reporters by 
asking an employee of the hotel, Farahat (Fawzi al-Jazayirli), to assume 
his identity. Th e backward, impoverished, and uneducated Farahat has 
been employed as a translator by the hotel under false (and humorous) 
pretenses. Nevertheless, the ruse succeeds; the reporters snap Farahat’s 
picture, convinced they have taken the photo of Dr. Hilmy, setting in 
motion this additional plot line of mistaken identity.
Nona’s family, eager to meet the young suitor, send for Hilmy, and 
instead get his geriatric pretender, Farahat. As the title suggests, it is Far-
ahat’s humorous misadventures in the guise of the esteemed Dr. Hilmy 
that dominate the plot. Farahat and his sidekick cAli, in the role of the 
doctor’s secretary, pay a visit to Nona’s house.25 Nona and her friend Ta-
hiya privately mock the suitor, and set out to humiliate him in the hopes 
of calling oﬀ  the engagement.
Coexistence in Mizrahi’s Alexandria Films 137
Figure 5.2. Hilmy disguised as Dr. Hilmy. Screenshot, Doctor Farahat 
(1935).
Figure 5.3. Hilmy disguised as Mustafa, with Nona. Screenshot, Doctor 
Farahat (1935).
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It is within this multilayered charade of mistaken identity that one en-
counters gender play. In what follows, I unpack two articulations of the 
queering of gender identity in Doctor Farahat. First, I examine instances 
when same sex pairs share the same bed. Th en, I discuss moments in 
the ﬁ lm that individually and collectively can be read as highlighting a 
performative construction of gender identity.
Much of the plot of Doctor Farahat revolves around Nona’s eﬀ orts 
to exhaust Farahat and to drive him away. Th e women ﬁ rst keep the 
men walking along the Corniche until midnight, then Nona calls at ﬁ ve 
o’clock the following morning to invite them for a swim. Nona also ar-
ranged for notable doctors to attend a lecture later the same morning to 
be given by “Dr. Hilmy” (Farahat), and in the afternoon she entices the 
men to join her for a party on a boat that lasts until late in the evening.
On four occasions, during the brief intervals between these engage-
ments, Farahat and cAli ﬂ op into the plush double bed in their shared 
hotel room. Th ese comic scenes are rife with sight gags and tame ver-
bal innuendo. On the ﬁ rst occasion, cAli removes his jacket on Farahat’s 
side of the bed and starts to climb over Farahat. Farahat exclaims, “Hey 
brother, why not enter from the door of your house?” cAli responds, “But 
it’s a long way from here. Let me pass through your roof.” Th e root of the 
verb kharama, here used in its form that signiﬁ es “pass through” or “take 
a shortcut,” can also signify “pierce”—adding to the suggestive double 
entendre to the exchange. Later in the scene, when the phone rings, cAli, 
in his role as the esteemed doctor’s secretary, again climbs over Farahat 
to answer the call (ﬁ gure 4).
Although the men remain fully clothed, physical contact between 
them in bed—like the sight of cAli climbing over Farahat—elicits laughs.26 
By contrast with this scene, while the opening sequence of Mistreated by 
Aﬄ  uence leaves no question that we are viewing a comedy, the fact that 
the two men share a bed is not played for laughs. Farahat and cAli would, 
like their counterparts Chalom and cAbdu, think nothing of sharing a 
bed with a male friend in their own cramped domestic quarters. Th e 
luxurious bed in the hotel is large and inviting, and despite the presence 
of a couch in the suite, neither character seems to question that they 
would share the bed. Farahat objects to the way cAli enters the bed, but 
not to his presence.
Th e scenes with Farahat and cAli conﬁ rm heteronormative sexuality 
within homosocial Egyptian norms. Any ambiguity of these bedroom 
scenes is resolved in the ﬁ nal iteration of this repeating pattern (ﬁ gure 
5). Th roughout the ﬁ lm, Umm Ahmad, Farahat’s wife, chases after him. 
After failing to follow him to the party on the boat, she lies in wait. After 
the party, Farahat falls drunk into bed and starts to brag about kissing 
Nona. Umm Ahmad indignantly reveals herself and demands an expla-
Coexistence in Mizrahi’s Alexandria Films 139
Figure 5.4. cAli climbs over Farahat to answer the telephone. Screenshot, 
Doctor Farahat, (1935).
Figure 5.5. Farahat and Umm Ahmad in bed. Screenshot, Doctor Farahat 
(1935).
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nation. We are restored to the standard heteronormative extramarital 
love triangle of the bedroom farce.
Just prior to the ﬁ rst scene of Farahat and cAli in bed together, Nona 
and Tahiya are also shown sharing a bed. After the long walk on the 
Corniche, Nona sits on the bed in a negligee, stretches, proclaims that 
she is tired and then lies down under the covers. Tahiya, sitting on the 
edge of the bed undressing, concurs, adding “If you think you’re tired, 
what about them?” Th is scene reads as a (male) voyeuristic view into the 
women’s boudoir.
Later, at the conclusion of the party scene, Nona and Mustafa embrace 
in the moonlight. Th e scene cuts abruptly to Nona’s bedroom, the sec-
ond scene showing the women in bed together. In this miniature scene, 
lasting nineteen seconds, Nona lies awake, and repeats Mustafa’s proc-
lamation of love to her, while Tahiya drifts oﬀ  to sleep beside her (ﬁ gure 
6). Th e ﬁ lm then cuts to Umm Ahmad hiding under the covers awaiting 
Farahat’s return from the party. As with the scene between Farahat and 
Umm Ahmad that follows, Nona’s wakeful reﬂ ection appears to restore 
heteronormative desire. But, Nona muses on Mustafa’s words—“I love 
you, Nona”—rather than giving voice to her own emotions (even in the 
privacy of her own bedroom). Unlike the conclusion of the scene be-
tween Farahat and Umm Ahmad, the self-reﬂ exivity of Nona’s utterance 
Figure 5.6. Nona and Tahiya in bed. Screenshot, Doctor Farahat (1935).
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simultaneously troubles the predominant narrative axis of heterosexual 
desire that it appears to assert. Th e ambivalence of Nona’s assertion also 
fails to completely displace the titillating queerness of the visual projec-
tion of two scantily clad women in bed together.
As my reading of these bedroom scenes implies, Nona’s role as an 
object of desire and as a desiring subject bears closer examination. Nona 
believes she has three male suitors in the ﬁ lm: Farahat, in the guise of 
Doctor Hilmy; Hilmy, in disguise as the stuﬀ y doctor; and Hilmy as 
Mustafa. Male desire is focalized through the main character, Farahat. 
Viewers recognize that Farahat is a buﬀ oon. His age and his coarse, un-
educated, and lower-class manner make him appear an inappropriate 
suitor for the wealthy, modern, westernized Nona. We also know that 
Farahat is already married.27 While he inadvertently falls into the role 
of suitor, he persists in the charade for the promise of access to Nona’s 
body. Each time Farahat considers walking away, Nona draws him back 
in by feigning aﬀ ection and then, after the appearance of Mustafa, by 
fomenting jealousy.
Nona embraces her performance of femininity to deceive Farahat. 
Take, for example, the early morning swim. In the cabana with cAli, Far-
ahat decides that it is too cold to swim. He steps outside to inform Nona. 
Borrowing a visual idiom already established by Hollywood cinema, the 
camera reproduces Farahat’s desirous gaze by panning Nona’s body 
from toe to head. Th e sight of Nona in her bathing costume changes 
Farahat’s mind.
But, the bathing scene that follows troubles these very same gendered 
assumptions about agency and desire. As she is changing into her bath-
ing suit, an exasperated Nona proclaims that perhaps the women should 
“drown [the men] and be done with them.” Tahiya, it appears, takes Nona’s 
suggestion seriously. A lengthy silent montage (accompanied by upbeat 
music) intercuts Tahiya wrestling with cAli and Nona attempting to coax 
Farahat into the water. As the scene progresses, Tahiya’s malicious intent 
becomes more apparent with each subsequent dunking. What is striking 
about this scene is its violence—violence perpetrated by the female char-
acters.28 Tahiya’s physical contact with cAli in the water is simultaneously 
ludic and menacing, playful dunking that verges on attempted drowning. 
In the ﬁ nal image of the scene, Nona is shown dragging Farahat scream-
ing into the cold water. Th is is torture, not play. Th anatos, not eros.
In the swimming scene the male characters are emasculated by an ag-
gressive, predatory, violent femininity. And, over the course of the ﬁ lm, 
Nona’s cruel tricks become increasingly more emasculating. Th e ﬁ nal 
indignity involves Nona piloting a small plane with Farahat as a pas-
senger. Nona’s aerial acrobatics frighten Farahat, causing him to wet his 
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pants, and then pass out. It is worth recalling that this violence and cru-
elty is in the service of repelling a prospective suitor, deferring marriage.
Tahiya encourages Nona in her sadistic yo-yo of attraction and repul-
sion toward Farahat. Her motives begin to emerge in the cabana as the 
two women change into their swim suits. As Nona begins to unbutton 
her shirt, Tahiya casts her own desirous gaze at her friend’s body. Far-
ahat, it seems, is not the only one to leer at Nona’s body. Nona is not 
only the object of the male gaze within the ﬁ lm (and for that matter, the 
object of the masculine gaze of the audience), she is also the object of 
a desirous female gaze.29 Tahiya’s desire for Nona poses a complication 
(but not a replacement) of the heteronormative reading of the women’s 
bedroom scenes.
Nona appears oblivious to Tahiya’s aﬀ ections. And, as the plots of 
mistaken identity unravel, we encounter a ﬁ nal (but not complete) res-
toration of heteronormativity. After Farahat passes out on the plane, the 
real Dr. Hilmy revives him. Hilmy and Farahat reveal their true identi-
ties. Hilmy requests Nona’s hand in marriage from her puzzled parents. 
Nona’s parents agree, although they admit they do not understand what 
has happened. When Tahiya bows out, she too, expresses her confusion. 
After dodging marriage for the whole ﬁ lm, Nona agrees to wed. Nona 
Figure 5.7. Tahiya watches Nona undress. Screenshot, Doctor Farahat 
(1935).
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and Hilmy embrace, as do the happily reunited Farahat and Umm Ah-
mad. Tahiya, however, is not paired oﬀ  at the end of the ﬁ lm, despite the 
presence of a suitable male mate—Hilmy’s friend. While her designs on 
Nona are thwarted, her same-sex desire is not normativized.
While I grant that this ﬁ lm narrates an especially convoluted plot, 
even for a farce, it is unusual for the characters in Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms to re-
main confused once all has been revealed. Th e boundaries of identity—
and gender—have been troubled. Th e characters’ confusion at the end 
of the ﬁ lm reﬂ ects the residual of the disturbances wrought by masquer-
ade. We may end up with two male-female pairs, but the ﬁ lm does not 
conclusively or universally restore heteronormativity.
Th us far, I have focused my attention on masquerade as an articula-
tion of gender instability in Doctor Farahat. I would also like to point to 
the way this ﬁ lm also marks ﬂ uidity of identity as Levantine. Hilmy ﬁ rst 
appears on screen in a disguise, insisting on embracing the ﬂ uid possi-
bilities aﬀ orded by Levantine subjectivity. He counts on names as a sig-
niﬁ er of an ethno-religious aﬃ  liation just as he relies upon the physical 
(and linguistic) indiﬀ erentiability of Levantines.
Dr. Hilmy makes his ﬁ rst appearance as he enters the hotel. In the ﬁ rst 
words he utters, Hilmy conﬁ rms with his secretary, cAli, that a room has 
been booked. He continues: “Under what name?”
“Doctor Hilmy,” replies cAli.
“You idiot,” exclaims Hilmy, “Didn’t we agree that you shouldn’t regis-
ter under the name ‘Doctor Hilmy?’”
“What should I have written?” retorts cAli.
“Write any name you want. Write ‘Boutros.’ Write ‘Mikha’il.’”
In this originary moment, the masquerade that sets into motion the 
multiple layers of role play in the ﬁ lm, lies the (nominally) Muslim char-
acter’s desire to hide behind a Christian name.
Th ere is yet another layer to passing as a Levantine. Th e credits 
identify the actor playing Hilmy as cAbd al-Aziz al-Mashriqi. Th is is a 
pseudonym. Th e actor playing Hilmy is none other than Togo Mizrahi.30 
Mashriqi is the Arabic translation of the Hebrew Mizrahi (meaning 
“eastern,” or, not to put too ﬁ ne a point on it “oriental”). In other words, 
a Jewish actor (always already in disguise) plays a Muslim character, who 
seeks cover under a Christian name.
A Parting Kiss – Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence (1937)
In Doctor Farahat the Levantine idiom I am mapping is articulated pri-
marily through gender play as masquerade, with limited, but notable, 
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articulations of an ethics of coexistence. Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence inverts 
this formula, emphasizing coexistence over masquerade. As noted ear-
lier, at the start of Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence, the protagonists, Chalom 
and cAbdu live together in a cramped room on the roof of an apartment 
building.31 Th e families of their respective ﬁ ancées, Esther and Amina, 
reside side by side in modest middle class apartments on the ﬂ oor be-
low.32 Although the families sleep in their separate quarters, they are 
frequently shown socializing in one another’s apartments. Th is con-
struction of domestic space, and the characters’ actual or virtual cohabi-
tation, serves as a microcosm for coexistence in the society at large.
Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence is not about coexistence, though. Th e ﬁ lm 
neither interrogates nor problematizes diﬀ erence. Nor does Mistreated 
by Aﬄ  uence rely upon ethno-religious stereotypes as a source of com-
edy (Starr 2011). Th e narrative takes for granted that Jews and Muslims 
could be longstanding friends and neighbors in 1930s Egypt. Th is domi-
ciled, or perhaps domesticated, coexistence serves as the solid founda-
tion against which the ﬁ lm’s contrived, farcical plot unfurls. Uncertainty 
lies beyond the conﬁ nes of the domestic space and the quarter.
Buﬀ eted along by chance, Chalom and cAbdu bumble into (comical) 
situations beyond their control. cAbdu is mistrusted, berated, and beaten 
by Hasan, the butcher for whom he works. But, when Hasan dies, he 
bequeaths the shop to his assistant. cAbdu shares his newfound wealth 
with Chalom, enabling his friend to open a small shop from which to 
sell lottery tickets and exchange currency. Th e money also enables the 
men to get married after lengthy engagements. Following the weddings, 
Chalom purchases a bundle of scrap paper on behalf of his friend to use 
for wrapping meat. He discovers that the papers are stock certiﬁ cates 
worth over 650,000 Egyptian pounds. Chalom insists on splitting the 
newfound wealth evenly with cAbdu. Th ey decide to purchase a bank, 
and settle into neighboring villas with their wives and in-laws. But the 
money sows discord, and the friends have an altercation. In the end, 
chance again prevails, the bank fails, and Chalom and cAbdu lose their 
wealth. Chalom and cAbdu reconcile, and they rejoice along with their 
families in the return to their homely coexistence.
Th e sharing of food and a shared food culture underpin the ﬁ lm’s con-
struction of coexistence between Jews and Muslims.33 Th e families are 
regularly depicted eating together in a series of scenes that intertwine the 
ﬁ lm’s Levantine ethics and aesthetics. Near the beginning of Mistreated 
by Aﬄ  uence, the two families prepare a picnic for Shamm al-Nasim—a 
spring festival celebrated by Egyptians of all religious aﬃ  liations. On the 
night before the festival, the women, Vittoria, Esther, Umm Amina, and 
Amina are shown packing food, while the men, Solomon and Ibrahim, 
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play backgammon. Both families await the return of Chalom and cAbdu 
who are charged with purchasing ﬁ sikh, the salted ﬁ sh traditionally eaten 
on Shamm al-Nasim. Th e day of the festival is heralded by a lively mon-
tage of documentary footage shot in the streets, parks, and beaches of 
Alexandria, accompanied by a festive, non-diegetic soundtrack. Follow-
ing shots of celebrants on the beaches of Alexandria, the scene cuts to a 
long shot in which we see Jewish and Muslim families crowded around 
covered crates, picnicking together in front of a bank of cabanas.
Th e scene is shot (in a studio) to give the impression of a busy beach 
during a popular festival. Th e wide-angle establishing shot of the group 
picnic oﬀ ers an inclusive vision of cosmopolitan Alexandria. Several ﬁ g-
ures from a range of classes cross between the seated picnickers and the 
camera: a male bather; a police oﬃ  cer; a woman in bourgeois, Western 
attire holding a parasol; a ﬁ sherman carrying his gear. Two barefoot chil-
dren sit cross-legged in the foreground eating, and in the background 
another man in a bathing suit engages in calisthenics. Even as the cam-
era zooms in to a tighter group shot of the picnic, the scene retains its 
inclusiveness as the camera pans to show all eight characters eating and 
conversing.
Th is vision of coexistence is disrupted only by Vittoria’s verbal abuse 
of her future son-in-law. Th e continuous take is broken by a cut to a 
close-up of Chalom asking about a dish not included in the feast. Vit-
toria berates him, and Chalom, gathering up loaves of bread, excuses 
himself and prepares to retreat, inviting Esther to join him. But, even 
in this moment of familial discord, a Levantine aesthetic persists. Th e 
camera pans from Chalom to Vittoria and back. Rather than shooting 
the argument in a shot-reverse-shot sequence of the two characters, the 
interaction is shot panning from one character to another, with other 
members of the group in view. Th is continuous, inclusive camerawork 
mirrors the content of this scene in which Jews and Muslims break bread 
together in celebration of a shared festival (Shaﬁ k 2007: 31).
Vittoria’s condemnation of Chalom turns to praise after the families 
relocate to posh estates. Th e Jewish and Muslim families remain neigh-
bors, residing in adjacent villas. Th e families continue to gather in their 
new homes and share meals together. But the pleasures of eating are 
denied to them just as they can ﬁ nally aﬀ ord expensive delicacies. In a 
comic subplot, two nurses, Maurice and Wali, pretending to be doctors, 
insinuate themselves on the families. Th ey diagnose imaginary diseases 
so they can be paid for providing ongoing care. In the meantime, they 
sidle up to the young brides, hoping to woo them away from their hus-
bands. Th eir “medical advice” consists primarily of manipulating access 
to food.
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In one scene, when Chalom and cAbdu are delayed at the bank, the 
families begin dining in their absence under the doctors’ vigilant eyes. 
Th e older generation is excoriated to abstain from anything but milk and 
boiled vegetables. Th e young women, by contrast, are plied with wine 
and rich foods. Like the picnic, the scene opens with a long establish-
ing shot showing the families gathered together around a formal dining 
table. A servant enters carrying food to the table. But, the camerawork 
then mirrors the rupture between this dining experience and the former 
communal preparation and consumption of food; the dining room scene 
is constructed with a discontinuous series of two-shots, rather than the 
inclusive zoom and pan of the picnic scene.
In Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence the masquerade is one of passing, involv-
ing Chalom and cAbdu’s (failed) eﬀ orts to act like members of the elite 
following their chance windfall. Th eir behavior is a comic exaggeration 
of the boorishness and ostentation of the nouveau riche. When they host 
a cocktail party for business associates, Chalom and cAbdu wear lapel 
pins identifying themselves as the bank’s directors. A bank manager 
charged with introducing the guests to the receiving line disdainfully 
ﬂ icks Chalom’s pin and asks in a scornful voice, “What are you wearing? 
What is that? Take that thing oﬀ !” Chalom, puzzled, responds, “Why? 
Shouldn’t people know that I am the director of the bank?” Gesturing 
toward cAbdu, he adds, “And him too?” Th e exasperated manager ex-
claims, “Director of the bank? Take it oﬀ ! Th at is something janitors 
wear!” Th is misjudgment reﬂ ects the myriad missed codes and social 
cues of their adopted titles and assumed identities.
Chalom and cAbdu take advantage of their newfound wealth and po-
sition of power to chase women. In the dalliance that renders Mistreated 
by Aﬄ  uence a bedroom farce, Chalom and cAbdu pursue the aﬀ ections 
of a singer, Zuzu, and a dancer, Ruhiya. In contrast to Doctor Farahat, 
the heterosexual love triangle itself is the site of gender instability in 
Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence.
Following their introduction at the nightclub where the women per-
form, Chalom and cAbdu agree to a date at the women’s apartment. 
Cha lom and cAbdu are cowed by the women’s overt sexuality and for-
wardness. Th e viewer understands that these “artists” [artistat], are to 
be understood as loose women, if not downright prostitutes.34 Ruhiya 
beckons cAbdu to enter her dressing room as she disrobes behind a 
shoulder-high barrier. While in this state of undress, she beckons cAbdu 
to give her a kiss. Meanwhile, Chalom is instructed to enter the adjoin-
ing room where he ﬁ nds Zuzu soaking in a tub. Covering his eyes as he 
approaches, Chalom hands Zuzu a bouquet of ﬂ owers. He crouches next 
to the tub and presents her with a bracelet, which he accidentally drops 
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in the water. He pushes up his sleeve and reaches into the tub. Realizing 
what he has done, he runs out of the room, only to ﬁ nd that cAbdu has 
also retreated. Chalom is rendered speechless, and resorts to gesturing 
and whistling to describe his interaction with Zuzu.35 Th e women’s overt 
expression of sexual desire and, as in Doctor Farahat, predatory female 
sexuality poses an aﬀ ront to the men’s masculinity.
Chalom and cAbdu regroup and resolve to reassert their masculin-
ity. cAbdu steels himself to return to Ruhiya saying: “Listen Chalom, we 
need to be men. Ruhiya! I must speak to her. I must tell her that I love 
her. I must hold her. I must kill her with my kisses. Yes, I must!” [my em-
phasis]. Pushing Chalom out of the way cAbdu warns, “Watch out!” and 
marches back toward Ruhiya’s door. Th umping his chest Chalom con-
curs, “Yes! Men!” He attempts to repeat cAbdu’s rousing speech, but gives 
up when he is unable remember the exact words. Instead, Chalom tips 
his tarbush forward, puﬀ s up his chest, and, as he dramatically prepares 
to march himself toward Zuzu’s quarters, he says “Men! I will go! Watch 
out!”
Th e men, however, remain passive recipients of the women’s aﬀ ec-
tions. When Chalom enters Zuzu’s boudoir, she is toweling her thighs, 
wearing only a bathrobe. She invites a nervous Chalom to kiss her, and 
he hesitantly responds with a chaste kiss on the top of her head. With 
further prompting, he kisses her on the cheek. Zuzu ﬁ nally takes charge, 
throws herself into Chalom’s arms and passionately embraces him. Like-
wise, after the encounter, a grinning cAbdu is shown with lipstick marks 
all over his face (but not on his lips). Although the camera does not fol-
low cAbdu’s second encounter with Ruhiyya, the visible evidence also 
places him in a passive role.
Zuzu and Ruhiya’s emasculating rhetoric sets into motion a sequence 
of events that devolve into a ﬁ ght between Chalom and cAbdu as they 
seek to reassert their masculinity. In the climactic party scene, Chalom 
and cAbdu hide behind a curtain planning to surprise Zuzu and Ruhiya 
with bouquets of ﬂ owers. Instead, they overhear the women disparaging 
them. Ruhiya calls cAbdu an oaf, but admits she likes the contents of his 
wallet. Zuzu casts aspersions on Chalom’s virility, calling him a grass-
hopper, and likening his ﬂ oppy mustache to a shrimp. She concludes 
with the kicker, “Th at half pint, you call that a man?”
From their hiding place, Chalom and cAbdu also overhear the nurses 
Maurice and Wali professing their love to Esther and Amina. Impotent 
to respond to these insults on their own, Chalom and cAbdu call for their 
in-laws to intervene. Following a chaotic shouting match, Maurice and 
Wali are escorted out of the party, but the protagonists are still smarting 
from the insults and spoiling for a ﬁ ght. When Chalom overhears a guest 
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claiming that he would be nothing without cAbdu, it is the last straw. 
Chalom pours out his wrath upon cAbdu, and his friend reciprocates. In 
the heat of the argument, each claims to have made “a man” out of the 
other.
Destabilized gender identity threatens to upset the narrative of co-
existence. Esther’s and Amina’s families appeal to Chalom and cAbdu to 
reconcile, urging the men not to let their ﬁ ght undermine a thirty-year 
friendship between the families.
Th e emasculation of the bourgeois lifestyle and the threats it poses to 
coexistence are reversed only after Chalom and cAbdu lose their wealth 
and the characters all return to their old residences. Likewise, at the end 
of the ﬁ lm, the equal access to communal food—along with the inclusive 
Levantine aesthetic—is restored. In the penultimate scene, the Jewish 
and Muslim families once again crowd around a table to share their fa-
vorite food together. As with the picnic, this scene is comprised of a 
single shot that includes all of the characters in the frame. Th e closing 
shot of the ﬁ lm also serves to reassert Chalom’s virility. Chalom is shown 
returning to the street in the old neighborhood hawking lottery tickets—
but this time he is carrying infant twins.
By way of conclusion, I would like return to a brief scene that depicts 
the intersection of the two idioms of Levantine ﬂ uidity I have traced: 
Figure 5.8. Chalom and cAbdu kiss. Screenshot, Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence 
(1937).
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communal, or ethno-religious identity on one hand; gender and sexu-
ality on the other. On their way to their ﬁ rst encounter with their pro-
spective mistresses, Chalom assuages cAbdu’s performance anxiety by 
oﬀ ering him a tutorial on kissing. Holding up a bouquet of ﬂ owers, Cha-
lom advises: “Say to her, ‘take this present.’ Say to her also, ‘come here my 
love.’36 And just like in the movies …” Chalom then leans over and plants 
a kiss on cAbdu’s lips.
For Mizrahi, it was not suﬃ  cient to draw laughs by depicting the two 
men kissing. Th e camera cuts to a second angle showing the driver ob-
serving the embrace in the rear view mirror (ﬁ gure 9). Th e presence of 
a witness, an audience, signals the ﬁ lm’s self-awareness of the act as a 
performance. Th e narratives of coexistence and the queering of identity 
evidenced in Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms meet with the touch of Chalom and cAbdu’s 
lips.
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 1. I have adopted Viola Shaﬁ k’s (2007: 29) translation of the ﬁ lm’s title 
from Arabic into English. Th e French title of the ﬁ lm at the time of its 
release was Les Deux Banquiers [Th e Two Bankers]. I am using a simpli-
ﬁ ed version of the IJMES transliteration system; I use “c” for cayin and an 
apostrophe for hamza, but I have omitted diacritical marks. Upon ﬁ rst 
mention, I identify ﬁ lms by both their Arabic title and the title trans-
lated into English; on subsequent reference, I refer to ﬁ lms exclusively 
by their title in English.
 2. My contention here is not unlike that made by Steven Cohan about the 
1940s Bob Hope and Bing Crosby “Road to” movies, about which he writes: 
“I do not mean to propose that the ‘Road to’ ﬁ lms openly represent a gay 
sexual relation between the two male stars; but I am arguing that the come-
dic framework of the series plays upon intimations of homoeroticism, and 
that the queer shading of their buddy relation must be taken into account 
when understanding the immense popularity of Hope and Crosby’s team-
ing in the 1940s” (Cohan 1999: 25).
 3. I refer to the ﬁ lm in English as Doctor Farahat, rather than “Doctor Farhat,” 
following the lead of Mizrahi’s own romanization of the title into French in 
the credits as Le Docteur Farahat. 
 4. Th e ﬁ lm was released in Alexandria as al-Hawiya [Th e Abyss] and later 
screened in Cairo under the title al-Kukayin [Cocaine].
 5. Little is known about 5001, and the ﬁ lm is unavailable. Ahmad al-Hadari 
does not include a plot summary in his entry on the ﬁ lm in his encyclope-
dic work on 1930s Egyptian cinema (al-Hadari 2007). Th e “Alex Cinema” 
website hosted by Bibliotheca Alexandrina oﬀ ers the following synopsis: 
“By a stroke of luck Shalom wins lottery ticket number 5001 and becomes 
rich. Rather than bring him happiness, this wealth causes him trouble. He 
therefore goes back to his old way of life.” (“Films Set or Filmed in Alexan-
dria,” Bibliotheca Alexandrina, http://www.bibalex.org/alexcinema/ﬁ lms/
Filmed_Alexandria.html.) Th is plot could either be played as comedy (as it 
is in Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence) or as a drama. Th e editors at “Alex Cinema” 
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mistakenly assume that the film is a drama that “tackle[s] social issues.” 
(“Togo Mizrahi,” Bibliotheca Alexandrina, http://www.bibalex.org/alexcin 
ema/cinematographers/Togo_Mizrahi.html.) Publicity around 5001 at the 
time of release identifies the film as a sports comedy.
 6. During this four-year period Mizrahi also released a musical melodrama 
al-Bahhar [The Sailor (1935)]. I emphasize “Arabic films” because between 
1937 and 1943 Mizrahi also directed four Greek-speaking films. Two of the 
films were Greek versions of his Arabic films Doctor Farahat [1935 Arabic; 
1937 Greek], and The Sailor [1935 Arabic; 1943 Greek] (“Greek-Speaking 
Films,” Bibliotheca Alexandrina, http://www.bibalex.org/alexcinema/films/
Greek.html). 
 7. Fi Layla Mumtira [On a Rainy Night], released on 9 March 1939, and 
Salafini 3 ginayh [Lend Me 3 Pounds], released on 28 September 1939, were 
shot at Studio Wahbi (al-Hadari 2007: 365–69).
 8. For more on Umm Kulthum’s career see Danielson (1997).
 9. Chalom starred in three films directed by Togo Mizrahi: 5001; The Two 
Delegates; and Mistreated by Affluence.
10. Ahmad al-Hadari also cites the Egyptian actor Bishara Wakim as a source 
of influence on Chalom’s acting style. Wakim had debuted a down-on-his-
luck character on screen in a silent comedy shot in Alexandria, Barsum 
Yabhath can al-Wathifa [Barsum Looks for a Job (1925), directed by Mu-
hammad Bayumi] (al-Hadari 2007: 255). 
11. Al-Kassar starred in five films directed by Togo Mizrahi in his Alexandria 
studio: Mi’at alf ginayh [One Hundred Thousand Pounds (1936)], Khafir al-
darak [The Watchman (1936)], al-Saca Sabca [Seven O’Clock (1937)], al-Tili-
graf [The Telegraph (1938)], and cUthman wa-cAli [cUsman and cAli (1939)].
12. In the 1930s Fawzi al-Jazayirli starred in two films directed by Mizrahi: 
Doctor Farahat and The Sailor. He also appeared in a supporting role in The 
Two Delegates.
13. Most of the later nostalgia literature about cosmopolitan Alexandria, by 
contrast, largely represents the foreign-minority bourgeoisie; see Starr 
(2009). This phenomenon is not limited to Alexandria, as Anagnostopoulos 
notes in this volume: “The way scholars and laypeople approach and recre-
ate images of peaceful coexistence in the Ottoman Empire is oftentimes 
markedly aestheticized by the heritage industry of today, especially in the 
context of cosmopolitan Mediterranean ports, and often prevents them 
from understanding the context of coexistence in the past” (p. 87). 
14. Mizrahi’s 1930s sound comedies tend to include musical numbers. I have, 
however, chosen not to designate them as “musicals.” Mizrahi’s 1940s musi-
cal melodramas feature a singer in a starring role, whereas the stars in the 
1930s Alexandria comedies are non-singing comic actors. While musical 
performance features in these films, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
engage in a sustained analysis of its significance. 
15. All three 1935 reviews are cited in al-Hadari (2007: 169). Tahiya Carioca’s 
given name was Badiya Muhammad cAli al-Nidani. In Doctor Farahat she 
is credited as Tahiya Muhammad.
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16. For example, there is a very small body of academic literature on the Vic-
torian farce Charley’s Aunt (1892), by Brandon Th omas, an enormously 
popular play with a record-breaking run on stage for its time, and multiple 
translations and adaptations—including a short Egyptian silent ﬁ lm in 1920 
starring cAli al-Kassar, al-Khala al-Amrikiyya. By contrast, Oscar Wilde’s 
Th e Importance of Being Earnest (1895), which is widely viewed as a subver-
sion of the genre, has received extensive critical attention.
17. Flibbert lists several notable examples of this commonly accepted claim. 
Others, including Flibbert have drawn attention to the value for ﬁ lm crit-
ics and historians of ﬁ lms in these under-studied periods, and of critically 
under-appreciated popular genres such as musicals and comedies. Th is 
present study emerges out of engagement with this body of scholarship. 
Ahmad Yusuf, for example, debunks assumptions about “the cinema of war 
proﬁ teers” of the 1940s, in Yusuf (1996). See also Armbrust (2000).
18. Joel Gordon’s Revolutionary Melodrama maps the centrality of melodrama 
to the construction of national identity in the 1950s (Gordon 2002).
19. I am not suggesting that the terms I am using (or their equivalents, such as 
they might be, in Arabic, French, or Italian, etc.) would have had currency 
in 1930s Alexandria—neither among Egyptians nor the resident minori-
ties and foreigners. Rather, the notions of “queerness” and “the Levantine” 
in tandem provide a language and critical framework for understanding 
and unpacking the signiﬁ cance of Mizrahi’s ﬂ uid construction of identity in 
these ﬁ lms.
20. In the American literary and ﬁ lm vernacular in the same period, Dashiell 
Hammett’s Joel Cairo oﬀ ers a notable example of the slipperiness attributed 
to both the Levantine and to queerness (Hammett 1984). I am not suggest-
ing that Th e Maltese Falcon (1929) nor its 1930s ﬁ lm adaptations [Th e Mal-
tese Falcon, Roy Del Ruth, dir. (1931); Satan Met a Lady, William Dieterle, 
dir. (1936)] should be read as direct intertexts for Mizrahi’s work. Rather, I 
wish to point out the parallel associations between queer and what I have 
termed “Levantine” identities in Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms.
21. I do not assume in my analysis that queerness need align with progressive 
or radical politics. While Mizrahi’s queer Levantine disrupts emerging pa-
rochial ethno-religious nationalisms in 1930s Egypt, his liberal, pluralist, 
ethics of coexistence could hardly be termed radical. 
22. A ﬁ lm Togo Mizrahi produced, al-Riyadi [Th e Athlete (1937)], garners brief 
mention in Jacob’s discussion of the place of sport and ﬁ tness in the emer-
gence of eﬀ endi masculinity (Jacob 2011: 156). Th e ﬁ lm, starring Chalom, 
was directed by L. Nagel and Clément Mizrahi.
23. Bryant, “Introduction,” p. 4.
24. For example, elsewhere I have examined Niyazi Mustafa’s Salama ﬁ  khayr 
[Salama is Fine (1937)] as an articulation of this Levantine idiom (Starr 
2011). Garay Menicucci (1998: 32) analyzes the homoerotic content of an-
other contemporaneous ﬁ lm, Bint al-Basha al-Mudir [Th e Pasha Director’s 
Daughter, Ahmad Galal, dir. (1938)], about a young woman who dresses as 
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a man for purposes of employment, precipitating a love triangle where she 
becomes the object of both male and female desire. Th e Pasha Director’s 
Daughter shares a ﬂ uidity of gender identities with Mizrahi’s ﬁ lms from the 
1930s.
25. Th e actor Ahmad al-Haddad also plays cAbdu in Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence.
26. Vito Russo (1987: 37) lists legions of examples from Hollywood cinema in 
the 1910s through the 1930s in which homoerotic innuendo between men 
was played comically. He also notes that the American press, which took 
issue with more directly subversive characters and plots, tended not to 
comment on “open signs of homosexuality in a comic context.” Th e screen-
writers of the documentary ﬁ lm based on Russo’s book put it more suc-
cinctly: “In a hundred years of movies, homosexuality has only rarely been 
depicted on screen. When it did appear, it was there as something to laugh 
at, or something to pity, or even something to fear.” Th e Celluloid Closet, 
Rob Epstein and Jeﬀ rey Friedman, dir. (1995). 
27. Although polygamy is permitted by Islam and remains legal in Egypt, it was 
not commonly practiced in Mizrahi’s time (Kholoussy 2010: 83).
28. I am thinking here of Eric Bentley’s (1964: 219–56) contention about the 
centrality of violence to farce, and the inherent dialectic within the genre 
between gentleness and violence. I would like to thank Nick Salvato for 
pointing me to this reference. 
29. Little has been written about female same-sex desire in the Middle East and 
its representation in literature and ﬁ lm. Stephen Murray (1997) provides 
a very brief introduction to the topic in “Woman-Woman Love in Islamic 
Societies.” Samar Habib’s (2000) monograph Female Homosexuality in the 
Middle East oﬀ ers the most extensive study of the topic, although her dis-
cussion skips from Medieval texts to late twentieth century, and her analy-
sis of Arab ﬁ lm begins in the 1970s. 
30. While writing and directing credits appeared in all of his ﬁ lms as “Togo 
Mizrahi,” as an actor, he appeared under a pseudonym. Togo Mizrahi acted 
in two ﬁ lms under the name Ahmad al-Mashriqi: Th e Abyss / Cocaine and 
Awlad Misr [Children of Egypt (1933)]. An actor credited in those same two 
ﬁ lms as cAbd al-cAziz al-Mashriqi is believed to be Togo’s brother. In Doctor 
Farahat, Togo Mizrahi, not his brother, is the actor credited as cAbd al-
cAziz al-Mashriqi (al-Hadari 2007: 168). I would also like to thank Jacques 
Mizart, Togo Mizrahi’s nephew, for conﬁ rming the identity of the actor.
31. In his 2002 novel cImarat Yacqubiyan (Th e Yacoubian Building), cAla al-
Aswani (2002; 2006) returns to roof-dwellers to reﬂ ect anew upon Egypt’s 
multi-cultural past and its bearing on the present and future of Egyptian 
society. For analyses of the signiﬁ cation of the homosexual relationship be-
tween a resident of the building and a roof-dweller in Th e Yacoubian Build-
ing, see al-Samman (2008) and Hadeed (2013).
32. Mistreated by Aﬄ  uence is the second of two ﬁ lms Mizrahi made about the 
friendship between Chalom and cAbdu, Esther and Amina. Th e ﬁ rst was 
al-Manduban [Th e Two Delegates (1934).
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33.	 In	the	introduction	to	this	volume,	Rebecca	Bryant	offered	shared	meals	
as	an	example	of	commensality	(p.	2).	She	notes	that	the	invocation	of	such	
shared	experiences	points	to	their	exceptionality,	and	to	the	pre-existence	
of	notions	of	difference	overcome	by	the	shared	practice.	The	shared	meals	
in	Mistreated by Affluence	 could	be	 read	 in	 this	way,	 too:	 the	 emerging	
forms	of	Arab-Islamic	nationalism	in	1930s	Egypt	threw	into	relief	the	dif-
ferences	 between	Muslims	 and	 Jews	 that	Mizrahi’s	meal	 scenes	 seek	 to	
overcome.	
34.	 For	more	on	popular	assumptions	about	 this	association	 in	 the	Egyptian	
context,	see	Nieuwkerk	(1995).
35.	 Chalom’s	expressive	whistling	in	this	scene	is	reminiscent	of	Harpo	Marx.	
Mistreated by Affluence appears	to	borrow	from	and	reference	Marx	Broth-
ers’	movies	at	other	junctures	as	well.	
36.	 The	Arabic	“tacali ya ruhi”	plays	on	Ruhiya’s	name.
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[• Chapter 6 •]
Memory, Conviviality, 
and Coexistence
Negotiating Class Diﬀ erences in Burgazadası, Istanbul
DENIZ NERIMAN DURU
In much of the literature on peace and conﬂ ict resolution in the Bal-
kans, Southern Europe, and the Middle East, scholars attempt to analyze 
cultural plurality using the concept of coexistence. Th is is a coexistence 
that is being excavated from the ruins of conﬂ ict, with the idea that it 
may shed light on how people could live together again. Examples of 
such coexistence include that between Israelis and Palestinians; Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots; or Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians (e.g., Wallensteen 
2007; Abu-Nimer 2001; Dayton and Kriesberg 2009; Phillips 1996; Anas-
tasiou 2002; Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld 2002). Th is is the coexistence 
that Bryant, in her introduction, contrasts with “everyday coexistence” 
and notes “the legal, political, and discursive forms of coexistence that 
imply the ‘living together’ of millets or ethnic groups within the empire 
or nation” (Bryant this volume, p. 8).
Th is chapter represents a critical engagement with coexistence in 
the context of Turkey, where the idea of “living together” has been bur-
dened with concepts of “toleration” inherited from the Ottoman past 
and inscribed in Republican law. Coexistence, with its connotations of 
diﬀ erent ethnic or religious groups living together, has no equivalent in 
Turkish. Rather, the most commonly used term to refer to the interac-
tion of such groups is hoşgörü, literally “to see well” and usually trans-
lated as “tolerance.” While I cannot engage here in all the connotations 
of the word and ways in which it may diverge from the primarily neg-
ative connotations of “toleration,” it is a word that has been applied in 
the post-Ottoman Turkish context primarily to non-Muslim minorities 
whose status as minorities was secured by the Treaty of Lausanne. As 
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Bryant notes in the introduction, this does not mean that there have not 
been concepts of everyday coexistence in operation, especially the idea 
of komşuluk and the mahalle. However, these ideas of living together 
have been problematically projected onto the scale of relations between 
ethnic and/or religious groups, blurring the scale that equates “the ex-
istence of certain neighborhoods where persons of diﬀ erent religions 
lived side by side, sharing the responsibilities of the mahalle, with the 
‘peaceful’ existence of religious and ethnic minorities within the Empire” 
(Bryant this volume, p. 17).
To complicate matters further, this discourse of coexistence, with 
its blurring of scale, furthermore returns to have real impact on actual 
everyday coexistence in the present. For instance, in the post-Ottoman 
context, scholars tend to view coexistence as something that belongs to 
the Ottoman past, a time before conﬂ ict based on ethno-religious iden-
tities (especially Couroucli 2010). Problematically, this literature tends to 
view the loss of religious minorities as necessarily creating homogenized 
nations. Couroucli, for instance, claims that with the departure of the 
non-Muslim millets—the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek-Orthodox mi-
norities—Turkey has long ago lost its pluralism. Such assumptions, how-
ever, rebound to reinforce the idea that minorities are those non-Muslim 
millets who are the subject of toleration, thus reducing coexistence to a 
form of hierarchical indulgence. Moreover, this understanding of coex-
istence, by equating plurality with those diﬀ erences acknowledged by 
the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, makes it seem as though other 
forms of diﬀ erence in Turkey today are not signiﬁ cant and do not require 
the sort of “labor of peace” that Bryant discusses in her introduction.
Th is chapter shifts the emphasis in this study of post-Ottoman plu-
rality from coexistence/toleration to “conviviality”—that is, ways of both 
sharing and contesting particular lifestyles in a place through daily in-
teractions and a sense of belonging (Duru 2015). I refer to “coexistence/
toleration” to emphasize the complex ways in which local discourses of 
tolerance are fed by and feed into historical and scholarly understandings 
of coexistence. And in my analysis of conviviality, “living together” is un-
derstood as sharing the same space and socio-economic resources, and 
a process that involves both cohesion and tension. While I emphasize 
conviviality and tensions due to diﬀ erences in lifestyle and class (see also 
Navaro-Yashin 2006), I also complement conviviality with an analysis of 
coexistence/toleration, which I understand in the context of Turkey to 
apply speciﬁ cally to recognized (former millets) and unrecognized mi-
norities (e.g., Alevis and Kurds) who explicitly articulate their identity 
based on ethnic and religious diﬀ erence in relation to the Sunni Muslim 
majority. My study of pluralism in the Turkish context draws attention 
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to the intersection of class with ethnicity and religion (see also Smith 
2000) through the concepts of coexistence/toleration and conviviality. In 
this chapter, I explore three complex eﬀ ects of class in everyday interac-
tions: (1) the ways in which belonging to the “same” class creates similar 
lifestyles and tastes and subsumes ethnic and religious diﬀ erences; (2) 
how diﬀ erences in lifestyle become exacerbated by class diﬀ erence; and 
(3) how, nonetheless, class diﬀ erence and economic mutual dependency 
may create a sense of belonging to Burgaz, through conviviality. Hard 
times, tensions as well as sensorial pleasures, produce a sense of place, 
where the islanders enjoy the shared ways of living in this diverse setting.
Th roughout the chapter, I distinguish memories and practices of co-
existence/toleration, which we might understand as “living with diﬀ er-
ence,” from memories and practices of “conviviality,” which I argue here 
are shared ways of living. While coexistence/toleration places empha-
sis on the need to share space with persons whom we already presume 
to be diﬀ erent, conviviality places emphasis on the production of place 
through shared attitudes and experiences. As I will show, conviviality 
may be seen as a particular form of everyday coexistence in which plu-
ralism is self-consciously valued for its own sake. In this context, while 
memories of coexistence/toleration become a nostalgia for multicultur-
alism or an irreversible loss of pluralism as a result of nationalist homog-
enization (Bryant this volume, p. 17), memories of conviviality are used 
to create a sense of belonging to Burgaz. Th e shared ways of living that 
create such a sense of belonging to Burgaz include both sweet memories 
of leisure and also bitter memories of adaptation, hardship, class, and 
lifestyle diﬀ erences.
Th is chapter responds to a particular strain in the analysis of the 
post-Ottoman space that takes as its subject the paradoxes of contem-
porary Ottoman nostalgia. In one form, that nostalgia posits that people 
got along well before the ravages of nation-state homogenization. Inter-
estingly, this particular form of nostalgia coincides with oﬃ  cial Turkish 
versions of the past that see life in the Ottoman Empire as harmonious 
and assert that it was broken up only by upstart minority nationalists. 
As a result, others have suggested in regard to Turkey that nostalgia for 
a pluralism that no longer exists is easy, but dealing with pluralism that 
actually exists (Kurdish, Alevi, etc.) is much more diﬃ  cult (e.g., Onar 
2009; Tambar 2014). Nicholas Doumanis (2013), in his important Before 
the Nation, attempts to take seriously the nostalgia of Greeks displaced 
from Anatolia before and during the 1923 population exchange. In that 
nostalgia, Greeks tend to assert a good life before they began to feel the 
eﬀ ects of nation-state ideologies. However, while Doumanis sees the in-
teractions of various religious groups in the empire as a form of everyday 
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practice, he is never suﬃ  ciently able to solve the puzzle of its nostalgia 
today. I argue that this puzzle of nostalgia becomes easier to solve when 
one sees it as a nostalgia for a place to which one belonged that was cre-
ated out of shared ways of living that encompassed and enjoyed diver-
sity. Th is is diﬀ erent from seeing it as nostalgia for diversity itself, which 
suggests that we are nostalgic for speciﬁ c features of other cultures.
Burgaz is an especially interesting site for exploring this question, as 
it is known in Turkey primarily as an elite resort of non-Muslim minori-
ties that is dominated by the lifestyle of a secular upper class (compare 
Couroucli 2010: 223). Burgaz is one of nine islands in the Marmara Sea 
that constitute a separate district within the Istanbul Province and are 
today accessible by a short boat ride from central Istanbul. Based on my 
ethnographic research, I suggest that, contrary to the dominant percep-
tion of Burgaz as a home of non-Muslim elites, there is a signiﬁ cant class 
diﬀ erence between the permanent and the summer inhabitants of the 
island who come from not only diﬀ erent ethno-religious groups but also 
diﬀ erent socio-economic backgrounds. Th e economy of Burgaz depends 
on the mutual relationship between the permanent inhabitants (mainly 
Zaza, Kurds, and Turks who are Alevi, Sunni, or Shaﬁ ’i from eastern and 
south-eastern Turkey) who run the shops and the restaurants, and the 
summer inhabitants, who are the customers, clients, and occasionally 
the employers (for instance hiring cleaners, gardeners, care takers, etc.). 
Moreover, despite these class diﬀ erences there are strong community 
relationships and friendships that go beyond economic exchange and 
involve forms of recognition, respect, and gift giving.
Conviviality and Cosmopolitanism
Scholars frequently refer to the upper-class sociality of the Ottoman 
context as cosmopolitanism, a word with connotations of urban cultural 
pluralism (see, e.g., Zubaida 2002; Driessen 2005; Gekas 2009). In con-
tradistinction to this, Ulrike Freitag argues that the political normative 
understanding of cultural pluralism implied in cosmopolitanism does 
not apply to the daily interactions among non-elite Ottoman subjects, 
which she describes as a form of conviviality. She shows that craftsmen 
and traders who belonged to diﬀ erent corporate organizations or guilds 
(Arabic tai’fa, Ottoman sınıf ) engaged with each other in structured 
quotidian rituals in order to sort out tax collection (Freitag 2014). Lo-
cals and strangers socialized in coﬀ ee houses, taverns, and bathhouses, 
while families went on excursions together or visited each other’s homes 
(Freitag 2014).1 Freitag’s (2014) analysis is useful for thinking about how 
Memory, Conviviality, and Coexistence 161
belonging to the same or similar classes intersects ethnic and religious 
diﬀ erences. However, her analytical framework neither explains the ne-
gotiations between diﬀ erent classes and socio-economic groups nor the 
ways in which people from diﬀ erent classes negotiate ethno-religious 
diﬀ erences.
I chose Burgaz as my ﬁ eldwork site because of its diverse popula-
tion and because it was one of the rare places where people collectively 
resisted the 1955 riots, one of the most signiﬁ cant events of Republi-
can Turkish history in that it resulted in a mass migration of remaining 
Greek Orthodox from Istanbul, primarily to Greece. I aimed to under-
stand the diversity that still exists in Burgaz, and how persons who con-
sider themselves “Burgazlı” understand that diversity. Hence I analyzed 
both the islanders’ narratives of past diversity and their current prac-
tices of conviviality, notably interactions across diﬀ erent classes and 
ethno-religious communities. My fourteen months of research in Burgaz 
(June 2009–September 2010) included both formal and informal inter-
views regarding past diversity, including life history interviews, as well 
as long-term participant observation, including in cafes, restaurants, 
embroidery class, and social clubs, as well as churches, mosque, syna-
gogue, and cemevi (Alevi places of worship). I also analyzed novels and 
a documentary ﬁ lm that Burgaz islanders have produced. Th is approach 
to current and past diversity and conviviality in the island also allowed 
me to assess how the island’s population has changed over time and how 
long-term residents assess those transformations. As my research pro-
gressed, I began to understand the diﬀ erence between memories and 
practices of conviviality and a sense of belonging to Burgaz, and my in-
formants’ narratives of coexistence/toleration, which fragments the 
sense of belonging into sharing space with diﬀ erent co-existing groups.
My ﬁ rst introduction to this distinction was when I met Orhan Özalp, 
a Burgazlı then in his mid-eighties, who was introduced to me by the 
security oﬃ  cer of one of the social clubs. Th e oﬃ  cer gave him my mobile 
number, and Orhan called me to arrange a time to meet. On the phone, I 
explained to him that I was doing doctoral research about the memories 
of Burgaz islanders currently living on the island. I added that as he was 
one of the oldest inhabitants in Burgaz, I would be very grateful for an 
interview with him. When he arrived for our morning meeting at the 
Blue Club, one of the island’s social clubs, he brought along sheets on 
which he had listed names of friends, activities, and events. I was sur-
prised that he was so well prepared, and I was happy that he was eager 
to talk to me. When I took out my small notebook, he exclaimed, “What, 
how can you write all the memories of many years in such a tiny book! 
Go get a proper notebook!” So, I went to the security desk and asked for 
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a stack of A4 sheets and came back prepared to write, as he preferred 
me to take notes rather than to record the interview. I quote a section 
here from the uninterrupted stream in which he narrated his story of 
Burgaz to me:
Burgaz was an island of Greek ﬁ shermen. Th e permanent inhabitants 
of Burgaz, such as restaurant and coﬀ ee shop owners, storekeepers, 
ﬁ shermen, bakers, and grocers were all Greeks. My father was one of 
the ﬁ rst Turks, who came to Burgaz between 1915 and the 1920s. Th ey 
were governmental oﬃ  cers, doctors, or lawyers, and the majority of 
them used the island as a sayﬁ ye yeri [summer resort place] and were 
very few in number. In the 1930s and 1940s, summer inhabitants, such 
as Ashkenazi Jews and Germans, were rich and elite. Th e Jews of Bur-
gaz were upper class in comparison to the Sephardic Jews who were 
lower middle class and who lived in Heybeli, another Princes’ Island. 
Th e Jews of Heybeli and Istanbul used to come for a day trip to Burgaz 
as they could not aﬀ ord to have houses in Burgaz. Th ese Sephardic 
Jews became richer when the Democratic Party was in power between 
1945 and 1960. Th us, from the late 1940s onwards, the Jews from Hey-
beli moved to Burgaz and the ones in Istanbul either rented or bought 
property in Burgaz.
 Th is island was the island of ﬁ sh. Greeks were very into ﬁ shing. 
Istavrit, uskumru, palamut, lüfer, torik, lapin, mercan, karagöz, ork-
inos, sinarit, kılıç balığı [names of ﬁ sh varieties] … there were so many 
ﬁ sh that the ﬁ shnets used to break. When there was excess ﬁ sh, the 
ﬁ shermen used to throw the excess back to the sea. Th e ﬁ shermen used 
to compete with each other in order to catch the biggest ﬁ sh, espe-
cially orkinos. Th e ﬁ sh caught were always displayed and sold in the 
market. Th e ﬁ shmonger used to mark the name of the ﬁ sherman on 
the orkinos caught, thus you would know who caught it and see the 
pride in the eyes of the ﬁ sherman when he walked in the market. Now, 
there are fewer and fewer ﬁ sh in the sea. People are not as careful as 
the ﬁ shermen of the old days. Th e new generation put dynamite in the 
ﬁ shes’ nests and ﬁ sh when the ﬁ sh were reproducing. Now the seagulls 
are hungry. I used to go ﬁ shing with my summer Greek friends. Th ey 
had boats. We used to go to Sivriada and Yassıada [the uninhabited 
islands]. Th ese islands were a heaven of ﬁ sh and mussels. We used to 
go there in the afternoon, ﬁ sh and eat the ﬁ sh there, get drunk and 
sleep and come back in the morning. Sivriada geceleri [the nights of 
Sivriada] …
 Th ese times were the times of bolluk [abundance, prosperity]. Th e 
rich Greeks had big gardens. For example, Taso’s garden was full of 
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fruit and vegetables. Quince, plum, lettuce, onion … Mimi had a ﬂ ower 
garden. In Foti’s garden there were almond trees. Th ey used to sell their 
fruit, vegetables and ﬂ owers to the islanders. Have you been to the 
Austrian chapel, high up in Burgaz? [I said “yes.”] Good. Th e Austrian 
nuns used to sell the spare produce to the islanders. Th ey had cows and 
chickens. Th e yogurt, cream, cheese, and milk that came from them 
were the best I have eaten in my life.
 Do you know Kalpazankaya? [I said “yes, I have been there.”] Do you 
know the Hişt Hişt story from Sait Faik?” [I said, “Yes I have read it.”] 
Sait got inspired to write the story on the way to Kalpazankaya. He 
lived in Burgaz, he was much older than me but he was my friend and 
Burgaz is known as Sait Faik’in adası [Sait Faik’s island]. In the story, 
Sait is on the Kalpazankaya road, he hears hişt hişt [similar to the “psst” 
sound that one person whispers to another to get their attention] but 
he cannot tell where it comes from. A plum tree? A hedgehog? A per-
son? A bird? Th e sea? Saik writes it so well. It does not matter where 
the sound comes from. It is the sound of what makes you feel alive. He 
says in the end that if you do not hear hişt, then it matters. In Burgaz, 
you constantly hear a hişt sound, whether it is a person, a tree, the sea, 
the nature, an animal; these things keep you alive.
 Th e times of the Greeks were the times of fun. I loved attending 
the church at Christmas and on important Greek Orthodox religious 
days. Th ey oﬀ ered pastry, biscuits, cookies, and meals at the church. 
Th ere was not a mosque on the island until 1954. I did not care about 
the mosque. I did not care when it was built. I am not interested in 
religion, but I enjoyed attending the church because it was good fun to 
socialize with my Greek friends. Th ere were ﬁ ve gazinos [dancing and 
drinking places] in Burgaz. In gazinos, Greek and foreign music played, 
sometimes live, sometimes from the gramophone. We danced day and 
night—tango, slow, swing … Th e Greeks knew how to drink. Th ere 
was always one person at the table who would control anyone who was 
getting too drunk. Now, people do not know how to drink. Th ey get 
drunk and they start ﬁ ghts.
 Adanın tipleri vardı [there were unique, almost crazy people]. You 
know, every place has its own unique people. Ali Rıza Kondos. Kondos 
means short in Greek. Ali Rıza was a short drunkard. He had built a 
cave for himself in Burgaz. When we saw him, we used to yell pırr, 
which would make him so angry; he would throw stones at us and run 
after us. And then Şilep [Ocean liner] Hasan … He was so huge we 
used to call him Şilep. Th e islanders used to give names to these unique 
people. Now, people are boring. Th e island was more diverse in the old 
days, we had adanın tipleri and everyone had a particular character, 
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fault, weakness, funniness, craziness that made Burgaz a place of fun. 
Now, everyone is the same. People watch TV, they go to work. Th ey do 
not have fun in their lives. Th ere are no adanın tipleri anymore.
Orhan’s memories of his youth are memories of conviviality, and they 
take their sources from the shared life in Burgaz. Orhan began the story 
of Burgaz with the Greeks, Turks, Ashkenazi Jews, Sephardic Jews, and 
Germans, which shows that ethnic and religious diﬀ erences were ac-
knowledged, not as “coexistence/toleration” but as part of what it meant 
to live in Burgaz. Orhan, like many of my Jewish, Muslim, German, and 
Armenian informants, joined and enjoyed the sociality at the churches. 
Greek rituals added to the richness of Burgaz. Th e luxurious summer 
lifestyle—full of discos, music and fun, drinking, and ﬁ shing lifestyles—
brought people from diﬀ erent ethno-religious backgrounds together to 
socialize.
Furthermore, Orhan’s perception of diversity is not limited to ethnic 
and religious diﬀ erences. People’s particularities, stories of craziness, 
anger, and jokes made Burgaz diverse and interesting to him. He also 
criticized greediness as what decreases the diversity in nature. Th e fact 
that he remembered what kind of fruits and vegetables grew in which 
garden, which dairy products came from where, and the names of par-
ticular ﬁ sh shows that the tastes of these foods are signiﬁ cant elements 
that tie him to the island. He has embodied Burgaz through dancing, 
ﬁ shing, drinking, attending church, socializing with his friends, and 
having fun. Orhan’s memories are of what Chau calls a “social senso-
rium,” a term he uses to refer to “a sensorially rich social space such 
as found at a temple festival, a busy market, or a packed dance ﬂ oor” 
(2008: 489, emphasis in original). However, while Chau explores “red-
hot sociality,” or the way that sociality is produced through a type of 
heated frenzy, Orhan refers to the way that a sense of the social, of what 
it means to be a Burgazlı, is produced through the experience of sen-
sory diversity. Orhan’s concept of bolluk, abundance, includes a diver-
sity of people, animals, and natural beings. Th e “Hişt Hişt story of Saik 
Faik Abasıyanık (1993) that Orhan referred to indicates that Burgaz—
with its people, nature, animals, tastes, trees, and its sea—whispers into 
islanders’ ears and keeps them alive. Th e experience of diversity is what 
makes Burgaz the place that it is, and enjoying diversity is what it means 
to be Burgazlı.
However, while Orhan remembers the years prior to the 1950s mainly 
as joyful and harmonious times for the non-Muslims and the Sunni 
Muslims, these were class-based memories. Orhan was a summer in-
habitant; his friends were mainly wealthy summer inhabitants from di-
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verse ethno-religious backgrounds. In contrast, in the same years, male 
Alevi workers came to Burgaz from Turkey’s east to do menial jobs. For 
the Alevis, the 1940s and 1950s were years of hardship, adaptation, and 
suﬀ ering. A couple of Alevi families came to Burgaz from Erzincan af-
ter the devastating earthquake in Erzincan in 1939. More male Alevi 
migrants came from Erzincan in the 1940s, to work during the summer 
season and take back what they earned to their families in Erzincan. My 
Greek, Sunni, and Alevi informants relate the immigration of the Alevis 
to economic factors. In the 1950s and 1960s, the migration from Anato-
lian villages to cities was increasing.
Th e Alevi men engaged in temporary migration to Burgaz in the 1940s 
did menial jobs such as helping the Greek ﬁ shermen reel in nets when 
they came back from ﬁ shing. Th ey worked as hamal, carrying the fur-
niture of the summer inhabitants when those inhabitants moved to 
the island and when they moved back to Istanbul. Th e Alevi men also 
built and restored houses, and worked as waiters and helpers in grocery 
shops, restaurants, and cafes. Th e building sector in Burgaz had been 
increasing and hence provided new job opportunities. Th ey worked as 
doorkeepers and gardeners in Greek houses (especially in the Ay Nikola 
area, which is higher up, away from the town center), where they were 
given rooms or ﬂ ats in which to stay. Th e zangoç (verger) of the Greek 
Orthodox Ay Yorgi church in Burgaz explained to me the story of how 
Ay Nikola became an Alevi neighborhood. He said: “Alevis came to work 
temporarily in summer. Most of them worked in Garipi monastery, in 
Ay Nikola, painting walls, and ﬁ xing things for the church. Th e priest 
who was in charge of the church at that time let the Alevis settle in the 
Ay Nikola area, near the Garipi church. Hence, they built small houses 
and made them bigger when they brought their family to the island.” 
Th us, Ay Nikola started to become an Alevi neighborhood.
My male Alevi informants always began their tales of this period with 
the many diﬃ  culties they faced when they started working. Nuri and 
Mustafa say that their fathers were among the ﬁ rst Alevis to come to 
work in Burgaz and were looked down upon because they did menial 
jobs. For instance, Mustafa’s father was a shoemaker and now does free-
lance casual jobs, like painting boats. Mustafa said: “Th e Greeks used to 
call us ‘kıro.’ When we passed near them they said ‘To kıro einai’ [He is 
kıro], and we started ﬁ ghting with each other.” Although the sentence 
was in Greek, the word kıro comes from Kurdish and is used in Turkish 
as a derogatory term for someone uneducated and ill-mannered. Th ese 
two Alevi informants recall that when they were children, the rich Greek 
children used to exclude them because they were kıro. Nuri said, “When 
we wore shorts, t-shirts, and sunglasses, they [Greeks] used to belittle us 
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and make fun of us. I was very upset about this because it was as if we 
did not have the right to wear these clothes and accessories. Th e Greeks 
behaved as if the sun and the summer belonged to them.”
Th e tensions that arose between the Greeks and the Alevis were trig-
gered by class diﬀ erences2 as well as lifestyle diﬀ erences. Th e summer 
inhabitants were generally upper-middle class, and they did not appre-
ciate the presence of the Anatolian culture on the island. Th ere were 
diﬀ erences in city and village lifestyles. What people wear in Istanbul 
and Burgaz and in Erzincan and how people talk in these two diﬀ erent 
regions were markers of diﬀ erence. Th e summer people in Burgaz wore 
bathing suits and modern European clothes such as shorts and t-shirts. 
When women went out in the afternoon, they wore perfume and elegant 
evening dresses. Th e Alevis grew up in villages in Erzincan. Th ey wore 
modest and comfortable clothes to work in the ﬁ elds and did not have el-
egant or fashionable dress. Th ere were also diﬀ erences in accents. Alevis 
from Erzincan spoke Zazaki and a version of Turkish that has a harder 
accent, in which letters like “k” and “g” are emphasized and syllables are 
rolled in their throat. In Istanbul, these letters are softer and the syllables 
are rolled in the mouth. In Burgaz, people sprinkle their speech with 
many Greek and Ladino words, as well.
Nuri also commented that in the times of his father’s generation there 
was tension between Greek employees and Alevi workers. Th e Greeks 
who worked in the building sector, constructing walls and painting, em-
ployed Alevis as their assistants. Th e Alevis of his father’s generation 
wanted to have more experience in the building sector. Th e Greeks gave 
menial jobs to Alevis, such as carrying the cement, while they (Greeks) 
performed the main duties of making the walls. When these Alevi male 
workers also wanted to learn to paint the walls, the Greeks did not let 
them. Th e Alevi men with whom I spoke interpreted this as “the Greeks 
did not want us to learn more and be better, because we might take their 
jobs.” On the other hand, Nuri also said that the Greek women treated 
them well, giving food and clothes to them and being hospitable towards 
Alevi children. Th is also raises a signiﬁ cant gender issue, because while 
there was tension between the male Greek employers and the male Alevi 
employees, the Greek women apparently behaved in a maternal way to-
wards Alevi children.
Nuri’s and Mustafa’s memories are ones of conviviality in the sense 
that I am using it here. My use of it derives less from the English and 
French meanings that connote feasting and celebration, and more from 
the Spanish convivencia, meaning “a shared life.” Expanding on this 
meaning for their own work in Amazonia, Overing and Passes remark 
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that conviviality’s “features would include peacefulness, high morale and 
high aﬀ ectivity, a metaphysics of human and non-human interconnect-
edness, a stress on kinship, good gifting—sharing, work relations and 
dialogue, a propensity for the informal and performative as against the 
formal and institutional, and an intense ethical and aesthetic valuing of 
sociable sociality” (2000: xiii–xiv, emphasis added). I would like to put 
emphasis here on the performative aspect of conviviality, as well as the 
valuing of “sociable sociality.” Sociable sociality, or conviviality in the 
more conventional English sense, is something that, in this deﬁ nition, is 
valued enough to be produced through performances that involve trans-
forming “the violent, angry, ugly capricious forces of the universe into 
constructive, beautiful knowledge and capacities” (Ibid.: 6).
Conviviality, then, is not only “sociable sociality” but is the production 
and performance of that sociality, which often also involves control of ten-
sions (see Bryant this volume, p. 21). Moreover, this control of tensions 
appears often to be gendered. For instance, in her ethnography of gen-
dered spaces in a Karachi apartment building, Laura Ring shows that the 
production of the apartment building as a peaceful space is achieved not 
only through pleasurable moments but also through the management of 
tension in everyday interaction and exchange (Ring 2006). While Mustafa 
and Nuri were discriminated against because of diﬀ erences in lifestyle, 
and Alevi employees and Greek employers experienced competition, Nuri 
also remembers the hospitality of Greek women. While he articulates that 
it was hard for them to adapt to island life and that there was tension be-
tween the previous settlers and themselves, he also emphasizes that he was 
a part of this conviviality, attending church, playing marbles, and ﬁ ghting 
with Greek children. All of these memories made Burgaz his home.
I suggest, then, that conviviality is not only the ways of living that Or-
han remembers so fondly but is a particular valuing of sociable sociality 
in the making of place. It is the sort of “everyday coexistence” discussed 
in the introduction but here given “an intense ethical and aesthetic valu-
ing” and self-consciously performed. For those who live there, what 
makes Burgaz a place with which they identify is precisely this form of 
sociality; to be Burgazlı is to experience and value this sociality and to 
invest in its reproduction. Th at reproduction involves the performance 
of particular forms of sociality, as well as the management of tensions. 
Tension, then, is not absent from conviviality, just as it is not absent 
from what Bryant describes as the everyday “labor of peace.” Rather, the 
management of tension is also a way of reproducing conviviality in that 
it performatively demonstrates the value placed on shared ways of life 
over other diﬀ erences.
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Conviviality and Coexistence
Th roughout the region of what was once the Ottoman Empire, the rise 
of nationalisms has led to homogenization processes: the construction 
of ethnic and national diﬀ erences led to violence; forced migrations; op-
pression towards “minorities;”3 conﬂ icts over territory, shared space, and 
borders; and changed demographics of the region (see also introduction 
and chapter 8 by Kasbarian). Political tensions between Turkey, Greece, 
and Cyprus, followed by the Turkish government’s restrictive policies 
on minorities (e.g., Wealth Tax in 1942,4 the expulsion of persons with 
Greek citizenship in 1964) and the riots of 6–7 September 1955, which 
were an attack on the socio-economic power of the non-Muslims, were 
various ways of consolidating the ethnic and religious identity of the 
non-Muslims and making them feel as though they were “others within.” 
Th is sensation was, I argue, a local consequence of coexistence/tolera-
tion, a creation of an Other and compartmentalization of people into 
groups that had to coexist or continue to survive within the majority. 
Th at sense of coexistence/toleration and its potential consequences trig-
gered the emigration of non-Muslims, while the sense of conviviality 
tied the non-Muslim islanders to Burgaz and enabled them to remain in 
the island. Conviviality also enabled the newcomers such as Alevis and 
Kurds to adapt and become a part of Burgaz diversity.
Th e sense of coexistence/toleration appeared in Orhan’s narrative in 
the form of the homogenization process that took away his friends. I 
asked Orhan: “You talk as if all these things do not exist anymore. What 
happened? What has changed? You said there were many, many Greeks? 
Where are they now?”
Orhan:
Th e Greeks left. Th ey went to Greece, Australia, New Zealand, and 
the United States. Varlık Vergisi [the Wealth Tax], the 6–7 September 
events in 1955, the 27 May 1960 coup, the Cyprus events scared them 
all. Th ey said: “Every twenty-ﬁ ve years, something will come up, the 
government will do something, we better leave.” Th e government did 
many things wrong. My father had a Jewish friend who was required 
to pay such a high Varlık Vergisi that it was impossible to pay, thus 
he was sent to do military service in Aşkale. When my father’s Jewish 
friend came back from Aşkale, my father lent him some money that 
helped him reconstruct his business. Varlık Vergisi made the ekaliyet 
[an older term used for minorities] suﬀ er economically. Furthermore, 
the Greeks had many shops in Beyoğlu, they all got destroyed during 
the 6–7 September events. Here in Burgaz nothing happened. We 
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protected the island and no one could enter. However, what was hap-
pening in Istanbul and in Turkey was scary enough for them to leave. 
And they left. Th ey sold their properties at a low price to Erzincanlı 
Alevis who were working for them. Erzincanlıs had saved money while 
working so Erzincanlı bought these properties. Now the permanent 
inhabitants are Alevis and Kurds.
When I asked Orhan what had changed, he referred to policies (the 
Wealth Tax in 1942), the riots on 6–7 September 1955, the coup in 1960, 
and events in Cyprus as what changed life in Burgaz. All of these were 
a logical consequence of what I refer to here as coexistence/toleration, 
or the management of diﬀ erence. In this case, that diﬀ erence was “man-
aged” by the state as a form of homogenizing social engineering. For 
Orhan, it appeared as the distinction between the conviviality that he 
remembered and related with such fondness, his eyes sparkling as he 
looked dreamily towards the horizon, and the management of diﬀ erence 
that led to his friends’ departure and the political tensions, which he 
related staring at the ground and with much reticence. It was clear in his 
mind that government policies had brought a rupture to people’s daily 
lives. Th rough those policies, the identity of the religious minorities was 
crystallized around their diﬀ erence. Nevertheless, he still stressed the 
conviviality in Burgaz, in the ways in which his father helped a Jewish 
friend in Burgaz, and how the islanders did not turn against each other 
during the riots. On the contrary, the islanders cooperated with the po-
lice on Burgaz and protected the island from an outside attack, by wait-
ing at the bays, scaring away the invaders who could not get to the island.
Th e Lausanne Treaty of 1923 provided the framework for this coexis-
tence/toleration, as it made the Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews 
remaining in the new Republic of Turkey oﬃ  cial minorities. Th is oﬃ  cial 
status of minority gave them recognition with particular rights, a recog-
nition that Muslim groups, such as Kurds and Alevis, have been denied. 
But it also set them apart as non-Turkish, not a part of the majority, 
despite the fact that the Republic of Turkey was originally intended as a 
civic nationalism in which every Turkish citizen would be a Turk. More-
over, as Istanbul’s Greek Orthodox were excluded from the population 
exchange with Greece, Istanbul remained the center of Greek Orthodox 
life until the 1950s. Istanbul, then, remained a heterogeneous city despite 
the nationalizing homogenization that aﬀ ected the rest of the country, 
and as a result the Muslims and non-Muslims of Istanbul remember the 
1955 riots as the event that caused rupture in a previous harmony.
While in Istanbul the riots are remembered as an experience of coex-
istence/toleration in which their religious identity made them the sub-
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ject of attack by non-Muslims,5 in Burgaz the resistance against the riots 
is remembered by my Greek, Muslim, German, and Alevi informants as 
a result of conviviality: Burgaz islanders collectively resisted the riots and 
protected their island from being invaded by outsiders. Kestane Karası 
(Aktel 2005) and Son Eylül [Last September] (Aktel 2008), both novel-
istic memoirs of Burgaz conviviality, describe how the islanders (both 
Muslims and non-Muslims) gathered together by ringing the bells of the 
church and made a plan of waiting and protecting the bays in order to 
prevent invasion of Burgaz during the 1955 riots. For instance, Ajda (a 
half Turkish - half Kurdish Sunni woman, who later married a Greek) 
told me that she was around ﬁ fteen years old in 1955 and clearly remem-
bers her father saying, “Unless they kill me and step on my dead body, 
they will not be able to set foot in Burgaz.” Th e shared memories of daily 
life and conviviality as described in Orhan’s vignette had created such a 
strong Burgaz identity that it overcame ethnic and religious identities in 
times of crisis. Th e discursive eﬀ ect of these memories (Bakhtin 1981: 
269) is a type of “Burgaz ideology,” a sense of belonging to Burgaz that is 
also infused with a moral discourse about how a “real” Burgazlı should 
behave, both in everyday life and in times of crisis.
In the early 1960s in Burgaz, people heard on the radio reports of the 
tensions in Cyprus and of Greek Cypriots oppressing Turkish Cypriots. 
Because the 1955 riots were linked to events in Cyprus, this later wave of 
intercommunal violence in this faraway island made the remaining Bur-
gazlı Greeks anxious. And their fear would prove to be justiﬁ ed. Th e ma-
jority of my Burgaz informants, regardless of their ethnicity and religion, 
told me that 1964 was also one of the most important dates they remem-
ber, because that year was the time when their Greek friends with Greek 
citizenship were expelled.6 Th e islanders reminisce that many Greeks of 
Greek citizenship were married to Greeks of Turkish citizenship. Hence, 
not only the Greeks of Greek citizenship left, but their families left as 
well.
I wanted to explore how the remaining Burgaz islanders interpreted 
the departure of their Greek friends. Nuri narrated:
I used to play marbles with my friends [probably in the mid-1960s] and 
realized that my friends were gone. I did not understand why they left, 
as I was a child. I knew that some Greeks never did military service, and 
later, I understood that these Greeks were of Greek citizenship. Some of 
the ones who left were the ones who did not do military service.
Th e 1964 expulsion was a memory of coexistence/toleration for Nuri, 
because prior to that, he did not have in his mind a category for “Greeks 
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with Greek citizenship” and “Greeks with Turkish citizenship.” Nuri re-
alized the ethno-religious and citizenship diﬀ erences of his childhood 
friends at the moment when they left Burgaz. One Greek informant with 
Turkish citizenship (a male aged 65) recalled that when he came back 
from military service in 1971, the island was “empty.” For him, the ex-
istence of Greeks made Burgaz a place with meaning and when many 
Greeks left, Burgaz became empty for him. Th e departure of the Greek 
friends who had to leave because of having Greek citizenship was an 
experienced consequence of coexistence/toleration.
Furthermore, the rise of Islamism and Kurdish nationalism in the 
1980s and the Alevi revival in the 1990s helped to create a new appre-
ciation of political and cultural pluralism (Neyzi 2001: 422; Çolak 2006: 
587). During the years of my ﬁ eldwork (2009–10), the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) introduced “democratization packages” that 
included increased freedom of speech and Kurdish cultural rights in-
tended to meet the Copenhagen criteria for Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union (Baç 2005). In addition, the government initiated a di-
alogue with the Alevis to discuss their demands for political and cul-
tural rights (Soner and Toktaș 2011). During this period, the Kemalist 
homogenizing impulses of early Republican Turkey were subject to new 
historical scrutiny, while varying ethnic and religious groups began to 
revive their identities, demand education in their native languages, and 
in the case of Alevis, the right and space to worship.
In Burgaz, this political context created an atmosphere where Alevis 
started to articulate their memories of coexistence/toleration by ex-
pressing the ways in which Alevis had been oppressed in and assimilated 
into the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.7 Alongside this 
politicization of identity, however, Alevis in Burgaz also recalled both 
bitter and sweet memories of conviviality in Burgaz. Quarrelling, ﬁ ght-
ing and playing marbles with the earlier established settlers in Burgaz 
and feeling sad about the departure of their Greek friends also signify 
their sense of belonging in Burgaz. When, at the end of the interview, 
I asked Nuri what Burgaz meant to him, he said “I was born in Burgaz, 
and I have sixty years of friendship with my oldest friend. You cannot 
ﬁ nd these long friendships in Istanbul or somewhere else for example.” 
In this experience of locality, Burgaz is separate from other places. His 
years in Burgaz and his lifelong friends from there make the island a 
unique place for him. He added:
Th e islanders do not know how to walk on the streets of Istanbul. We 
do not know what traﬃ  c is, here on the island, we walk in the middle 
of the streets. Burgaz is a büyülü [mysterious] place; it has its own way 
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of life. Burgaz means the sea, the seagulls and the pine trees for me. 
Whenever I go outside of Burgaz and I see seagulls and pine trees, it 
reminds me of Burgaz.
Nuri’s comments echo those of Orhan and many other Burgaz islanders 
whom I met and talked with. Th is sense of Burgaz as having a special 
way of life is both what creates the sense of it as a place and also what its 
inhabitants value and attempt to reproduce.
Negotiating Class and Religious Diﬀ erences in Today’s Burgaz
Burgaz is heterogeneous not only in terms of ethnicity and religion, but 
also in terms of class diﬀ erence. Minority religious communities in Tur-
key, as well as in Burgaz, tend to be well educated, and are ﬁ nancially 
comfortable. Th ese minority elites (e.g., Armenian, German, Levantine, 
Greek, and Jewish) and majority elites (Sunni Muslims) usually go to the 
same foreign schools in Istanbul, work in similar sectors, and hence can 
aﬀ ord to pay to eat out or to become members of social clubs. Sharing 
the same class creates similarities in lifestyle. In Bourdieu’s (1990) terms, 
they have the economic and also the cultural capital and share a simi-
lar habitus. Th eir similar lifestyle creates milieux for interactions. Th ey 
spend the weekends at the social clubs mostly swimming, sunbathing, 
playing scrabble or cards. Th ey can aﬀ ord to have most meals at cafes 
and restaurants and do not cook at home, with cleaning done by a maid. 
Most of the old, wooden mansions are owned by these summer resi-
dents. Th ese mansions were designed and built by Armenian and Greek 
architects, mostly at the end of the nineteenth century (Tuğlacı 1992), 
and are spread between the center and the peak of the island.
However, the houses in Turgut Reis, toward the back of the island, are 
concrete constructions, most of them built by the permanent Zaza and 
Kurdish Alevis and Sunni Muslim inhabitants with their own hands. Th e 
waiters, seasonal workers, horse cart drivers, and menial laborers are 
mostly of Kurdish origin from Southeastern Turkey or of Turkic nation-
alities (e.g., Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan). Islanders’ everyday interactions 
across classes, between summer and permanent inhabitants, between 
customers and restaurant and shop owners, form an important part of 
conviviality on the island. My last ethnographic account illustrates cur-
rent practices of conviviality and the ways in which class and religious 
diﬀ erences are negotiated in Burgaz today. It is a story of an Anatolian 
family who moved to Burgaz and became Burgazlı through acquired ap-
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preciation of the cultural diversity that is explicitly valued in the island 
and is what people there consider to be “sociable sociality.”
I met Zümrüt on a winter day in January 2010 at the embroidery class 
taken by the permanent inhabitants, mainly Sunni Turkish and Kurd-
ish Shaﬁ ’i women. While the other women were embroidering ﬂ owers 
and animal patterns on their fabric, Zümrüt wanted to embroider a big 
cross, a symbol of Christianity, and was looking for a cross pattern. I told 
her that I could bring a pattern and asked what she planned to do with it.
 Zümrüt: I want to make a big cross for Niko Ağabey (elder brother). 
He is my boss and he is so nice. If I embroider a big cross on a big piece 
of fabric, he will be very happy and then we can put it in the church.
 Author: I know Niko! He is in charge of Ay Yanni Church, isn’t he? 
And how come he is your boss?
 Zümrüt: I am the verger of the Metamorphosis church on the top of 
the island. Niko Ağabey [whom the reader will know from the previous 
section] is in charge of the bills and formalities of Ay Yanni and Meta-
morphosis churches.
I was struck by the fact that a Sunni Muslim family took care of the 
Greek Orthodox Church and that she called her boss ağabey, and so I 
went to visit Zümrüt Abla, coincidentally on Easter Day 2010. As I was 
thumbing through her poetry book, where she wrote about welcoming 
the spring on top of Burgaz, we heard some people entering the garden. 
A French tourist couple came to visit the church as guests of a Turkish 
and a Greek Burgazlı couple. I found myself in the middle of translat-
ing in Turkish and French the conversations between Zümrüt and the 
couple. Th e French woman asked how and why Zümrüt took this job. 
Zümrüt responded:
When I was young, with my friends, we used to clean the mosque in 
our village in Sivas, in Anatolia. I married my paternal uncle’s son and 
came to Istanbul as a bride in 1987. While working in Istanbul, my hus-
band developed good relationships with the Greeks. Th ese Greeks who 
lived in Istanbul also had houses in Burgaz. When they proposed to us 
the job of taking care of the church, my husband and I accepted. I said: 
“both mosques and churches are the houses of God. Why wouldn’t we 
take care of the church?”
When the French woman heard this, she had tears in her eyes and said, 
“While there are wars between diﬀ erent religions, it is very touching 
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to see a Muslim woman taking care of a Christian church, this is very 
moving and impressive.” When I translated that, Zümrüt did not react 
as if she was doing something spectacular or extraordinary but that was 
a natural act for her.
After regular visits to Zümrüt, I learned more about how she keeps 
the traces of her Anatolian rural life and how much she has learned from 
the Greek community. She climbs up and down Burgaz on her donkey, 
makes mantı (Turkish tortellini), and grows vegetables and herbs in 
her garden as she did in her village. Nonetheless, through interactions 
with Greeks and to do the job properly, Zümrüt and her son picked up 
a few Greek words, which are used in the mass, like ψωμί (bread), κρασί 
(wine), νερό (water). Her little son, aged nine, puts out the candles of the 
church, carries the ritualistic items listed above and holds the big keys 
of the church. Zümrüt knows the important Greek Orthodox religious 
days and the meaning of rituals, and she paints and cleans the church 
and shows it to visitors. While Niko was telling me the story of the de-
parture of some Greeks, he added, “Today Greeks do not want to work 
as a verger. Th ere are not many Greeks left to take care of the church, 
and those who stayed are all educated, with good jobs, and do not want 
to do this job.” Th is sentence shows a signiﬁ cant class diﬀ erence and also 
economic mutual dependency between the Greeks and the Muslims.
In Niko and Zümrüt’s case, class diﬀ erence and mutual dependency 
played a positive role in the ways in which they embraced their religious 
diﬀ erences. Zümrüt and her husband accepted the job out of necessity. 
As they took care of the church, they were given free accommodation 
and salary. If Zümrüt and her husband had been religiously conserva-
tive or prejudiced, they could have simply refused to work under the 
authority of a Christian and taken jobs similar to those of other Muslims 
in the island. On the contrary, Zümrüt and her husband greatly respect 
Niko, their boss whom they address with a kinship term “elder brother.” 
Zümrüt does not only do the basic duties of a verger, she looks after 
the church as if it were her own house, through cleaning the crystals of 
the church lantern one by one. She even embroidered a large cross on 
a piece of cloth that would be put on the alter table of the church, as a 
present to Niko Ağabey. To show their appreciation, the Greek com-
munity held Zümrüt’s son’s circumcision ceremony in the garden of Ay 
Yanni Church: a Muslim ritual took place in a Christian religious setting.
Even though the Muslim family took the job of a verger out of neces-
sity, then, the relationship between Zümrüt and Niko goes beyond an 
employee/employer relationship. Th is is again an example of conviviality, 
where we see that Niko is not a “Greek” in Zümrüt’s mind, but an “elder 
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brother.” Zümrüt, in return, is not “just a verger” or “Muslim” to Niko 
and the Greek community. Th ey work together, they exchange gifts, and 
they make Burgaz a place where they can easily practice their religious 
rituals. Th e relationship between Zümrüt and Niko is not an exception. 
Th e boundaries of client/customer and employer/employee blur quite 
often and become that of friendship among café and restaurant owners 
or waiters and their regulars; grocery store owners and their clients; and 
Burgazlı people from diﬀ erent class, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.
Conclusion
Th is chapter argued that in the Turkish context, where the main word for 
living with diﬀ erence is “toleration,” “coexistence” represents a compart-
mentalization of the community into fragmented ethnic and religious 
groups who have to live together and share space. Th is sense of coexis-
tence/toleration was contrasted with shared ways of living and a sense 
of belonging to a place through the prism of conviviality. I described the 
homogenization of nation-building and crystallization of ethnic and re-
ligious identities as a logical consequence of coexistence/toleration. De-
spite the negative connotations of hoşgörü (tolerance), however, a new 
discourse of human rights attached to minority groups has also resulted 
in a politics of diﬀ erence that mobilized Alevis to ask for recognition. My 
approach to “conviviality,” on the other hand, highlighted the cohesions 
and tensions that emerge from shared lifestyles and class diﬀ erence, and 
how these tensions are managed in daily life and create a sense of place 
and belonging. I suggested that a more careful ethnographic analysis of 
speciﬁ c locations in the post-Ottoman space may direct us beyond the 
coexistence/toleration paradigm to see the ways in which conviviality, or 
common ways of living, may lead to a conscious valuing of the sociable 
sociality of plural lives.
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Notes
 1. In that sense, Freitag’s take on conviviality is similar to Werbner’s (2008) 
working class cosmopolitanism and Diouf ’s (2000) vernacular cosmopoli-
tanism, in the ways in which they criticize Hannerz’s (1990) elitist view of 
cosmopolitanism.
 2. See Passerini (1987) and (1992), where she analyzes memories of the work-
ing class in Turin under a totalitarian regime.
 3. During the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the “minoritization” 
process (Cowan 2001), the concepts of minority and majority came into the 
Balkan nations’ state system. Cowan (2001:156) points out, “A minority is 
better understood as a product of particular ideological, social, political and 
economic processes, rather than a clear-cut component of a pre-existing 
multiplicity. In most cases, minorities are formulated at the moment of 
state formulation.”
 4. Th e CHP (Republican People’s Party) government of İsmet İnönü passed 
the Varlık Vergisi (Wealth Tax) law in 1942 and explained that Varlık Ver-
gisi aimed to redistribute the capital that was unequally and unfairly dis-
tributed during World War II (Ökte 1951: 15, cited in Güven 2006: 135; 
Kuyucu 2005: 370). Dönmes (non-Muslims, mostly Jews, who had con-
verted to Islam) were supposed to pay double and non-Muslims had to pay 
ten times more (Güven 2006: 139, 141).
 5. Th ere has been a recent proliferation of writing and representation of the 
events. See especially the documentary ﬁ lms, Unutulmayan iki gün 6–7 
Eylül [An unforgettable two days, 6–7 September] (2007) and 6–7 Eylül 
Belgeseli [Th e 6–7 September documentary], as well as Aktel (2008), Güven 
(2006), Kuyucu (2005), and Mills (2010).
 6. Th e Greeks of Turkey with Greek citizenship were blamed for helping the 
Greek Cypriots economically (Akgönül 2007: 267) and also accused of 
being on the Greek side (Akgönül 2007: 252). In March 1964, the Inonu 
government decided to expel the Greeks with Greek citizenship (Akgönül 
2007: 257, 409). Th e Turkish government did not renew the Seyrisefain 
pact, which was signed between Turkey and Greece in 1930, and which gave 
residence and free movement to Greek citizens in Turkey (Akgönül 2007: 
86–87). With this pact, the Greeks who had migrated to Greece during the 
population exchange, and who had become Greek citizens were allowed to 
settle back and work in Turkey (Akgönül 2007: 87). Hence, work permits, 
freedom of movement and residence of Greeks with Greek citizenship were 
cancelled. Furthermore, this expulsion would make the Greeks of Greek 
citizenship lose their jobs thus enabling the Turks to take their places (Ak-
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gönül 2007: 261, 265). Th is would also “solve” the unemployment problems 
of the immigrants from the Anatolian villages to cities (Akgönül 2007: 265). 
 7. See Neyzi (2004) and Shankland (1999) for Alevi memories of the 1938 
rebellion in Dersim and the massacres in Çorum, Kahramanmaraş, and 
Sivas/Madımak. 
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Negotiating Coexistence
SOSSIE KASBARIAN
Dismantling Nationalist Narratives, Critiquing the Nation
With the prospect of membership into the European Union (EU) in 
sight, Turkey has been undergoing a tortuous democratization since the 
early 2000s. A question at the heart of this process is whether it can deal 
with its internal diversity, reconcile historical tensions, and heal deep 
wounds.1 Th is involves the rethinking of fundamental concepts like na-
tionhood and belonging, citizenship and rights, and relations between 
state, authority and religion. Th is chapter looks at everyday personal and 
social negotiations in being Armenian in Istanbul and the struggle to 
claim a coexistent Armenian space within the Turkish nation.2
One founding myth of the Turkish Republic established in 1923 is 
the ethnic purity of the nation, rendering the very existence of Others 
and Other narratives problematic from the outset. Unlike the Ottoman 
identity, the new republic privileged ethnicity over religion, a particu-
larly diﬃ  cult condition for the non-Muslim, non-Turkish communities. 
From the turn of the century onward Ottoman leaders and Young Turks 
pursued an agenda that relentlessly aimed to decrease the number of 
non-Muslims living within the new borders of the emerging nation. Mus-
tafa Kemal and his followers introduced policies and programs designed 
to aggressively homogenize Turkish society and to create a new national 
identity that excluded Others. A nationalist historiography rooted in the 
famous three-day speech given by Kemal in 1927 at the Second Congress 
of the Republican People’s Party “articulated and narrated the excluded 
minorities as the vanquished, and then proceeded to attribute to them 
the exactly opposite characteristics: the excluded were stripped of most 
of their agency, and the very little they were permitted to exercise was 
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of course depicted within parameters deﬁ ned by the triumphant group, 
thereby appearing totally subversive and immoral” (Göçek 2006, 2013: 
89). Th e emerging nation and new state were “constructed through a 
narrative that denied, forgot and silenced minorities” (Mills 2008: 386). 
Göçek’s analysis links the “hegemony of Turkish nationalism” and 
“the hegemony of 1915” in constructing a prevailing master-narrative 
whereby Armenians (and other non-Muslim minorities) were depicted 
as untrustworthy and inferior, and ultimately ungrateful and treacher-
ous to Ottoman/Turkish benevolence and tolerance.
Although there was considerable continuity between Ottoman and 
Turkish institutions, there was a concerted policy of “engineering obliv-
ion” that cut oﬀ  the Republic from its past and in particular from its 
non-Muslim and non-Turkish peoples and their histories (Kadıoğlu 2007: 
289). Kadıoğlu singles out education as the “vehicle for the reproduction 
of oblivion in Turkey” making contemporary Turks “ignorant about the 
multi-religious and multi-ethnic history of the lands that they inhabit … 
paving the way to an oﬃ  cial rhetoric of denial” (Ibid). Hence, the very 
concept of the coexistence of Others and their respective experiences, 
their non-Turkish, non-Muslim identities, were wiped out in the foun-
dation of the Turkish state and their continuing existence problematic.
In 1913 one in every ﬁ ve people in (what became) Turkish lands was 
a non-Muslim. At the end of 1923 that number was one in forty (Key-
der 1989: 67). Despite the constitution of 1924 stating that being a Turk 
is self-ascriptive, in practice non-Muslim minority groups have always 
been considered Others. Th e Turkiﬁ cation policies in operation rein-
forced the dominance of Sunni Islam and Turkishness in every aspect of 
life. Today the non-Muslim minority groups constitute less than 1 per-
cent of the population of Turkey. Of these, the Armenian Orthodox are 
estimated to comprise around 65,0003 (US State Department 2010).4 Th e 
Turkish state distinguishes between two types of minorities. Th e ﬁ rst are 
the three oﬃ  cially recognized non-Muslim minorities (the Armenian 
Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, and the Jews) as protected by the Treaty 
of Lausanne (1923). Th e second category covers religious communities 
that are not linked to a particular ethnic group (e.g., the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses and the Baha’is.) All Muslim minorities (Kurds, Alevis, Circas-
sians, etc.) were deemed to belong to the Turkish nation at the time of 
the foundation of the Republic. Despite the fact that minorities were 
legal citizens, in practice citizenship became an instrument of forced as-
similation to a Turkish national identity rather than a guaranteed set of 
rights. In discussing the concept of minority in the Turkish context, Ak-
gönül (2013: 77) says, “[N]on-Muslims were meant to be exterminated, 
not assimilated, during the eﬀ orts to build a homogeneous nation. As 
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in all nation-building processes, the utopia of a homogenous nation in 
Turkey based itself on three principal mechanisms: extermination, as-
similation and folklorization.” Th e remnant non-Muslims, were either 
made invisible, forced to ﬂ ee, or “ornamentalized.”
Kemalist secularist principles that founded the state, meant that 
religion, in particular non-Muslim religions, have not been practiced 
freely. Religious identity and the practice of religion remains an area 
fraught with constant negotiation in modern Turkey, caught between 
the forces of conservative Islamism (as represented by the ruling AKP) 
and a strict Kemalist secularism (represented by the Republican People’s 
Party, CHP). Th e Treaty of Lausanne stipulated equal treatment under 
the law, and rights and privileges to be given to religious minorities, in-
cluding the right to maintain their own schools, churches, foundations 
and other institutions, which enabled them to maintain their ethnic, re-
ligious, and cultural identity, at least in theory.5 In practice all of these 
institutions face fundamental problems due to this relationship with 
the state. Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, there have been 
strict restrictions on religious minorities owning, maintaining, or trans-
ferring their property (individual and communal), as well as restrictions 
in the training of teachers and clergy of the minority. In fact successive 
Turkish governments have systematically conﬁ scated properties from 
religious minorities since the foundation of the republic, most notably 
in 1936 with the Foundations Law, in 1971 with the Private University 
Law, and in 1974 when a law recognized only the ownership of religious 
community properties registered in 1936.
According to the national census of 1927, Turkish was not the native 
language of around 28 percent of the city’s population. Out of 794,000 
people in the city, 92,000 spoke Greek, 45,000 spoke Armenian, 39,000 
spoke Ladino, 6,000 spoke French, and 6,000 spoke Albanian. Th e re-
maining 31,300 spoke a mix of other languages, including Arabic, 
Kurdish, Persian, Circassian, and Bulgarian (Aslan 2007). After the Re-
publican period, there continued an assault by assimilationist and exclu-
sionary policies and practices, designed to eradicate these diﬀ erences. 
Th e “Citizen Speak Turkish” campaign initiated in 1928 (but with lasting 
impact) made the speaking of minority languages in public an oﬀ ence,6 
enforcing Turkiﬁ cation in the public sphere. Many of my interviewees 
spoke of childhoods fearful of inadvertently speaking to their parents in 
Armenian when out in public, creating another layer of personal trauma 
and insecurity in the shared urban space. Th e Law of Settlement in 1934, 
which aimed to assimilate Balkan Muslims and Kurds by settling them in 
areas populated with Turkish speakers, also banned those whose mother 
tongue was not Turkish from establishing towns and villages. Th e state 
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changed the names of cities, towns, and villages into Turkish. Th e Law 
of Surnames of 1934 forced all citizens to take Turkish surnames (Aslan 
2007). Th ere continued state policies designed to make life for the mi-
norities uncomfortable and in some cases to threaten their existence, 
including the Wealth Tax in 1942 (which disproportionally aﬀ ected 
non-Muslim minorities), and the Istanbul pogrom of 6–7 September 
1955, when gangs organized by state institutions attacked minority 
businesses, homes and churches. During the Cyprus crisis in 1963–64, 
minorities were forced to ﬂ ee Turkey, and limited to taking only $100 
with them. Th ese policies together reveal a state intent on eradicating or 
subjugating its non-Muslim minorities. Göçek (2006, 2013: 102) stresses 
the historical continuities of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish re-
public in “state-sponsored prejudice and violence against minorities in 
the name of nationalism.”7
Furthermore, the conceptualization of non-Muslim minorities in 
modern Turkey is directly linked to how the Ottoman Empire and its 
legacies are approached in popular and political discourse. Th ere are 
two broad, seemingly contradictory, myths at play when one looks at the 
discourse surrounding the change from an Ottoman to a Turkish state. 
Th e ﬁ rst is the reigning nationalist discourse that presents Turkey as a 
homogenous state of ethnic Turks and Muslims. In this exclusionary 
discourse, all Others are deemed foreigners, and should they not prove 
docile and compliant, they are seen as threats to the integrity and coher-
ence of the Turkish state.
Th e second is a nostalgia for a cosmopolitan empire, with Istanbul the 
city of cities at its center, viewed with a romantic and sentimental wist-
fulness for a mythical period when people of diﬀ erent ethnicities, reli-
gions, languages, classes, and backgrounds lived side by side, in what the 
late Tony Judt (2010: 206) has called “lost cosmopolitan cities.” In recent 
years this celebratory nostalgia for an apparently peaceful and idealistic 
past has been expounded by both Turkish and non-Turkish writers and 
scholars, with little critical reﬂ ection, nor adequate engagement with 
historical data. In Turkey, this extended to musings about the multicul-
tural past inhabitants of Istanbul, of which there are tiny communities 
left over. In some cases this “boutique multiculturalism”8 led to “white 
Turks” (middle class, secular, Kemalist, Sunni, urban, liberal) attending 
Christmas services in churches in Istanbul, as part of a self-consciously 
constructed Europeanness. Th is nostalgia tends to gloss over the struc-
tural and everyday discrimination minorities experienced under the 
Ottoman regime, and it infantilizes and fossilizes the remaining com-
munities as a historical relic. As Bryant argues in the introduction to 
this volume (p. 6) “current popular nostalgia for a multicultural past may 
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mask denial of the ways in which that multiculturalism was destroyed,” 
and it certainly ignores the intrinsic violence of imperialism and the 
power asymmetries contained within. Mills, Reilly, and Philliou (2011: 
135) talk about the paradoxical way that the Ottoman past is viewed in 
scholarship, through “the lens of nostalgia,” but also as a “time of back-
wardness and decline leaving a dolorous legacy that must be undone and 
overcome.” Th is paradox can be extended to the Christian minorities, 
the “physical and social remnants of the past” in modern Turkey as being 
“both ubiquitous and unacknowledged, both remembered nostalgically 
and rejected ideologically” (Ibid.).
Cosmopolitan nostalgia has been very limited in terms of political 
potential to open up Turkish notions of citizenship, identity, and belong-
ing. Th is trend among Turks who are unsympathetic to the ruling AKP 
is partly a response to their perceptions that the party has an Islamist 
agenda that seeks to dismantle the laicist foundations of the Kemalist 
state. “White Turks,” according to Akgönül (2013: 90) ﬁ nd themselves 
confronting “a new type of otherness, the ‘Islamist’ movement—with 
the headscarf as an icon—on one side and the Kurdish presence associ-
ated with violence, on the other,” resulting in nostalgia for the “former 
others” along with “a ﬁ rm belief that Istanbul was more cosmopolitan, 
‘civilized’ and ‘habitable’ before the non-Muslims were deported or 
forced to ﬂ ee.”
Central to the Ottoman nostalgia is “tolerance as a political discourse” 
and the vision of a pluralist empire with Istanbul as its cosmopolitan 
center. Th is tolerance is often presented as a critique of an intolerant 
present (reﬂ ected in the intolerance each Turkish faction has for the oth-
ers). Implicit in the tolerance discourse is the existence of the dominant 
majority that is doing the “tolerating” and therefore an intrinsic disap-
proval at the core for the “tolerated” (Mills 2011). As Bryant discusses 
in the introduction to this volume (p. 12) “toleration implies living with 
or tolerating beliefs of practices that one ﬁ nds wrong or disagreeable 
for social, economic, or political reasons” and “tolerance assumes that 
diﬀ erence is perceived negatively.” She contrasts the ideological position 
of “tolerance” to quotidian realities and negotiations encapsulated in 
“coexistence,” the day to day living together that “attempts to interrogate 
understandings of diﬀ erence and boundaries including indiﬀ erence to 
diﬀ erence,” where there are “rituals of accommodation that simultane-
ously deﬁ ne(d) and cross(ed) boundaries.”
All nation-states are built on forgetting and remembering selectively. 
In the Turkish case the persistent denial of the harsh realities of the Ot-
toman past in relation to the minorities still within constitutes the very 
foundation of the nationalist state and is constantly reproduced in the 
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hegemonic narrative. Central to this hegemony is the complete silencing 
of the voice of these minorities, where counter-narratives are regarded 
as threats to the nation. Historically the coexistence of diﬀ erent nar-
ratives has not been tolerated, and regardless of the apparent democ-
ratization and liberalization policies since 2000 they are interpreted as 
developments that need to be suppressed, and opposed. Despite this, 
recent oral history projects have unearthed a hesitant emerging space 
for counter-memories and counter-narratives (Mills 2008; Üngör 2014). 
Mills (2010: 211) remarks, “Th e price of belonging in Turkey comes at a 
cost—the forgetting of particular histories at the expense of the frequent 
retelling of others and the silencing of particular memories that cannot 
entirely be repressed.” In the Armenian case, the specter of the genocide 
of 1915 and being considered ﬁ fth columns in the state of the perpe-
trators led to a particularly alienated position. As one recent analysis 
has poetically put it, it has led to “one hundred years of abandonment,” 
alongside “a clear disengagement from a quest of justice for themselves, 
but also a clear—albeit forced—disengagement from their relatives in 
the diaspora. … Th e never-spoken cost for Istanbul Armenians was the 
complete negation of their political identity and history” (Erbal and 
Suciyan 2011). Suciyan (2012), drawing on Hannah Arendt’s study of 
being a Jew in Europe in the nineteenth century, talks of the pressure 
on Armenians in Turkey “to assimilate into anti-Armenian campaigns, 
which also entails hatred against and dehumanization of the Armenian 
diaspora. … In this way, you are expected to become an enemy of your 
own past, of your own biography, and reject your own present.” One 
recent example of this, in April 2014, was the apparent wish of Turkey’s 
Armenians to nominate PM Erdoğan for the Nobel Peace Prize.9 Th is 
demonstrates the utter subjugation of this community, who (outwardly 
at least) were grateful and impressed by Erdoğan’s acknowledgment 
of the deaths of Armenians during the end days of the Ottoman Em-
pire,10 in a statement11 that Öktem has called a “perfect example of de-
nialist-lite,”12 much to the dismay and shock of the Armenian diaspora. 
Suciyan posits that a rejection or surrendering of the Armenian past and 
indeed the present in Turkey is the “only way oﬀ ered to survive in a state 
of denial.” Th e charge is that “coexistence” in the Turkish state for Arme-
nians has necessitated the usurping of one’s identity and an alienation 
of the self, leading to a chastened and insecure existence. Th e Istanbul 
Armenians are in the unique position of being the physical embodiment 
of a highly politicized wound in the nationalist narrative—physical re-
minders of the genocidal past but also the remnants of centuries of Ot-
toman Armenian lives and contributions to the nation, both of which 
the Turkish state denies, erases, or belittles.
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Signs of Change: Post-2005
While there have been ground-breaking works in scholarship on the 
tragic fate of the Ottoman Armenians in recent years,13 it is the emer-
gence of pioneering Turkish academics engaging with these issues in a 
critical manner that has had the most impact in Turkey itself.14 In late 
2008 a controversial “apology campaign” initiated by four Turkish intel-
lectuals was circulated, gathering over 30,000 signatures of Turks and 
Kurds “apologizing” for the events of 1915.15 Th e works of novelists like 
Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk and Elif Shafak have also had widespread 
international impact, although both, along with other public intellectu-
als and journalists, have been chastened by the threats from the state, 
under Article 301 of the Turkish penal code that makes it a crime to 
“insult the Turkish nation.”
If one were to pinpoint a date for the “opening” of a public debate on 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, it would be 2005, when the nine-
tieth anniversary of the genocide sparked a new eﬀ ort by a few Turk-
ish intellectuals to confront the oﬃ  cial denialist line by focusing on the 
human story. Th e ground-breaking conference, “Ottoman Armenians 
during the Demise of the Empire: Responsible Scholarship and Issues of 
Democracy,” in September of that year marked a turning point in public 
discourse in terms of what was possible to discuss and the terms of that 
debate. Th e conference was referred to as the Genocide Conference in 
the mainstream media, and there was pressure to cancel it from politi-
cians and oﬃ  cials, leading the venue to be changed several times and 
some ugly scenes at Bilgi University, where it was eventually held. Th ose 
present, upon returning to their home institutions, continued working 
in this ﬁ eld, creating, claiming, and shaping a new space and discourse 
that transgressed the hegemonic operative of genocide recognition and 
denial (Kasbarian and Öktem 2014).
Arguably the most inﬂ uential vehicle for a change in social attitudes 
in Turkey was My Grandmother (Çetin 2004, 2008), a biographical story 
written by the human rights lawyer Fethiye Çetin about her grand-
mother, who revealed near her death that she had in fact been born Ar-
menian and had survived the genocide by being taken in by a Turkish 
family. Th e incredible impact of this modest book lies in its poignant 
human story. Columnist Tuba Akyol in her review of the book stated, 
“stories can do what large numbers or concepts cannot do. … Concepts 
are cold, stories can touch you inside” (Akyol 2005). Ayşe Gül Altınay 
has written of the success of My Grandmother in employing “Arendtian 
storytelling to open up a creative space for historical critique and rec-
onciliation” (2006: 127), by evoking curiosity about one’s ancestry, de-
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constructing the nationalist homogenous nation, thereby allowing for 
a construction of a hybrid Self. She describes the momentum the book 
has created as a completely unexpected “phenomenon,” with Çetin tour-
ing throughout Turkey and internationally, being treated as a “celebrity” 
by both Turks and Armenians16 (and others) who are touched by this 
powerful personal story in surprising ways. Çetin herself talks about the 
shocking discovery of her Armenian roots as suddenly seeing “the world 
through diﬀ erent eyes” (quoted in Bilefsky 2012).
Th is development in particular, tapping into the critical studies and 
gender studies space, introduces a radical new space for empathy, the 
exploration of personal and historical memories and sharing of personal 
stories. It is both subtle and powerful, as it is not taken seriously in the 
realm of high politics and yet has a real impact on people’s attitudes. 
Th is approach is a serious challenge as it is an entirely diﬀ erent kind 
of discourse to which nationalists cannot respond—thereby acting as a 
transgressive undermining of the state discourse.
Th ese tentative surfacings of hidden or silenced histories and iden-
tities have led to a wave of Turkish citizens discovering and uncover-
ing their Armenian (and other non-Turkish) roots and working through 
their family histories. Some Armenian orphans of the genocide and later 
massacres were taken in by local Muslim families, who changed their 
names and converted the children to Islam. Th e Dersim Armenians are 
one such case of a group reclaiming their Armenian identity and some 
now choosing to get baptized. Th ey have even formed a union to teach 
Armenian and restore graves and churches in the Tunceli province.17 
Th ere has emerged a distinct phenomenon of the “Islamized (or Muslim) 
Armenians,” a subject explored in a trail-blazing conference at Boğaziçi 
University in November 2013.18 Islamized Armenians as a concept are a 
huge challenge for the Turkish (almost exclusively Muslim) state, which 
has to confront the previously silenced, growing numbers of citizens 
rediscovering and claiming Armenian roots. Th ere has simultaneously 
also been a new awareness of the mongrel roots of most Turkish citizens, 
something that contradicts and challenges Kemalist principles and the 
state’s oﬃ  cial nationalist discourse. Th is process of discovery for some 
has led to a personal crisis; for others it has been a chance to question the 
exclusionary racist tenets of Turkish nationalism from a personal posi-
tion. Nükhet Kardam, writing in Today’s Zaman, expressed this lyrically:
Once I dug into my family history, I found forgotten, hidden and sup-
pressed identities. My grandmother’s father is a “Rum,” the descendent 
of a Byzantine “Tekfur” who fought alongside the Ottomans and later 
converted to Islam. My grandmother’s mother is the grandchild of the 
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revered Kurdish leader Mir Bedirhan who ruled a large semi-autono-
mous Kurdish territory in the Ottoman Empire. My great uncle’s wife 
is Greek but had to change her name and religion in order to marry 
the love of her life. My family adopted a girl and included her in our 
family registry. She was born in 1910, in Erzincan in Eastern Turkey. 
She could very well be Armenian, as many Armenian children were 
saved and adopted by Turkish families during that time. I now look 
at Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds with a very diﬀ erent eye, now that 
I know I belong to each one in some way. I then began to ask myself 
many questions about who really is a Turk. (Kardam 2011)
Th is intertwining of the historical, the political, and the intimate oﬀ ers 
a radical new space for exploration, expression, and political action. 
Whereas high politics has a distancing quality and can be ignored by 
(the increasing number of ) disenfranchised and disinterested popula-
tions, politics as embodied in the personal speaks to our common hu-
manity and revives interest from a human position.
Th ese developments have led to the inevitable nationalist backlash. 
Th e most signiﬁ cant event was the gunning down of the prominent Is-
tanbul Armenian and newspaper editor, Hrant Dink, outside the oﬃ  ces 
of Agos19 in central Istanbul on 19 January 2007. His murder and his 
funeral march when hundreds of thousands took to the streets bearing 
the signs “We are all Armenians; we are all Hrant Dink” marked a turn-
ing point for Istanbul Armenians, and arguably for Turkish society as a 
whole. Th is great show of solidarity with the Armenians of Turkey was 
highly symbolic and perhaps the most public display of the possibility of 
an emerging shared post-nationalist common identity in Turkey (despite 
immediate nationalist backlashes). Th is unprecedented development 
also exposed the polarized attitudes around “the Armenian issue,” and 
forced the idea of “Turkishness” forward for public debate and reﬂ ection 
(Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 2013: 675).
Th e loss of the most noted Armenian public intellectual in Turkey 
was an unmitigated calamity for the community. One Turkish activist 
said to me, “the Armenian community has lost its voice,” and yet his 
death has given an impetus to many others. Dink’s murder brought the 
plight of the Istanbul Armenians to the forefront, and opened up the pa-
rameters of what it was possible to discuss. Th e same activist explained, 
“What has changed is that people can now talk freely about the geno-
cide, it seeped into people’s discourse and conversation more. People 
also started talking about their own families and the past.”20
Within the Armenian community Hrant Dink’s murder resulted in 
two apparently contradictory trends: on the one hand there is greater 
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fear and retreat by some elements of the Armenian community; and on 
the other, especially among the younger generation, an increased bold-
ness in remembering and claiming their identity and making demands. 
With regard to the former tendency, I heard several stories of Armenian 
families buying property in Armenia or getting visas for the West in case 
they had to make a quick escape. For the latter group, the assassination 
was a wake-up call to ﬁ ght for the rights and freedoms that Dink had 
dedicated his life to, to retrieve their lost and silenced voices and iden-
tities.21 Th e murder has also made the local and transnational network 
of Turkish, Armenian, and other activists working in this new, emerging 
shared space, closer, more coherent, and more conﬁ dent (Kasbarian and 
Öktem 2014).
Th e perpetrators of Dink’s murder have not been brought to justice, 
and the protracted legal process has been farcical. Murders of religious 
minorities have continued steadily with few repercussions, giving the 
impression that the infamous deep state tolerates this.22 Turkey is con-
sidered a “country of particular concern” by the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom.23 Most recently, an Armenian soldier 
was shot dead under suspicious circumstances while performing his 
national service, on 24 April (the day the genocide is commemorated) 
2011. His murder was whitewashed by a military court in Diyarbakır in 
March 2013.24
And yet there does seem to be a creeping sense of realization that 
despite the nationalist backlashes, and denialist strongholds in state in-
stitutions, developments in the liberal public sphere have radical long-
term potential. Nonetheless, there is no real change at the oﬃ  cial level, 
nor is there a mellowing in the militancy of nationalists, and arguably 
among wider Turkish society, where negative portrayals of, and attitudes 
toward, Armenians are the norm.25
Istanbul as Hub and Synergy
Istanbul acts as a hub for the launch of new Armenian-Turkish initia-
tives and the creation of a new space and discourse. While not the focus 
of this chapter, it is important to recognize that Istanbul also acts as a 
site for reconciliation initiatives, often ﬁ nanced or led by non-Turkish or 
Armenian groups, mediators, and international organizations.26 In this 
process the Istanbul Armenians have a potentially unique pivotal role 
to play, and yet they rarely seem to be at the forefront of such projects, 
lacking the agency to take on a leadership or public role.
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Osman Kavala, Chairman of the Board of Anadolu Kültür,27 a prom-
inent NGO working in art and culture, talked about a three-pronged 
approach—local community, diaspora, and the Republic of Armenia. He 
stressed the importance of the city as the site where all these factions 
can meet: “Istanbul is really a cosmopolitan place and the infrastructure 
allows us to work well with others here—NGOs, academics, artists. … 
Istanbul is a natural place for such meetings, making for a kind of syn-
ergy.”28 Kavala prefers to limit his remit to the civil society sector, though 
getting involved with the state is sometimes unavoidable, as in the case 
of Anadolu Kültür’s project in Ani to restore churches. Being located 
in Istanbul has meant that these initiatives are able to attract external 
funding from a wide range of sources invested in these ﬁ elds. Kavala 
is realistic about the impact of exhibitions and programs in Istanbul, 
saying that the audience is usually limited to a progressive elite who are 
already receptive to these ideas, but at least these projects document 
and publicize the historic and contemporary presence of minorities.
Th ere is also a recent trend to explore or rediscover the multi-eth-
nic past (inhabitants) of Turkey through artistic projects. Many of these 
projects also travel to other countries, facilitated and supported by dias-
pora groups and institutions, an intrinsic part of the burgeoning trans-
national network of Turks, Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, Cypriots, and 
others committed to constructing an emerging shared space. One prom-
inent exhibition was My Dear Brother: Armenians in Turkey 100 Years 
Ago, a collection of eight hundred postcards depicting Armenian life in 
Anatolia at the turn of the century. Th e exhibition opened at the Karşı 
Gallery in Istanbul in January 2005 and travelled to several cities, in-
cluding London, where it attracted great attention at the Brunei Gallery 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies for nearly three months.29 
Th e exhibition of both enlarged images and original postcards was con-
ceived and put together by Osman Köker. A few initiatives showcasing 
the minorities came through the Istanbul 2010 European City of Cul-
ture program, including the book Classical Ottoman Music and Arme-
nians by Istanbul-born French Armenian Aram Kerovpyan (2010). Most 
important in articulating the position of Armenians in Turkey (amid a 
wider remit of democracy-building and human rights issues in Turkey 
and beyond) is the Hrant Dink Foundation,30 established after the assas-
sination of the most prominent Istanbul Armenian.
While Istanbul is the natural hub for meetings, negotiations, and plans, 
many of the actual projects also concern the historic Armenian lands in 
the east. Th e retrieving and piecing together of past Armenian life might 
emanate from Istanbul where the residual community survives, but it 
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also connects to their historical spaces in Anatolia in particular. One 
notable recent development concerned the tenth-century Cathedral 
Church of the Holy Cross, on Aktamar Island on Lake Van. Between 
May 2005 and October 2006, the church underwent a controversial res-
toration program ﬁ nanced by the Turkish Ministry of Culture. It oﬃ  -
cially re-opened as a museum on 29 March 2007 in a ceremony attended 
by the Turkish Minister of Culture, government oﬃ  cials, ambassadors 
of several countries, the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul Mesrob II, a 
delegation from Armenia, and international journalists. Th e Governor 
of Van described the refurbishing of the church as “a show of Turkey’s 
respect for history and culture,” and yet the fact that it was turned into 
a museum rather than re-opened as a place of worship, that permission 
to remount the cross on top of the church was not given, that the oﬃ  cial 
name of the museum was changed to Turkish, and very sparse reference 
was made to anything Armenian, led many others to criticize the move 
as a public relations stunt.31
In September 2011, for the ﬁ rst time in a century or so, a church ser-
vice was permitted to take place in Aktamar, with worshippers coming 
from Armenia, Istanbul, and a smattering from the diaspora. Th e now 
annual service was controversial, with many in the diaspora interpreting 
it as a shallow gesture. Yet for others, like the British Armenian historian 
Ara Saraﬁ an, it is a meaningful and unprecedented ﬁ rst step upon which 
to build.32 Saraﬁ an was at the helm of the publication of Aghtamar: A 
Jewel of Medieval Armenian Architecture, a bilingual Turkish and En-
glish book launched in Van and Istanbul in September 2010,33 where it 
attracted much discussion. Th ese developments require a radical shift in 
mindset on the part of diasporans to comprehend the changing political 
landscape of Turkey, and also to capitalize on it, something that only 
small sections of the diaspora have thus far been able to do whole-heart-
edly. In general there is a cautious attitude to “wait and see” how things 
will actually pan out.
Th e current big project concerns the sixteenth-century Armenian 
Apostolic Cathedral Sourp (Saint) Giragos in Diyarbakır, the biggest Ar-
menian church in the Middle East with a capacity of three thousand, 
which has lain in ruin for decades. Abdullah Demirtaş, Diyarbakır Sur’s 
district mayor, seems sincerely committed to the principle of multicul-
turalism, through the resurrection of the diﬀ erent languages, places 
of worship and cultures of the city.34 Th is renovation has been mostly 
ﬁ nanced by the Armenian diaspora, through the initiatives of Vartkes 
Ergün Ayık, a businessman of Armenian origin from Diyarbakır, and 
Raﬃ   Bedrosyan, an Istanbul Armenian now living in Canada. Bedrosyan 
explains, “Th e church, when reconstruction is completed, will become 
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a historic destination of pilgrimage for all Armenians—a memorial and 
reminder of the past Armenian presence in Anatolia, and a hope for 
the future.”35 At the heart of this project (and others like it) seems to 
be the need to validate (and consecrate) the past coexistence of Arme-
nians alongside Turks, Kurds, Greeks, and others in Anatolian lands, 
rather than a realistic possibility of future such coexistence. It is import-
ant to recognize that in the wider Armenian-Turkish terrain, the strug-
gle for negotiating coexistence is premised upon the perceived need to 
“prove” and document past coexistence, and the past lives of Armenians 
in these, their historic homelands. Th e fact that these past inhabitants 
were forcefully expelled or annihilated makes this an extremely charged 
and complex mission. It is understandable then that this project is best 
undertaken by Western diasporans who are relatively exempt from the 
powers and tentacles of the Turkish state, as opposed to Turkish Ar-
menians who live with the possibility of being charged with “insulting 
Turkishness” or Islam.36
By using private funds, the church can be used as a consecrated house 
of worship, rather than a state-controlled museum like the Aktamar 
Church in Van, where only one annual religious ceremony is permitted. 
Although there is no Armenian community in Diyarbakır, a priest has 
been named by the Patriarchate to conduct occasional services for visi-
tors. At the conclusion of the inaugural mass, Diyarbakır Mayor Osman 
Baydemir movingly addressed the congregation, in Armenian, and then 
Kurdish, Turkish, English, and Arabic: “Welcome to your home. You are 
not guests here; this is your home. … We all know about past events,” he 
said, referring to the genocide, “and our wish is that our children will 
celebrate together the coming achievements.” Th e Sourp Giragos project 
has also been controversial among some diasporans and locals, with the 
charge that it is supporting Turkish and Kurdish interests and is unnec-
essary as there are no Armenians left in the region.
In Istanbul I spent some time with a visiting group of diasporan 
Armenians who visited the Sourp Giragos Cathedral along with some 
Istanbul Armenians who helped facilitate the trip. Despite it being 
deemed a good thing, the renovation was criticized by several of them 
in that it (paraphrased) “is essentially like being given permission by the 
people who stole your house to renovate it and pay to visit it now and 
again while it continues to be in their possession.”37 Beyond the senti-
mentalism of visiting “the old country” that was very much embraced 
by this group, this renovation was criticized, especially by the younger 
members of the group as a “PR exercise by the Kurdish community as 
a model of managing minorities.” Rather than having signiﬁ cant im-
pact for potential diasporan tourism the project was considered by one 
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interviewee as “a propaganda device by the Kurds and very clever of 
them.”
Th e Kurdish role in the Armenian-Turkish terrain has yet to be fully 
critically engaged with. Th e Kurdish leadership’s acknowledgement of 
the role played by the Kurds in the genocide has aﬀ ected the public dis-
course of some Kurdish activists, as well as leading to the uncovering 
of Armenian grandparents and unearthing of hidden identities. Some 
Kurds, as more recent victims of aggressive Turkish nationalism, have 
claimed solidarity with Armenians in a pan-minority movement in the 
democratization process (Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan 2010: 19–20). 
Yet from the perspective of many Istanbul Armenians, and especially di-
asporan Armenians, there is much that still needs to be addressed and 
reﬂ ected upon with greater critical honesty. Th ere is also the sense that 
in the current political context Armenians lack agency and are reacting 
to initiatives and the unfolding agenda of others with uncertainty.
In recent years a tiny tourism industry run by Istanbul Armenians has 
started and is aimed at Western diasporans seeking to explore the lands 
from which their families originated pre-genocide. Th is phenomenon 
deﬁ es its small numbers in terms of impact in the diaspora communities 
from which the tourists come and the wider diaspora, as well as con-
tributing to a change of attitudes towards the Turkish people (though 
not the state) of Western, mostly North American diasporans. Bakalian 
and Turan (2015) have written eloquently of the “subversive” quality of 
this tourism and its potential impact within the transnational space of 
Armenians, Turks, Kurds, and others, dedicated to uncovering, redis-
covering, and remembering the Armenians of the Ottoman, particularly 
Anatolian, lands and centuries of coexistence.
Negotiating Identity and Coexistence 
in Private and Public Spaces
On the personal level interviewees shared many moving memories and 
encounters that they were in the process of reﬂ ecting upon from a more 
informed position. Th us the “everyday diplomacy” (Bryant this volume, 
p. 21) intrinsic to coexistence was constructed, narrated, and reﬂ ected 
upon in their own oral histories as the interviews unfolded.
Rana, a middle-aged Turkish woman, told the story of how as a young 
girl she had been invited to her friend’s house where they had eaten pas-
tries unfamiliar to her and colored, hard-boiled eggs. Only years later 
did she realize that this had been an Easter celebration and that the fam-
ily had wanted to share the occasion with her but had been unable to 
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tell her what it was, which would have meant revealing that they were 
Christians and Armenians. Rana remembers that “there was fear in the 
mother’s eyes” and is able to reﬂ ect upon this with empathy and sadness.
As a ﬁ lmmaker, Rana is now working on a ﬁ lm project of the “geno-
cide trail” through Anatolia to the Levant. She recounted how, even 
before she gets the chance to ask, the elderly village and townspeople 
spontaneously share the fact that they once had Armenian neighbors 
and share stories of this past. It is an interesting realization that just 
as genocide survivors and their descendants are haunted by memories 
(personal and received), so too are the perpetrators and bystanders, 
and their descendants: “Th ere was a desperate need to unburden them-
selves,” Rana observed.
Pelin is a 62-year-old professional working in the media, having lived 
a typical Armenian life—born in Istanbul, living for long spells in Lon-
don, the U.S., travelling regularly to her extended diaspora family and 
friends scattered in the Middle East, Paris, and North America, and ﬁ -
nally resettled in Istanbul. She wryly observed, “Wherever you go you 
are a foreigner, even here where I am born.” Her personal reﬂ ections, 
while representative of others of her age group, were also poignantly 
unique. When asked about what part her Armenian identity has played 
in her everyday life in her childhood, she shared:
My grandparents never told us their stories; we grew up without know-
ing these things. Now there are books and you can ﬁ nd out and learn. 
But in those days we knew nothing. We started questioning as we got 
older, but they always covered up and closed the subject. It was only 
after we moved to the U.K. that my grandfather told us the stories—
he explained, so as not to make us turn against the country where we 
lived.
Many others spoke of this lack of information, that they were aware 
that there were secrets and hidden areas, and that they felt powerless 
to probe their elders, as there were subjects that were clearly oﬀ -limits 
and couched in fear and insecurity. Th is “subliminal knowledge” and the 
struggle to “piece together” a true version of the past was also some-
thing Turkish interviewees talked about, through their childhoods in the 
1970s and 1980s where information within Turkey was limited. Silences 
and gaps featured in stories of the past of their elders and society more 
widely (Kasbarian and Öktem 2014).
Pelin and many other interviewees recalled having Turkish friends 
who were “like siblings,” who protected her through trials like the reac-
tions to the ASALA campaign38 in the 1970s and 1980s. A Turkish family 
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friend loaned her father the money for her brother to study in the U.S. 
after he was expelled from a Turkish university following a politically 
motivated quarrel with a professor. Indeed, she and others recounted 
many acts of extreme kindness and experiences bordering on familial 
closeness and intimacy.39 Implicit in these stories lies also a postcolonial 
dynamic—“the Armenian” as needing protection (from “bad Turks”?) 
and as infantilized in this encounter with “the Turk.” By lacking agency 
and reduced to appealing to the good will of “good Turks,” the Arme-
nians continued the subjugated relationship from Ottoman times, and 
power structures were replicated in diluted forms, extending to Arme-
nians’ self-perception.40
Most interviewees, when asked if they had suﬀ ered discrimination, 
insisted that they had not, and yet within minutes remembered incidents 
from their childhood or even quite recently. Yet oﬃ  cially the answer 
seems to be “no,” perhaps putting a brave face on, perhaps because these 
memories have been buried, maybe because they are commonplace oc-
currences to which one is immunized through time, or because there is 
no safe space to adequately express and articulate these experiences. Th e 
silencing of Armenian voices extends well beyond the genocide to con-
temporary experiences, where individuals lack the tools, the language, 
or the agency to own and express their experiences openly. Th e per-
ceived impossibility of the coexistence of diﬀ erent narratives leads to the 
complete negation of the Armenian experience in the public sphere. Th e 
hegemonic narrative invalidates the Armenian experience to the extent 
that individuals have internalized this obliteration and are only able to 
extract and read their memories upon conscious, focused reﬂ ection, al-
most as if the stories that surface happened to someone else.
When contemplating coexistence, therefore, the coexistence of diﬀ er-
ent narratives is at least as essential as physical coexistence. Th is marks a 
need for the radical reconceptualization of the master (nationalist) nar-
rative, which can make space for the experience of others. Th us, stories 
like Çetin’s or the subsequent Grandchildren (Altınay and Çetin 2011) 
are pioneering trajectories that are carving out a space in the public 
sphere for the possibility of counter-narratives from below and from the 
margins. Th e deconstruction and critique of the state master-narrative 
and the proliferation of other voices is an essential part of coexistence 
beyond “everyday diplomacy,” underpinned by narratives that articulate 
and validate the subaltern experience. Spivak (1994) when asking “Can 
the Subaltern speak?” argues that a narrative of identity is an essential 
condition for agency and subjectivity. Arendt (1958) too stresses the need 
to hear one’s story from others as key to constructions of identity and 
also to social relations.
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Th e lack of coexisting multiple narratives of identity led to deeply 
buried and ambivalent identities. Helin recounts that in 1960, when she 
was ten years old,
We had very good Turkish neighbours and we little girls used to play 
together every day. One day I went over as usual to her house, the little 
girl stood at the door and said “My grandmother does not want us to be 
friends anymore because you are Armenian.” I didn’t understand what 
this meant and went home crying, “what does being Armenian mean?”
Hagop, a 38-year-old man, recounted how as the only Armenian in high 
school he encountered some problems especially in the “ASALA days,” 
was referred to as Th e Armenian, and was involved in a few ﬁ ghts. Th is 
resulted in him becoming withdrawn, something that seems to have be-
come a permanent part of his character. He has two clear sets of friends 
that do not overlap—Turks and Armenians. He said “with some Turks 
when they ﬁ nd out you’re Armenian they make banal and patronizing 
statements like ‘they are good people,’ and other Turks don’t want to be 
friends once they ﬁ nd out.”
Th is in-betweenness also applies to many individuals who are profes-
sionally active in mainstream society, where they have to negotiate (or 
hide) their Armenianness, and are also involved with the factious Arme-
nian community, where they also have to manage their identities. Jour-
nalist Anahid, who has experienced extensive criticism from the various 
Armenian factions and their competing agendas, ﬁ nds this is a tiring 
and demanding position: “I feel very lonely deep inside” and “sometimes 
I am more afraid of Armenians than Turks.” Th is example also demon-
strates the complexities of a layered identity, which can be stiﬂ ing and 
restrictive when the state (and your community) deems you diﬀ erent 
and polices boundaries of identity and belonging. In the words of an 
interviewee in Beirut “it’s impossible to escape my Armenian identity 
even if I wanted to.”41
It became apparent through my interviews that individuals thought 
in terms of clearly deﬁ ned spheres and the need to transgress and move 
from one to the other. Th ere are a few ways in which these demarcations 
were blurred. For example all the Istanbul Armenians I met had Turki-
ﬁ ed surnames, and many had ﬁ rst names that were not obviously Ar-
menian (like Helin). Schools reported a decrease each year of obviously 
Armenian-sounding ﬁ rst names. I was also told that some Catholic Ar-
menians are using Turkish ﬁ rst names, the expressed aim being “to be 
totally invisible.” Some Istanbul Armenians have two business cards—
one with their Armenian name and another with the Turkish version. 
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Many individuals recalled taking on a Turkish name when in the work-
place—for example as boys working in the Grand Bazaar. Famous places 
like Ara Café owned by the noted Istanbul Armenian photographer Ara 
Güler also play on the fact that Ara means gap or interval in Turkish (the 
café is in a pedestrian side street), and most of the clientele are unaware 
that this is an Armenian establishment. Th ese subtle forms of negoti-
ation have the desired eﬀ ect of being able to blend in and not attract 
unwanted attention.42
Th is sometimes extends to a kind of duality in that Armenian, if spo-
ken at all, is conﬁ ned to the house. Public life to all appearances must be 
Turkish, including names. Community identity therefore is limited to 
the private sphere, and often not even that. Th is divided self can result in 
feelings of exclusion from every side, being neither a Turk nor an Arme-
nian, especially if one does not speak Armenian (an increasing trend) or 
practice the religion. Identities are complex and multi-layered but when 
politicized can result in profound disempowerment for those that fall 
outside the boundaries. Th is process aﬀ ects individuals from a young 
age when they are grappling with their identity and sense of belonging. 
Th is often results in a compartmentalizing of identity, based on context. 
Neyzi and Kharatyan-Araqelyan (2010: 57) quote one such person from 
Sason in southeastern Turkey: “We are three things. We are Kurds at 
home, we speak Kurdish. Second, we are Turks at school, we speak Turk-
ish. Th ird we are Armenians at the camp, we speak Armenian. We are 
Armenians in summer, Turks in school in winter, and Kurds at home.”
Negotiating Coexistence, Rights, and Belonging
Th e Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul (past and present) has tradition-
ally kept a low proﬁ le, a policy considered to be the wisest in order to 
protect the community from nationalist backlashes.43 Th is extends to 
taking positions contrary to those of the diaspora, leading at times to a 
fraught relationship of mutual disappointment and misunderstanding. 
For example, genocide recognition is viewed fearfully by many Istanbul 
Armenians, including Patriarch Mesrob II, who conveyed this to the am-
bassador of the United States following the nationalist backlash after the 
murder of Hrant Dink (as leaked by Wikileaks in 2011).44 Th e diaspora in 
general is perceived as not being appropriately sensitive to the vulnera-
ble nature of the Istanbul Armenians, who will ultimately bear the brunt 
of any repercussions, as they have previously.
Minority religious leaders at ﬁ rst seemed cautiously optimistic about 
the AKP government. Th ere were initially a number of positive signs 
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and gestures from the government, though these were on an “ad hoc ba-
sis, leaving open the possibility that they could be revoked or discontin-
ued.”45 Historically, the Armenian religious foundations and the Istanbul 
Armenian Patriarchate have faced great diﬃ  culty in preserving or pro-
tecting the church buildings and schools under their jurisdiction. Th ere 
would be no permission from the government to carry out repairs or 
renovations. But this seems to have changed somewhat with the present 
government. Th e Deacon at the Patriarchate was cautiously optimistic 
about the future, saying that the current government has taken unprec-
edented steps, due to pressure from the EU as part of the conditions 
in the accession package.46 Th e Armenian Patriarchate has also lost its 
strength in the last few years as the Patriarch has been seriously ill and 
the institution has been left in a kind of limbo with squabbles among 
the community as to the way forward. Since 2008 Archbishop Aram 
Atesyan has been the acting patriarch, his appointment a point of great 
contention in the community.
Th e government has recently announced its plans to return the prop-
erties conﬁ scated after 1974—a move deemed “necessary but insuﬃ  -
cient” but hailed as a magnanimous gesture by the state itself. In fact it 
is also a shrewd and strategic act to avoid having to pay compensation 
through the European Court of Human Rights, and one undertaken with 
pressure from both the EU and the U.S. Th e present government has 
pledged to return 162 of the 1,410 assets of minorities conﬁ scated in 
1974. Th e state closed down minorities’ seminaries so clergy cannot be 
trained in Turkey, and there are currently only twenty-six Armenian Or-
thodox priests in the whole of Turkey (U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, 2012 Annual Report). Th ese restrictive measures se-
riously threaten the long-term viability of the Armenian community as 
a religious community.
Th ere are also thought to be up to 25,000 Armenians from Armenia 
living illegally in Istanbul, forced to migrate temporarily for economic 
reasons.47 A 2009 study carried out for the Eurasia Partnership Foun-
dation (Ozinian 2009) reported that most illegal Armenian migrants in 
an interview pool of 150 originated from the northwestern Armenian 
region of Shirak, the site of the devastating 1988 earthquake. Of the re-
spondents 94 percent were women employed in domestic work. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan has made threats to expel illegal Armenian migrants 
several times, claiming that there are close to 100,000. Th ese comments 
are seen as retaliation for Armenia’s push for recognition of the geno-
cide. Alongside this regressive talk, there are some promising signs, too. 
For example, the children of the thousands of illegal Armenian workers 
have until recently not been allowed to attend (Armenian) community 
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schools. However in 2011 the government announced that this ban 
would be lifted so long as the children did not receive any oﬃ  cial doc-
uments that might facilitate their long-term stay in Turkey (Ozinian 
2011).
Although this is hailed as a step forward by the Armenian community, 
there are also fears about the already-limited resources of the fourteen 
primary schools and ﬁ ve high schools in Istanbul being further stretched. 
Th is concerns not just material resources but also teachers. Th e general 
trend is acknowledged to be one of decline, both in terms of enrollment 
numbers and in terms of the quality of Armenian education. Th e schools 
must follow the Turkish curriculum in full, while allowing for classes in 
Armenian language and literature. However, they are not permitted to 
recruit teachers from outside Turkey and hence the standard of teaching 
of Armenian is limited. Th ey are only permitted to teach oﬃ  cial Turkish 
history. Furthermore, all minority schools have a Turkish vice-principal 
appointed by the state to act as the “eyes and ears” of the state and make 
sure they stay in line. Th is role is apparently being taken less seriously 
in schools in recent years, but it is still a reminder of the watchful state, 
along with the images of Ataturk adorning every classroom. Th e fact 
that there is no Armenian Studies at university level in Turkey means 
that the schools are forced to employ teachers of Armenian language 
who are merely high school graduates, thereby also compromising the 
standard of instruction. Th e general decline of the Armenian language 
in Turkey is also evident in the reduced number of pages published in 
Armenian of Agos.48 Th is has led to much soul-searching among many in 
community leadership roles, about “what makes us and keeps us Arme-
nian, just language … or religion or something else?” Armenian schools 
are full of pupils who “are already very Turkiﬁ ed, speak Armenian with 
Turkish accents, sometimes struggling to speak it at all.”49
Whether change should come from above or below is a subject of 
much discussion. Traditionally the community organizations have kept 
a low proﬁ le and have only very cautiously made the slightest responses 
to adverse state policy. Th is docile position was taken in order to pro-
tect and preserve an already threatened and fearful community, thereby 
leading to a culture of meekness. Some groups and individuals are now 
arguing that the community needs to take on an active role in making 
changes rather than just accepting things. One primary school principal 
talked too of a “self-censorship” by the community that is entrenched 
in its ways, exuding inertia and acceptance of the situation. Th is bind 
also results in contradictory positions. For instance, wealthier patrons of 
the schools gift money but do not send their children there, preferring 
to send them to private, more prestigious schools, where the standard 
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of education is higher. So although they are committed to (ﬁ nancially) 
supporting community institutions, they are not so invested personally. 
Th e same principal and others talked about the need to be “clever and 
creative” in their teaching—to bring in Armenian history in an oblique 
or roundabout way, as it is not permitted to be taught.50 In the case of 
the Church, Armenian history is brought in where possible under the 
guise of religious lessons, another example of the subversive “weapons 
of the weak” (Scott 1990) that subaltern groups use to resist the power 
of, in this case, the authoritative state.
Contemplating Coexistence, Beyond “Tolerance”
One major area of contention with regard to the coexistence of the mi-
norities in Turkey is the properties of their foundations, religious and 
secular. Th ese valuable and impressive properties and their extent hark 
back to a period where there were signiﬁ cant minority populations in 
Turkey, and in Istanbul in particular. Akgönül (2013: 91), considers the 
foundations as “the most important element that guarantees the ex-
istence of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey” and the foundation sys-
tem as “a tether for minority institutions—religiously and symbolically 
as well as ﬁ nancially.” Historically there have been severe restrictions 
on the minorities with regard to these properties, their ownership, use 
and maintenance. In 2008 the Foundations Law was amended in several 
ways, including the possibility of applying for the return of minorities’ 
property conﬁ scated by the Turkish state, though the scope and mecha-
nisms of the law are limited and a small number of properties have been 
returned to the religious foundations thus far.
Lakis Vingas is the minority representative on the General Director-
ate Council for Foundations, representing the 162 minority foundations 
in Turkey. He is the ﬁ rst ever such representative, serving alongside four-
teen others representing the non-minorities, since December 2008. For 
the ﬁ rst time in the history of the republic a representative has been 
appointed especially for minorities, and his position has been a diﬃ  cult 
one, balancing the suspicions and criticisms of the directorate on the 
one hand and the minority foundations on the other. He believes that 
the time is right for minorities to be at the forefront of the demand for 
change:
I know there is progress because I know both Turkeys. I know from 
where to where (we have come). … Th e progress is huge, but we have 
no time, we are tired. We cannot have more suﬀ ering. Th e new gen-
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erations will not work as we used to. We need to be demanding, to be 
claiming—look at how far the Kurds have progressed in this compared 
to ten years ago and they say still it is not suﬃ  cient. Th ings need to 
happen quickly!
Th e Ottoman principles of “tolerance” and “protection” with which 
the religious minorities are still approached sound anachronistic and 
potentially oﬀ ensive. As discussed by Bryant in the introduction to this 
volume, etymological meanings of tolerance carry a sense of burden and 
forbearance (Kaya and Harmanyeri 2012: 398). In the Ottoman Empire 
tolerance simply meant a lack of persecution, so long as the subjects 
obeyed the laws and obligations set out through the dhimmi system of 
governing. Kaya and Harmanyeri (2012: 414) talk about the myth of tol-
erance that functions to “conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and 
religious minorities.” “Tolerance” as a political principle has been criti-
cized by minorities for its grudging acceptance of diﬀ erence as opposed 
to the possibility of incorporating and celebrating diversity (Kasbarian 
2009; see also Duru this volume). In the words of one middle-aged in-
terviewee, “I don’t want to be tolerated, private, and special, I want to 
be equal. I don’t need to be treated as a piece of antique that needs to 
be protected. … If we don’t feel equal or if they don’t see us as equal we 
cannot progress!”
Formally, minorities in Turkey have the status of “equal citizens,” yet 
they cannot use the same rights granted by this citizenship, with dis-
criminatory practices commonplace in the institutional, political and 
social realms. Citizenship is increasingly viewed beyond its legal deﬁ -
nition, as “a set of discourses and practices that are translated unevenly 
across unequal social groups and local contexts” and as a “hegemonic 
strategy” that “works to deﬁ ne these groups or localities, to ﬁ x the power 
diﬀ erentials between them, and then to naturalize these operations” 
(Secor 2004: 354). Th e prospect of EU membership has acted as a re-
forming project in Turkey, as it has in other candidate countries (Kas-
barian 2009), gradually addressing restrictions upon minorities. Since 
2002 Turkey has undergone a serious program of reform, but this has 
fallen short of addressing non-Muslim minorities’ demands and rights 
(Goltz 2006, 2013). While meeting EU standards is a promising means 
of promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights, legislation alone 
cannot change deep-seated attitudes and historic grievances. What we 
are witnessing in Turkey is the potential for redeﬁ ning Turkish iden-
tity, to reconsider the question of “who is a Turk”—and the creation of 
a Turkey not for ethnic Turks but for all citizens of Turkey, regardless 
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of ethnicity or religion. Th ough there have been a few overtures by the 
state,51 window-dressing gestures fall short of the fundamental changes 
that are necessary. What is needed is for the state to redeﬁ ne and create 
meaningful and suﬃ  ciently open categories of identity and belonging, 
and for policy to reinforce the gradual advances in civil society.
Clearly, genuine coexistence that fully acknowledges Others needs 
to go beyond “tolerance.” For genuine coexistence there needs to be a 
structural framework that underpins equality and respect for diverse 
groups (and allows for their internal diﬀ erences). For this the work of 
civil society is essential in changing attitudes, opening up spaces for 
discussion and expression, and challenging the nationalist and exclu-
sionary foundations of the Turkish state. Acknowledging diﬀ erent nar-
ratives may liberate people from being forced to inhabit ﬁ xed categories 
of identities ascribed by competing nationalizing projects, and allow 
for a reconceptualization of identity (on all levels). Where nationalizing 
projects and practices seek to enclose and conﬁ ne identities, the real-
ity of lived experience, of coexistence despite real and perceived diﬀ er-
ence, is testimony to a diﬀ erent narrative and with it the possibility of 
a redemptive post-nationalist future. Th e legacy of the genocide and its 
continuing denial make the Armenian existence in Turkey highly politi-
cized. Yet despite state denialism and a wider climate of political regres-
sion and polarization, there continue to be signiﬁ cant developments at 
the level of civil society (Kasbarian and Öktem 2014). Intrinsic to this 
process is the recognition of diﬀ erent narratives and of being able to 
articulate and own one’s own story. Th at this is a mutually reinforcing 
project, and needs to be underpinned by a transformation in the state 
narrative (and structures) is a given. Only then can Istanbul Armenians 
speak and act with conﬁ dence and dignity as Armenians and Turkish 
citizens.
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Notes
My thanks to the editor and two anonymous reviewers for insightful and helpful 
feedback on this chapter.
 1. Th is chapter was written before the dramatic downward spiral in Turkey 
and the polarization of Turkish society, exempliﬁ ed by the Gezi Park pro-
tests of 2013; the witchhunt against the AKP’s former Islamist allies, the 
Hizmet movement of US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen; the clear re-emer-
gence of ultra-nationalists and the ‘deep state’ in violent attacks against op-
ponents of the AKP, and the complete collapse of the uneasy peace with 
the PKK in 2015. Th ere has been an escalating crackdown on basic free-
doms and rights, to the extent that a recent report by the senior Turkey 
researcher at Human Rights Watch stated, “Human rights and the rule of 
law in Turkey are at the worst level I’ve seen in the 12 years I’ve worked on 
Turkey’s human rights.” (Emma Sinclair-Webb, “No EU, Turkey is not safe 
for everyone” 23 October 2015, Open Democracy, https://www.opendem
ocracy.net/emma-sinclair-webb/no-eu-turkey-is-not-safe-for-everyone)
 2. Th is chapter draws upon one month of ﬁ eldwork and over thirty formal 
and informal interviews in Istanbul in June–July 2011. Th is included (Ar-
menian) community leaders and activists, as well as a representative cross-
section of the Armenian community, spanning diﬀ erent ages, socio-eco-
nomic and educational backgrounds, and degrees of aﬃ  liation and involve-
ment with the Armenian community. All names (unless speaking in an 
oﬃ  cial capacity) have been changed to protect anonymity.
 3. Th is ﬁ gure refers to Turkish citizens. It does not count the signiﬁ cant num-
bers of Armenians from Armenia working in Turkey as seasonal or more 
long-term economic migrants, usually illegally. Th is has been a subject of 
media and political concern, as well as being used as a political tool on 
more than one occasion. See section below.
 4. Th e 2010 estimates from the U.S. State Department include 23,000 Jews; 
15,000 Syriac Christians; 10,000 Baha’is, 5,000 Yezidis; 3,300 Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses; 3,000 Protestants; and 1,700 Greek Orthodox. 
 5. For an analysis of the Treaty of Lausanne and “Protection of Minorities” see 
Akgönül (2013: 65–101).
 6. For a comprehensive analysis of the campaign and its legacies, see Aslan 
(2007).
 7. Göçek’s latest book focusses on this. (Fatma Müge Göçek [2015], Denial 
of Violence – Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and the Collective Violence 
against the Armenians 1789-2009. Oxford and New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.)
 8. Stanley Fish (1997: 1) says, “Boutique multiculturalism is characterized by 
its superﬁ cial or cosmetic relationship to the objects of its aﬀ ection. Bou-
tique multiculturalists admire or appreciate or enjoy or sympathize with 
or (at the very least) ‘recognize the legitimacy of ’ the traditions of cultures 
other than their own; but boutique multiculturalists will always stop short 
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of approving other cultures at a point where some value at their center gen-
erates an act that oﬀ ends against the canons of civilized decency as they 
have been either declared or assumed.” 
 9. http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/134778/turkeys-armenians-suggest-er
dogan-for-nobel-prize
10. Erdoğan went on the Charlie Rose show that same week and claimed that if 
there had been a genocide there would not be any Armenians still living in 
Turkey, thereby exposing the way that this community are held hostage and 
employed instrumentally by the state, and the extremely precarious position 
they ﬁ nd themselves in. See http://www.charlierose.com/watch/60382027
11. http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=e11
bde56-a0b7-4ea6-8a9a-954c68157df9.
12. Personal communication, June 2014.
13. See, for example, Bloxham (2005).
14. Th e most signiﬁ cant include Taner Akçam, Fatma Müge Göçek, Baskın 
Oran, Uğur Ümit Üngör, Kerem Öktem, Ayşe Kadioğlu, Cengiz Aktar, Ayşe 
Gül Altınay, among others. Th ere is also a growing new generation of schol-
ars whose work follows these pioneers and promises to be very exciting.
15. Th e instigators were scholars Ahmet İnsel, Baskın Oran, Cengiz Aktar, and 
journalist Ali Bayramoğlu. Th e campaign was denounced by the Turkish 
state and nationalists, and criticized for not going far enough by others. For 
a critical reading of the campaign see Erbal (2012).
16. Interview with Ayse Gül Altınay, Istanbul, June 2011.
17. Th e founder of the union, Mihran Gültekin, says that he knew that he was 
Armenian since he was seven but only managed to reclaim his identity 
formally at the age of ﬁ fty. His 21-year-old son has also been converted, 
and is baptized Hrant. Over 200 families in the region have reclaimed their 
Armenian identity in recent years. Gültekin claims that 75 percent of the 
Dersim population is composed of converted Armenians. (Dersim is a 
region of eastern Turkey that includes Tunceli Province, Elazığ Province, 
and Bingöl Province.) See for example, http://massispost.com/archives/
1752.
18. Th e conference on Islamized Armenians was organized by the History 
Department of Boğaziçi University, the Hrant Dink Foundation and the 
Charitable Association of Armenians from Malatya (HAYDer), and held in 
Istanbul on 2–4 November 2013. For links to the conference and related 
pieces, see “Conference on Islamized Armenians,” 14 November 2013, avail-
able on the Hrant Dink Foundation website (www.hrantdink.org/?Detail
=753&Lang=en) (accessed 2 April 2014). 
19. Agos (meaning “furrow” in Armenian) is an Armenian weekly newspaper 
published in Istanbul since 1996. It has both Armenian and Turkish pages 
(see http://www.agos.com.tr). Hrant Dink was one of its founders and chief 
editor until his murder in January 2007.
20. Interview, Istanbul, June 2011.
21. Th is theme is eloquently explored in Anahit (2014). 
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22. For a discussion of the deep state in contemporary Turkey, see Karabekir 
Akkoyunlu (2015) “Old Demons in New Faces – Th e ‘Deep State’ meets 
Erdogan’s ‘New Turkey’” (October 25, 2015, Th e Huﬃ  ngton Post http://
www.huﬃ  ngtonpost.com/karabekir-akkoyunlu/old-demons-in-new-fac
es-t_1_b_8383086.html
23. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2012 Annual Report.
24. See for example, “Sevag Balıkçı was Shot By Mistake, Court Rules” by 
Ekin Karaca, http://www.bianet.org/english/minorities/145402-sevag-bal
ikci-was-shot-by-mistake-court-rules.
25 Th is was apparent in the run-up to the commemoration of the centenary 
of the Armenian Genocide in April 2015. See Kasbarian and Öktem, 2016 
(forthcoming).
26. Th ere are currently a number of successful Armenian–Turkish initiatives 
at the level of civil society aimed at encouraging relations between the two 
countries. For instance, the Armenia-Turkey Cinema Platform (ATCP) 
organizes meetings between ﬁ lm-makers of both countries and explores 
themes of identity and common roots. ATCP was founded through the 
cooperation of Anadolu Kültür and Golden Apricot Yerevan International 
Film Festival in 2008 to encourage a common network and projects, and 
has been supported by organizations including USAID, the Eurasia Part-
nership Foundation, the International Center for Human Development, the 
Yerevan Press Club, and the Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen of 
Armenia.
27. http://www.anadolukultur.org/
28. Interview with Osman Kavala, Istanbul, June 2011.
29. Th e Armenian Institute organized the exhibition and cultural program, 
sponsored by the St. Sarkis Charity Trust and Diana and Panos Katsouris. 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/gallery/mydearbrother/
30. For the vision and activities of the Foundation see http://www.hrantdink.
org/index.php?About=18&Lang=en
31. Th e controversial cross was ﬁ nally erected on the top of the church on 2 
October 2010.
32. Book Launch in Hai Doon (Armenia House), London, October 2010.
33. Coproduction between Gomidas Institute in London and Birzamanlar 
Yayıncılık in Istanbul.
34. For which he has had charges brought against him numerous times. Lo-
cated in the city’s Gavur (inﬁ del) district, St. Giragos is close to St. Peter’s 
Chaldean Catholic church (also undergoing restoration), a mosque, the Di-
yarbakır Protestant Church, and a synagogue, with construction plans for 
places of worship along the same street for Alawites and Yezidis. Mayor 
Demirtaş’s vision is to make Diyarbakır “Anatolia’s Jerusalem.”
35. “Evolving Armenian Realities and the Surp Giragos Dikranagerd Church” 
by Raﬃ   Bedrosyan. Posted on July 1, 2011, http://www.armenianweekly
.com/2011/07/01/evolving-armenian-realities-and-surp-giragos-dikranag
erd-church.
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36. Th e latest victim of this is the writer and linguist Sevan Nişanyan (May 
2013), sentenced to prison for alleged blasphemy, http://www.globalpost
.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/turkey/130523/sevan-nisanyan-turk
ish-armenian-blogger-jailed-blasphemy.
37. Informal conversations, Istanbul, July 2011.
38. Th e Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) 
launched a violent campaign against Turkish diplomats from the late 1970s 
to the early 1990s. For an overview see Dugana, Huang, LaFree, and Mc-
Cauley (2008). For a reading of these groups as part of a third world liber-
ation movement and their mission to awaken the Armenian diaspora, see 
Tölölyan (1988).
39. See also Anahit 2014.
40. In Ottoman times, the Armenians were known as “the Loyal Millet” (Mil-
let-i Sadika).
41. Interview, Beirut, March/April 2003. In Lebanon, the “country of mi-
norities,” the Armenian Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants are among 
the eighteen state-recognized religious minorities, with the “private do-
main” being conducted by religious leaders and within the arena of the 
community.
42. Not one of my interviewees (apart from the few that spoke in an oﬃ  cial 
capacity) was willing to be recorded, revealing an insecurity and fear of 
repercussions. 
43. In contrast, the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew is viewed as strong and 
outspoken in a way that Armenian equivalents feel they cannot be. Th is is 
explained not just by personality but also by the relative strength and im-
portance of Greece compared to Armenia, as well as the much more cordial 
links. 
44. For full text from Wikileaks (based on a meeting between Patriarch Mes-
rob II and then-Deputy U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian Aﬀ airs  Matthew Bryza in February 2007) and analysis see Bar-
soumian (2011).
45. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2012 Annual Report.
46. Interview at the Patriarchate, Istanbul, June 2011.
47. See for example, Grigoriyan and Hayrapetyan (2011). 
48. Interview with Agos journalists, Istanbul, June 2011
49. Interview, Armenian high school principal, Istanbul, June 2011.
50. Interview, Armenian primary school principal, Istanbul, June 2011.
51. Examples include the appointment of Armenians in minor oﬃ  cial posts.
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[• Chapter 9 •]
A Conﬂ ict of Spaces 
or of Recognition?
Co-presence in Divided Jerusalem
SYLVAINE BULLE
The breakdown of the peace accords, the resumption of the Intifada in 
2000, and the numerous military incursions that followed marked a new 
phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict. Today, Jerusalem is a city cut in 
two by a security barrier—called a wall by the Palestinians—whose con-
ception and ongoing construction was initiated by the State of Israel in 
2006. With the decision to build a security barrier cutting Jerusalem in 
two—separating the Palestinians of East Jerusalem from other Palestin-
ians and from Israeli citizens—Israel created a visible and impermeable 
border and in so doing, aﬃ  rmed the spatial delimitation of an enemy 
territory behind it (Brown 2010). Th e security barrier acts to redeﬁ ne a 
symbolic and spatial nomos1 (Schmitt 2003), and to safeguard the limits 
between Israel and the surrounding world: a world conceived as a threat.
In this context of separation, studies of the Israel-Palestine conﬂ ict for 
the most part operate under a theory of simple domination: a primary re-
lation between dominators (Israeli) and those who are dominated (Pal-
estinians), where transgression and resistance can only be understood 
as interiorization or some continuation of power by which the subject 
is stripped of subjectivity, thus making it impossible for a communal 
world to exist. Th e exteriorization of power assumes that no description 
of relations is possible that is unrelated to government techniques, to ju-
ridical means of exception from the common law, to modes of exclusion 
that operate through enclosure within Palestinian enclaves, or else the 
symbolic violence of the Israeli state.
Th e approach elaborated here is diﬀ erent. It proposes to consider the 
reality of separation through the observation of Jerusalem and its bor-
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ders and walls. Without discounting the real constraints that have been 
created by the wall and its limits, this approach also considers subtle 
interactions between segmented populations (Israeli and Palestinian, 
Jewish and Arab) and the ways in which these interactions shape links 
between these social worlds. We will thus highlight examples of acts of 
communication and the mechanisms actors use to continue exchange 
at the edges of Jerusalem and between Jerusalem and the Palestinian 
territories. Th ese operations may seem improbable or minor. But is it 
possible to ﬁ nd a model of balanced justice that assumes this state of 
facts, and the possibility of exchanging within a space that is fragmented 
and conﬂ ictual? Does not the vision of a politics of co-presence oﬀ er an 
alternative to theories and abstract political scenarios in the search for a 
solution to the spatial and inter-community conﬂ ict of Jerusalem?
Co-presence or Separation? 
Holding onto Contiguity at Any Price
What is this security barrier called a wall in the case of East Jerusalem? It 
is a militarized and social frontier. Certain people ﬁ nd themselves within 
Figure 9.1. Confrontation in Jerusalem: Mt. of Olives and East Jerusalem 
(photo by Sylvaine Bulle).
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the limits of Jerusalem (on the “good” side of the wall, within the perim-
eter of the Municipality of Jerusalem). Th ey beneﬁ t from their status as 
residents of Jerusalem, a kind of socio-economic citizenship—providing 
Israeli social rights to education, health, the right to live and circulate—
even if the accordance of residency has been considerably limited since 
the creation of the barrier. Family reuniﬁ cation is diﬃ  cult. Residency 
status can be taken away from Palestinians from Jerusalem who leave 
the territory. Th e de facto acquisition of residency status for a wife and 
children no longer applies.2 On the other side of the wall stretches a 
gray zone. In this zone, despite being a dependent part of Jerusalem, 
residents are now under the control of Palestinian institutions, and as 
such, lack the possibility of exchange with those who ﬁ nd themselves on 
the opposite side of the wall. Th e wall has thus instituted a within and 
a without; it has redeﬁ ned social relations and ﬁ xed an internal limit 
to the Palestinian community by distinguishing those who are included 
and those who are shut out, deprived of their rights at the periphery of 
the city.
Rather than aiming here to make an argument about the nature of 
Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem—the exercise or not of the “state of ex-
ception” (Agamben 1998)—this chapter shows how diﬀ erent interac-
tions exist along the barrier and how these interactions coexist with the 
idea of enclosure itself. Th ese situations provide ways to think about the 
politics of separation, modes of thinking that do not operate through a 
strict vision of vertical power as it is understood in radical critical the-
ory (in political science or geography).3 What I would like to examine is 
less a theory of exception (deﬁ ned as the suspension of rights and of the 
frontier between within and without) and more a theory of heteronomy 
(Simmel 1999). Heteronomy is usually deﬁ ned as inﬂ uence over one’s 
will, i.e., less than full autonomy. For Simmel, however, heteronomy has 
a dual face: it is a form of interdependence, deﬁ ned by both autonomy 
and constraint, and this may be ﬁ gured by spatial frontiers. Th e tension 
between the two polarities of freedom and constraint may be seen as 
structural (Simmel says “grammatical”) elements of social life. In Sim-
mel’s reasoning, parts are isolated from the whole while still belonging 
to that whole. Individuals or groups, even if they are conﬁ ned by physical 
boundaries, react to each other because there is a totality of meaningful 
eﬀ ects that both emanates from and inﬂ uences them. Th e everyday con-
straint on autonomy is also a theory of contiguity or co-presence.
In their approach to social theory, the sociologists of the Chicago 
School (Grafmeyer and Joseph 1984) also emphasized this aspect and 
deﬁ ne what they call an “urban mentality.” For Wirth and Park, a citizen 
is understood as a person who is able to communicate, able to distrib-
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ute attention, and to live at the same time in several worlds, between 
or among multiple spheres of belonging. By extension—and as Simmel 
(1971) emphasizes—the most signiﬁ cant aspect of the metropolis lies in 
this contiguity or co-presence upon which urban life is erected. Despite 
its division, co-presence also deﬁ nes the city Jerusalem. Th e physical 
“contiguity” of diﬀ erent communities (Jews, Arabs, and other minori-
ties) gives the city its psychological and aesthetic foundation. Th e at-
mosphere of the city depends upon diﬀ erent lifestyles that intersect at 
every street corner—between customers and merchants, or in other ca-
sual encounters—generating unexpected exchanges, conversations, and 
emotions. Th e atmosphere of the city emerges both from the possibility 
of such encounters and from their realization. Th e city is a place where 
such encounters can occur, and its atmosphere emerges from the fact 
of their occurrence. Conversely, however, the very interdependence of 
parts of the city deﬁ ned as hostile to each other may engender fear, an-
ticipation, and other emotions caused by the threat of violence and the 
permanent conﬂ ict and division. In other words, it is the fact that Pal-
estinians and Israelis interact and move in the city despite the wall that 
both creates the city as “Jerusalem” and also lays the groundwork for 
fear. Th e military presence and erection of the security fence inside the 
borders of Jerusalem give to its metropolitan life a new signiﬁ cance but 
do not end that life altogether.
Paradoxically, it is because the foundations of exchange, of neighbor-
hoods, or of existence itself are threatened that the texture of the urban 
exchanges appears, i.e., the texture of the city. Th ese are the particularly 
intense urban exchanges of a divided and militarized city. Spatial con-
ﬁ nement creates practical ordeals through which an individual measures 
himself in relation to his environment. It is in the most problematic of 
conditions that this research makes sense, when individuals aﬀ ected and 
troubled by events (Boltanski 2009; Dewey 2005) work to resolve the 
enigma of their own lives.
To achieve this, it is useful as a sociologist to turn to ethnographic 
research that may give us insight beyond a ﬁ rst general impression of the 
constraints of the wall. Ethnography enables us to see the ways that ac-
tors use various principles and resources to resolve the problems of their 
everyday lives in the face of enclosure and thereby how they assert the 
plurality of their forms of existence and action. We see here that people 
are not only subject to the barrier and its enforced separation but that 
they also have critical and reﬂ exive capacities. Th ey work to continue 
their existence. Within the regime of enclosure, they use an eclecticism 
of relationships and actions to access primary goods: housing, labor, 
mobility, education, and domestic production. We can only touch on a 
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few of the actions—some superﬁ cial, others more profound—through 
which the conﬁ ned individual (in this case a Palestinian) reconsiders 
his or her universe and sometimes his or her relation to the Other (the 
Israeli).
Excursus Outside the Boundaries: 
Workers, Residents and Merchants as “Transfugees”
For the citizens of East Jerusalem, the political model of separation and 
security implies a new deﬁ nition of territorial belonging, of exchange, 
and of mobility. Th e separation wall has been complete since 2009 and 
has become the residents’ visual and existential horizon. It puts into 
place a new type of challenge that is no longer a test of force (by military 
control) but a challenge to reality—through administrative control and 
new mechanisms for exchange and circulation. Th e wall has become a 
frontier. Crossing through the wall is only possible at one of thirteen 
checkpoints that are regulated and controlled by the Israeli military ad-
ministration, which also carries out exacting and regular patrols from 
the watch-stations situated along the wall. To enter Jerusalem, Palestin-
ian residents or workers must have special work permits4 that are con-
tingent on certain civic, familial, or security-based criteria and also on 
the economic needs of Israel (in the case of workers). 
By describing a within and a without, the separation wall has rede-
ﬁ ned social relations, erased advantages and privileges, weakened the 
capacities of individuals to move about, and brought internal fractures 
to light. Since the completion of the security barrier, Jerusalem as a place 
of work has become inaccessible, despite the active trade and extensive 
job and knowledge networks that existed in the preceding period. Th e 
judicial and physical separation has considerably reduced the personal 
connections that once existed between Palestinians and Jews or among 
Palestinians from Jerusalem, while informal transactions have been cur-
tailed. Despite this, maintaining exchanges with Israel or the Territories 
remains a priority for Palestinians. It is necessary to diﬀ erentiate super-
ﬁ cial engagements that are created for instrumental ends—the search 
for work or for business—and those that are longer lasting where the 
person’s ontology, as well as the ontology of the group, is itself destabi-
lized. In all cases, the interactions comprise practical, situated actions 
that allow actors to meet.
Restaurant owners and shopkeepers situated at the limit of the wall 
are an instance of those who must develop concrete transactions and 
strategies to continue their trade. An example would be the shopkeepers 
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in the city of A-Ram, situated at the limit of the security barrier, near 
the main entry and exit checkpoint to East Jerusalem (Qalandiya). Th is 
checkpoint forms a true buﬀ er zone with Israel and is particularly con-
straining for people entering the West Bank (where Israeli settlements 
are located) but also for the Palestinians of Jerusalem who continue to 
pursue activities or have family in Palestine. All crossings at this check-
point—cars, trucks, pedestrians—are veriﬁ ed.5 Workers hailing from 
the Territories who are authorized to make the crossing into Jerusalem 
are particularly scrutinized. Th ese workers are not able to use their per-
sonal vehicles and must be in possession of a work or residence permit. 
Despite the closed and rigid character of these security measures, many 
interactions take place around the checkpoint, creating a public spec-
tacle where every act is visible to those taking part, including those of 
the Israeli military personnel charged with controlling the frontier. Th e 
area surrounding the checkpoint forms a microeconomic space with the 
presence of small shopkeepers oﬀ ering their services: we ﬁ nd coﬀ ee and 
water from the nearby refugee camp al-Amari, restaurants, taxis. All are 
interested in maintaining their economic interests despite the rareﬁ ed 
nature of the exchanges between Jerusalem and the zones located on the 
other side of the security barrier, which itself has become an impassable 
frontier.
One example is striking: the ritual undertaken by certain restaurants 
to “deliver” to checkpoints in order to maintain their commercial activ-
ities. Th is concerns, for example, restaurant owners situated near the 
security barrier (A-Ram), who have created links to a Jewish or Arab cli-
entele within Jerusalem who previously frequented these restaurants and 
have been deprived of this possibility by this newly constructed segment 
of the barrier. Th is is the case for Elias, a resident of Jerusalem who chose 
the site for his restaurant only several months before the erection of the 
barrier at A-Ram. His pizzeria, known for the quality of its products, is 
now hidden and inaccessible. Elias’ movement has also been limited, and 
his restaurant lost many potential clients. Nevertheless, the young en-
trepreneur found a way to counteract this loss of business. Armed with 
a strong network of relations with Jewish and Christian Israelis and with 
Palestinian families from the Old City, he is able to deliver his pizzas 
to these privileged clients. Sensitive to Elias’ economic situation, they 
make the journey specially to buy his products at the Qalandiya check-
point. Pizza delivery, like a well-honed choreography, takes place in the 
presence of military personnel who closely watch the exchange.
Th e “delivery” of merchandise, of meals, is an urban experience that 
creates interactions within public space. Th e physical environment is mo-
bilized, while communication between partners in the exchange, Israelis 
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and Palestinians, takes place within neutral and interstitial spaces such 
as checkpoint parking areas (Qalandiya and Bethlehem). In the case of 
these “deliveries”—or of certain micro-commercial activities that take 
place along frontiers, in a space of surveillance—sovereign space relaxes 
or transforms into a space of civility based on the conversation and or-
dinary acts (oral exchanges, food exchanges). Th ese types of exchanges, 
which continue despite the divide and the growing hostility between the 
two communities, make it possible to stabilize relations between actors.
Take, for example, the case of farmers of Bethlehem and Hebron, who 
arrive every morning at the gates of East Jerusalem to sell their products. 
Th eir portals to the outside world (Jerusalem and Israel)—the check-
point crossings to Bethlehem—are only possible because of a chain of 
tolerance and the support of diﬀ erent partners. In certain cases, their 
excursions require the complicity of military personnel, because the 
farmers do not legally have access to Israeli territory or to Jerusalem. Th e 
oﬃ  cers close their eyes to foodstuﬀ s transported in sacks, baskets and 
blouses, and give the farmers the right to enter the capital clandestinely. 
In turn, Palestinian boutique owners in Jerusalem agree to keep or stock 
the farmers’ products. Th e farmers themselves, often elderly, spend the 
night in the back of the shops, in the doorways of shops, in residences in 
the Old City or in public spaces.6 Concern for the common decency of 
the Other has made it possible to establish this chain of acts that links 
individuals otherwise divided socially and geographically, diﬀ erentiated 
one from another in terms of their status as citizens.
Th e consolidation of exchanges in the workplace is also striking. Lack-
ing Jerusalem-resident status, ever more diﬃ  cult to come by, or else 
without permits to work or freely circulate that require drastic measures 
to obtain, it is diﬃ  cult for businesses and job-seekers to develop con-
tacts. In part because of the increasingly complex nature of legal im-
migration procedures, maintaining access to work is almost impossible 
without the aid of formal or informal networks that assist with border 
crossings between Jerusalem and the West Bank. For a Palestinian to 
acquire a job, for example in Jerusalem or in Israel, requires that he or 
she go through an organized network—with companies based in Jerusa-
lem or in Israel that have contacts with the military administration—to 
negotiate a permit or to sell products or services in Israel.
Permits are rare, depending entirely on a vertical organization be-
tween employees, employers, and the Israeli administration: a liberal 
state model where economic interests—and corruption—combine with 
military interests. Parallel to the oﬃ  cial network of entrepreneurs, other 
types of practices are developing. Th ey can be understood as a possi-
ble response to the coercion that is placed upon Palestinians wanting to 
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work in Israel—despite the fact that Palestinian institutions symbolically 
forbid Palestinians from doing so in the name of the boycott and of the 
“White Intifada,” the call for a sustained, nonviolent campaign of Pales-
tinian resistance. Informal practices that deal with work and the cross-
ing of the wall are indissociable from a horizontal chain of conﬁ dence 
between employees and employers or within a controlled community.
Th en there is an entirely diﬀ erent clandestine organization that shut-
tles people through the wall with organized passage points or with lad-
ders that make it possible to climb over. Th ese activities imply complicit 
neighbors, people to organize shuttling back and forth—passers—and 
an entire way of thinking that leads to the creation of temporary neigh-
borhood communities of passers (Druze, Arab Israelis), businesses, and 
neighbors. Th e interactions vary from a paid barrier crossing service to 
simply the aid of the neighbors—for example, watching for the arrival of 
the police. Th is leads to coordination between the various actors—that 
is to say, communication skills. Of course, these interactions are rarer 
than the everyday transactions described earlier, and they develop only 
in situations where the illicit crossings are a last resort. Th e relationship 
that links these individuals is built within space through connections 
and ﬂ eeting agreements.
“We just want to live,” repeat day-workers, residents of A-Ram, Bir 
Nabala, or Bethlehem. Th eir voluntary actions take shape in a world of 
suﬀ ering. To stake one’s life by crossing the security barrier means risk-
ing prison for a salary, putting one’s family in peril with illegal actions, 
and risking the judgment of those close to you or of the community. Th e 
latter is especially problematic in the case of Palestinian workers in the 
Israeli settlements—a type of work strongly forbidden by the Palestinian 
authorities7—and also in the case of intelligence cooperation with the 
military regarding counterfeit work certiﬁ cates. Palestinians from Jeru-
salem or the Territories working intermittently on the construction or 
cleaning of the security barrier are also taking great risks.
Th ese workers’ excursions into an “enemy” world are, by all accounts, 
linked to the economic motivations of the two parties. Employers have 
access to labor that is ﬂ exible, easily managed, and readily available, and 
the employee sees the opportunity for Israeli work as a means to better 
his condition. Th ese workers may also invoke a moral justiﬁ cation for 
this excursion and the “collaboration” it entails. For example, he may 
speak of his own victimhood and the instrumentalization of judicial and 
economic resources of the “Israeli enemy” as a political act of resistance. 
In most cases, the workers are blind to moral and political divergences, 
or to communitarian or cultural diﬀ erences between them and their em-
ployers, instead revealing mutual understandings based on conﬁ dence 
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and common interest.8 But the regime of forced connections with the 
Other through labor and business may also lead to a moral and social 
duplicity. Th e workers, moving between one world and another, modu-
late their rhetoric and appearance based on whether they are inside their 
communities, outside, or between several sets of juridical and political 
norms—for instance, situations in which they must recognize the State 
of Israel or not). Th e actors can also be destabilized in terms of their rela-
tion to their own community by entering into contacts with other norms 
during the period of transaction. Th ey can also destabilize the grammar 
of their own community—by betraying their own patriotism.
If we take, for example, the case of Palestinian workers, Bedouins, 
workers in the formal and informal sector of the industrial complexes 
in Mishor Adumim and in the Jordan Valley, perceived indignity and 
humiliation often reappear in these workers’ statements and are linked 
to their labor conditions (low salaries, no social rights, and no vacation 
days). And it is through these injustices that certain workers today get 
in touch with humanitarian organizations to defend their basic rights 
and to beneﬁ t from the same working conditions as Israelis. By turning 
to the courts and to workers’ aid associations with their demands and 
with the discrimination they face, they implicitly recognize Israeli law 
and the presence of Israeli interlocutors, such as Israeli legal aid asso-
ciations. Th us, contact with the adversary in the name of the defense 
of basic rights but also with a certain liberal individualism would sug-
gest the renunciation of the principles of a Palestinian resistance that 
is founded on non-contact and the boycott of enemy interlocutors in 
the name of group solidarity. Encounters with outside partners (lawyers, 
NGOs, courts), the conﬁ dence these meetings create and the feeling 
of being defended, lead these workers to experience a certain distance 
from their own community. Th eir families, on the other hand, may feel 
embarrassed by these public eﬀ orts and the disobedience to their own 
group’s rules that they imply.
Situational Exchanges
We could also cite a second case that speaks of a less superﬁ cial en-
gagement with the renegotiation of collective norms through individual 
choice: Palestinians who settle in Jewish quarters called Israeli settle-
ments because they are built outside of the frontier of 1967. Th ese ur-
ban Jewish districts (like Pisgat Zeev) are populated with religious Jews 
(often Hasidim) or National Religious (Zionist) and were the ﬁ rst to be 
built outside of the Green Line. Th ey are home to several hundred Pal-
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estinians. Th irteen hundred of the 42,000 residents of Pisgat Zeev are 
Arab. Very close to Pisgat Zeev, on French Hill, one person out of six is 
Arab out of a population of 7,000. Finally, in Neve Yaakov, there are six 
hundred Arabs out of 20,000.9
Th ere are two motivations for this phenomenon. Th e ﬁ rst is what 
many perceive as the necessity of retaining their Jerusalem residence 
permit. In such cases, persons who were residents of Jerusalem before 
the erection of the wall have left what is now the Palestinian side to re-
locate to an area where they can retain their residency.10 Th e wave of 
returning Palestinians inside the limits of East Jerusalem has been an 
important factor in skyrocketing real estate prices.11 As a result, Pales-
tinians concerned with conserving their rights sought out apartments 
in the ﬁ rst settlements in East Jerusalem such as Pisgat Zeev. Th is rental 
activity creates transactions with a network of real estate agents—Jew-
ish—that are more or less discrete, and a redeployment of communi-
tarian movements that are more or less accepted: Palestinians turn up 
in cafes and in malls located in Jewish neighborhoods and more or less 
also in public spaces. Th e recent public nature of identity has been the 
source of some incidents: verbal abuse and mutual violence in the shop-
ping malls, protest posters ﬁ xed to synagogue walls, the intimidation of 
Jewish real estate agents selling land to Arabs. Th e press and activists 
for Israeli religious rights often speak out about a troubling menace: the 
turning back of Jewish repopulation through Arab settlement. “Th e Jews 
are leaving and the Arabs returning,” announced a community Israeli 
newspaper,12 as if the latter were imitating the former through a recon-
quest of the space, ethnicity, and real estate of Jerusalem.
But another type of more individual mobility exists: Palestinians who 
already live within the perimeter of Jerusalem and make the choice to 
live in the Jewish districts at the entry of East Jerusalem. Here we ﬁ nd 
an example of pluralism that is expressed by the decision to maintain 
a social life outside of one’s own community. Decisions to leave Arab 
neighborhoods to attempt to integrate into quarters such as Pisgat Zeev 
or Ramot become a choice that speaks to concerns for a way of life: a 
desire for social ascension that also makes it possible to beneﬁ t from the 
cultural, educational and health facilities of Israeli Jews, judged to be 
better that those in Arab neighborhoods. Such decisions to settle in Jew-
ish districts are discrete and remain unpublicized among their commu-
nity because they cannot be argued in terms of necessity.13 On the one 
hand, middle-class and professional Palestinians—for instance, oﬃ  ce-
workers, professors, or doctors working in Israeli hospitals—make a prag-
matic and subjective choice to settle within Jewish districts that may be 
seen as betrayal by their own family and community. On the other hand, 
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the diversity within a Jewish neighborhood imposes rules of civility. We 
ﬁ nd ourselves here within the public rules of “civil inattention” (Goﬀ -
man 1971) that deﬁ ne a mode of living together based on an indiﬀ erence 
toward communitarianism and respect for private life.14
Th e last example comes from the Jerusalem tramway that was put 
into service in the spring of 2012. It crosses the city from northeast to 
southwest, through Israeli neighborhoods created in 1948 and into the 
city center. It runs parallel to the Old City, crossing Arab quarters, and 
ending in colonies that are at the frontier of 1967. Th e tramway project 
led to important ideological controversies: it was denounced as an in-
strument of Zionism, a consolidation of the annexation of Jerusalem, 
and as a political project destined to achieve the uniﬁ cation of Jerusalem 
by serving the residents of the settlements. Nevertheless, the project can 
be understood as a kind of laboratory for the study of the city as mo-
saic—the open city. We note the high participation of Arab citizens and 
the network’s utilization by a mixed group of inhabitants: frequent tram 
users are Orthodox religious Jews as well as young and old Palestinians. 
Circulation is a moment of civility and diversity, a moment where a pub-
lic space is created that breaks up communitarian divisions. Mobility is 
a place of contiguity and a personal or collective test where the voyagers 
have to show their ability to be face to face.15 Here we ﬁ nd again the no-
tion of “civil inattention” and of reserve. Th e social order of the tramway 
functions through a minimum amount of tact and a visual courtesy that 
operate as a kind of poor interaction (Joseph 1997) or civil inattention. 
Th e oxymoron suggests that the importance of the superﬁ cial exchange 
is having a social function that guarantees civility. It requires partici-
pants in a situation that is public and delicate because of its intercom-
munal nature to not presume the Other has hostile intentions and to 
not manifest feelings of discomfort or shame. Th is visual courtesy also 
enables a superﬁ cial sociability to take shape. Within the tram, we speak 
several languages and we identify diﬀ erent ways of being—religious ﬁ rst 
of all, secular, Jewish, Arab, tourist, and foreigner—without a commu-
nitarian hierarchy, which is exactly the deﬁ nition of a public space. Th is 
mode of transportation of course makes it possible to cross the city and 
also implies collective surveillance, vigilance, and a certain conﬁ dence 
between groups. Circulation is thus the means through which ephem-
eral ways of living together are understood. From this point of view, the 
tram is a success in that it does not lead to incidents of conﬂ ict or vio-
lence, as if it is able to engender that which diplomacy has itself been 
unable to create.
Such examples give us the contours of temporary communities of con-
ﬁ dence—within economic activity, or public space—that are created in 
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situations where people simply come together, without aﬃ  rmations of 
belonging. All these situations require communication and informal ex-
change and show the potentiality of the city of Jerusalem itself, despite 
the political situation, to elucidate a theory of interdependence that is 
both political and sociological. From such cases, we open up several po-
tential questions related to contiguity and hospitality in divided cities 
such as Jerusalem.
For a Th eory of Minimal Co-presence 
as Sociological and Political Frame
Rebecca Bryant, in the introduction to this volume, makes a subtle dis-
tinction in approaches to coexistence. While the term “coexistence” is 
often used in general, historical, and even diplomatic terms, without 
practical considerations, she asks what coexistence means at the level 
of quotidian interactions. She suggests everyday diplomacy as a way to 
expand spaces, relations inside a constructive ambiguity, considering 
the potential self-transformation of identities and places. Bryant, in her 
introduction, speaks of the necessity of a constructive ambiguity of the 
boundaries of belonging as a language allowing the parties to overcome 
the issues about which they were at ﬁ rst irreconcilable.
In a previous chapter, Anita Bakshi discusses Simmel’s notion of the 
stranger as descriptive of relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots in the Nicosia marketplace. Th ese were the relations of shop-
keepers with customers, of traders with clients, and of neighboring trad-
ers within the marketplace. In a city whose neighborhoods were mostly 
ethno-religiously divided, the marketplace became one of the few spaces 
where interactions occurred that are today remembered as “coexistence.” 
Although those relations for the most part were not able to survive the 
fracturing of violence, they were the basic foundation for interaction 
outside one’s group in the context of a relatively divided society.
In Jerusalem, institutions, habits, and the recurrence of geopolitical 
conﬂ ict have put into place a closed, east to west, functioning of neigh-
borhoods that reﬂ ect the hardening of identities. Th e disordered, chaotic, 
hyper-dense, and walled-in space of East Jerusalem evokes a painful geo-
political history. Enclaves, the wall, and the refugee camps mark places 
of minority life excluded from municipal politics. Th ey form what Oren 
Yiftachel calls “gray spaces”:
Th e concept of “gray space” refers to developments, enclaves, popula-
tions and transactions positioned between the “lightness” of legality/
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approval/safety and the “darkness” of eviction/destruction/death. Gray 
spaces are neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-perma-
nent margins of today’s urban regions, which exist partially outside the 
gaze of state authorities and city plans. (Yiftachel 2009: 243)
However, even within the conﬁ nes of these gray spaces, and even in the 
context of growing hatred, it is diﬃ  cult to overlook the physical and spa-
tial interdependence that is the basis or has been the basis of relations.
We know that Jerusalem was always a cosmopolitan city, and that un-
til recent wars its Arab and Jewish populations had spaces for interac-
tion. In the early twentieth century, Jerusalem was home to cosmopolitan 
cafes, interactions between Arab and Jewish intellectuals and activists, 
and a certain atmosphere of bilingualism that characterizes the “spirit” 
of many cities. Th e sociologist Salim Tamari (2008) has shown that sub-
sequent wars, nationalism, and sometimes the destruction of public 
spaces have removed this urbanity. But does this assessment privilege 
certain forms of sociality over others? Can or should the pluralist city 
exist in a context of conﬂ ict and tension?
Paradoxically, the material manifestation of the Israeli-Palestinian or 
Israeli-Arab conﬂ ict in the divided city of Jerusalem allows considera-
tion of the positive aspects of coexistence. Even inside the divided city, 
citizens are not constrained to a trajectory on the basis of communal 
aﬃ  nity. Citizens weave a path, encounter obstacles and opportunities. 
Th ey travel in “foreign” areas, and necessarily encounter Others. Being 
Jewish or Arab—not to mention a member of the mizrahim (Eastern) or 
Ethiopian minorities, for example—today refers to a particular condi-
tion, that of identiﬁ cation with a neighborhood, a mosque, a synagogue, 
a part of the occupied city. Yet the real city does not coincide with the 
illusion of harmonious communities locked inside their own territories. 
Instead, the character of the city is also one of dissonance—what Bryant 
in the introduction, citing Laura Ring, refers to as “bearing tension”—
where laboring to surmount obstacles and overcome potential conﬂ ict 
is also part of what it means to live together in the city.
Th is “moral crossing” or co-presence, I claim, is an organizing princi-
ple of civil life that can be not only understood as an urban phenomenon 
but also deployed as a philosophical principle. I consider co-presence 
as a sociological and political method that exceeds the metaphor of a 
“mosaic” of communities and their territories, and one that may help 
us think about the sources for a regeneration of urban dynamics. What, 
then, are the features of a notion of co-presence? Th e ﬁ rst is understand-
ing the city as a milieu for acquaintance where the stranger might be seen 
less as a foreigner—a representative or custodian of a community—and 
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more as a smuggler. Th e stranger as smuggler crosses spatial and moral 
regions using bilingualism, resourcefulness, and skills of cultural trans-
lation. As a type of “everyday diplomacy,” it requires self-transformation, 
but it does not have the connotation of the diplomat as emissary.
A second element is the porosity of the city, which encourages all 
sorts of interaction, including the right to intrusion and mobility. Th e 
latter includes intercultural circulation, guaranteeing mixing, with the 
possibility of leaving the community to which one belongs (Park 1967). 
Co-presence occurs, for instance, through the circulation of people, and 
the choice to live in diﬀ erent areas. Th e spatial entanglement, the de-
pendence of Palestinians on the Israeli job market, and the need for eco-
nomic trade between the two parts of the city or of the Territories make 
relations necessary. And this physical contiguity in Jerusalem has, in the 
very near past, resulted in an ensemble of relations.
Th e city of Jerusalem could be viewed as one that encourages inter-
action—in the image of the journey of the tramway, a crossing of mul-
tiple worlds, near and far, those by which the individual reconsiders his 
or her universe of belonging. It is the replacement of communitarian 
links by social relations that create a form of positive urban interaction. 
Co-presence, then, is possible within the open city, a form of sociality 
not structurally determined, but rather dependent upon circulation, 
chance meetings, and superﬁ cial exchanges. Only social interaction 
(what Bryant in this volume calls everyday diplomacy) can break the ri-
gidity of closed groups and of ethnic circles bound by familiarity, making 
it possible to decrease hostilities.
In other words, following the sociologists of the Chicago School, we 
might say that the city needs more sociality and less society: that is to 
say, less collective treatment of social realities by institutions. Th e idea of 
co-presence puts emphasis on living together as a practice rather than as 
an ideal. Rather than ideals or ideologies, co-presence is a matter of tact. 
It assumes that citizens in the public space present themselves with dis-
tance and reserve, as suggested in the notion of civil inattention. In Je-
rusalem, tact may be seen in the case of tram transportation that crosses 
various districts of the Palestinian neighborhoods, caught between the 
Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. Mobility can be seen as a test of 
citizens’ capacities to interact in public, to demonstrate some commu-
nicative competences.16
A third, normative element of co-presence is pluralism, understood 
here not as a juridical frame but as pragmatic governance. Pluralism in 
this sense begins with the encouragement of mobility and a politics of 
contact. Th e capacity to visit, as both a moral and social virtue, assures 
the possibility of meetings between individuals. Th is kind of co-presence, 
252 Sylvaine Bulle
still existing, does not erase frontiers, but it marks forms and spaces of 
contiguities. Th ey must be understood as moments of relational con-
tiguity and of the presence between people, beyond the threshold of 
rupture. Th is is the pluralism of hospitality, of being open to the other 
while also recognizing scales of sovereignty (see Bryant this volume; also 
Joseph 1997).17
Sociologically, such practical eﬀ orts already exist in Jerusalem even if 
they are rare. Th ey appear in the social mixity of adjacent neighbors—
for instance, in Pisgat Zeev—and in associations made possible by prop-
erty and social diversity. Politically, in the absence of a common gov-
ernance in Jerusalem—the PLO and the Palestinian political parties all 
refuse any kind of representation in local political bodies—some asso-
ciations (Jews and Arabs) create common cause through common asso-
ciations.18 In East Jerusalem (Beit Hanina), shopkeepers, residents, and 
property-owners, already engaged in the maintenance of exchanges, 
progressively make up a shared community. Such practices in turn cre-
ate a habitus (Bourdieu 1980) that may be mobilized for other politics. 
Such uncommon “communities of conﬁ dence” are rare and discrete but 
demonstrate the potential for an idea of coexistence that includes con-
ﬂ ict and tension within sociality and that allows us to think diﬀ erently 
about forms of urban governance (Loﬂ and 1998).
Conclusion
Individual and ethnographic portraits have shown us forms of interac-
tion even within the most extreme conditions of division and polariza-
tion. Viewed not from the perspective of an ideal model of coexistence 
but rather from its actual practice, we see that small acts of respect for 
the Other—the exercise or not of domination, of courtesy, of civility—
may be able to construct a livable space, creating a place for people, while 
at the same time helping to build a shared life. Th is is a minimalist por-
trait of what Bryant refers to as the “labor of peace,” depending not on 
the active maintenance of neighborly relations but instead on ordinary 
civility. It is this form of “peace building”—the constraints of ordinary 
civility—that I claim are central in the context of hostility where cultural 
and communitarian inﬂ uences are strong.
Th e Palestinian philosopher Sari Nusseibeh19 reminds us that the 
future of Jerusalem, and more broadly speaking the treatment of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict, depends on “new ideas” (Nusseibeh 2011). 
Here I have addressed not the practice of coexistence per se, but rather 
its necessity and pragmatics in a non-ideal world (Anderson 2010). I also 
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suggest, however, that such a pragmatic approach to living together may 
form the basis for a politics beyond the communitarian, based on socio-
economic rights and an equality of spaces. Th is vision of justice is based 
not on control of institutions but on spatial contiguity and social respect 
on the neighborhood scale. From a sociological perspective, it is not im-
probable that ordinary politics may make it possible to achieve a more 
equitable city. It requires that violence disappear so that democracy can 
take its place.
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Figure 9.2. East Jerusalem (photo by Sylvaine Bulle).
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Notes
 1. According to Schmitt, the nomos is a kind of juridical order based on a ter-
ritorial delimitation of the nation.
 2. Th e demographic policy of Israel aims ﬁ rst of all to limit the presence and 
the social cost of Palestinians in East Jerusalem. Th e capital has 765,000 
people, 495,000 of whom are Jewish (65 percent), half living in the eastern 
section, and 270,000 Arabs (35 percent), almost entirely Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem. Furthermore, 80,000 Palestinians currently have permanent res-
ident status in Jerusalem but do not live within the municipal limits of the 
capital. Th e Israeli administration is currently controlling the situation by 
ending residence status for married persons whose partners come from the 
Territories but live abroad. 
 3. See for instance Graham (2010); Weizman (2003); and Azoulay and Ophir 
(2005).
 4. Based on the needs of certain sectors open to Palestinians, such as con-
struction (approximately 60,000 authorized and legal workers) and accord-
ing to the demographic equilibrium objective in Jerusalem between the 
Jewish populations (70 percent) and Arabs (30 percent) for requests for 
residence in Jerusalem. 
 5. Every Palestinian crossing into one of the Palestinian sub-zones is hence-
forth subject to computer and biometric veriﬁ cation based on a personal 
dossier that includes information about a person’s geo graphic and family 
origins and their employer. Th e management of these checkpoints is under 
the control of the Israeli Defense Forces and in certain cases is subcon-
tracted to private security ﬁ rms with contracts with the army. Palestinians 
hailing from the Territories are not authorized to enter Jerusalem except 
under exceptional circumstances (sickness or a special permit). Marriages 
and family reuniﬁ cation between citizens of the Territories and Jerusalem 
are extremely rare and must fall under speciﬁ c criteria (birth in Jerusalem, 
security criteria, children born in Jerusalem). 
 6. For example, the Damascus Gate, the northwestern gate of the Old City. 
Analysis is based on surveys in Jerusalem and the West Bank (2009–12).
 7. Approximately 25,000 Palestinian workers are employed in the Jewish set-
tlements (Israeli statistic 2011). Israeli settlements are military or civilian 
implantations built on lands occupied by Israel during and after the 1967 
Six-Day War. Such settlements currently exist in the West Bank, East Je-
rusalem, and in the Golan Heights. In the 121 oﬃ  cially recognized set-
tlements in the West Bank live 300,000 Jews; over 300,000 Israelis live in 
settlements in East Jerusalem. Th ey have their own jurisdictions, law, and 
regulations due to their extra-territorial status.
 8. On this aspect see Hirschman’s essay (1970) on the moral economy at the 
age of capitalism.
 9. According to the press.
10. Th e Palestinians of East Jerusalem, born and residing within the city perim-
eter beneﬁ t from resident status (without citizenship and therefore without 
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a passport). Th ey have economic, health and social rights, access to public 
institutions (hospitals, doctors, social aid), and pay city taxes. 
11. Historically, only a few Palestinians inhabitants of Jerusalem live in the 
western or central areas (except the historical quarters of Beit Safafa, Ein 
Karem, and the old cities).
12. Matzav.com (Th e Online Voice of the Torah Jewry), 2/9/2009.  See http://
www.thesanhedrin.org/en/index.php/Psak_5769_Av_23.
13. Th is also concerns the young Palestinians who choose to study, and some-
times live, at the Hebrew University located on Mt. Scopus, rather than in a 
Palestinian university. 
14. For Goﬀ man, the notion of civil inattention is an attention not focused on 
the Other. It consists of showing to the Other that we have understood and 
are attentive to his or her presence, but without taking notice of the verbal, 
oral, or gestural habits of the Other, thus without intruding into the life of 
the Other. 
15. Elaborated by Erving Goﬀ man (1971). Th e face to face is not only a way we 
deﬁ ne and interpret for ourselves a situation but also the way we engage 
ourselves in a course of action. 
16. We can refer here to a recent experience in the tram, in which sixty young 
Israelis planned a demonstration in which they would speak Arabic while 
using public transportation in order to encourage contact.
17. For a philosophical and closed approach, see Derrida (1997).
18. For example, there is the case of the association that was against the dem-
olition of the ancient village of Lifta situated at the entrance to West Je-
rusalem. Composed of activists as well as Jewish and Arab residents, the 
association demanded that the village be listed as a world heritage site in 
the name of environmental preservation.
19. Sari Nusseibeh is a Palestinian philosopher and an inﬂ uential leader who is 
based in East Jerusalem.
References
Agamben, Georgio. 2003. Homo Sacer. II, 1, État d’exception. Paris: Seuil.
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2010. Th e Imperative of Integration. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Azoulay, Ariella, and Ophir Adir. 2005. “Th e Monster’s Tail: Th e Wall and the 
Logic of the Occupation.” In Against the Wall, ed. M. Sorkin, p. 95–118. 
New York: Th e New Press.
Boltanski, Luc. 2009. De la critique: Précis de sociologie de l’émancipation. Paris: 
Gallimard.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1980. Le sens pratique. Paris: Editions de Minuit.
Brown, Wendy. 2010. Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. New York: Zones Books.
Cheshin, Amir, Bill Hutman, and Avi Melamed. 2001. Separate and Unequal: 
Th e Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
256 Sylvaine Bulle
Derrida, Jacques. 1997. De l’hospitalité. Paris: Calmann-Levy.
Descola, Philippe. 2005. Par delà nature et culture. Paris: Gallimard.
Dewey, John. 2005. Art as Experience. New York: Berkley Publishing (1st ed. 
1934).
———. 2012. Th e Public and Its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry. Univer-
sity Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press (1st ed. 1924).
Dumper, Michael. 1996. Th e Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967. New York: Colum-
bia University Press.
———. 2014. Jerusalem Unbound: Geography, History, and the Future of the 
Holy City. New York: Columbia University Press.
Fraser, Nancy. 2008. Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globaliz-
ing World. New York: Columbia University Press.
Goﬀ man, Erving. 1971. Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order. 
New York: Basic Books.
Grafmeyer, Yves, and Joseph Isaac. 1984. L’Ecole de Chicago: Naissance de l’écol-
ogie urbaine. Paris: Aubier.
Graham, Stephen. 2010. Under Siege: Th e New Military Urbanism. London: 
Verso Publishers.
Harvey, David. 2009. Social Justice and the City. Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press (1st ed. 1973).
Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Honneth, Axel. 1996. Th e Struggle for Recognition: Th e Moral Grammar of So-
cial Conﬂ icts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ingold, Tim. 2000. Th e Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, 
Dwelling and Skill. London: Routledge.
Joseph, Isaac. 1997. “Prises, réserves, épreuves.” Communications 65, p. 131–
142.
Kimlycka, Will. 2001. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, 
Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loﬂ and, Lyn. 1998. Public Realm: Exploring the City’s Quintessential Social Ter-
ritory. New York: Aldine Transaction.
Marcuse, Peter, and Ronald Van Kempen. 2002. Of States and Cities: Th e Parti-
tioning of Urban Space. Oxford: Oxford Geographical and Environmental 
Studies.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Nusseibeh, Sari. 2011. What is a Palestinian State Worth? Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Park, Robert, and Burgess Ernest. 1987. Th e City: Suggestions for Investigations 
of Human Behavior of the Urban Environment. Oakland, CA: University of 
Chicago Press.
———. 1984. “La ville comme laboratoire social.” In L’Ecole de Chicago: Nais-
sance de l’écologie urbaine, ed. Y. Grafmeyer and I. Joseph, p. 167–179. 
Paris: Aubier. 
A Conﬂ ict of Spaces or of Recognition? 257
Pettit, Philip. 2001. A Th eory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of 
Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, John. 1999. A Th eory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press (1st ed. 1971).
Rancière, Jacques. 1995. La Mésentente. Paris: Galilée.
Schmitt, Carl. 2003. Th e Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum. New York: Telos Press Publishing (1st ed. 1951).
Sen, Amartya. 2010. Th e Idea of Justice. London: Penguin Books.
Simmel, Georg. 1903. “Th e Sociology of Conﬂ ict: I.” American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 9: 490–525.
———. 1971. “Th e Metropolis and Mental Life.” In On Individuality and Social 
Forms: Selected Writings, ed. Donald N. Levine, 324–39. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. 
———. 1999. Sociologie: Études sur les formes de la socialization. Paris: Puf.
———. 1984. “Digressions sur l’étranger.” In L’Ecole de Chicago: Naissance de 
l’écologie urbaine, ed. Y. Grafmeyer and I. Joseph, p. 53–60. Paris: Aubier.
Tamir, Yael. 1993. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tamari, Salim. 2008. Mountain Against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society 
and Culture. Oakland: University of California Press
Tilly, Charles. 1998. Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weizman, Eyal. 2003. A Civilian Occupation. London: Verso Books.
Wirth, Louis. “Le phénomène urbain comme mode de vie.” In L’Ecole de Chi-
cago: Naissance de l’écologie urbaine, ed. Y. Grafmeyer and I. Joseph, p. 
255–282. Paris: Aubier.
Yacobi, Haim. 2009. Th e Jewish-Arab City: Spatio-Politics in a Mixed Commu-
nity. London: Routledge.
Yiftachel, Oren. 2009. “Critical Th eory and ‘Gray Space’: Mobilization of the 
Colonized.” Cities 13(2–3): 240–256.
Young, Iris Marion. 2007. Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination, and Re-
sponsibility for Justice. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———. 2010. Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books.
[• Chapter 10 •]
Grounds for Sharing—
Occasions for Conﬂ ict
An Inquiry into the Social Foundations 
of Cohabitation and Antagonism
GLENN BOWMAN
Although the title of this collective project refers to “shared spaces,” 
we are for the most part discussing places rather than spaces when we 
talk of the social aspects of cohabitation and/or antagonism. Places in 
this context are lived-in spaces or, in more academic terms, sites of in-
habitance, while space denotes an area, of general or unlimited extent, 
indiﬀ erently providing the physical setting for such places; hence the 
Oxford English Dictionary notes that “place” is “a space that can be oc-
cupied … a particular spot or area inhabited or frequented by people; a 
city, a town, a village.”1 Spaces are far more easily “shared” than places, if 
sharing is the correct term to use when referring to coexisting in contig-
uous space. When suitably organized, entities can move past and around 
each other in space without eﬀ ecting signiﬁ cant contact. Movement in 
shared places, however, entails negotiation, commensality, and at times 
conﬂ ict insofar as persons occupying place not only coexist with each 
other but are very much aware of the fact of that coexistence. In Michael 
Sorkin’s fascinating discussion of “traﬃ  c” in Giving Ground: Th e Poli-
tics of Propinquity we see a modernist mode of organization that chan-
nels persons and vehicles into nonintersecting pathways in order to give 
priority to unimpeded ﬂ ow at the expense of relations between entities 
moving across the same terrain. Counterposed to this Sorkin shows us a 
more traditional setting in which ﬂ ow is impeded by repeated intersec-
tion and the necessary and mutually aware sharing of place:
Modern city planning is structured around an armature of … conﬂ ict 
avoidance. Elevated highways, pedestrian skyways, subway systems 
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and other movement technologies clarify relations between classes of 
vehicles for the sake of eﬃ  cient ﬂ ow. … Th e result is a city altogether 
diﬀ erent from the older Indian cities with their indigenous styles of 
motion. … Typically Indian traﬃ  c is completely mixed up, a slow-mov-
ing mass of cows and pedicabs, motor-rickshaws, trucks and buses, 
camels and people on foot, the antithesis of “eﬃ  cient” separation. Mo-
tion through this sluggish maelstrom does not proceed so much by 
absolute right as through a continuing process of local negotiation for 
the right of passage. (Sorkin 1999: 2)
In the latter case we are shown not only a space occupied by persons 
and entities but a place in which those inhabiting the terrain are linked 
together by what he terms “a primal rite of giving ground … the def-
erence to one’s neighbour that urban existence daily demands” (Ibid.). 
Here, rather than a skein of distinct and mutually disengaged pathways 
encompassed within a common space we see a place inhabited by a di-
versity of persons and objects, shared through processes of mutual rec-
ognition and accommodation.
I would like to look further at this issue of “giving ground” in the 
context of shared holy places in the post-Ottoman Mediterranean so 
as to evaluate how such places are shared, what sorts of situations sup-
port that sharing and what sorts of events or developments disrupt it. 
Sylvaine Bulle’s chapter, in this volume, investigates neighborhood and 
the way that within a neighborhood a multitude of diﬀ erent groups of 
people are tied together into a community by networks that variously 
engage them as individuals and groups. Foregrounded by her examina-
tion of how shared practices of being in a neighborhood enable both the 
recognition of the diﬀ erence of others and the framing of that diﬀ erence 
as something beneﬁ cial rather than problematic is the issue of whether 
we can see local communities, and the set of relations that constitute 
them, as forms of what Bourdieu called habitus.2 Bourdieu, in the rather 
dense terminology of his Logic of Practice, writes that
[t]he conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of ex-
istence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, 
that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and repre-
sentations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary to attain them. (Bourdieu 1990 [orig. 1980]: 53)
Practices of interaction and negotiation of place experienced through 
living in a community imprint themselves in individuals as preconscious 
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dispositions to act, and interpret, in the future in accordance with those 
earlier experiences. A person’s dispositions are neither habits nor con-
sciously applied rules but tacit knowledge, often embodied, learned 
through the “prestigious imitation … [of ] actions which have succeeded 
and which he has seen successfully performed by people in whom he has 
conﬁ dence and who have authority over him” (Mauss 1979 [orig. 1935]: 
101). As Mauss, and Bourdieu after him, make clear, it is this process of 
internalizing social practices (actions, interpretations, self-presentations) 
that imposes the social on the individual and that, in eﬀ ect, maps the 
neighborhood—and its modes of incorporating and negotiating with in-
ternal diﬀ erence—onto the selves who traverse it. “Giving ground,” rec-
ognizing the right of the Other to be in the same place as oneself as well 
as committing to the rites of negotiating her presence, is a core element 
of the habitus of neighborhood.
Two ethnographic studies, one on South India and one on the North, 
exemplify the ways neighborhoods constituted by nominally distinct re-
ligious communities (communities that are elsewhere mutually antago-
nistic) are able to share place peacefully. Th e ﬁ rst text, Jackie Assayag’s 
At the Conﬂ uence of Two Rivers—Muslims and Hindus in South India 
(2004), discusses what might be called a situational syncretism whereby 
Muslims and Hindus are able to celebrate at each others’ religious festi-
vals because, in the course of the communities living together for nearly 
a millennium, cultural elements that might have in the past been the 
exclusive properties of distinct communities have become part of an 
annual cycle of neighborhood practices and thus, in eﬀ ect, common 
property:
Th e religion of Mohammed insinuated itself very gradually in a Hindu 
environment already segmented by numerous castes, sects and local 
traditions. Th is mixture of discreet elements gave rise to many sub-
tle and complex forms of acculturation caused by alteration, addition, 
superimposition and innovation, which vary from region to region. 
So by absorbing elements that were no longer either strictly Hindu or 
Muslim, but may have been the result of an earlier assimilation, these 
cultural forms allowed movement between systems of action and rep-
resentation that seemed to be mutually exclusive. (Assayag 2004: 41)
Anna Bigelow’s Sharing the Sacred: Practicing Pluralism in Muslim 
North India (Bigelow 2010; see also Bowman 2013) treats a seemingly 
more conscious process of intercommunal cohabitation in the town of 
Malerkotla, located in the Punjab, a far more conﬂ icted region than As-
sayag’s Karnataka. Bigelow notes that the town’s cultivated tolerance 
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might be seen as a response to Malerkotlan residents’ horror of the sec-
tarian cleansing that aﬄ  icted the Punjab during Partition (as well as of 
the violence of subsequent sectarian riots that have taken place in the 
region over the past few decades) leading to their recognition that “all 
religious groups are in some regard vulnerable … [making them] cogni-
zant that their wellbeing depends on their positive relations with oth-
ers” (Bigelow 2010: 10). She, however, demonstrates fulsomely that overt 
intercommunalism is very much grounded on the town’s “practice of 
everyday pluralism” (Ibid.: 217) and is a projection of “the vibrant com-
munity life in the streets and homes and shrines of a locale” (Ibid.: 223). 
In each case the “cultural property” of one sectarian community is seen 
by members of adjacent communities as theirs as well, not because they 
wish to appropriate it but because, via a process of living with the “own-
ers” of the property and engaging with them in their quotidian lives, 
that property and the practices surrounding it have come to be seen as 
common. Whereas in some cases, such as those described by Assayag, 
sharing is for the most part unconscious because the traces of the own-
ership of signiﬁ cant elements of cultural property have been eﬀ aced by 
time, in others, as in Bigelow’s Malerkotla, practices of mutual engage-
ment in religious festivals and shrine worship are conscious moves to af-
ﬁ rm community solidarities across sectarian borders. In both instances, 
however, sharing in religious celebrations and festivities is an extension 
of the habitus of a shared communal life.3
Th is is not, of course, to say that an identical “script” of community re-
sponse is instilled in all the community’s members by their participation 
in a neighborhood. While the term “disposition” suggests a tendency to 
interpret situations and act in response to them in certain ways familiar 
from past engagements with similar events, Bourdieu’s work, like Mauss’ 
before it, makes clear that there is “play” in the system of application al-
lowing for accommodating speciﬁ cities of context, of individuality, and 
of intention. A disposition is a proclivity rather than an imperative. Part 
of what accounts for the lability of persons’ responses in communities in 
general and mixed communities in particular is the multitude of iden-
tities at play in any individual’s experience of everyday life. Th e concept 
of “situational identities”4 enables us to recognize a multitude of iden-
tity contexts existing in even the least complex of societies, and when a 
community creates complexity to the extent of encompassing multiple 
ethnic and/or religious identities, the opportunities for a proliferation 
of identity strategies expands commensurately. At diﬀ erent moments of 
interaction within the community, diﬀ erent dispositions will be called 
to the fore. Th us in one instance you might be working with someone 
as a coworker or in an employee-employer relation whereas in another, 
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sometimes even contiguous with the ﬁ rst, you might be called on to rep-
resent a family or a religious denomination. Each of these situations will 
call on distinct dispositions and may in fact call for enunciating those 
dispositions in ways that improvise on previous enactments. What is 
important to stress is that none of these enacted identities are primary 
other than in situations—some of which will be elaborated below—in 
which the primacy of one of those identities is staged as more import-
ant than, and either subsuming or obviating, others. Recognition of the 
situatedness of identity articulations allows us to understand the ways 
numerous linkages can be made between diverse persons within a com-
munity, but also to see that certain events or developments might render 
previously amenable identities incommensurate and thus conﬂ ictual.
Nonetheless investigation of the character of neighborhood bonds 
resonates with Bigelow’s investigation of Malerkotla’s “daily work of 
community maintenance” (2010: 122) and indicates that in most in-
stances communities will seek to perpetuate communal cohesion. Th e 
concept of habitus makes clear that the degree to which people are who 
they are is a consequence of the appropriateness of their learned dispo-
sitions to settings the same as, or not unlike, those in which they im-
bued those dispositions. Radical reworkings of those settings—either 
through intercommunal conﬂ ict and separation or through migration or 
exile—threaten selfhood. Th ere are, of course, circumstances that bring 
about the fragmentation of communities, but these often come about 
through external inﬂ uences that, through direct action or the indirect 
impact of rumors or propaganda, create distrust and antagonism be-
tween elements of the community (compare Tone Bringa’s ﬁ lm We Are 
All Neighbours [Bringa 1993]). Left to its own devices a community will 
not only celebrate its social arrangement as natural and heimlich (home-
like) but may, as in the instances described by Marcel Mauss in his study 
of magic, imagine the domain of its everyday life as knitted together by 
a skein of connections defying scientiﬁ c conceptions of cause and eﬀ ect 
and allowing eﬃ  cacy at a distance through the manipulation of objects 
or settings associated via contiguity, similarity, or opposition (see Mauss 
1972 [orig. 1950]). Here persons, powers, and things associated in ev-
eryday experience are seen as connected even when literally apart. For 
Mauss magic works by laying over the place of the everyday a distort-
ing mirror that not only draws together diﬀ use elements but also allows 
power to operate across its surfaces. “In society there is an inexhaustible 
source of diﬀ use magic. … Everything happens as though society, from 
a distance, formed a kind of huge magical conclave around [the magi-
cian]” (Ibid.: 138). For Mauss, rites can bring about “direct, automatic 
eﬃ  cacy, without the presence of diﬀ erentiated spiritual intermediaries” 
Grounds for Sharing—Occasions for Conﬂ ict 263
(Ibid.: 136) so that, in the case of Dayak women engaged in war dances 
to support their men, who have gone oﬀ  to battle,
time and space no longer exist; they are on the ﬁ eld of battle. … Th eir 
sensibilities are overwhelmed by the awareness of their existence as a 
group of women and the social role they are playing in relation to the 
warriors, an awareness which is translated into sentiments about their 
own power and the relation of this power with that of their menfolk. 
(Ibid.)
Muslims and Christians in the Monastery of 
Sveti Bogoroditsa Prechista
I mention this embodied sense of a habitus accessible through magic 
and ritual not so much to explain the mechanisms of how shrine prac-
tices can eﬀ ect cures or the redirection of fortune but to suggest that the 
powers people imagine as working in and on their world are social pow-
ers, imagined in the image of their own experience of the world. Let me 
expand on this using an ethnographic encounter I had in Kicevo, Mace-
donia, in April 2006. I had been researching, with the help of Elizabeta 
Koneska of the National Museum of Macedonia, Muslim and Orthodox 
Christian uses of Sveti Bogoroditsa Prechista (the church of the Holy 
Mother of God Most Innocent) outside of Kicevo, itself a mixed Muslim 
and Christian town. In the course of examining the context of shared 
shrine practices, we interviewed the imam of the local Sunni mosque. 
He, trained in the renowned Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, re-
sponded to our queries about Muslims attending the nearby Sveti Bo-
goroditsa monastery by asserting strongly that he had never gone there 
and never would. He nonetheless went on to explain that he would ad-
vise members of his congregation to go to the monastery for help with 
particular problems because “the world of demons, like our world, is 
made up of Christians and Muslims. When someone is aﬄ  icted by a 
Muslim demon I can deal with the problem, but when someone is trou-
bled by a Christian demon there is nothing I can do, so I send them to 
the church” (interview Kicevo, 30 April 2006).
What is of interest here, besides the concept of a mirror world of de-
mons that replicates the demography of the lived world, is that—in this 
local context—the imam seems to see no incommensurability between 
this vision of the interaction of the demonic and the human worlds and 
that of a more Orthodox Sunni theology with its considerably more 
strict deﬁ nition of domains, borders, and pollutions. However, as I will 
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show later, when the world of religious orthodoxy impinges upon lo-
cal practices it disrupts this inter-communalism, asserting property and 
propriety issues at the expense of sharing. Here, however, relations be-
tween the human and the demonic world are analogous to those occur-
ring in the quotidian world of social interaction, and rites and obeisances 
made in the human world engage an economy or reciprocity with the 
demonic. Just as the demonic world mirrors the intermixing of Mus-
lim and Christian while maintaining the diﬀ erence between the two, so 
too do movements within the ritual space of the church maintain that 
diﬀ erentiation, even as Muslims “tap into” Christian rituals to ward oﬀ  
Christian demons.
Sharing the space of the Sveti Bogoroditsa monastery’s chapel does 
not entail a syncretic blending of identities, just as interacting on the 
streets and in the markets of Kicevo and its satellite villages does not 
eﬀ ect an eﬀ acement of sectarian identities (compare Lockwood 1975: 
especially 195–211). Muslims within the walls of the church seem, on 
initial observation, to go through the same procedures of reverencing the 
saints and the sites of power as do the Christians: they circulate through 
the church, they light candles in front of the icons (particularly those of 
the iconostasis before which they lay gifts of clothing, towels, and some-
times money), they proceed to the rear left of the church where, like the 
Christians, they pass a string of cross-inscribed beads over their bodies 
three times before crawling three times through a passageway beneath 
a pair of healing icons toward a well from which, in leaving, they take 
water to splash on their faces and carry home in bottles for healing (see 
Bowman 2010: 206–9, for a more detailed description). Closer observa-
tion reveals that this apparent mimicry is subtly but signiﬁ cantly diﬀ er-
entiated. Muslims, holding back from Christian groups, introduce small 
but important diﬀ erences of deportment. Th ey do not cross themselves, 
they bow their heads to but do not kiss the icons, and in praying they 
silently mouth Muslim prayers while holding their hands close to their 
chests in front of them with their palms up. Muslims here “work” an 
environment they know through the social world they share with their 
Christian neighbors and in so doing both engage in ritual acts that they 
have learned are eﬃ  cacious from their neighbors (and their imam) and 
render appropriate obeisance to the powers resident in the place (the 
Virgin Mary, the saints, the Mother Superior, and the nuns). At the same 
time they refuse to violate their own identities by sacrilegiously adopting 
the signiﬁ ers of Christians as though they were their own. Here, in a reli-
gious setting we have an interaction analogous to what Sorkin describes 
in the dense streets of Indian cities—“the continuing process of local 
negotiation for the right of passage” (Sorkin 1999: 2).
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Property and Propriety in Jerusalem’s 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre
Th e “sharing” described above—a sharing extending into religious places 
the same modes of intercommunal mixing one sees in the everyday in-
teractions of neighbors in the streets and workplaces of the region—
diﬀ ers substantially from the types of interactions one sees between 
strangers in sites they commonly revere, but not “in common.” I will 
try to resolve that seeming contradiction between “commonly revering” 
but not “in common” through the use of Slavoj Žižek’s rendering of Saul 
Kripke’s concept of the “rigid designator” (Kripke 1980). Žižek contends 
that the name for a phenomenon—the rigid designator—constitutes the 
ideological experience of the thing rather than the thing itself. Th us it is
the word which, as a word, on the level of the signiﬁ er itself, uniﬁ es a 
given ﬁ eld, constitutes its identity. It is, so to speak, the word to which 
“things” themselves refer to recognize themselves in their unity. … It is 
not the real object which guarantees as the point of reference the unity 
and identity of a certain ideological experience—on the contrary it is 
the reference to a “pure” signiﬁ er which gives unity and identity to our 
experience of historical reality itself. (Žižek 1989: 95–96 and 97; see 
also Vološinov 1973 [orig. 1929]: 79–80)
Generally, in a world of shared experience, “rigid designators” suﬃ  ce to 
indicate objects and experiences common to those sharing that world, 
subsuming idiosyncrasies of personal experience or contextual applica-
tion. However where quotidian experience is not shared, identical signi-
ﬁ ers may conjure up very diﬀ erent signiﬁ eds for the communities using 
them, and the diﬀ erences may in fact prove to be incommensurabilities. 
In earlier examinations of the politics of Palestinian identity before and 
after Oslo (Bowman 1988, 1994) I wrote of the diﬀ erent ways the name 
“Palestine” signiﬁ ed both a future homeland and a reuniﬁ ed people to 
communities in diﬀ erent locales of exile, both outside and inside the 
borders of historic Palestine. So long as those populations remained 
isolated from each other those disparities of understanding remained 
relatively unproblematic, but once Oslo eﬀ ected a regathering of the 
Palestinians from the various sites of their dispersion serious conﬂ icts 
erupted between groups over what Palestine should be, what Palestin-
ians should be like, and who in fact was even truly Palestinian.
Something very similar happens at holy places with constituencies 
that gather from dispersed locales. Rather than neighbors sharing a sa-
cred place we talk here of strangers coming together in the same space. 
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Th e Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, known to Orthodox Christians as the 
Anastasis, lies at the center of an extended web of narratives dealing 
with the death and resurrection of Jesus.5 When I carried out ﬁ eld re-
search on Jerusalem pilgrimage in the early 1980s, the Holy Sepulchre, 
like other sites throughout the “holy city” of Jerusalem, was visited by 
pilgrims from twenty-seven distinct Christian denominations (these, for 
the most part, are further divided into distinct national and linguistic 
communities) as well as by a multitude of tourists, many from Christian 
backgrounds but also many non-Christians. Five sects had places within 
the church—the Greek Orthodox, Catholics, and Armenians occupy-
ing the most territory, with the Coptic and Syrian Orthodox holding 
tiny chapels—while a sixth, the Ethiopians, held two external chapels 
and a rooftop. Despite that sectarian topography the church was swept 
daily with crowds of pilgrims and tourists ﬂ owing indiscriminately 
through the corridors and chapels.6 Such heterodoxy within a limited 
space could give rise to “traﬃ  c problems” (pushing, expressions of hos-
tility, and occasionally ﬁ ghts, usually between individuals not travelling 
in organized groups), but for the most part conﬂ icts were avoided by 
what appeared to be spontaneous traﬃ  c management. Th is took place 
not through “local negotiation” but because groups moving through the 
church eﬀ ectively “enclaved” themselves into mobile units ﬂ owing past 
and alongside each other without either engagement or signiﬁ cant rec-
ognition (see Bowman 2011: 376–77). Th ese groups, often made up of 
people coming from the same locale or brought together prior to the 
visit by an institution or a leader, constituted “in-groups” able not only to 
insulate themselves from others but also, under the authority of spiritual 
or secular guides associated with the respective groups, to ensure that 
their perceptions of the sites and events they encountered conﬁ rmed 
and built upon their expectations. Such a mode of engaging with holy 
sites7 protected the integrity of the connection between rigid designa-
tors and the experiences they signed while preventing the cognitive dis-
sonance of other’s readings of those shared designators from disrupting 
that alignment. While individuals within these groups shared with each 
other an experience of place, they simultaneously related to members of 
other groups like bodies in space, moving past and around them with-
out eﬀ ecting signiﬁ cant contact. Th us while this site might nominally be 
termed a “shared site,” the character of this interaction throws doubt on 
the applicability of the phrase “shared.”
Th e relations described above rarely become conﬂ ictual because while 
those involved share the same space they rarely share the same place. For 
the majority of pilgrims travelling in mobile enclaves the experience of 
holy places provides an intimate conﬁ rmation of the “reality” of those 
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sites and of the pilgrims’ personal relations to that “reality”; seeing the 
“real” place, without being forced to acknowledge the dissonance of 
others’ interpretations of its reality, provides a sense of spiritual own-
ership that visitors take back to their places of origin.8 “Strangers” do 
not need literally to own the place because they do not live there. For 
them it is enough to experience the place and possess the knowledge of 
its reality.
Relation to place is very diﬀ erent for the monks and priests who 
move through and live in the immediate vicinity of the church. Th ey see 
themselves as “owning” the holy sites in a much more literal way, and 
their conception of property—and of propriety (an etymologically re-
lated term)—can but be conﬂ ictual when others who are not of the same 
community have similar claims on the sites and diﬀ erent conceptions of 
the modes of deportment proper to them. Th e Franciscan, Armenian, 
and Greek Orthodox brotherhoods that care for their respective chapels 
within the building9 are brought into daily, often conﬂ ictual, contact with 
others whose senses of the site’s signiﬁ cance, the legitimacy of its pos-
session, and the appropriateness of ritual activities carried out therein 
diﬀ er on numerous points. Although these men cohabit the Holy Sepul-
chre and its neighborhood, they do not share locale and dispositions 
in the ways set out in the opening of this chapter. Jeﬀ  Halper describes 
the monasteries of the Christian Quarter in the late Ottoman period as 
each enclosing radically diﬀ erent lifeworlds, redolent of the nations of 
the monks’ origins (Greece, France, Armenia) rather than of Jerusalem 
(Halper 1984). In many ways, at least in terms of self-suﬃ  ciency and 
ideological closure, the situations in the monasteries have not changed 
much. Th ese insulated habitus produce literal neighbors who are, in ef-
fect, strangers (compare Duru and Bulle this volume). Unlike pilgrims 
who move past each other in the holy sites as migratory strangers, these 
hierophants are continuously forced to deal in “their” holy places with 
the presence of others who see those places as their own. For the monks 
and priests the holy sites in the “shared” space of the Anastasis or Holy 
Sepulchre are organically connected to the “pure” cultural spaces of the 
monasteries, and the presence of others in “their” spaces, much less the 
attempt of those others to claim the spaces as “their” own, is anathema. 
Whereas in the above cited situations of urban Indian traﬃ  c and Mace-
donian shrine sharing mutual investment in “common ground” gives 
rise to generally amenable and decorous ritual processes of negotiation 
over co-presence, in the Holy Sepulchre quotidian encounters between 
representatives of the respective churches are only prevented from rou-
tinely breaking into open violence by the regimen of the Status Quo, a 
system of spatial and temporal regulations initially imposed by the Otto-
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man state and currently maintained through fear of the open intercom-
munal warfare and state side-taking that its rejection would provoke.10
At the core of this conﬂ ict is not a simple issue of property ownership; 
actual property can—as the tenets of the Status Quo themselves assert—
be shared, albeit through complex ritual regimes. We are instead look-
ing at issues more closely tied to propriety, and through that to identity. 
Monks and priests associated with the Holy Sepulchre are able, when 
outside of domains demarcated as sacred, to relate to secular locals and 
even to members of other fraternities in non-conﬂ ictual—sometimes 
even amenable—ways. In contexts where religious identities are fore-
grounded, however, particularly in the choreographies of movements 
through the spaces of the holy sites, they become representatives of their 
particular religious community or, in the terms members of the Greek 
Orthodox Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre in the wake of a ﬁ ght with 
Armenian monks over territory referred to themselves, as “defenders of 
the holy places” (ﬁ eldnotes, 31/12/84). In these contexts they, and the 
places they “protect,” manifest the truth value of their church and its the-
ology; their presence in the places, and the rituals they carry out there, 
are seen to “suture” their dogma and their orthopraxy toward real Chris-
tian revelation. Th e presence of others carrying out their apostate rituals 
and asserting their authority in those places constitutes what Laclau and 
Mouﬀ e term an “antagonism” (Laclau and Mouﬀ e 1985: 93–148)—liter-
ally a radical denial of their own assertions of identity as the sole vehicles 
of the true church.
In the case of antagonism … the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me 
from being totally myself. … (it is because a peasant cannot be a peas-
ant that an antagonism exists with the landowner who is expelling him 
from his land). Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full pres-
ence for myself. (Ibid.: 125)
It is in this context that property, and the propriety of liturgical de-
meanor therein, becomes an issue of overarching concern. Concern 
with overcoming the antagonism presented by the presence of other be-
lief communities is what motivates the insistence of the various religious 
communities that they “own” holy places and drives the demands of re-
ligious authorities worldwide that shrines and holy places be purged of 
heterodox practices and persons. Th e politics of the “rigid designator” is 
insistence that there is but one signiﬁ ed for the signiﬁ er. While this may 
appear to take the shape of straightforward demands for sole posses-
sion and inhabitance of a holy place, beneath that demand is the asser-
tion of the truth value of a core identity and the insistence that no other 
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representation can lay claim to the place where that identity manifests 
and celebrates itself. As a Greek monk told Nikos Kazantzakis when he 
visited the Anastasis in 1927: “this entire church belongs to us, the Or-
thodox. All the sacred shrines are ours. … [W]e’re going to throw the 
Armenians out. … Whatever the Latins tell you is a lie. All their shrines 
are fakes. I hope to God the day comes when we can throw them out” 
(Kazantzakis 1973: 153).
Sveti Nikola/Hadir Bābā: Simultaneity of Place
Th e concept of “property” functions in various ways in sites we refer to 
as “shared.” In the case of Sveti Bogoroditsa Prechista, Muslims attend-
ing the monastery’s church do not in any way dispute the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church’s ownership of the site, visiting and using it with due 
deference to the nuns who live there. Th e Mother Superior and the ma-
jority of the nuns are in no way threatened by the presence of Muslims 
in the church, appreciating their generosity (“they give more than the 
Christians”) and recognizing coexistence within the site as a welcome 
consequence of the long-term good relations of Muslims and Chris-
tians in the nearby town and surrounding countryside11 (see Bowman 
2010: 209). In another Macedonian site I have written on, Sveti Nikola in 
Makedonski Brod, Suﬁ  and Sunni Muslims praying in the church recog-
nize the authority of the Orthodox caretakers, yet simultaneously asso-
ciate the ediﬁ ce and the tomb within with the Bektashi saint Hadir Bābā. 
Relations between the Christian visitors from the town and the Muslim 
visitors from neighboring settlements are cordial, and lubricated—as at 
Sveti Bogoroditsa—by the generosity of Muslims whose copious gifts 
are auctioned oﬀ  to support the town’s main church. Intriguingly, in the 
case of Sveti Nikola/Hadir Bābā mutual commitment by both communi-
ties to the continued sharing of the site is manifest in the simultaneous 
display of Suﬁ  and Christian iconography within the church although, 
as I describe in my study of the site, perceived imbalances of display 
are able to give rise to aggrievement and potential hostility (Bowman 
2010: 203–6). In both instances, as at the shrine of Haider Shaikh in 
Malerkotla described by Anna Bigelow, the local communities as well 
as the oﬃ  ciants at the religious sites commit themselves to maintaining 
forms of intercommunal cooperation in the shrines cognate with those 
taking place beyond their perimeters. Changes in that wider context of 
social relations, resulting in a breakdown of conviviality, can fracture that 
commitment, making way for one or the other community to attempt 
to force the other from the shrine; such an expulsion would mirror that 
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eﬀ ected in the surrounding social world. In other instances religious au-
thorities, often backed by individuals of inﬂ uence over local members 
of one or the other local religious community, may exploit frictions or 
ﬁ ssures in the local community to push for the “puriﬁ cation” of a shrine. 
Even, however, in such instances the perceived sanctity of a site may 
be retained by the general population so that not only might members 
of the religious and ethnic communities banished from the site return, 
covertly and sometimes overtly, but also, as relatively amicable inter-
communal relations in the surrounding locale are re-established, the 
site may again begin to be shared (see Bowman 2012: 215–17; see also 
Hayden this volume).
Shrines such as the Anastasis or Holy Sepulchre are very diﬀ erent 
insofar as rather than being perceived as properties of the local commu-
nity (in both the sense of belonging to the local milieu and being charac-
teristic of that social formation) they are presented as standing outside 
of their immediate context, belonging instead to ideologically consti-
tuted communities that may originate, and even reside, at a substantial 
physical and cultural distance from their literal site. For pilgrims visiting 
such sites from afar the holy places “belong” to them in a spiritual or 
devotional sense. Th ey ideologically imagine the place as a spiritual pos-
session that, once witnessed, can be “taken home” with them for medi-
tation and validation, but their desire to literally possess the place rarely 
extends further than their wish to collect relics (oil, candles, carved olive 
wood crosses) to metonymically connect them with the place. For resi-
dent clergy, however, such holy places not only “belong” to their sects in 
a spiritual sense but must literally belong to their churches, since pos-
session of the site both conﬁ rms their core identities as guardians of the 
holy places and authorizes and ampliﬁ es the sanctity of the site through 
their provision of appropriate liturgical practices (and their blockage of 
heterodox practices). Here the presence of others not only presents an 
integral challenge to their identities but also desecrates the sanctity of 
that central site (see Hassner 2009). “Tolerance” is anything but tolera-
tion in this context as it is in eﬀ ect no more than enforced cohabitation.
Strangers and Neighbors
Th e distinction between “space” and “place” set out at the opening of 
this chapter is key to understanding the emergence of antagonism in 
shared sites. Space, as an encompassing container, is able to hold a num-
ber of entities without their having any relation aside from that of con-
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tiguity. Place, as a site of inhabitance, can contain diﬀ erentiated bodies, 
but these, by sharing place, enter into relations with each other. Th us, 
on the one hand pilgrim groups, converging on the same holy sites from 
diﬀ erent places of origin, are able to ﬂ ow around and past each other, 
each pursuing their own realizations of their own envisionings of the 
signiﬁ cance of the sites they temporarily occupy. Th e “place” each group 
inhabits is eﬀ ectively rendered discontinuous with the “places” of oth-
ers, and interaction is kept minimal and impersonal. On the other hand, 
neighbors of diﬀ erent sectarian aﬃ  liations can meet in local holy places, 
engaging with each other through media of negotiation and mutual rec-
ognition analogous to those they use in their everyday interactions out-
side of holy ground. Here each group simultaneously occupies the same 
place and must engage modes of mutual accommodation, rendering that 
coexistence as non-conﬂ ictual and as mutually beneﬁ cial as possible. In 
the instance of the Holy Sepulchre or Anastasis, a situation not unlike 
others worldwide in which religious powers work to present a site as a 
pure signiﬁ er of an exclusive identity that must be defended from the 
pollution of other forms of worship,12 two or more communities attempt 
to construct, and inhabit (literally and ritually), exclusive places at the 
same time in coterminous spaces. Such cohabitation is, in terms of their 
respective discourses, an impossibility, and thus the presence of the other 
presents a literal antagonism that must either be overcome through ex-
pulsion or succumbed to by withdrawal. Th e “stand-oﬀ ” that is the cur-
rent status quo eﬀ ected by the Status Quo is an ideological impossibility, 
and the Holy Sepulchre/Anastasis will remain a ﬂ ashpoint, surrounded 
by the tinder of cadres of ideologically motivated monks, until either a 
discursive shift in the respective theologies replaces antagonism with 
fraternity or one group successfully expropriates and “cleanses” the site.
In the post-Ottoman sphere, where conceptions of “nationalist” iden-
tity increasingly impose themselves on domains where “national” identi-
ties had served as markers of nominal diﬀ erence within mixed commu-
nities,13 places that had been shared—whether secular or sacred—are 
transformed into the exclusive properties of ethno-nationalist groupings. 
Sharing, or even mixing, is there rendered contentious, and local events 
in which individuals with diﬀ erent allegiances clash come to be read 
more widely as indubitable signiﬁ ers of irresolvable inter-communal an-
tagonisms. Once such a discursive shift has taken place, and shared sites 
have been transformed into terrains on which struggles for possession 
take place, it becomes increasingly impossible to imagine contemporary 
cohabitation and sharing, and the image of coexistence fades into a uto-
pian fantasy of a distant “Ottoman” past.
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Notes
 1. Place, n.1. OED Online. March 2013. Oxford University Press (accessed 19 
April 2013), see also Casey (1997), Casey (2002), and Massey (2005).
 2. Th e concept of habitus, itself a Latin translation of the Greek hexis, has a 
long genealogy stretching back nearly two and a half millennia from Bour-
dieu’s Outline of a Th eory of Practice (1977 [orig. 1972]) and Logic of Prac-
tice (1990 [orig. 1980]) via Mauss’ Les Techniques du Corps (1935, see also 
1979) and Aquinas’s Summa Th eologica (la2ae, 49–54) to Aristotle’s Nich-
omachean Ethics (1098b33).
 3. See too the essays collected in Albera and Couroucli (2009 and 2012) and 
Bowman (2012).
 4. “Situational identity” is a concept generally assumed to have been gener-
ated by, but not speciﬁ cally used in, Erving Goﬀ man’s theory of the dra-
maturgical construction of social identity developed in Th e Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life (1959). Max Gluckman had, however, elaborated the 
concept of “situational selection” in 1940 whereby individuals shape their 
behaviors, in diﬀ erent social contexts, so as to conform to the values and 
practices of groups they associate with there: “the shifting membership 
of groups in diﬀ erent situations is the functioning of the structure, for an 
individual’s membership of a particular group in a particular situation is 
determined by the motives and values inﬂ uencing him in that situation. In-
dividuals can thus live coherent lives by situational selection from a medley 
of contradictory values, ill-assorted beliefs, and varied interests and tech-
niques” (Gluckman 1958 [orig. 1940]: 26).
 5. Despite the diﬀ erence in name the “place” of the cruciﬁ xion, tomb (“sepul-
chre”), and resurrection (“anastasis”) of Jesus is established at the heart of 
New Testament biblical narratives so that that “place” can be seen to func-
tion as a rigid designator even when ideas of its actual location can diﬀ er by 
several hundred meters (as with the Anglican Garden Tomb).
Grounds for Sharing—Occasions for Conﬂ ict 273
 6. Th e Greek Orthodox Katholicon was, however, normally closed to all but 
the Greek Orthodox.
 7. Th ese strategies were carried out throughout Holy Land pilgrimages and, 
one suspects, across other forms of organized travel—see Schmidt (1979).
 8. Th ose whose experiences do not live up to their expectations, or in fact 
seem to refute them, may be impelled to deny that the sites are the “real” 
sites (either because the real sites are elsewhere or because they have been 
eﬀ aced by time) or may be forced to question their previous assumptions 
and beliefs.
 9. Th e Coptic, Syrian, and Ethiopian Orthodox, who possess chapels because 
of historic precedent, are small communities with little political or eco-
nomic power, and their presence in the church is rarely challenged by the 
dominant religious communities (although they ﬁ ght among themselves 
over the territories they do control; see Bowman 2011: 389–91).
10. See Fisher-Ilan (2004) for one of many examples, Cohen (2008) and Bow-
man (2011, 2014) for diﬀ erent interpretations of how and why the Status 
Quo is maintained.
11. Although one university-trained novice, recently relocated to the monas-
tery from Skopje, expressed hostility toward Muslim visitors, claiming they 
were planning to “steal” the church (Bowman 2010: 209).
12. A salient example is the 1992 destruction by Hindu activists of the Babri 
Mosque at Ayodhya in order to clear the site for the construction of the Sri 
Ram Janam Bhumi Temple commemorating the birthplace of Lord Rama 
(an avatar of Vishnu).
13. See Bowman 2015 as well as my discussion of the Titoist treatment of “na-
tional” versus “nationalist” identities in Bowman (2003: 229–30).
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